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  • clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 13, nothing in sub-rule (1)
  • Order 9 Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 C.P.C
  • Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 13
  • sub-rule (2) nothing in sub-rule (1)
  • SECTION 145 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 74 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Order 13 Rule 1
  • Order 13 Rule 2 to CPC
  • Section 115 C.P.C
  • Order 13 Rules 1
  • Order 13, Rule 2
  • sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (1)
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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  • clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 13, nothing in sub-rule (1)
  • Order 9 Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 C.P.C
  • Sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 13
  • sub-rule (2) nothing in sub-rule (1)
  • SECTION 145 EVIDENCE ACT
  • SECTION 74 EVIDENCE ACT
  • provisions of Order 13 Rule 1
  • Order 13 Rule 2 to CPC
  • Section 115 C.P.C
  • Order 13 Rules 1
  • Order 13, Rule 2
  • sub-rule (2)
  • sub-rule (1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenges the order dated 20.2.85 of the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh in Misc. (J) Case No. 6 of 1979 arising out of Title Suit No. 48 of 1976. The impugned order rejected two petitions by the petitioner: (a) a petition to accept a certified copy of a decree in Suit No. 290 of 1974 of the No. II Civil Judge, Gorakhpur; and (b) a petition to recall the opposite party for further cross-examination.

Background facts as presented in the opinion: The petitioner instituted a suit for partition and accounts as one of the legal heirs of the late Adharam Singh. The suit was decreed ex parte on 10.8.76. The opposite party filed petition No. 514/79 on 16.2.79 under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 C.P.C. challenging the preliminary decree, and Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79 was registered. The grounds for setting aside included alleged suppression of the opposite party's minority and non-service of summons.

In the miscellaneous (judicial) case, the opposite party's evidence was closed on 6.12.82. After adjournments, the petitioner (as opposite party in the miscellaneous proceeding) filed petition No. 1797/84 and No. 1796/84 seeking acceptance of a certified copy of a decree (to show the opposite party was major when the title suit was instituted) and praying for recalling the opposite party for further cross-examination. The trial Judge rejected both applications, giving reasons that included inordinate delay in producing the certified copy (the decree was passed on 28.2.82, signed on 19.9.82, copy ready on 30.9.82, but produced only after the close of evidence), doubts about genuineness because some pages lacked proper signatures, and discrepancies in names and addresses between the certified copy and the opposite party's description in Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to receive the certified copy of the decree produced belatedly, having regard to Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the requirement of showing "good cause" for non-production of documents.
  2. Whether the trial court erred in refusing to recall the opposite party for further cross-examination in light of the alleged certified copy (and the requirements of Section 145 of the Evidence Act regarding contradiction by written statements).
  3. Whether the High Court should exercise revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. (or otherwise) to interfere with the impugned interlocutory order rejecting the application to receive the document and the application to recall the witness.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Mr. D.N. Choudhury)

  • The certified copy is a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act and the court could not doubt its genuineness without affording an opportunity to explain; this denial was violative of natural justice.
  • The trial court improperly assessed the probative value of the document without admitting it and relied on materials not on record.
  • Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 are not penal and should be liberally construed; the court should have admitted the document and awarded costs rather than rejecting it on technicalities.
  • The court should prioritize the ends of justice over mere technicalities of procedure.

Opposite Party's Arguments (Mr. P.G. Barua)

