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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908,
  • Code of Civil Procedure making the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 4, of the said Code
  • Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940,
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act (36 of 1963)
  • Section 141 of the Code and other provisions of the Code
  • provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 11 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Order 1, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure.'
  • Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 181, Limitation Act.
  • Section 14(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908,
  • Code of Civil Procedure making the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 4, of the said Code
  • Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940,
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act (36 of 1963)
  • Section 141 of the Code and other provisions of the Code
  • provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act.
  • ARTICLE 226 A CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Rule 11 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ARTICLE 226 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
  • Order 1, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure.'
  • Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Article 137 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 181, Limitation Act.
  • Section 14(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The opinion relates to an appeal concerning orders dated November 23, 1973 and March 28, 1974 passed by learned Judges of the High Court. The core procedural posture is an appeal challenging those orders and seeking resolution of whether a specific provision of the Limitation Act governs applications to add or substitute parties in petitions filed under Article 226 of the Constitution. The detailed facts of the original controversy were set out in an "elaborate order of reference" prepared by the Chief Justice and are not repeated in this opinion. The case was remitted to a learned single Judge for fresh decision in accordance with law after the appeal was allowed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act (36 of 1963) applies to an application for adding or substituting parties to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution.
  2. Whether Order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure (and related provisions) apply to writ petitions under Article 226 or to revision petitions and, more broadly, whether the procedural provisions of the Code are applicable to such proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The appellant's counsel urged that the provisions of Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to writ proceedings under Article 226. This position was supported by reference to earlier decisions (for example, Kirpal Singh and its affirmations in appeal) and the view that the law of abatement does not apply to such petitions.
  • The appellant relied on authority and reasoning that writ petitions are essentially different from suits and that importing the full procedural rigour of the Code would defeat the purpose of Article 226 (a quick and inexpensive remedy).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The respondents' counsel relied upon Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai (AIR 1972 All 504 (FB)) and argued that Article 137 of the Limitation Act governs an application for substitution of heirs in a revision petition; by analogy they urged applicability to the present application in a writ petition.
  • Respondents also relied on observations in Dula Singh v. Union of India ((1971) 73 Pun LR 432) that an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party in a writ petition is governed by Article 137.
  • The respondents' counsel contended that Article 137's language — providing a three years' period for "any other application for which no period ... is provided elsewhere in this Division" — indicates a three-year limitation for applications generally, including those to add or substitute parties.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jwala Singh Prem Singh v. Malkan Nasirpur, AIR 1958 Punj 171 One of a series of High Court judgments holding that Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to revision petitions. Used as part of a line of High Court authorities to support the proposition that Order XXII does not apply to revision petitions.
Ram Saran Dass Tara Chand v. Ram Richhpal L. Mannu Lal, AIR 1963 Punj 206 Same line: decision that Order XXII does not apply to revision petitions. Cited as part of the preponderant view in this Court that Order XXII is inapplicable to revision petitions.
Smt. Dhan Devi v. Bakhshi Ram, AIR 1969 Punj & Har 270 Another authority in the series holding Order XXII does not apply to revision petitions. Relied upon as part of consistent High Court holdings on inapplicability of Order XXII to revision petitions.
Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63 Definition/principle that the word "suit" ordinarily means a civil proceeding instituted by presentation of a plaint and that other proceedings may not be "suits". Quoted to show that proceedings under other statutes do not necessarily amount to "suits" and therefore Code provisions cannot be mechanically applied to all proceedings.
Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagar Mal, AIR 1965 SC 1798 Similar view adopted by Supreme Court about the meaning of "suit" and applicability of Code procedures. Invoked to support distinction between suits and other proceedings and to caution against automatic application of Code procedures to writs.
Babu-bhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105 Interprets "as far as it can be made applicable" in Section 141 CPC to mean that the character of proceedings and relief sought must be considered; emphasises that writ petitions require a quick remedy and suit procedure cannot be rigidly applied. Used to demonstrate that Section 141 cannot be used to import full suit procedure into writ proceedings; supports refusal to apply procedural fetters of the Code to Article 226 petitions.
Bhagwan Singh v. Additional Director of Consolidation, Punjab, Ferozepore, AIR 1968 Punj & Har 360 Expresses the view that a High Court exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be equated with a Court of civil jurisdiction for purposes of importing all Code procedures. Cited to reinforce that provisions of the Code do not, in terms, govern writ proceedings under Article 226.
K. L. Bhansali v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1967) 69 Pun LR (D) 19 Holds law of abatement does not apply to petitions under Article 226 and that legal representatives could be allowed to prosecute the writ petition. Cited to support the proposition that the law of abatement does not automatically affect writ petitions and that legal representatives may be brought on record.
Dula Singh v. Union of India, (1971) 73 Pun LR 432 Contains observations to the effect that an application for bringing legal representatives of a deceased party in a writ petition is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Discussed and ultimately distinguished/criticised by the Court; the opinion concludes Dula Singh was incorrectly decided on the point that Article 137 applies to such applications.
Chandradeo Pandey v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1972 All 504 (FB) Held that an application for substitution of heirs of a deceased party in a revision petition is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. Relied upon by respondents but the Court observed it does not advance their case because Chandradeo Pandey concerned revision petitions, whereas the present matter concerns a petition under Article 226.
Sha Mulchand and Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem, AIR 1953 SC 98 Holds that the corresponding Article in the earlier Limitation Act (Article 181) has been held by a long series of decisions to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Quoted to support the view that Article 137 (corresponding to old Article 181) is confined to applications under the Code and does not automatically extend to writ petitions under Article 226.
Kirpal Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, Civil Writ No. 325 of 1956 (decision of Shamsher Bahadur, J.) Used to support view that provisions of Order 22 CPC do not apply to writ proceedings and that writ petitions do not abate on death of a party in the same manner as suits. Cited as antecedent authority that influenced High Court decisions and was relied upon by counsel for the appellant.
Ajit Singh v. The Deputy Custodian, L. P. A. No. 133 of 1961 Appeal that confirmed the view taken in Kirpal Singh's case. Referenced as confirming authority for the non-applicability of Order XXII to writ proceedings.
Chaudhry Jai Ram Dass v. Guroharan Singh Another Division Bench decision supporting that Order XXII provisions do not apply to writ petitions. Referred to as part of the body of High Court decisions aligning with the view that Order XXII is inapplicable to writ proceedings.
Pali Ram v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Hissar Case in which the author (as a judge) held that writ petitions do not abate for failure to bring legal representatives within the Limitation Act period and that Order 1, Rule 10 CPC can be used to bring legal representatives on record. Cited in the opinion to show earlier reasoning by the Bench on how legal representatives may be added without invoking Article 137.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in a sequence of interrelated steps:

