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  • provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, inferred by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976,
  • Rule 38-A of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952,
  • Order 22 Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule 38-A
  • Indian Limitation Act, R. 38-A refers to O. XXII R. 3 (2) CPC
  • Rule 38-A of Ch. VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules,
  • Amendment Act of 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976)
  • Art. 226 of the Constitution and Tax Acts
  • SECTION 5 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section 141, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order 22 Rule 4
  • provision of Order 22 Rule 3
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, inferred by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976,
  • Rule 38-A of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952,
  • Order 22 Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule 38-A
  • Indian Limitation Act, R. 38-A refers to O. XXII R. 3 (2) CPC
  • Rule 38-A of Ch. VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules,
  • Amendment Act of 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976)
  • Art. 226 of the Constitution and Tax Acts
  • SECTION 5 INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
  • section 141, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • SECTION 5 LIMITATION ACT
  • provisions of Order 22 Rule 4
  • provision of Order 22 Rule 3
  • INDIAN LIMITATION ACT
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — K.N. Misra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The dispute concerns Khata No. 102 of Village Vijaigaon, Faizabad, recorded in the basic year Khatauni in the name of Ram Prasad. Opposite parties Nos. 2 to 5 jointly objected, claiming co-tenancy and ancestral possession. The Consolidation Officer rejected the objection by order dated 19-4-1974, maintaining the basic-year entry in Ram Prasad's name. Opposite party No. 5 (Mata Din) appealed; the Settlement Officer allowed the appeal on 10-10-1974, recognizing co-tenure of opposite parties Nos. 2–5 with the petitioner. The petitioner obtained a revision which was allowed by the Joint Director of Consolidation on 29-4-1977, holding that only the petitioner and Mata Din were co-tenure holders; shares were fixed at 2/3 for the petitioner and 1/3 for Mata Din. Opposite parties Nos. 2–4 were excluded because they had not joined the earlier appeal.

Opposite parties Nos. 2–4 pursued review and further appeals; a Settlement Officer refused condonation of delay on 17-3-1980. The Deputy Director of Consolidation later allowed a revision on 15-12-1980, condoned the delay and remanded the matter to the Settlement Officer for disposal on merits. The petitioner challenged that remand order by the present writ petition under Article 226.

During the writ's pendency, opposite party No. 5, Mata Din, died on 27-3-1982. On 19-11-1982 the petitioner filed an application for substitution of Mata Din's heirs, with a prayer for condonation of delay and to set aside abatement. The petitioner explained the delay by asserting he believed no substitution was necessary because Mata Din was not a contesting party and that he was unaware of the 90-day requirement for substitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether substitution of a deceased party in a writ petition under Article 226 must be made within the 90-day period prescribed by Order XXII Rule 3 (as applied through Rule 38-A and the Limitation Act).
  2. Whether ignorance of law (specifically ignorance of the 90-day limitation for substitution) constitutes sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act to condone delay in moving a substitution application.
  3. Whether Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure (and its limitation rules) applies to writ petitions under Article 226, having regard to the Allahabad High Court Rule 38-A and the Explanation to Section 141 CPC introduced by the 1976 Amendment.

Arguments of the Parties

Arguments advanced by opposite parties (respondents)

  • The petitioner's ignorance about the legal requirement to move a substitution application within 90 days is not a legally sufficient ground for condoning the delay.
  • Mata Din could not be treated as merely a pro forma party because he, along with opposite parties Nos. 2–4, had claimed co-tenancy rights in the disputed holding.
  • The Deputy Director of Consolidation's order dated 15-12-1980 remanding the case to the Settlement Officer required disposal on merits, and allowing late substitution would be inappropriate; the application to set aside abatement and condone delay should be rejected.

