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  • S. 13, Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1946 (Madras Act 15 of 1946)
  • S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946
  • provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
  • S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946
  • rule or Section of the District Municipalities Act.
  • Rent Control) Act of 1946,
  • Rent Control) Act, 1946
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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  • S. 13, Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1946 (Madras Act 15 of 1946)
  • S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946
  • provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act
  • S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946
  • rule or Section of the District Municipalities Act.
  • Rent Control) Act of 1946,
  • Rent Control) Act, 1946
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are lessees of municipal market godowns and the Gandhi Market in Tenali. They challenged a Government of Madras notification (G.O. Ms No. 3741 dated 30-9-1946) which exempted all buildings owned by municipal councils (and certain other public bodies) from the operation of Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 (Madras Act 15 of 1946). The petitioners contended that this exemption violated the principle of equality before the law and equal protection guaranteed under Article 14 of the Constitution (and formed part of an attack on fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19). Respondents urged that earlier decisions of the Madras High Court had already concluded the question. The court was asked to determine the validity of the State notification and whether the exemption was inconsistent with Article 14 and therefore void under Article 13 of the Constitution.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Government of Madras notification exempting municipal buildings under Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 is inconsistent with Article 14 of the Constitution and therefore void under Article 13.
  2. Whether the exemption violates Article 19 of the Constitution (as alleged by the petitioners) by affecting fundamental rights of tenants.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments

  • The notification exempting municipal buildings from the Act violates Article 14 (equality before the law and equal protection) by discriminating against tenants of municipal buildings as compared with tenants of other buildings.
  • The exemption enabled municipal councils to lease godowns by open auction under rules framed under the District Municipalities Act, allowing the municipality to realise higher rents and thereby leading to eviction or loss of protections available under the Rent Control Act.
  • The Government had earlier issued orders (24-11-1948) directing municipal councils not to lease godowns by open auction but subsequently (23-1-1954) directed leasing by open auction to increase council revenue; petitioners contended the latter direction was improper or inconsistent with prior orders.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The legal questions raised had been addressed by prior Madras High Court decisions — notably K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras (AIR 1953 Mad 351) and Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras (AIR 1954 Mad 690) — which were relied upon to resist the challenge.
  • The exemption constituted a permissible classification and was either not open to challenge (as held originally in Nambiar) or subject to challenge only if shown to be arbitrary or mala fide (as held in the subsequent Bench decision).
  • The municipal procedure to lease by public auction for rents expected to exceed Rs. 200 per annum was authorised by R.12(f) of the rules framed under the District Municipalities Act; the 1954 instructions directing auction were therefore in accordance with that rule and not invalid.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 351 Held (by Subba Rao, J.) that a Government order exempting a house from the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act was an administrative order not open to judicial review and did not affect tenants' fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19. The court noted this earlier view but observed that it had been superseded by a later Bench decision; the court did not follow the absolute non-justiciability aspect of Nambiar and required examination of each case on merits.
Globe Theatres Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 690 Held that the discretion under S.13 is not unguided; if shown to be exercised arbitrarily, mala fide, or contrary to declared legislative policy, such exercise may be challenged under Article 14. The court treated this Bench decision as authoritative, holding that Subba Rao J.'s earlier view was no longer correct and that the petitioners must demonstrate arbitrariness or mala fides to succeed.
Babu Rao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board, AIR 1954 SC 153 Das, J. observed that exemption (Section 4 in that context) constituted a classification based on an intelligible differentia with a rational relation to the object of the Act; Government/local authority tenants were not in need of the same protection as private tenants. The court applied these observations to the present facts, concluding that the exemption of municipal buildings is based on a reasonable classification and does not violate Article 14.
Gorieb v. Fox, (1926) 71 Law Ed 1229 Observation (Sutherland, J.) that "exceptions may be made without subverting the general purposes of the ordinance." Quoted to support the proposition that exemptions may be compatible with the general purpose of legislation; used by the court in upholding the State's power to exempt municipal buildings under S.13.
Rampratap Jaidayal v. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 Bom 170 Chagla, C.J. explained that exemption of a class from a law need not further the object qua that exempted class; what matters is a reasonable and logical connection between the exempted class and the legislative purpose. The court relied on these observations to reject the contention that exemption of municipal buildings defeated the policy/object of the Rent Control Act, holding there was a reasonable basis for exclusion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded by first identifying the controlling precedents. It contrasted the earlier single-judge view in K.C. Nambiar (that government exemption orders were administrative and non-justiciable) with the later Madras Bench decision in Globe Theatres which held that the discretion under S.13 could be judicially examined if shown to be arbitrary, mala fide, or contrary to legislative purpose. On this basis the court rejected the absolute non-justiciability approach and required petitioners to prove that the Government had abused its power in issuing the blanket exemption.