  • The petitioner engaged in dilatory tactics; there was no good reason for not producing the certified copy earlier.
  • The certified copy was obtained in 1982 but the petition to produce it was filed only on 13.12.84 and no satisfactory explanation for the delay was given.
  • The impugned order is an interlocutory procedural order that does not finally decide a case and, therefore, the order is not a "case decided".
  • No jurisdictional error has been shown in the trial court's exercise of discretion.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kumar Gopika v. Atal Singh, AIR 1922 PC 99 The exclusionary rule in Order 13 Rule 2 applies only when documents should have been produced at the first hearing; exception where documents were not in party's possession or unknown to advisers at that time. Used to explain that O.13 R.2 does not operate where documents could not reasonably have been produced earlier; supports discretionary reception where appropriate facts exist.
Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram, (1977) 1 SCC 669; AIR 1976 SC 461 Order 13 Rule 2 does not require any ritualistic formula in which an order must be passed; its object is to prevent belated production so as to avoid injustice, and it vests discretion in the court. Relied upon to underline that the trial court has discretion to admit belated documents if good cause is shown and that the manner of recording reasons is not subject to a fixed ritual.
State of Punjab v. Shyamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 Procedural law is a servant of justice and not a tyrant; procedure should aid, not obstruct, justice. Cited to emphasise that procedural rules should not be applied rigidly to defeat justice; informs the Court's approach to discretionary admission under O.13.
Major S.S. Khanna v. Brig J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497 The expression "case" is comprehensive and not restricted to an entire proceeding; High Court's supervisory jurisdiction is not so limited as to exclude parts of proceedings. Applied to explain the ambit of revisionary jurisdiction under Section 115 C.P.C. and to reject a narrow reading that would prevent High Court interference in certain interlocutory orders that may cause injustice.
Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors, (1969) 2 SCC 201; AIR 1970 SC 406 Not every order in the course of a suit is a "case decided" under Section 115; a "case" involves adjudication of some right or obligation. Used to explain limits of Section 115 and to clarify when an interlocutory order may be treated as a case decided for revisional purposes.
Naba Kumar Das v. Rudra Narayan Jana, AIR 1923 P.C. 95 Interpreting Section 145 of the Evidence Act: a witness may be cross-examined about prior written statements without showing the writing, but if the writing is to be used to contradict, the witness's attention must be drawn to those parts before proof. Applied to hold that even if the certified copy was not received, the petitioner should be given an opportunity to recall the witness and use the certified copy to contradict him, subject to Section 145 requirements.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying and summarising the relevant procedural provisions: sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 13 (production of documentary evidence at or before settlement of issues), sub-rule (2) thereof (Court shall receive documents so produced subject to list requirements), and Rule 2 (effect of non-production and requirement to show good cause for late production, and the requirement for reasons to be recorded when such evidence is received). The Court also noted clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 which exempts documents produced for cross-examination of the other party's witnesses.

The Court reviewed authorities interpreting Order 13 Rules 1 and 2, emphasising that:

  • The exclusionary rule of O.13 R.2 applies when a document should have been produced at the first hearing; it does not apply where the document was not in the party's possession or reasonably unknown to advisers at that time (Kumar Gopika).
  • Order 13 Rule 2 confers discretion and does not dictate any ritualistic formula for orders; its object is to prevent belated production that would cause injustice (Madan Gopal Kanodia).
  • Procedural law must aid justice rather than obstruct it (State of Punjab v. Shyamlal Murari).

Applying these principles to the facts, the Court observed:

  • The certified copy of the decree was passed on 28.2.82, signed on 19.9.82; the petitioner applied for a copy on 16.9.82 and was informed it was ready for delivery on 30.9.82. Despite that, the certified copy was produced only after the close of evidence in the miscellaneous proceeding.
  • Given this sequence, the petitioner did not provide a satisfactory explanation for the inordinate and inexcusable delay in production; the trial court was therefore entitled to require "good cause" before receiving the document under O.13 R.2.
  • The trial court also expressed serious doubts as to the genuineness of the certified copy because not all pages bore the signature of the proper authority, and there were discrepancies between the name and address in the certified copy and the way the opposite party had described himself in the miscellaneous case.
  • If a document produced belatedly is not relevant on scrutiny (for example, because of discrepancies or doubts about genuineness) the trial court is entitled to refuse to receive it; the trial court gave reasons for refusing to receive the certified copy and the High Court found no jurisdictional error in that regard.