Arguments advanced by the petitioner (applicant)

  • The provisions of Order XXII Rule 4 (and by implication provisions concerning substitution) do not apply to proceedings under Article 226, relying on the Explanation to Section 141 CPC as inserted by the 1976 Amendment.
  • Cited Ram Kala (AIR 1977 P&H 87, Full Bench) and an order in Dhanesh Prasad's case as authority that Order XXII does not apply to writ proceedings; relied on those authorities to contend substitution could be allowed notwithstanding delay.
  • The petitioner asserted ignorance of the 90-day requirement for substitution and that he believed substitution was unnecessary because Mata Din was not a contesting party, seeking condonation of delay on that basis.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Kala and others v. The Asst. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and others (AIR 1977 P&H 87) (Full Bench) Held that Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to writ proceedings. The Court noted this view but distinguished it because the High Court in that case did not have a rule equivalent to Rule 38-A; therefore the Full Bench's conclusion was not followed in the present case.
Order in Dhanesh Prasad and others v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others (Civil Misc. Application No. 1884 (W) of 1976 in Writ Petition No.1253 of 1972) Single Judge order allowing substitution in a writ petition despite insufficient explanation for delay, on the ground that no period of limitation was prescribed for substitution in Article 226 proceedings. The Court observed that this decision did not take into account Rule 38-A or the Division Bench authority in Nand Kishore; the Court declined to follow that order.
Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1968 A.W.R. 755) (Division Bench) Interpreted Rule 38-A of the Allahabad High Court Rules to mean substitution applications in writ petitions must be made within the period provided by the Indian Limitation Act; held substitution application should be made within 90 days and failure results in abatement. The Court relied on and followed this Division Bench decision as binding in holding that substitution in a writ petition must be moved within 90 days; this authority was central to rejecting the petitioner's claim.
Devi Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and another (1982 Allahabad Rent Cases 617) Application of the Division Bench approach in Nand Kishore to similar questions (followed by a single judge). The Court noted that N.D. Ojha, J. followed the Division Bench view in this decision; the present Court expressed respectful agreement with that approach.
M/s. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1979 A.L.J. 368; Supreme Court) Discussed the absence of a presumption that everyone knows the law and principles relating to waiver and knowledge of rights. The Court observed that the Supreme Court's statements about knowledge of law do not directly decide whether ignorance of law is a sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condoning delay in substitution applications; thus it was not dispositive here.
Nandu v. Bhuwanoo (AIR 1929 Nagpur 74) Held that ignorance of law cannot be a sufficient excuse for failing to file substitution application in time. The Court relied on this decision to support the proposition that ignorance of law is not a sufficient ground to set aside abatement; it reinforced the conclusion to reject the petitioner's application.
12 Allahabad 461 (Full Bench, 1890) (as cited) Older Full Bench authority relied on in Nandu to support non-availability of ignorance of law as an excuse. Referenced within the Court's discussion of Nandu; used to support the long-standing position that ignorance of law is not a sufficient excuse for delay in substitution matters.
P.V. Dehadrta v. Navin Kumar Nanda (1967 AWR 251) Held that ignorance of law is no excuse and that a party must inform counsel of material facts so that counsel can take legal steps; benefit of Section 5 Limitation Act not available on the ground of ignorance of law. The Court applied this precedent to find that the petitioner acted negligently in failing to inform counsel of Mata Din's death and that ignorance of law did not provide sufficient cause for condonation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a focused analysis on two linked issues: (a) whether rules governing substitution (Order XXII and related limitation provisions) apply to writ petitions under Article 226, and (b) whether the petitioner's asserted ignorance of the 90-day limitation constituted sufficient cause for condonation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

On applicability of Order XXII to writ petitions, the Court examined Rule 38-A of Chapter VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules (added by notification in 1964). Rule 38-A provides that the provisions contained in certain rules of Order XXII (and Order XXXII) of the CPC shall, so far as may be and with necessary modifications, apply to writ petitions under Article 226. The Court relied on Nand Kishore (Division Bench, 1968) which interpreted Rule 38-A as adopting the limitation period prescribed by Order XXII R.3(2) of the CPC and the Indian Limitation Act, concluding that substitution applications in writ petitions must be made within the 90-day period. The Court distinguished the Full Bench in Ram Kala on the ground that the Punjab & Haryana High Court did not have a rule equivalent to Rule 38-A; therefore Ram Kala's conclusion that Order XXII does not apply to writ petitions was not applicable here.