  1. The Court first noted that Order XXII, Rule 4 CPC governs substitution of legal representatives where defendant(s) die in suits and that Order XXII has been made expressly applicable to appeals by Rule 11 of Order 22 CPC, but there is no express provision making Order XXII applicable to revision petitions. The Court observed that a series of High Court judgments had held that Order XXII does not apply to revision petitions.
  2. The Court examined the broader question of whether the procedural provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure (including Order XXII) apply to petitions under Article 226. It observed that proceedings under Article 226 "relating to civil matters" are civil in character but are not suits in the ordinary sense. The Court relied on authorities that the word "suit" ordinarily means a proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint and that other proceedings cannot automatically be treated as suits.
  3. The Court considered Section 141 CPC, which directs that the procedure of the Code shall be followed "as far as it can be made applicable" to other proceedings in courts of civil jurisdiction. The Court emphasised that this language requires consideration of the nature of the proceedings and the relief sought, and that writ petitions under Article 226 are meant to provide quick and inexpensive remedies. Consequently Section 141 cannot be used to import the procedural fetters of suits into writ proceedings.
  4. Turning to Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act (which prescribes a three-year limitation for "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division"), the Court analysed whether Article 137 governs applications to add or substitute parties in Article 226 petitions.
  5. The Court relied on the Supreme Court decision in Sha Mulchand and Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., which stated that the corresponding Article in the earlier Limitation Act had been held in a long series of decisions to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. From this and the differences between writ petitions and Code applications, the Court concluded that Article 137 cannot be held to govern applications filed in the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226.
  6. The Court also considered practical consequences: if Article 137 were held to apply, a dismissal for failure to bring legal representatives on record could be treated as not on merits and a fresh petition with explanations could be filed, increasing procedural delay. The Court preferred an interpretation that avoids such delay and facilitates justice.
  7. On this basis the Court concluded that the view expressed in Dula Singh — that Article 137 applies to such applications in writ petitions — was incorrectly decided for the purposes of the present case.
  8. The Court therefore held (i) that Order XXII CPC does not apply to writ proceedings and (ii) that Article 137 of the Limitation Act does not apply to an application for adding or substituting a party to a petition under Article 226.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed. The Court held that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963 does not apply to an application for adding or substituting a party to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, and that Order XXII of the Code of Civil Procedure does not apply to writ proceedings.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the orders dated November 23, 1973 and March 28, 1974 are set aside and the matter is remanded to the learned single Judge for fresh decision in accordance with law.
  • As a practical consequence for parties, applications to add or substitute parties in Article 226 petitions are not to be governed by the three-year limitation in Article 137; the High Court retains the discretion to draw on principles of the Code and equitable considerations to decide whether bringing parties on record would promote the ends of justice.
  • The Court expressly disapproved (for the purposes of this case) the view in Dula Singh that Article 137 applies to such applications in writ petitions, thus narrowing applicability of Article 137 to applications under the Code rather than writ proceedings.
  • No suggestion is made that the writ jurisdiction should be fettered by automatic importation of the procedural provisions of the Code; instead, the High Court may devise appropriate procedure to secure speedy and efficacious justice in writ matters.