Regarding recall for cross-examination, the Court analysed Section 145 of the Evidence Act (as explained in Naba Kumar Das) and noted that clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Order 13 Rule 2 excludes documents produced for cross-examination from the operation of the exclusionary rule. Thus, even though the certified copy was not admitted, it would remain open to the petitioner to cross-examine the opposite party if he were recalled, and, if the certified copy embodied statements inconsistent with the witness's deposition, Section 145 requires that the witness's attention be drawn to the parts intended to be used for contradiction.

The Court concluded that while it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the trial court's refusal to receive the certified copy (given the delay and doubts about authenticity), refusal to allow recall of the opposite party could result in miscarriage of justice if the petitioner were thereby deprived of an opportunity to contradict the witness on the basis of the certified copy. Therefore, the Court set aside the part of the impugned order rejecting the recall application and remanded that application to the trial court to be decided in the light of the principles articulated in the opinion (including the possibility of recalling the witness to permit contradiction in accordance with Section 145).

Holding and Implications

Holding: Petition partly allowed.

Court's specific orders and direct consequences:

  • The High Court upheld the trial court's refusal to receive the certified copy of the decree; the trial court's exercise of discretion in refusing the late-produced document was not interfered with.
  • The High Court set aside the trial court's order refusing to recall the opposite party for further cross-examination and remanded that application to the trial court for fresh consideration in light of the discussion (including requirements under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and the exemption in O.13 R.2 for documents produced for cross-examination).
  • The Court indicated that reasonable costs could be awarded by the trial court to the opposite party to cover loss and expenses and to discourage delay, but the final line of the opinion records: "In the result this petition is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs." Thus, the High Court itself awarded no costs.

Broader implications:

The opinion applies established principles on the discretionary admission of belated documents under Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 and on the requirements of Section 145 of the Evidence Act for contradicting a witness by prior written statements. The decision does not purport to lay down a new general rule or a novel precedent; it applies existing authority to the facts before the Court. The direct practical effect is to give the petitioner an opportunity to seek recall of the opposite party for contradiction (subject to procedural safeguards), while leaving the trial court's finding on delay and doubts about the certified copy's genuineness intact.

    Shri Jai Prakash Singh v. Shri Ram Narayan Singh Opposite Party.

    1. The petitioner herein impugns the order dated 20.2.85 of the Assistant District Judge, Dibrugarh in Misc. (J) Case No. 6 of 1979 arising out of Title Suit No. 48 of 1976 rejecting his petitions, the first for accepting the certified copy of a decree in Suit No. 290 of 1974 of No. II Civil Judge, Gorakhpur; and the second to recall the opposite party for cross-examination.

