Hegde, J.:—

ORDER OF REFERENCE TO THE FULL BENCH

By Das Gupta C.J and Mir Iqbal Husain, J. on 20th July, 1960

Das Gupta, C.J:— In our opinion, the question which is raised in this revision petition should be referred to a Full Bench for decision. That question is:—Whether once a reference has been made to the Court on an application made under section 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, the Court can go into the question as to whether the said reference was made out of time and on that ground dismiss the reference. The matter arises in this way.

On 6-5-1953 an award was made by the Land Acquisition Officer, Tungabhadra. The compensation which was awarded was apportioned half and half between the petitioner and the respondent. The petitioner then applied under S. 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, on 12-1-1954, claiming the entire compensation for himself and asking the Collector to refer the case to the Court for settlement of the dispute in this matter. S. 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act provides that when a person interested, who is displeased with the Taluqdar's award may, within two months from the date of receiving notice of the award, apply to the Taluqdar in writing to refer the case to the Court for determination, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, or to the amount of the compensation, or to the persons to whom it is payable or to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. On such reference being made the Court under S. 16 of the said Act, shall cause notices to be served on the objector as the plaintiff and on all the persons interested and fix a date for enquiry of the case. S. 17 of the said Act provides that the enquiry in the case shall be restricted to the interest of the persons affected by the objection. S. 18 mentions the matters, which are to be considered in such enquiry. One more Section, which I need refer to, is S. 25 of the said Act, which provides; when the amount of compensation has been settled under S. 10 and any dispute arises in respect of such amount or any part thereof, or as to the persons to whom the compensation or any part thereof should be paid, the Taluqdar shall refer the dispute to the Court for decision. The Court, to which the matter was referred, held that the application of the petitioner made on 12-1-54 on which the reference was made was barred by limitation and therefore the Land Acquisition Officer (Collector) had no jurisdiction to refer the matter to the Court and the court had, also no jurisdiction to enter in the reference. On this view the Court dismissed the reference. On the merits, however, the Court came to the conclusion that the petitioner was alone entitled to the whole of the compensation. In this revision petition this decision of the Court is questioned by the petitioner.

The learned Advocate for the petitioner contended before us on the authority of a large number of decisions, viz., Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad(1) and Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad(2) and in others that once a reference is made to the Court, the Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether such a reference was within time and on that view to dismiss the reference. As against this contention the learned Advocate for the respondents urged before us, also on the authority of a series of decisions, viz., Abdul Sattar v. Hamida Bibi(3) Narayanappa v. Revenue Divn. Officer(4), and in others, that the Court has jurisdiction to go into the question as to whether or not the reference was made out of time. There are thus divergent views taken by different High Courts on this point. This matter, in our opinion, requires careful consideration and an authoritative decision on this point should be given by this High Court. It has to be noted at this stage that the decisions on which both the parties rely are decisions under the Central Land Acquisition Act. We have in this case to decide on the provisions of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act. There are obviously certain differences in some of the material provisions of this Act. Whether or not those differences will have any bearing on the question which we have to decide is a matter that will have to be gone into. In our opinion, this is a fit case where a decision on the question involved in it should be given by a Full Bench of this Court. We, therefore, refer the following question for decision by a Full Bench:—

“Whether the Acquisition Court can go behind a reference made by the Collector under sec. 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, if the application on which the reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation?”

The papers of this case be placed before me as the Chief Justice for constituting a Full Bench to decide this question.

Mir Iqbal Husain, J.:— I agree.

OPINION OF THE FULL BENCH

Hegde, J.:— The question referred for the decision of the Full Bench is:

“Whether the Acquisition Court can go behind a reference made by the Collector under section 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act, if the application on which the reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation?”

Section 14(1) of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act provides that:—

“Every person interested, who is displeased with the Taluqdar's award may, within two months from the date of receiving notice of the award, apply to the Taluqdar in writing to refer the case to the Court for determination whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, or to the amount of the compensation, or to the persons to whom it is payable or to the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested.’

It is conceded that for our present purpose Section 14(1) of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act is in pari materia with that corresponding provisions in the Indian Land Acquisition Ace, i.e Section 18. Hence hereinafter reference will be made only to the provisions contained in the Indian Land Acquisition Act and the same shall be referred to as the “Act”.