The court examined the affidavits filed by the petitioners and found they did not disclose arbitrariness or mala fides in exempting municipal- and local-board-owned buildings. The petitioners' factual contention, as recorded, was that the exemption enabled municipalities to lease godowns by public auction and thereby obtain higher rents and evict existing tenants. The court addressed this on two fronts:

  • On classification and equality (Article 14): the court adopted the reasoning in Babu Rao More (as quoted) that the exemption represents an intelligible differentia and bears a rational relation to the object of the legislation because government/local authorities are not presumed to be motivated by profit and therefore their tenants may not require the same protections as tenants of private landlords. The court found the exemption to be a reasonable classification.
  • On whether exemption defeated the Act's policy (control of rents and prevention of unreasonable eviction): the court relied on analogous observations in Rampratap Jaidayal to explain that an exempted class need not further the object qua the exempted class, but there must be a reasonable basis connecting the class with the legislative objective. Applying that principle, the court found a reasonable basis for excluding municipal and local-board buildings.

The court further considered the administrative practice and statutory rules governing municipal leasing. Petitioners relied on prior Government orders (24-11-1948) which had limited municipal leasing practices; the Government later issued fresh instructions (23-1-1954) directing leases by public auction for 1954–55. When pressed, the Government Pleader could not point to a specific provision at first, but the court accepted that R.12(f) of the rules under the District Municipalities Act required public auction for leases whose rents were expected to exceed Rs. 200 per annum. The court held that the municipality's procedure for 1955 and the Government's instructions were consistent with that rule, and that the objective of increasing municipal revenue by auction was in the municipality's and public interest. The notice requiring petitioners to deliver possession was therefore not vulnerable to attack.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: APPLICATIONS DISMISSED.

The court held that the Government notification of 30-9-1946 exempting buildings belonging to Municipal Councils, Local Boards and the Corporation of Madras under Section 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 did not violate Article 14 (or Article 19) as alleged. The exemption was held to be based on a reasonable classification and not shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or mala fide in the material before the court.

Direct consequences as stated in the opinion:

  • The petitioning applications challenging the notification were dismissed with costs.
  • Advocates' fees awarded: Rs. 100 to the 1st Respondent and Rs. 100 to the 2nd Respondent for each writ.
  • The municipality was held entitled, by virtue of the exemption and applicable municipal rules (R.12(f) under the District Municipalities Act), to hold an open auction and lease the godowns; the notice to deliver possession was not open to attack.

The opinion does not set out any broader declaratory pronouncement beyond these consequences nor does it state that it is laying down a new precedent distinct from the authorities it applied.

    Dasari Venkatadri And Another v. The Tenali Municipality And Another

    Judgement

    The petitioners in both the applications are the lessees of the municipal market godowns and the Gandhi Market in Tenali. The main question raised by the petitioners is that the notification issued by the Government of Madras in G-. O. Ms No. 3741 dated 30-9-1946 exempting all. buildings owned by municipal councils under S. 13, Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 1946 (Madras Act 15 of 1946) violates the principles of equality before law and equal protection of the law laid down in Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    The respondents contended that the questions sought to be raised in the applications are concluded by two decisions of the Madras High Court in - Dr. K.C. Nambiar v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 Mad 351 (A) and - Globe Theatres Ltd., v. State of Madras, AIR 1954 Mad 690 (B).