    2. The petitioner instituted the above title suit against the opposite party and few others for partition and accounts of their ancestral coparcenary properties amongst themselves claiming themselves to be the legal heirs of one late Adharam Singh. The suit was decreed exparte with costs on 10.8.76 The opposite party filed petition No. 514/79 on 16.2.79 under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Sec. 151 C.P.C for rejecting the preliminary de???ree which was drawn up, whereupon Misc.(J) Case No. 6/79 was registered. The main grounds urged for setting aside the decree of the title suit were that the petitioner, as plaintiff, suppressed material facts of defendant-opposite party's minority on the date of filing of the suit and non-service of summons on him. In the miscellaneous (judicial) case the opposite party's evidence was closed on 6.12.82 and the next date 19.1.83 was fixed for evidence of the petitioner's party. After several adjournments the instant petitioner as opposite party filed two petitions, namely, petition No. 1797/84 and No. 1796/84 for acceptance of the above certified copy of the decree and for recalling the opposite party for further cross-examination, as stated above. By the certified copy of the aforesaid decree the petitioner wanted to show that the opposite party was major and not minor at the time of institution of the title suit. The learned trial Judge, after examining the provisions of Order 13 Rule 1 observed that as the said decree was passed on 28.2.82 and was signed by the Presiding Officer of the Court on 19.9.82, there was no valid reason or cause preventing the petitioner from procuring the certified copy of the same at an early date and the reason given that the cerfied copy was lying at Gorakhpur, was not believed. Besides, the petition for copy of the document was filed on 16.9.82 and the same was ready for delivery to the petitioner on 30.9.82 and consequently the document was evidently produced before the Court after inordinate and inexcusable delay and without any reasonable explanation. It was produced after the closure of evidence, including that of the opposite party himself, who was cross-examined at length by the petitioner. The learned trial Court also expressed serious doubt about the correctness, if not genuineness, of the alleged certified copy as all the pages did not bear the signature of the proper authority. The Court further observed that the said decree contained the name of one Ram Narayan Singh, aged 19 years, son of Ram Awadh Singh, resident of Village Bharah Tappa Burhej, Pargana Dhuripur, Tehsil Bongaon, Gorakhpur. The opposite party described himself in Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79 as Sri Ram Narayan Singh, son of late Adharam Singh, resident of Village Gareh, P.C Rekahat, District Gorakhpur, U.P, presently residing at Digboi town, Mouza Makum, P.S Digboi in the district of Dibrugarh. The application for acceptance of the certified copy of the decree having been rejected, the Court also rejected the prayer for recalling the opposite party for cross-examination as his evidence was already over and he was thoroughly cross-examined. Mr. D.N Choudhury, the learned counsel for the petitioner, submits, inter alia, that the certified copy of the decree being a public document under Section 74 of the Evidence Act doubting the genuineness and authority of the document without giving the petitioner an opportunity to explain, was wholly without jurisdiction and violative of the principles of natural justice; that the Court acted in excess of jurisdiction by assessing the probative value of the document without admitting the document itself, on materials which were not on record; that Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 are not penal provisions and hence they are to be liberally construed and costs should have been awarded; and that the Court should have aimed at the ends of justice rather than mere technicalities of the law.

    3. Mr. P.G Barua, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite party, refutes the contentions submitting that the petitioner has been resorting to dilatory tactics and that there could be no earthly reason why the certified copy could not be produced earlier; that the certified copy was obtained in 1982 while the petition was filed after inordinate delay on 13.12.84 without giving satisfactory explanation for the delay; that the impugned order is purely an interlocutory procedural order and does not affect the right and, as such, it is not a case decided; and that no jurisdictional error has been pointed out by the petitioner.

    4. To appreciate the rival contentions a reference to relevant provisions may be necessary. sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 13 of the C.P.C provides that the parties or their pleaders shall produce, at or before the settlement of issues, all the documentary evidence of every description in their possession or power, on which they intend to rely, and which has not already been filed in Court, and all documents which the Court has ordered to be produced. Under sub-rule (2) thereof the Court shall receive the documents so produced: Provided that they are accompanied by an accurate list thereof prepared in such form as the High Court directs. Rule 2 deals with the effect of non-production of documents. Under sub-rule (1) thereof, no documentary evidence in the possession or power of any party which should have been but has not been produced in accordance with the requirements of Rule 1 shall be received at any subsequent stage of the proceedings unless good cause-is shown to the satisfaction of the Court for the non-production thereof; and the Court receiving any such evidence shall record the reasons for so doing. Under sub-rule (2) nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to document,—(a) produced for the-cross examination of the witnesses of the other party, or (b) handed over to a witness marely to refresh his memory.

