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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents inducted the petitioner into flat No. 9 in Manashree Apartments, Pune, under a leave and licence agreement dated February 4, 1984, for a period of 11 months, which has since expired. The respondents initially filed a dispute before the Co-operative Court under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, seeking possession of the premises. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court. On December 1, 1994, the respondents sought withdrawal of the dispute with liberty to file fresh proceedings, but the Co-operative Court permitted only unconditional withdrawal without granting such liberty. Subsequently, the respondents filed proceedings before the Competent Authority under Part 2-A of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, seeking recovery of possession. The Competent Authority granted the application, leading to this petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the respondents' application before the Competent Authority is barred under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code due to the prior withdrawal in the Co-operative Court.
  2. Whether section 31-H of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 applies to bar the respondents' application.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The respondents' application before the Competent Authority is barred under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code because the earlier dispute was withdrawn unconditionally in the Co-operative Court.
  • Alternatively, the application is barred under section 31-H of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondents' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shah Mukhun Lall v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh, 12 M.I.A 157 Principle that a party cannot both approbate and reprobate the same transaction The court applied this principle to reject the petitioner's attempt to challenge the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court while relying on its order to bar fresh proceedings.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court first rejected the applicability of section 31-H of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, as the dispute was initiated after the Amending Act of 1986 came into force, and the section applies only to proceedings pending at the commencement of that Act.

Regarding the bar under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court held that since the petitioner had challenged the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court, it could not now contend that the dispute was maintainable there and that fresh proceedings without leave are barred. This is based on the principle against approbation and reprobation, as explained in the cited precedent.

Furthermore, the court found that the Co-operative Court erred in permitting withdrawal without liberty to file fresh proceedings when the application was for withdrawal with liberty. It is settled law that a court cannot grant withdrawal without liberty if such liberty is sought, although it may reject the application altogether.

Thus, the petitioner's contentions were rejected, and the application before the Competent Authority was held to be maintainable.

Finally, the court considered the petitioner's request for time to vacate the premises and granted an extension until the end of April 1996, subject to certain conditions including a written undertaking and payment of arrears and compensation.

Holding and Implications

The court's final decision was to DISMISS the petition challenging the order of the Competent Authority directing delivery of possession to the respondents.

The petitioner was granted time until April 30, 1996, to vacate the premises on specified conditions. No costs were ordered. This decision directly affects the parties by upholding the Competent Authority's order and allowing possession to be delivered to the respondents, without setting any new legal precedent.

    Mario Shaw v. Martin Fernandez And Another

    1. This petition takes exception to an order passed by the Competent Authority, Pune directing delivery of possession of the licensed premises to the respondents.

    2. Ms. Purohit, learned counsel for the petitioner, raised before me a twofold submission. Firstly, Ms. Purohit submitted that the application of the respondents is barred under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. Alternatively, she submitted that the application must be held to be barred by the provisions of section 31-H of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. Before I deal with the submissions of Ms. Purohit, I would briefly state the factual background.

    3. Under an agreement of leave and licence dated February 4, 1984, the respondents inducted the petitioner in flat No. 9 in building called Manashree Apartments, situate at Fatima Nagar, Pune. The agreement of leave and licence was for a period of 11 months and there is no dispute that the said agreement has come to an end by efflux of time. Initially, the respondents approached the Co-operative Court by filing a dispute under section 91 of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 claiming possession of the premises. The petitioner contested the dispute by filing a written statement. It is not necessary to deal with the various contentions raised in the written statement, but suffice it to say that the petitioner challenged the maintainability of the dispute on the ground that the Co-operative Court has no jurisdiction to try the dispute. On December 1, 1994, the respondents made an application for withdrawal of the dispute with a liberty to file appropriate proceedings. The Co-operative Court, however, passed an order permitting only unconditional withdrawal without granting any liberty for institution of fresh proceedings. Thereafter, the respondents filed the present proceedings before the Competent Authority under Part 2-A of the Act and recovery of possession By the impugned order, the Competent Authority has granted the application.

    4. Turning then to the submission raised by Ms. Purohit, it is necessary to mention at the outset that section 31-H of the Act has no application to the facts of the present case, which contemplates withdrawal of the proceedings pending in the other Courts at the time on the date of commencement of the Amending Act of 1986. Admittedly, the dispute in the present case was filed after the Amending Act came into force and, therefore, section 31-H is not attracted.

    5. Now I will deal with the other part of the submission of the learned counsel. Ms. Purohit says that the order of the Co-operative Court clearly shows that the dispute was withdrawn unconditionally and if that is so, the initiation of the present proceedings on the same cause of action is barred by sub-rule (4) of Rule 1 of Order 23. The submission must be rejected for more than one reason. In the first place, it is not permissible for the petitioner to approbate and reprobate at the same time. Before the Co-operative Court, the petitioner specifically contended that the Co-operative Court has no jurisdiction to try the dispute. If the Co-operative Court has no jurisdiction, then, surely, the bar under Order 23, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code will not be operative. It is an age old principle that a party shall not at the same time affirm and disaffirm the same transaction — affirm it as far as it is for his benefit, and disaffirm it as far as it is to his prejudice. In Shah Mukhun Lall v. Baboo Sree Kishen Singh, 12 M.I.A 157, Lord Chelmsford observed:

    “A man cannot both affirm and disaffirm the same transaction, show its true nature for his own relief, and insist on its apparent character to prejudice his adversary. This principle, so just and reasonable in itself, and often expressed in the terms, that you cannot both approbate and reprobate the same transaction, has been applied by their Lordships in this Committee to the consideration of Indian Appeals, as one applicable also in the Courts of that country, which are to administer justice according to equity and good conscience. The maxim is founded, not so much on any positive law, as on the broad and universally applicable principles of justice.”

    Once having questioned the jurisdiction of the Co-operative Court, it is not now open for the petitioner to say that the dispute before the Co-operative Court was maintainable and, therefore, the present proceedings, which are instituted without the leave of the Co-operative Court, are not maintainable.

    6. There is one more reason for rejecting the petitioner's contention. Admittedly, the application made by the respondents before the Co-operative Court was for withdrawal of the dispute with a liberty to file fresh proceedings. If that is so, the Co-operative Court was clearly in error in passing an order of withdrawal without granting permission to initiate fresh proceedings. It is well settled that if an application is made for withdrawal of the suit with liberty to file a suit, it is not open for the Court to grant only permission for withdrawal without liberty to institute the proceedings, though it is open for the Court to reject such application. Thus I do not find any merit in this petition and the same is dismissed summarily.

    7. Ms. Purohit says that her client is prepared to abide by the orders passed by this Court. She says that in view of the fact that the petitioner's children are still studying, the petitioner requires some time to search for the alternative premises. In my opinion, the ends of justice will be served if the petitioner is granted sufficient time to vacate the premises. Accordingly, the petitioner is granted time to vacate till the end of April, 1996 subject to filing his written undertaking in this Court within two weeks from today that the petitioner and his family members are in exclusive possession and no one else is in possession; that he will not create any third party interest or part with possession of the suit premises till the vacant possession thereof is handed over to the landlord; that he will deliver the vacant and peaceful possession to the landlord on or before April 30, 1996; that he will pay all the arrears as per the order of the Competent Authority within four weeks from today and he will go on paying compensation as per the rate fixed by the Competent Authority.

    8. Civil Revision Application is disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.
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    Comments

    Mario Shaw v. Martin Fernandez And Another
    (Oct 11, 1995)