Judici alopinion is divided on the question whether the L.A Court (Acquisition Court) could examine the validity of a reference made to it under Sec. 18. The preponderance of judicial opinion is that the L.A.O (Land Acquisition Officer) being a statutor authority, his powers are those conferred by the “Act”, exercise of those powers should be in accordance with the provisions contained in the “Act” and that failure to comply with their requirements, of the law would make his reference under Sec. 81 an incompetent reference.

The Judicial Committee held in (Rai) Pramatha Nath Mullick Bahadur v. Secretary of State that the L.A Court being a special tribunal, its powers are strictly limited by the terms of Sections 18, 20 and 21 it can act only when a specific objection has been taken to the Collector's award, and its jurisdiction is confined to a consideration of that objection. But in that case there was no occasion to consider the scope of the powers of the L.A.O There can be no doubt that if the reference made by the L.A.O is a valid reference, then the L.A Court which is statutory tribunal is bound by that reference its duties and functions are those set out in the “Act”. But can it be said that the L.A Court has no competence to find out whether it has jurisdiction to try the matter referred to it? The scope and powers of specially constituted tribunals came up for consideration in The Queen v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-Tax. Dealing with that question Lord Esher, M.R observed:

“When an inferior Court or tribunal or body, which has to exercise the power of deciding facts, is first established by Act of Parliament, the legislature has to consider what powers it will give that tribunal or body. It may in effect say that, if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to each tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction to do such things, but not otherwise. There it is not for them conclusively to decide whether that state of facts exists, and, if they exercise the jurisdiction without its existence, what they do may be questioned, and it will be held that they acted without jurisdiction. But there is another state of things which may exist. The legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more. When the legislature are establishing such a tribunal or body with limited jurisdiction, they also have to consider, whatever jurisdiction they give them, whether there shall be any appeal from their decision, for otherwise there will be none. In the second of the two cases I have mentioned it is an erroneous application of the formula to say that the tribunal cannot give themselves jurisdiction by wrongly deciding certain facts to exist, because the legislature gave them jurisdiction to determine all the facts, including the existence of the preliminary facts on which the further exercise of their jurisdiction depends; and if they were given jurisdiction so to decide without any appeal being given, there is no appeal from such exercise of their jurisdiction.”

The law as explained by Lord Esher, M.R has found acceptance at the hands of the Supreme Court in Chaube Jagdish Prasad v. Ganga Prasad Chaturvedi wherein it was laid down, after referring to Lord Esher's observations noticed above, (see para 17 of the Judgment) that:

“These observations which relate to inferior Courts or tribunals with limited jurisdiction show that there are two classes of cases dealing with the power of such a tribunal (1) where the legislature entrusts a tribunal with the jurisdiction including the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminery state of facts on which the exercise of its jurisdiction depends exists and (2) where the legislature confers jurisdiction on such tribunate to proceed in a case where a certain state of facts exists is or shown to exist. The difference is that in the former case the tribunal has power to determine the facts giving it jurisdiction and in the latter case it has only to see that a certain state of facts exists.”

If the case falls under the former category, the decision of the tribunal as to the existence of the facts in question is final unless the same is made appealable or revisable by law, whereas in cases falling in the second category the jurisdiction of the tribunal is conditional on the existence of the jurisdictional facts. To put it differently: In setting up a tribunal the Legislature may follow one of two methods. It may provide that a tribunal shall have jurisdiction provided certain conditions exist and those conditions would be jurisdictional conditions going to the very jurisdiction of the tribunal. It would not be then for the tribunal to decide whether those conditions exist or not, because the very existence of its jurisdiction, its very authority depend upon those conditions existing, or the Legislature may set up a tribunal and confer upon that tribunal jurisdiction to decide all questions which arise in respect of a particular subject-matter for which the tribunal has been set up. In such a case it is not possible to contend that it is left to the Civil Court to decide whether certain conditions exist so that the tribunal can exercise its jurisdiction—see Baburao K. Pai…Plaintiff; v. Dalsukh M. Pancholi,…Defendant.. Bearing in mind these well accepted principles we shall now proceed to examine the scope of the powers conferred on the L.A.O