    5. As was ruled in Kumar Gopika v. Atal Singh, AIR 1922 PC 99 the rule of exclusion in O. 13, R. 2 only comes into-operation when the documents on which the parties rely should have been but were not;, produced at the first hearing. Where according to the evidence, at the date of the first hearing certain documeuts were not in the possession or power of the plaitiff and his advisers did not know of their existence so as to enable them to inspect them and form an opinion as to whether they would rely on them or not it was held that it could not be said that they should have been produced at the first-hearing and therefore, the rule did not authorise the exclussion. Even where the rule of exclusion applies and documents cannot be filed without the leave of the Court, that leave should not ordinarily be refused where the documents or official records of undoubted authenticity might assist the Court to decide rightly the issues before it. So also in Madan Gopal Kanodia v. Mamraj Maniram, (1977) 1 SCC 669 : AIR 1976 SC 461 it has been held that Order 13 Rule 2 to CPC does not provide for any particular ritualistic formula in which the order of the Court has to be passed. The object of Order 13, Rule 2 is merely to prevent belated production of documents, so that it may not work injustice to the defendant. This provision clearly clothes the Court with discretion to all production of documents if it is satisfied that good cause is shown to its satisfaction. It was observed in State of Punjab v. Shyamlal Murari, (1976) 1 SCC 719 at para 8 that “procedural law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice.”

    6. In the instant cafe as the petitioner failed to produce the copy of the decree u???til the opposite party's evidence was closed, the same could not be received unless good cause was shown to the satisfaction of the Court for non-production thereof. For receiving any such evidence it was necessary to record the reasons for doing so. Order 13 Rule 2 has not made it necessary on the part of the Court to record reasons for not receiving such evidence. Even so the learned Court has given reasons for rejecting the certified copy. If the document so produced was not found to be at all relevant it would be enough justification for the Court to refuse to receive it. On a persual of the application for acceptance of the certified copy it appears that no discrepancy in the address of the opposite party and his father's name as given in the certified copy of the decree sought to be produced and in the petition in Misc. (J) Case No. 6/79, was at all stated or indicated. If on scrutiny of the certified copy proposed to be produced the court found out a discrepancy and therefrom came to the conclusion that the certified copy would not be relevant, no fault can be found with the trial Court. If the court was not satisfied with the explanation given as to the delay in production of the certified copy, then the court ordinarily would not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court in this regard. It is true that the object of Order 13 Rules 1 and 2 is not to penalise the party and not to shut out the door for the party to state his case. When good cause is shown and the document is of vital importance for proper adjudication of the case and there was no apparent reason to withhold the document the party's submission deserves to be accepted. The doubt expressed as to the genuinness of the certified copy will in no way affect its validity if it is otherwise valid. In para 9 of the petition the petitioner states that Adharam Singh, son of late Mohabir Singh, grand-father of the petitioner, described himself both an Adharam Singh as well as Ram Awadh Singh; that the identity of Adharam Singh who is also described as Ram Awadh Singh, son of late Mohabir Singh was never questioned by any of the parties; and that it is also not disputed that Ram Narayan Singh is one of the sons of late Adharam Singh alias Ram Awadh Singh. According to the petitioner it is not disputed that Adharam Singh had properties including residence both at Village Bharah Tappa also described as Bharroah and village Garahi, but there was no such explanation in the application for production of the copy

    7. In the context of the view we have taken it is not necessary to decide whether the impugned order amounted to a case decided. As was ruled in Major S.S Khanna v. Brig J. Dillon, AIR 1964 SC 497, the expression ‘case’ is a word of comprehensive import. It is not restricted by anything contained in Section 115 C.P.C to the entirety of the proceeding in a civil court. To interpret the expression ‘case’, as an entire proceeding only and not a part of a proceeding would be to impose a restriction upon the exercise of powers of superintendence to which the jurisdiction to issue writs, and the supervisory jurisdiction are not subject, and may result in certain cases in denying relief to an aggrieved litigant where it is most needed, and may result in the perpetration of gross injustice. The expression ‘case’ includes a suit, but in ascertaining the limits of the jurisdiction of the High Court, there would be no warrant for equating it with a suit alone. As ???uled in Baldevdas Shivlal v. Filmistan Distributors, (1969) 2 SCC 201 : AIR 1970 SC 406, every order of the Court in the cource of a suit does, not amount to a case decided. A case may be said to be decided, if the Court adjudicates for the purposes of the suit some right or obligation of the parties in controversy; every order in the suit cannot be regarded as a ‘case decided’ within the meaning of Section 115. The word ‘case’ is more comprehensive than the word ‘suit’ and it includes a large number of proceedings which are strictly speaking mot suits. Therefore, what is allowed to a party by 0. 13 Rr. 1 and 2, if illegally denied, it would amount to denial of a procedural right conferred by law; and the order would be revisable.