    2. So the question for consideration is, whether the exemption of the Municipal Buildings under S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946 is inconsistent with Article 14 and therefore void under Article 13 of the Constitution.

    3. In AIR 1953 Mad 351 (A), Subba Rao, J. As he then was held that an order of the Government exempting a house from the operation of the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act is an administrative order not open to judicial review and that such an order does not affect the fundamental rights of a tenant under Art. 14 of the constitution or violate the provisions of Article 19.

    Subsequent to this decision, a Bench of the Madras High Court held in AIR 1954 Mad 690 (B), that the discretion given to the Government under S. 13 is not an unguided and arbitrary discretion and that if it be shown in any given case that the discretion has been exercised in disregard of the standard or contrary to the declared policy and object of the legislature or arbitrarily or mala fide, then such exercise of discretion can be challenged and declared void under Art. 14 of the Constitution.

    Having regard to this Bench decision, it must be held that the view of Subba Rao, J. (as he then was) that the order of the Government under S. 13 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 is not open to judicial review and is not liable to the challenged as violating Arts. 14 and 19 of the Constitution, is no longer right and each case has to be examined on its merits.

    4. Under the notification issued, by the Government of Madras on 30-9-1946, exemption is granted to all buildings owned by (i) Municipal Councils (ii) Local Boards and (iii) the Corporation of Madras. The petitioners who challenge the notification have to satisfy me that the discretion give to the Government was exercised arbitrarily, or mala fide.

    The allegations in the affidavits do not disclose that in exempting the buildings belonging to the Municipal Councils or Local Boards, the State of Madras abused its powers or acted arbitrarily or mala fide. What is contended is that by exempting the municipal buildings from the operation of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act of 1946, the municipal council is enabled to lease out the Godowns in opera auction under the rules framed under the District Municipalities Act and thereby realise rents higher than what the petitioners were paying.

    It is also urged that the tenants occupying the municipal buildings are discriminated against the tenants occupying the other buildings and that the benefits conferred by the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1946 upon the other tenants are taken away or denied to them by reason of the exemption. A similar contention was raised before the Supreme Court in - Babu Rao Shantaram More v. Bombay Housing Board, AIR 1954 SC 153 (C) and was negatived by Das, J. in the following terms :

    "The contention is that Section 4 discriminates against the tenants of properties belonging to the Government, local authority or the Board in that these tenants are denied the benefits of the bombay rent act which are available to all other tenants in Bombay. There can be no question that this exemption is given, by Section 4 to certain classes of tenants and this classification is based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes them from other tenants and this differentia has a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by the Act.

    It is the business of the Government to solve the accommodation problem and satisfy the public need of housing accommodation. It was for the purpose of achieving this object that the Board was incorporated and established. It is not to be expected that the Government or local authority or the Board would be actuated by any profit-making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents or eject the tenants from their respective properties as private landlords are or are likely to be.

    Therefore, the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board are not in need of such protection as the tenants of private landlords are and this circumstance is a cogent basis for differentiation. The two classes of tenants are not by force of circumstances placed on an equal footing and the tenants of the Government or local authority or the Board cannot, therefore, complain of any denial of equality before the law or of equal protection of the law."

    5. Those observations apply with equal force to the present case and the exemption of the buildings belonging to the municipal councils and local boards is in my view based on a reasonable classification, and that, discretion cannot be said to have been exercised arbitrarily or mala fide. It was observed by Sutherland, J. in - Gorieb v. Fox, (1926) 71 Law Ed 1229 at p. 1230 (D), that "exceptions may be made without subverting the general purposes of the ordinance.

    Following those observations, I hold that under S. 13 it was open to the State to exempt the buildings belonging to Municipal councils and local boards. I am therefore unable to hold that the notification issued by the Government violates the terms of Art. 14 or Art. 19 of the Constitution.