Judges: O. Chinnappa Reddy, J. (author). Two other judges expressed agreement (Surinder Singh, J. and another judge who also wrote "I agree").

    Ram Kala, v. The Assistant Director, Consolidation Of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak And Others,

    1. The facts of the case are given in the elaborate order of reference prepared by my Lord the Chief Justice and need not be repeated all over again.

    2. The decision of the case depends upon the answer to the following ques-tion:--

    Whether Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act (36 of 1963) does or does not apply to an application for adding or substituting parties to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution ?

    3. Order XXII, Rule 4, Code of Civil Procedure, lays down that where one of two or more defendants die and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application given in that behalf shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit. These provisions have been made expressly applicable to appeals by virtue of Rule 11 of Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure. However, there is no express provision in the Code of Civil Procedure making the provisions of Order XXII, Rule 4, of the said Code applicable to the revision petitions. Consequently, this Court has held in a series of judgments that Order XXII of the Code does not apply to the revision petitions. See in this connection Jwala Singh Prem Singh v. Malkan Nasirpur, AIR 1958 Punj 171; Ram Saran Dass Tara Chand v. Ram Richhpal L. Mannu Lal, AIR 1963 Punj 206; and Smt. Dhan Devi, v. Bakhshi Ram, AIR 1969 Punj & Har 270.

    4. It is, however, argued that in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, civil rights of the parties are involved and the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, so far as it can be made applicable to proceedings which partake of the nature of civil proceedings and by virtue of Section 141 of the Code and other provisions of the Code including Order XXII, does apply to such proceedings.

    5. While exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, this Court does not try a "suit" as is ordinarily understood. The word "suit" is not defined in the Code of Civil Procedure. However, in Hansraj Gupta v. Dehra Dun Mussorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd., AIR 1933 PC 63, it was held that the word "suit" ordinarily means, and apart from some context must be taken to mean, "a civil proceeding instituted by the presentation of a plaint". Similar view was taken by the Supreme Court in Nawab Usmanali Khan v. Sagar Mal, AIR 1965 SC 1798. The Court observed-

    "Now, a proceeding under Section 14 read with Section 17 of the Indian Arbitration Act, 1940, for the passing of a judgment and decree on an award does not commence with a plaint or a petition in the nature of a plaint, and cannot be regarded as a suit and the parties to whom the notice of the filing of the award Is given under Section 14(2) cannot be regarded as 'sued in any Court otherwise competent to try the suit'."