    8. Section 115 of the C.P.C speaks of ‘any case’ which has been decided by any Court subordinate to such High Court and in which no appeal lies, but the High Court shall not vary or reverse any order made, or any order deciding an issue in the course of a suit or other proceeding, except where-(a) the order, if it had been made in favour of the party applying for revision, would have finally disposed of the suit or other proceeding, or (b) the order, if allowed to stand, would occasion a failure of justice or cause irreparable injury to the party against whom it was made. Even if it is not strictly speaking a case decided, when it appears to the Court that the order, if allowed to stand would occasion failure of justice or cause irreparable injury against whom it was made, it is open for the High Court to interfere in revision. While strictly applying the provision of O. 13. R. 1 there may be situations and circumstances where its operation might cause miscarriage of justice. Hence O. 13. R. 2 invested the Court with discretionary jurisdiction to accept documents filed at belated stage. The Court, however, has to be satisfied as to existence of good and sufficient grounds for not filing the document at or before the settlement of issues. What would be good and sufficient reasons will always depend on the facts and circumstances. Where, however, the provision of O. 13 R. 2 is being invoked malafide or for vexatious reasons, the cause shown cannot be held to be good and sufficient cause. Under such circumstances disc???etionary jurisdiction should not be exercised. Where, however, the document is vital and would assist the Court in coming to a correct decision and no oblique motive is clear for not filing the document earlier, the Court should not ordinarily refuse to receive it. If the consequence of the refusal to receive the document is such that it would result-in miscarriage of justice, there will be justification for the High Court to intefere in revision with such an order. In the instant case we do not find any jurisdiction for interfering with the order refusing to receive the certified copy. As regards the recalling of the opposite party for further cross-examination, Mr. Choudhury relies on Naba Kumar Das v. Rudra Narayan Jana, AIR 1923 P.C 95 wherein interpreting section 145 of the Evidence Act, it was held that a witness cannot be disbelieved without his attention being drawn to the documents inconsistent with deposition even though the documents were produced after his examination. Under section 145 of the Evidence Act a witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in writing or reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question without such writing being shown to him, or being proved; but if it is intended to contradict him by the writing, his attention must, before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him. We have already seen that under clause (a) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 2 of Order 13, nothing in sub-rule (1) shall apply to documents produced for the cross-examination of the witnesses of the other party. Thus though the certified copy of the decree was not received by tne Court, it would be open for the petitioner to cross-examine the opposite party with referrence to the certified copy, if he is recalled. Considering the fact that the minority of the opposite party is in issue he could be contradicted on basis of the certified copy as regards his age. If that opportunity is refused to the petitioner it may result in miscarriage of justice. The learned trial court rejected the application for recalling the opposite party after he rejected the application for receiving the certified copy of the decree. It is however felt that if the petitioner is not given an opportunity to cross-examine the opposite party with reference to the statements he made earlier, if embodied in the certified copy of the decree, it may result in injustice. The impugned order rejecting the application for recalling the opposite party is accordingly set aside and the application is remanded to the trial court for decision in light of what has been stated hereinabove. Mr. Choudhury submits that the petitioner is ready and willing to bear reasonable costs. The court should therefore, award reasonable costs to the opposite party to cover his loss and expenses and should see that the delay is avoided.

    9. In the result this petition is partly allowed to the extent indicated above. No costs.

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    Comments

    Shri Jai Prakash Singh v. Shri Ram Narayan Singh Opposite Party.
    (Aug 4, 1986)