    6. It was next contended that the exemption of the buildings under Section 13 does not promote the policy and object of the Act namely the control of rents and the regulation of letting with a view to prevent unreasonable eviction of tenants, as the municipality is enabled to lease the buildings in open auction and thereby realise higher rents and evict the tenants already in occupation of the godowns.

    The observations of Rajamannar, C.J. at pages 697, 698 and 699 in AIR 1954 Mad 690 (B), were relied on in support of this contention. In my view, this contention is also not tenable. The observations of Chagla, C.J. in - Rampratap Jaidayal v. Dominion of India, AIR 1953 Bom 170 at p 173 (E) clearly afford a complete answer to this objection and they are as follows :

    "It is impossible to understand how in any conceiveable case when a class is exempted from the operation of a law the object of that legislation can ever be advanced quae the exempted class. If Mr. Javeris contention were right, then no class can ever be exempted from the operation of any legislation. Take the very Prohibition case which the Supreme Court was considering. The question that fell for determination was whether the Legislature was justified in exempting the Army from the operation of the Prohibition Act.

    If what Mr. Javeri says was correct, then the exemption could not have been upheld because it is impossible to contend that the policy of Prohibition was furthered and the moral principle underlying that legislation was advanced by the Army being permitted to consume liquor as against the civilians who could not do so. But the Supreme Court upheld the classification on the ground that it was a reasonable classification, that the Army had a discipline of its own, that the Army, looking to its traditions, its past and, the dangerous profession which it had to practise, was entitled to certain relaxations which the civilians as a class were not entitled to, and it is from this point of view that the Supreme Court, came to the conclusion that there was a reasonable and just relation to the class exempted to the object sought by the legislation to be attained;

    Therefore, what is emphasised is the relevancy between the class exempted and the object of the legislation, or, in other words, the-logical connection between the two. What is emphasised is not the fact that in exempting a class the Legislature must carry out the entire legislation quae the exempted class. It is further pointed out in that judgment that whenever a class is excluded from the operation of the law, it must be possible for the Court to say that there must be some reasonable basis for exclusion of that class."

    7. Adopting those observations, I hold that there is a reasonable basis for the exclusion of this class of buildings, viz., the buildings, belonging to municipal councils and local boards and the Corporation of Madras in the State of Madras.

    8. The learned advocate for the petitioners-invited my attention to the orders passed by Government on 24-11-1948 directing the Municipal Councils not to lease out the godowns in open, auction but to lease them out on reasonable rents or periods extending to three years. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that the Government erred in going behind those orders-and issuing fresh instructions on 23-1-1954 directing the Commissioner to lease out the godowns by open auction for 1954-55 with a view to increase-the revenues of the council.

    When I asked the Government Pleader under what rule or provision the instructions were being issued by the Government, he was unable to point out any rule or Section of the District Municipalities Act. My attention was drawn to R. 12(f) of the rules framed under the District Municipalities Act and it provides that all leases of buildings and of lands belonging to the municipal Councils the rents of which are expected to exceed Rs. 200/- per annum should be effected by public auction.

    So the procedure adopted by the municipal council for 1955, in leasing out the godowns by public auction is perfectly justified. The instructions issued by the Government, D/- 23-1-1954 are also in accordance with that rule. The object of holding the auction, viz., to increase the revenues of the councils, is certainly in the interests of the Municipality and the public. The notice-issued by the Municipality to the petitioners, D/- 16-3-1955 calling upon them to deliver possession on 31-3-1955 is therefore not open to attack.

    I hold that by reason of the exemption of the godowns from the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act the Municipality was entitled to hold an open auction and lease out the buildings.

    9. In the result the applications fail and are dismissed with costs. Advocates fee in both the writs to the 1st Respondent is Rs. 100/- and to the 2nd Respondent is Rs. 100/-.

    Applications dismissed.

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    Comments

    Dasari Venkatadri And Another v. The Tenali Municipality And Another
    (Jul 27, 1955)