    6. The proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution relating to civil matters are no doubt civil proceedings but on that ground alone it cannot be held that the Code of Civil Procedure governs such proceedings. This Court may while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution draw upon the principles enunciated in the Code of Civil Procedure, for, the principle confined therein or by and large based on the principles of natural justice. Never-theless, it can devise its own procedure for rendering speedy and efficacious jus-tice in the circumstances of the case. Section 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure lays down that the procedure provided in that Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of Civil jurisdiction but this provision cannot be pressed into service for putting procedural fetters in the way of this Court for exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution for, the adoption of that course would practically strangulate this jurisdiction. In Babu-bhai Muljibhai Patel v. Nandlal Khodidas Barot, AIR 1974 SC 2105, the Court took special notice of the words "as far as it can be made applicable" in Section 141, Code of Civil Procedure, and held-

    "The words 'as far as it can be made applicable' make it clear that, in applying the various provisions of the Code to proceedings other than those of a suit, the Court must take into account the nature of those proceedings and the relief sought. The object of Article 226 is to provide a quick and inexpensive remedy to aggrieved parties. Power has consequently been vested in the High Courts to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within the jurisdiction of the High Court, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari. It is plain that if the procedure of a suit had also to be adhered to in the case of writ petition, the entire purpose of having a quick and inexpensive remedy would be defeated. A writ petition under Article 226, it needs to be emphasised, is essentially different from a suit and it would be incorrect to assimilate and incorporate the procedure of a suit into the proceedings of a petition under Article 226."

    7. Similar view was expressed by R. S. Sarkaria, J. (now a learned Judge of the Supreme Court), in Bhagwan Singh v. Additional Director of Consolidation, Punjab, Ferozepore, AIR 1968 Punj and Har 360. It was observed-

    "What is provided in Section 141 is that the procedure laid down in the Code in regard to suits is to be followed so far as it can be, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction. A High Court, when it exercises extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, cannot, in my opinion, be said to be a Court of civil jurisdiction. This special jurisdiction of a High Court aims at securing a very speedy and efficacious remedy, to a person whose legal or constitutional right has been infringed. If all the elaborate and technical rules of Civil Procedure laid down in the Code, were to be imported through section 141 of the code into these writ proceedings, their very purpose is likely to be de-

    feated by their becoming bogged in procedural delays. In short, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure do not, in terms, govern writ proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution."

    8. In K. L. Bhansali v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1967) 69 Pun LR (D) 19, R. S. Narula, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed-

    "Moreover, I am inclined to think that if even one of the legal representatives of the deceased petitioner had claimed to be brought on record he could have been allowed to prosecute the writ petition. The law of abatement does not apply to petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. All that has to be seen is whether the right which entitled the deceased to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High Court has or has not survived to the legal representative who claims to prosecute the petition."

    9. Even in Dula Singh v. Union of India, (1971) 73 Pun LR 432, Tuli, J., speaking for the Bench, endorsed this view in the following words:--

    "The learned counsel for the appellant has urged that the provisions of Order 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure do not apply to writ proceedings and in support of his submission he relies on the judgment of Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Kirpal Singh v. The Deputy Custodian General, Civil Writ No. 325 of 1956, decided on April 21, 1961 (Punj). The iudg-ment of the learned Judge was confirmed in appeal by a Division Bench in Ajit Singh v. The Deputy Custodian, L. P. A. No. 133 of 1961, decided on August 10, 1961 (Punj). The same view was taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Chaudhry Jai Ram Dass v. Guroharan Singh, decided on March 6, 1'963 (Punj). The matter was examined by me in Pali Ram v. The Additional Director Consolidation of Holdings, Hissar, wherein I held that-

    'The writ petition does not abate because of the death of the respondent on the ground that his legal representatives were not brought on record within the time prescribed in the Limitation Act. The legal representatives of a deceased petitioner or a deceased respondent can be brought on the record under Order 1, Rule 10, Code of Civil Procedure.' While coming to that conclusion I had relied on the judgment of Shamsher Bahadur, J. in Kirpal Singh's case (supra) and on the judgment of Narula, J. in K. L. Bhansali v Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, 1967-69 Pun LR (D) 19, wherein the learned Judge had held that 'the law of abatement did not apply to the petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution'. "