The provisions that bear on the powers of the L.A.O are found in sections 18 and 19 of the “Act”. Sec. 18 stipulates certain restrictions on the powers of the L.A.O Those restrictions are: (1) For making a reference under sec. 18, the L.A.O should be moved by a written application; (2) the person applying should be one interested in the subject matter of the reference and he should not have accepted the award; (3) the grounds of objection must relate to the measurement or the amount of compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation amongst the persons interested and those objections must have been stated in the application made by the “interested person” and (4) the application should be filed within the period stipulated in the provision. If these conditions are not considered as limiting and controlling the jurisdiction of the L.A.O then he can ignore those conditions and ask the L.A Court to decide on whatever matter he pleases and whenever he pleases. This is placing the L.A Court in an intolerable position. Nothing so bad could have been intended by the Legislature. There are no specific provisions requiring the L.A.O to examine or decide whether the conditions laid down are complied with or not, much less an appeal is provided against his decision; nor is it laid down that his decision on those points is final. The powers of the L.A.O in this regard clearly fall within the first category of cases mentioned in the decision in The Queen v. The Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-Tax case, and the second category of cases mentioned in Chaube Jagdish Prasad's case. This Court had to consider the scope of the powers of L.A.O in the State of Mysore v. K.L Gurushankaraiah. Therein one of us observed:

“The L.A.O is a statutory authority. His powers are those conferred by Act and the exercise of those powers should be in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. The very Statute which confers powers on him, also limits his jurisdiction and regulate the exercise of those powers. If he fails to comply with the provisions of the statute then his decision will be ultra vires of the powers conferred on him.”

In other words the conclusion arrived at was that the L.A.O has no absolute powers in the matter of making a reference under sec. 18 and the exercise of his powers is conditional. Several Courts have taken the view that the powers of the L.A.O to refer a matter to the L.A Court for decision is a conditional power and if the conditions set out in the “Act” are not complied with, the reference made by him would be an incompetent reference. In other words such a reference, in the eye of the law, is non-est. But, some decisions have taken the view that it is within the jurisdiction of the L.A.O to make a reference or not and if he chooses to make a reference, the L.A Court which is a statutory authority has no jurisdiction to go behind the reference and examine its correctness or validity. According to those decisions while the L.A.O could ignore the provisions of the “Act”, and as he pleases, the L.A Court should not travel outside the “Act” to find out its powers; the Court having not been conferred with specific powers to examine the validity of the reference made to it, it must proceed to dispose the reference according to the provisions contained in the “Act”.

The question whether the L.A Court can go behind the reference to find out the validity of the reference made was considered by a Division Bench of this Court (of which one of us was a Member) in Boregowda v. Subbaramiah. The judgment of the Bench was delivered by Sreenivasa Rau, J. (as he then was). This is what his Lordship stated on the point in question:

“It is urged however that the Court to which a reference is made cannot go behind the reference and consider its competency. In Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad, there are no doubt observations in support of that contention, but there are other decisions which take a contrary view; [Vide: Sukhbir Singh v. Secy, of State, Sitaram v. Kalandi Patra, Ghulam Mohyuddin v. Secy. of State(5), Collector of Akola v. Anand Rao(6), In re: Land Acquisition Act, (7)] The case, viz., Venkata Rao v. Devaraye Gowda(8), and the cases referred to in it also support the same view though it may be mentioned that the question of competency arose in all these cases while considering whether the reference had been made within the time prescribed in sec. 18.

But they all proceed on the footing that it is open to the Court to go behind the reference and see whether it is competent. That appears to us to be the correct view. When the power given to the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference is governed by statutory provisions, such a reference has to be made in conformity with those provisions and it stands to reason that the Court in which the reference is made, before embarking on the proceedings consequent on the reference, should be able to satisfy itself that the reference is in accordance with law, for the question is as much one of the Deputy Commissioner's jurisdiction to make the reference as of the Court to entertain the reference.”

This decision does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who made the present reference to the Full Bench. There is no reference to this decision in the order of reference. The view taken in Boregowda's case, is in accordance with preponderance of judicial opinion in this Country. The said view had commended itself to Chandavarkar, J. as long back as 1905. See Government and Nanu Kothare. Therein his Lordship held that the conditions prescribed by Sec. 18 of the Act are the conditions to which the power of the Collector to make the reference is subject, and those conditions must be fulfilled before the Court can have jurisdiction to entertain the reference.