On the question whether the Explanation to Section 141 CPC (introduced by the 1976 Amendment) or other arguments could render Order XXII inapplicable to Article 226 proceedings, the Court rejected that contention. It held that because Rule 38-A expressly extends the relevant provisions to writ petitions, the 90-day limitation applies notwithstanding the Amendment's Explanation. The Court emphasized the High Court's rule-making power under Article 225 as the source of Rule 38-A's validity and effect.

Turning to condonation, the Court considered whether the petitioner's ignorance of the 90-day requirement constituted "sufficient cause" under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The Court acknowledged the Supreme Court's observation in M/s. Motilal Padampat that there is no presumption that everyone knows the law, but held that this observation does not equate to allowing ignorance of law to excuse delay in substitution applications. The Court relied on older and binding precedents (Nandu v. Bhuwanoo; P.V. Dehadrta v. Navin Kumar Nanda) which held that ignorance of law is not a sufficient excuse for not filing substitution applications in time. The Court also noted that the petitioner became aware of Mata Din's death on the very day it occurred and failed to inform counsel, demonstrating negligence rather than a compelling, legally sufficient cause.

On that basis the Court found no adequate explanation to justify condoning delay under Section 5 and concluded that the petitioner's application for substitution, condonation of delay, and to set aside abatement could not be allowed.

Holding and Implications

Core ruling: The applications for substitution, condonation of delay and for setting aside abatement were rejected; accordingly the writ petition is ordered to abate so far as opposite party No. 5 (Mata Din) is concerned.

Consequences for the parties:

  • No substitution of the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased opposite party No. 5 (Mata Din) is permitted; the writ petition stands abated with respect to that deceased party.
  • The Court applied Rule 38-A and the Division Bench authority in Nand Kishore to treat substitution in writ petitions as subject to the 90-day limitation (as envisaged by Order XXII and the Limitation Act), and refused to allow the petitioner to rely on mere ignorance of that requirement.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent; it applies existing High Court Rules and earlier decisions (especially the Division Bench in Nand Kishore and earlier authorities on ignorance of law) to the facts of this case.

    Ram Prasad (Petitioner) v. D.D.C And Others (S).