    10. Tre learned counsel for the respondents then relied upon Chandradeo Pan-dey v. Sukhdeo Rai, AIR 1972 All 504 (FB) in which it has been held that an application for substitution of heirs of a deceased Party in a revision petition is governed by Article 137 of the Limitation Act. This authority does not advance the case of the respondents because in the instant case we are concerned with an application for the substitution of the heirs of a deceased party in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Besides, so far as this Court is concerned, it has been consistently held that Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure, does not apply to revision petitions. For the purposes of this case, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of the earlier judgments of this Court on this point vis-a-vis the view taken by the Allahabad High Court.

    11. In view of the binding precedent of the Supreme Court and the preponderance of opinion in this Court, we hold that Order 22, Code of Civil Procedure, does not apply to the writ proceedings.

    12. However, in Dula Singh's case ((1971) 73 Pun LR 432) (supra), the learned Judges after coming to the above-mentioned conclusion made some observations to the effect that an application for bringing on record the legal representatives of a deceased party in a writ petition is governed by Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act. The learned counsel for the respondents strongly relied on these observations and referred to Article 137 of the Limitation Act corresponding to Article 181 of the Limitation Act No. 9 of 1908, which reads as under:--

    Description of application.

    Period of Limitation.

    Time from which period begins to run.

    137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division.

    Three years.

    When the right to apply accrues.

    13. He argued that the language employed in the Article indicates that three years' period of limitation is provided for any application which is presented to a Court. We are unable to accept this contention raised by the learned counsel in view of the following observations made by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Sha Mulchand and Co. Ltd. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd., Salem, AIR 1953 SC 98:--

    "Learned Advocate, however, strongly relies on Article 181, Limitation Act. That Article has, in a long series of decisions of most, if not all, of the High Courts, been held to govern only applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. It may be that there may be divergence of opinion even within the same High Court but the preponderating view undoubtedly is that the Article applies only to applications under the Code."

    14. As already noticed, this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution does not try a suit as commonly understood. It is settled law that when a Court is invested with a particular jurisdiction under an Act of the Parliament, it also gets invested with the authority to take all ancillary steps which are necessary to exercise that jurisdiction. A petition presented to this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot necessarily be regarded as an application under the Code of Civil Procedure. It is an entirely different matter that while entertaining and deciding such an application, this Court may draw upon, the principles of the Code of Civil Procedure which arc based on equity, justice and good conscience but in doing so this Court seldom takes recourse to the penal provisions of the said Code. All that has to be seen is whether the grant of such an application would promote the ends of justice or not. We are, therefore, of the view that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act cannot be held to govern an application filed in the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

    15. There is yet another way of looking at the things. In case a writ petition is dismissed on the ground that the legal representatives of a necessary party could not be brought on record, the dismissal of the petition would not be regarded as a dismissal on merits and the order passed cannot operate as a bar of res judicata. The petitioner could file another petition on the same subject and explain the delay by averring that he had been diligently fighting the earlier writ petition. If the High Court is then satisfied that manifest injustice done to such a petitioner cannot be avoided unless the newly filed writ petition is admitted to hearing, it would be open to it to entertain such a petition. Such a course would tend to increase procedural delays only instead of promoting the cause of justice. An interpretation which leads to such a result has to be avoided at all costs. In our considered opinion Dula Singh's case ((1971) 73 Pun LR 432) (supra) which lays down that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963 applies to an application for adding or substituting parties to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is not correctly decided.

    16. For the aforementioned reasons, we are of the view that Article 137 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963 does not apply to an application for adding or substituting a party to a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution,

    17. In the result this appeal is allowed, the orders dated November 23, 1973, and March 28, 1974, passed by the learned Judges of this Court are set aside and the case is remanded to the learned single Judge for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

    O. Chinnappa Reddy, J.

    18. I agree.

    Surinder Singh, J.

    19. I agree.

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    Ram Kala, v. The Assistant Director, Consolidation Of Holdings, Punjab, Rohtak And Others,
    (Dec 15, 1976)