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F.M.A.T Nos. 1544-46 of 1981

Attorney(S)

D.Pal
A.P.Chatterjee
H.N.Mukherjee
Rabilal Maitra

Judges

M.M Dutt
Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, JJ.

Acts

provision of Order 1 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
Order 1 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.10.
S. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
provision of Rule 3(2) of the Rules,
S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act,
provision of Order 1 rule 1,

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

These three appeals were preferred by the District School Board of Nadia against a judgment of B.C. Ray, J., which had made absolute the Rules Nisi issued on applications brought by the respondents (primary teachers) under Article 226 of the Constitution. The respondents had been included in a panel prepared in 1972–1973 by the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, and had been appointed to deputation vacancies (vacancies arising when permanent teachers went for training). They were not appointed to permanent vacancies at that time, although they had worked in deputation vacancies from about 1973–1974 onwards.

The Director of Public Instruction issued a circular dated 19 December 1974 stating that approved empanelled candidates appointed in deputation vacancies may be absorbed in permanent posts during service or within one year of expiry of the deputation term even if the panel's validity expired or a fresh panel was prepared in the meantime. That circular was subsequently suspended from time to time. By an order dated 3 November 1978 the Government of West Bengal decided to suspend final absorption of deputation vacancy teachers pending full examination of policy; that order also treated a prior departmental G.O. dated 30.8.78 as cancelled.

Prior to the 3 November 1978 order, an advertisement had been published to prepare a fresh panel. The respondents contended that, had the 1974 circular not been suspended, they would have been absorbed in permanent vacancies; they challenged the 3 November 1978 order by writ petition. The learned trial Judge made the Rule Nisi absolute and directed the appellants to consider and absorb the respondents in permanent vacancies (in posts kept vacant by interim orders) within four weeks of the trial Judge's judgment and to place them in schools nearer to their residences, as far as possible. The District School Board of Nadia appealed.

The opinion notes that the facts and most issues in these appeals are the same as in two earlier appeals (F.M.A.T. No. 1380 of 1980 and F.M.A.T. No. 1499 of 1981), which this Court had disposed of by its judgment dated 11 January 1982. The learned Judges in the present opinion who authored/concured are M.M. Dutt, J., and Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J. (who agreed).

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the writ petition that gave rise to F.M.A.T. No. 1544 of 1981 was maintainable when some of the joint petitioners had already been appointed to the posts sought, i.e., whether appointment of some petitioners during pendency should defeat the entire joint petition.
Whether the Government order dated 3 November 1978 that suspended absorption of deputation-vacancy teachers (thereby suspending the Director of Public Instruction's circular of 19 December 1974) was valid.
Whether the inclusion of the respondents' names in an allegedly "additional panel" (a list dated 29 July 1973 prepared two days after a first list dated 27 July 1973) rendered them ineligible for appointment, i.e., whether the Director of Public Instruction had authority to prepare an "additional" panel or whether only a single panel could exist.
Whether candidates whose names were approved for appointment in one circle could be appointed to posts in another circle (a contention which the Court noted but declined to decide in substance).

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (District School Board of Nadia)

The writ petition in F.M.A.T. No. 1544 of 1981 is not maintainable because, of 23 writ petitioners, 15 applied under the notification dated 27 November 1978, and of those 15, seven have already been appointed and two included in a panel; since some petitioners are already appointed and therefore disentitled to relief, the entire joint writ petition should be dismissed. Reliance was placed on Ganesh Nayak v. Land Acquisition Collector, 65 CWN 908 (Sinha J.).
The names of the respondents were included in an "additional panel" dated 29 July 1973 (separate from a list dated 27 July 1973). Appellants contended there was no scope for preparing an additional panel and therefore the Director of Public Instruction lacked authority to prepare such a panel; consequently the respondents were not entitled to appointment.
The respondents included in the list dated 29 July 1973 were not selected by the Advisory-cum-Selection Committee before their names were included; hence they lacked entitlement.
The candidates approved in one circle should not be appointed to posts in another circle.