    K.N. Misra, J. – The present Writ Petition relates to land of Khata No. 102 of Village Vijaigaon, district Faizabad, which was recorded in the basic year Khatauni in the name of Ram Prasad. An objection was jointly filed be opposite parties No. 2 to 5 claiming to be co-tenure holders in the aforesaid holding along with the petitioner with the allegation that it is ancestral land and they are Bhumidhars in possession. The Consolidation Officer, by his order dated 19-4-1974, rejected the objection and maintained the basic year entry in the name of the petitioner. Against this order opposite party No. 5, Mata Din, preferred an appeal impleading opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 as respondents. The Settlement Officer, Consolidation, allowed the appeal by order dated 10-10-1974 and found that the opposite parties No. 2 to 5 are co-tenure holders along with the petitioner in the holding in dispute. Against this order, petitioner preferred revision which was allowed by the Joint Director of Consolidation by order dated 29-4-1977. He held petitioner and opposite party No. 5 alone to be co-tenure holders. Petitioner’s revision in respect of another holding, Khata Nos. 234 and 249, which are not in dispute in the present writ petition, was dismissed. The claim of opposite parties No. 2 to 4 in respect of Khata No. 102 in question was rejected merely on the ground that they had not filed any appeal nor they had joined as appellants in the appeal filed by Mata Din, opposite party No. 5 against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer. The petitioner was accordingly given 2/3rd share and l/3rd share was given to Mata Din in “the said disputed holding, Khata No. 102. Opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4 filed review application against the said order, before the Deputy Director of Consolidation, but the same was rejected, being not maintainable, by order dated 19-9-1978. It appears that after dismissal of review application, the opposite parties No. 1 to 4, on 30-1-1978, filed an appeal before the Settlement Officer, Consolidation against order dated 19-4-1974 passed by the Consolidation Officer. A prayer for condonation of delay was also made. The petitioner contested the appeal and opposed the application for condonation of delay. The Settlement Officer Consolidation, by order dated 17-3-1980 refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal being time barred. The opposite parties Nos. 2 to 4, thereupon filed revision which was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation by order dated 15-12-1980. He condoned the delay and remanded the case to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, for disposing of the appeal on merits. The petitioner has challenged this order in the present writ petition. 2. During pendency of this writ petition, opposite party No. 5 Mata Din died on 27th March, 1982. An application for substitution along with an application for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement was moved by the petitioner on 19-11-1982. The only ground on which condonation of delay was sought is that the petitioner was under the impression that since Mata Din is not a contesting party and so no substitution will be required to be made and as a matter of fact the petitioner did not know that substitution will have to be applied within 90 days, the time permitted by law. 3. Learned counsel for the opposite parties contended that on the aforesaid ground, delay cannot be condoned in moving application for substitution. He urged that the petitioner’s ignorance about the requirement of moving substitution application within 90 days, cannot be deemed to be a legally sufficient ground for condoning the delay nor the delay can be condoned on the ground that the petitioner could not take steps for substitution earlier, labouring under the impression that since deceased opposite party No. 5 Mata Din is not a contesting party and as such no substitution of his heirs and legal representatives will be required. He further contended that Mata. Din cannot be treated to be merely a proforma party, as he along with opposite parties No. 2 to 4 had claimed co-tenancy rights in the holding in dispute and that the Deputy Director of Consolidation, by the impugned order dated 15-12-1980, has remanded the case to the Settlement Officer, Consolidation for disposing the appeal n merits according to law. He, thus, contended that the application for setting aside abatement and condonation of delay deserves to be rejected and no substitution can be ordered of the heirs and legal representatives of deceased opposite party No. 6, Mata Din. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner firstly contended that the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 will not apply to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution in view of Explanation appended to section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, which was inserted by Amendment Act of 1976 (Act No. 104 of 1976) with effect from 1-2-1977. In support of his contention, he referred to a decision in Ram Kala and others v. The Asst. Director, Consolidation of Holdings, Punjab and others (AIR 1977 P&H, 87), (Full Bench) wherein it is held that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to writ proceedings. Learned counsel also referred to an order passed by an Hon’ble Single Judge of this Court in Civil Misc. Application No. 1884 (W) of 1976 in Writ Petition No. 1253 of 1972, Dhanesh prasad and others versus Deputy Director of Consolidation, Pratapgarh and others, wherein, while allowing the substitution application, it was observed: “...................... Though no sufficient explanation has been given for not moving the application early but the application for substitution has got to be allowed because no period of limitation has been prescribed for moving such an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of the respondent in a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.” 