The Bombay High Court has stood by that view consistently in Mahadeo Krishna Parkar v. Mamlatdar of Alibag, a Bench of the Bombay High Court presided by Beaumont C.J (who spoke for the Bench) observed:—

“On a reference under Sec. 18 the Court is bound to satisfy itself that the reference made by the Collector complies with the specified conditions so as to give the Court jurisdiction to hear the reference. It is not a question of the Court sitting in appeal or revision on the decision of the Collector; it is a question of the Court satisfying itself that the reference made under the Act is one which it is required to hear. If the reference does not comply with the term of the Act, then the Court cannot entertain it is the duty of the Court to see that the statutory conditions have been complied with and the reference is within time.”

(As summarised in the Head Note)

This view was again reiterated in C.J Desai v. Abdul Mazid Kadri. The judgment of the Bench in that case was delivered by Chagla, C.J He stated the law on the point thus:

“The power of the Collector to make a reference is circumscribed by the conditions laid down in sec. 18 and one important condition is the condition regarding limitation to be found in the provisi……Therefore in order to decide the petition under sec. 45 the Court would have to consider the question of limitation and take a contrary view to the view taken by the Collector if the Collector was wrong in his decision…”

(As summarised in the Head Note).

The same view was again expressed in Jehangir Bomaji v. C.D Gaikwad. The view taken by the Madras High Court is identical with the view taken by the Bombay High Court. In A.K Subramania Chettiar v. Collector of Coimbatore, it was held that in a reference made by a Collector under Sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Court has got power to go into the question of limitation. This very question came up for consideration again in Kana Navanna Narayanappa Naidu v. Revenue Divisional Officer, Sivakasi. It was held therein:—

“The necessary ‘sine qua non’ of the reference by Collector under Sec. 18 is the basic fact that the application for such a reference must be made in accordance with the provisions of that section and within the period specified in the proviso to that section if these provisions are not complied with, there cannot be any valid application at all and necessarily if such an application does not exist, a positive reference is incapable of existence.

No Court can be compelled to adjudicate upon matters which do not come before it in strict conformity with the requirements of law. It is within the inherent power of the Court to find out whether the matter that comes before it, is in the proper form and in accordance with the requirements of particular statutes. A passive attitude which the Court is compelled to adopt in case it is asked to adjudicate upon invalid references cannot be founded on law or reason.

It is, thus, within the competency of the Court to which a reference is made by the Collector under Sec. 18 to reject the reference made to it by the Collector beyond the period of limitation laid down in provision (a) to sub-sec. (2) of sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act.”

(As summarised in the Head Note).

The view taken by the old Mysore High Court is in accordance with the view taken by the Bombay and Madras High Courts. The earliest decision of the old Mysore High Court read to us is the decision in N. Venkata Rao v. Devaraya Gowda. Therein it was observed that:

“The Land Acquisition Officer's authority to make a reference is restricted 1 by the statutory conditions prescribed in Sec. 18 of the Regulation; if the requirements of the section are not complied with; if he does make a reference notwithstanding the fact that the application for reference was barred by limitation, the Court is not bound to accept the reference.”

This view was reiterated in Hosadurga Srinivasa Rao v. The Treasury Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer, Shimoga. The same was the view taken in T. Venkatarama Sastri v. Bangalore City Municipality and Special Land Acquisition Officer, City Improvement Board, Bangalore v. B. Varadaraja and S. Venkatanarasimha Raju. A Bench of the Lahore High Court in Ghulam Muhuyuddin v. Secretary of State held:

“It is always open to the Court to hold that an application to a Collector for reference could not form the basis of reference under Sections 18 and 19 in as much as it was barred by time.”

A Full Bench of the Lahore High Court in Abdul Sattar v. Mt. Hamida Bibi took the same view. It held:

“The Court functioning under the Land Acquisition Act being a Tribunal of special Jurisdiction, it is its duty to see that the reference under that Act is made to it by an authority competent to make the reference and that the reference relates to a matter which can be referred to it under that Act.”

Now we shall proceed to examine the decisions that have taken the contrary view. Kuppuswami Ayyar, J. sitting singly in Sri Venkatewaraswamy Varu, Bezwada v. Sub-Collector, Bezwada, took the view that it is the duty of the Collector before he makes the reference to decide on the materials before him whether he should make the reference or not, and if he decides to make and does make a reference, it is not open to the Land Acquisition Court to go behind it; It is not open to the High Court or any other authority to interfere when the Land Acquisition Officer decides to make or not to make a reference. He further opined that in case of a reference under Sec. 18 it is not the application of the party which gives jurisdiction to the civil Court, but it is the reference made by the L.A.O, an application may be given and the reference may not be made; consequently, if the application was not validly made, then it will only indicate that the reference was made without adequate grounds; but that will not make it any the less a reference which would give the Court jurisdiction to enquire into the question referred to. In the view of his Lordship, the powers conferred on the L.A.O, are-absolute powers and it was for him to decide whether the conditions stipulated in Sec. 18 are fulfilled or not. As noticed earlier, there is no provision in the “Act” requiring the L.A.O, to decide the question of limitation. On the other hand, an application by one of the interested persons within the period of limitation is a condition precedent for making a reference under Sec. 18. For the reasons already mentioned, we are unable to accept the view expressed in Verkateswaraswami's case, as laying down the law correctly. Moreover that decision was specifically over-ruled by a Division Bench of that Court in Narayanappa Naidu's case.

This takes us to the decisions of the Allahabad High Court. The earliest decision cited before us is the decision in Sukhbir Singh v. Secretary of State for India. In that case a Division Bench of that Court held:—

“That the application did not comply with the provisions of Sec. 18 and on a reference made on such applications, the District Judge got no jurisdiction.

That the matter of the award should be referred for the determination of the District Judge, but they asked that the matter relating to compensation should be postponed until the final decision as to the propriety or legality of Government in acquiring the land had been settled by a competent Court and they mentioned that the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector was low and was not accepted.”

The ratio of this decision is in accordance with the view taken by majority of the High Courts. But a different view was taken by another Division Bench of that Court in Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad. Therein their Lordships opined that making reference under Sec. 18 is an act within the jurisdiction and authority of the Collector and the L.A Court does not sit on appeal over the Collector and that the “Act” did not give authority to the Court either in express terms or by implication to go behind the reference. In the body of the judgment Mukerji, J. observed:

“If the application is beyond time, the Collector need not make a reference” but

“If he decides to make a reference, his act is within his jurisdiction, for he is entitled to act either way, i.e, either to make a reference or not to make a reference.”

That was also the view of Niamatullah, J. the other Judge constituting the Bench. He observed:

“It was the province of the Collector alone to decide for himself whether he should make the reference or refuse to do so. If he decides the question of limitation one way or the other, the Act does not allow an appeal against his decision to the District Judge, the High Court or any other superior authority.”

The view taken in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad was again reiterated in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad by a Bench consisting of Mukerji and Benett, JJ. The authority of these decisions has been rudely shaken by the decision of a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Panna Lal v. The Collector, Etah Therein the Full Bench held:—

“The powers of the Collector to make the reference are not unlimited. Compliance with the conditions mentioned in Sec. 18 which are conditions precedent to the exercise of the power of reference is necessary before that power can be invoked. Before exercising the jurisdiction conferred upon him by the section, the Collector is bound to see whether the required conditions have been complied with, and if they have not been complied with, he cannot exercise the jurisdiction. The making of the application within the prescribed time being one of the conditions laid down in the section itself, if the application is not made within time, the Collector can reject the application as incompetent and refuse to make the reference.”

(As summarised in the head note)

Even though the Full Bench did not in terms overrule the decision in Secretary of State v. Bhagwan Prasad Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad and Kashi Prasad v. Notified Area, Mahola, the ratio of the decision in the Full Bench case clearly runs counter to the ratio of the decisions above noticed. We are of the opinion that the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad Secy. of State v. Bhagwan Prasad and Kashi Prasad v. Notified area, Mahola, is not the correct view.