5. With due respect to the Hon’ble Judge, I am unable to subscribe to-said view because of a Division Bench decision in Nand Kishore’s case (1968 AWR 755) taking the view that a substitution application is to be moved within 90 days. Reference may also be made to an express provision on the point contained in Rule 38-A of Ch. VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, which provides that: “38-A. The provisions contained in Rules 1 to 6 and 9 of Order XXII and in Order XXXII of the Code of Civil Procedure shall, so far as may be and with necessary modifications and adaptations, apply to special appeals, writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution and Tax Acts references (and revisions) failing under Chapter IX, XXII and XXVII of these rules.” 6. This provision was added to the Rules vide Notification No. -310/VIII-C-169, dated August 3, 1964, published in U.P. Gazette, dated 5th December 1964. Exactly similar question, as one in, hand, cropped up before Divsion Bench in Nand Kishore v. Deputy Director of Consolidation and others (1968 A.W.R. 755), wherein, considering the aforesaid Rule 38-A, it was observed that: “............................Under Article 225 of the Constitution the Court has jurisdiction to frame rules for regulating its business. The Court, therefore, has framed R. 38-A under that provision and if the effect of that rule is to make the provisions of the limitation act applicable to substitution proceeding arising out of or in a writ petition that rule of limitation will govern the substitution application. “We must therefore find out whether our R. 38-A requires that a substitution application must be made in the period provided by the Indian Limitation Act, R. 38-A refers to O. XXII R. 3 (2) CPC also. Beyond that it provides for no other period of limitation. In our opinion it is implicit in R. 38-A that the period of limitation within which a substitution application under that rule should be made is the one provided by the Indian Limitation Act. When R. 38-A refers to O XXII, R, 3 (2), it clearly adopts the rule of limitation envisaged by that rule, i.e. the one provided by the Limitation Act. This, is, in our opinion, the clear meaning and intention of R. 38-A.” 7. It was further observed that: “We answer the question by saying that the application for substitution in a writ petition should be made within 90 days and if not made within that period, and the cause of action does not survive in favour of the remaining petitioners, it will be deemed to have abated.” 8. It appears that the aforesaid Division Bench decision and Rule 38-A was not brought to the notice of the Hon’ble Judge in Dhanesh Prasad’s case (supra) wherein inspite of the fact that sufficient explanation was not given for not moving the application early, the application for substitution was allowed merely on the ground that no period of limitation has been prescribed for moving a substitution application under Atticle 226 of the Constitution. In view of express provision contained in Rule 38-A and in view of, the decision pf the Division Bench in Nand Kisbore’s case (supra), lam of the opinion that application for substitution under Article 226 of the Constitution is required to be moved within 90 days under Order 22 Rule 3 Code of Civil Procedure. The said rule 38-A has not been deleted and the Explanation to section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, inferred by Amendment Act No. 104 of 1976, will not make it inapplicable to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. It would have been a different matter if provision of Order 22 Rule 3 would not have been made applicable by adding Rule 38-A of Chapter-VIII of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, which were framed under Article 225 of the Constitution for regulating business of the Court. The Full Bench decision in Ram Kala’s case (supra) (AIR 1977 Punjab and Haryana 87) has no doubt expressed the view that Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to writ proceedings, but it appears that this view has been taken as no rule similar to Rule 38-A exists in the Rules of High Court of the said High Court. I am, therefore, unable to subscribe to the view expressed in Ram” Kala’s case (supra) in view of what has been said in the Division Bench decision of this Court in Nand Kishore’s case (supra), which has been followed by N.D. Ojha, J. in Devi Prasad and others v. State of U.P. and another (1982 Allahabad Rent Cases 617). I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in the aforesaid Division Bench decision of this Court. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner next contended that the petitioner has indicated the reason for not moving substitution application earlier, to the effect he was not aware that substitution will have to be applied for within 90 days, the time permitted by law and that he was under the impression that no substitution will be required to be made as Mata.. Din was not a contesting party. It is not disputed that Mata Din died on 27th March, 1982 and the petitioner became aware about his death on that very day. The only ground shown in the application for not moving the application for substitution is that he was not aware about the requirement of moving substitution application within 90 days. It was urged by learned counsel that it cannot be presumed that every person knows taw and as Such since the petitioner was ignorant about the requirement of law regarding moving of substitution application within 90 days arid therefore the delay in moving the application deserves to be condoned. In support of his contention he referred to a decision of Supreme Coifrt in M/S. Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills. Co. Ltd v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others (1979 A L.J. 368). The Hon’ble Supreme Court in aforesaid decision, while dealing with the question whether the claim of the appellant to exemption from sales tax could be sustained only on the doctrine of promissory estoppel or hot, observed that: “...............There can be no waiver unless the person who is said to have waived is fully informed as to his right and with full knowledge of such right, he intentionally abandons; it.” 10. Further dealing with the matter it was observed that “in fact in the petition as originally filed, the right to claim total exemption from sales tax was not based on the plea of promissory estoppel which was introduced only by way of amendment. Moreover, it must be remembered that there is no presumption that every one is presumed to know the law. It is often said that every one is presumed to know the law, but that is not a correct statement; there is no such maxim known to the law.” 11. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in the aforesaid decision. But it is not argued here by learned counsel for the opposite parties that a presumption should be drawn that every-body knows law. What has been urged is that the well settled rule is that ignorance of law is no excuse; a maxim of very different scope and application. In the present case the question which is required to be determined is whether the ignorance about the requirement of moving application for substitution within 90 days would or would not be deemed to be a sufficient cause for condoning the delay under Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act. It is well settled that if substitution of legal heirs and representatives is not made within limitation, a valuable right accrues to the party which cannot be lightly interfered with unless, sufficient cause is shown for setting aside abatement by condoning the delay. Whether ignorance about the requirement regarding moving an application for substitution would be taken to be a sufficient cause or not for condoning the delay, is the sole material question for consideration in the present case. This question did not arise for consideration nor it was dealt with by the Supreme Court in M/s. M.P. Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others (Supra). It has, therefore, no direct bearing on the point under consideration. 12. Exactly similar question cropped up for consideration in Nandu v. Bhuwanoo (AIR 1929 Nagpur 74). In said case, three out of thirteen legal representatives filed an application on 12th December, 1928 stating “that they were not aware that an application for substitution of legal representatives of the deceased appellant had to be made within 3 months of his death;” and prayed that, in the circumstances, the delay in making the application be condoned. In short the applicants pleaded ignorance of law, and put forward this ignorance of law as sufficient cause for not making the application earlier. Referring to several decisions and placing reliance upon Full Bench decision of this Court in 12 Allahabad 461 (1890 (12) Allahabad page 461), it was held that: -- “..............Ignorance of law cannot be sufficient excuse for not filing the application in time and therefore, the abatement cannot be set aside.” 13. In P.V. Dehadrta v. Navin Kumar Nanda (1967 AWR. 251) D.S. Mathur, J. observed that: -- “What the appellant says is that he had come to know of the death of Smt. Rani Nanda early in February, 1962, but he being ignorant of law did not inform his counsel that Snit. Rani Nanda was dead; and that it was in the end of March, 1962 that he gave the information to his counsel when the present applications were made. Ignorance of law is no excuse. Further, if the appellant did not know the law it was necessary for him to communicate all the facts to his counsel so that he may take all the legal steps.” 14. It was, thus, held that the benefit of section 5 of the Limitation Act is not available on the ground of ignorance of law. In the present case it is admitted that the petitioner was aware about the death of opposite party No. 5 Mata Din having occurred on 27th of March, 1982, leaving behind his five sons. The petitioner should have, therefore, approached his counsel telling him about the said fact and the learned counsel should have, thereupon, taken steps for substitution of the deceased opposite party No. 5 Mata Din. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner has not acted negligently. There is no other explanation forthcoming except the one indicated above as to why he did not proceed to move application for substitution within limitation. He also took no care to intimate this fact to his counsel although he had come to know about the death of opposite party No. 5 Mata Din on 27th March, 1982. 15. In view of what has been said above, I am of the opinion that ignorance of law regarding requirement for moving an application for substitution within 90 days cannot be taken to be sufficient ground for condoning delay in moving application for substitution. I further find that no case is made out for condoning the delay and for setting aside the abatement and as such substitution cannot be ordered of the heirs and legal representatives in place of deceased Mata Din. The applications are accordingly rejected and the writ petition is ordered to abate so far as opposite party No. 5, Mata Din is concerned, (Applications rejected) _____________

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    Ram Prasad (Petitioner) v. D.D.C And Others (S).
    (Apr 18, 1983)