The only other decision cited in support of the contention that the L.A Court cannot go behind the reference is the decision in Hari Krishna Khosla v. State of Pepsu. This decision, more or less, followed the decision of the Madras High Court in Venkateswaraswami's Case, without noticing that the same had been over-ruled by a Division Bench of the said High Court in Narayanappa Naidu's case, which fact does not appear to have been brought to the notice of the learned Judges who decided Hari Krishna Khosla's case. As Sri Jagannatha Shetty, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, had placed great deal of reliance on that decision, it is necessary to examine the same in some detail. It was held in that decision that Sec. 18 constitutes the Collector the sole authority for making the reference; in the statement, which he has to make under Sec. 19 the question of limitation is not one of those matters which he is required to state at all; he is not even bound to send the application which is to be made under Sec. 18 along with the reference which he makes; all that the Court then has to do or can do under S. 20 is to thereupon cause a notice specifying the date on which the Court will proceed to determine the objection; in other words, as soon as the Collector makes a reference and states for the information of the Court the various matters set out in Sec. 19, the Court has to perform a ministerial act, namely, of causing a notice of the nature mentioned in Sec. 20; there is no other provision in the statute which entitles the Court to reexamine the question whether the Collector's order was correct on the question of the application having been made within the period of limitation; the Court's jurisdiction is confined to considering and pronouncing upon any one of the four different objections to an award under the “Act” which may have been raised in the written application for the reference. From these conclusions, it follows that at any rate some of the conditions laid down are binding on the L.A.O to wit a written application and objections only as regards the four specified subjects. From a reading of that judgment, it appears that the Court regarded these conditions as prerequisites for a valid reference. If that is so, it is not known how the Court was able to separate those conditions from the remaining conditions set out in Sec. 18. The Court did not address itself to the question as to what would be the position if the application to the L.A.O is made by a person other than the “person interested”. Would the L.A.O have authority to make a reference in such a case? This question was left unanswered. The observation “if the application was beyond time, the Collector need not make a reference. For the purpose of determining as to whether the application is within time, the Collector has to consider the facts and come to a decision. If he decided that the application was within time and otherwise in order, he would make a reference. It was entirely for him to decide whether he would make a reference. A reference having been made, it was not open to the Collector or to the State to say that the reference had been wrongly made nor could the Court sit in appeal over the Collector” has no basis in the provisions contained in the “Act”. We have not been shown any provision under which the L.A.O is required to decide the Hegde, J. question of limitation. The conditions mentioned in Sec. 18 appear to us to be conditions limiting; and controlling the jurisdiction of the L.A.O They are not matters to be decided by the L.A.O The discussion in the above cited decision as to whether the L.A.O is an administrative officer or a judicial officer is besides the point for our present purpose. Therefore, we are not called upon to examine the implications of the decision of the Privy Council in Ezra v. Secy. of State for India.

We are firmly of the opinion that the powers conferred on the L.A.O do not fall within the second category mentioned by Lord Esher, M.R in the Queen v. Commissioners for Special Purposes of the Income-Tax, viz., “the legislature may intrust the tribunal or body with a jurisdiction, which includes the jurisdiction to determine whether the preliminary state of facts exists as well as the jurisdiction, on finding that it does exist, to proceed further or do something more”. On the other hand, they fall within the first category mentioned by his Lordship, viz., that “if a certain state of facts exists and is shown to exist to such tribunal or body before it proceeds to do certain things, it shall have jurisdiction but not otherwise”.

It was then observed in Hari Krishna Khosla's case that:

“In fact the proviso occurs in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 18 and merely lays down that the plication which has to state on which ground objection to the award is taken, has to be presented within the period prescribed, but the real matters, on which the reference can be required, are stated in sub-sec. (1). The provision made with regard to the period within which the application is to be presented is purely procedural and it is difficult to see how it can be regarded as a condition precedent.”

If this conclusion is correct, the L.A.O can make a reference after the lapse of any number of years. Such a construction cannot be viewed with favour; it leads itself to mischief as well as misuse. With respect to the learned Judges who decided the above case, we do not think that their analysis of the scheme of sections 18 and 19 is correct. Sec. 18(1) says as to who could make the application how the application is to be made; and what objections could be raised in the application; Sec. 18(2) says that:

“The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken”.

Sec. 18(2) is a corrollary to sec. 18(1). Now we come to the proviso. The proviso lays down that such an application [meaning the application contemplated in sec. 18(2) shall be made within the time prescribed in clauses (a) and (b)] of that proviso. The conditions laid down in section 18 are not matters of procedure. They are conditions precedents for a valid reference. Statement under section 19 is in the nature of a covering letter giving a brief summary of the relevant facts, to assist the L.A Court to decide the points in issue. It serves the purpose of a plaint in a civil suit. We are unable to subscribe to the view that the L.A.O confers jurisdiction on the L.A Court either by means of a reference under section 18 or by his report under sec. 19. In our judgment, the L.A.O merely invokes the jurisdiction of the L.A Court by taking steps under sections 18 and 19 of the “Act”.

For the reasons mentioned above, we hold that the L.A Court can go behind the reference made by the Collector under section 14 of the Hyderabad Land Acquisition Act (or under section 18 of the Indian Laud Acquisition Act) if the application on which the reference has been made is beyond the period of limitation.

The reference is answered accordingly. The case will now go back to the Division Bench for disposal according to law in the light of the above decision.