Respondents' Position (Writ Petitioners / Primary Teachers)

The respondents were empanelled and had been working in deputation vacancies since about 1973–1974. Under the Director of Public Instruction's circular dated 19 December 1974 they were eligible to be absorbed in permanent posts; had that circular not been suspended they would have been absorbed. On that basis they challenged the Government's order dated 3 November 1978 which suspended final absorption pending policy review.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Ganesh Nayak v. Land Acquisition Collector, 65 CWN 908 (Sinha J.)	Addressed maintainability of a joint writ petition by multiple applicants with independent causes of action; held joint petition not maintainable and dismissed on technical ground where some applicants had alternative statutory remedies.	The Court considered the decision but observed that Sinha J. did not consider Order 1 Rule 1 CPC. The Court rejected the appellants' reliance on this case as establishing a rule that a joint writ petition must fail if some petitioners become disentitled to relief. The Court treated Ganesh Nayak as distinguishable and not determinative here.
N.N. Singh v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works, 77 CWN 334 (Salil Kumar Datta, J.)	Held that where the claim is joint and cannot be severed, failure of one petitioner may cause the whole petition to fail; but where claims are severable or arise out of common questions of law/fact, failure as to some petitioners will not defeat the petition as to others.	The Court approved this analysis as correctly applying Order 1 Rule 1 CPC principles and used it to support the conclusion that the writ petition should not be dismissed merely because some petitioners were appointed; where relief is severable, remaining petitioners may succeed.
Beehu Singh v. Bicharam Sahu, 10 CLJ 91 (Sir Ashutosh Mookherjee)	Articulated the court's inherent power to adopt or invent procedure to do justice and warned against deciding matters on mere technicalities when merits call for relief.	The Court invoked this principle to emphasize that Article 226 relief is discretionary and that courts should prioritize justice, equity and good conscience over technical formalism; this supported refusal to dismiss the joint petition for the technical reason urged by appellants.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner addressing the principal contentions raised by the appellants:

Maintainability of the joint writ petition:
- The Court examined the appellants' reliance on Ganesh Nayak and observed that that decision did not consider Order 1 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure (which governs joinder of parties). The Court explained that Order 1 Rule 1 permits joinder where rights to relief arise out of the same act or series of acts involving common questions of law/fact.
- The Court referred approvingly to N.N. Singh (Salil Kumar Datta, J.), which articulated that if claims are joint and inseverable then failure of one petitioner may cause the entire petition to fail, but where claims are severable or arise from common questions, failure as to some does not defeat the whole petition.
- The Court emphasized that Article 226 relief is discretionary and that courts must act according to justice, equity and good conscience, invoking the principle from Beehu Singh that courts should not allow technicalities to defeat substantive justice.
- Applying these principles the Court held that the District School Board could not insist on dismissal of the entire petition solely because it had appointed some of the petitioners during pendency; doing so would permit authorities to defeat substantive relief by partial compliance.
Validity of the panel and "additional panel" contention:
- The Court examined the record: two lists existed — one dated 27 July 1973 with 2,032 candidates and another dated 29 July 1973 with 199 candidates — and noted that the Director of Public Instruction's letter of 14 August 1973 forwarded a panel of 2,231 candidates (2032 + 199) as one panel for the district.
- The Court held that mere inclusion of names on two dates does not convert the lists into two separate panels; all lists could validly be treated as constituting a single panel. Rule 3A's reference to "panel" in the singular did not preclude compilation of the panel in more than one list or on different dates.
Allegation that the Advisory Committee did not select the 199 candidates:
- The Court observed there was no proof (and no allegation of bias by the Director of Public Instruction) to support the contention that the Advisory Committee had not selected the 199 candidates. The District School Board had itself appointed those candidates in deputation vacancies over time, which precluded them from challenging the panel's validity on that basis.
- The Court considered the Advisory Committee proceedings (including a resolution in paragraph 7 referring to totals that summed to 2,032) but found nothing in those proceedings to show the Advisory Committee had not selected the extra 199 candidates; further the Advisory Committee had no authority to limit the total number empanelled.
Appointment across circles:
- The appellants argued that candidates approved for appointment in one circle should not be appointed in another. The Court declined to decide the point on the facts before it but clarified that appointments should be made in accordance with Rule 3(2) of the Rules and the directions already given by the learned Judge below.

On these bases, and relying also on its earlier judgment in the related appeals (F.M.A.T. Nos. 1380/1980 and 1499/1981 dated 11 January 1982) which had dealt with similar contentions, the Court dismissed the present appeals.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEALS DISMISSED.

The Court dismissed the appeals for the reasons stated: it rejected the contention that the joint writ petition must fail because some petitioners were appointed during the pendency; it upheld the validity of the panel as a single panel despite two lists dated 27 and 29 July 1973; it rejected the Board's attack on selection and held the Board was precluded from challenging entitlement where it had already appointed candidates to deputation vacancies; and it left the circle-transfer issue to be governed by Rule 3(2) as directed by the learned Judge below.

Direct consequences for the parties (as reflected in the opinion): the relief granted by the learned Judge below (that the appellants consider and absorb the respondents in permanent vacancies kept vacant by interim orders and make those appointments within four weeks, assigning schools nearer to the respondents' residences as far as possible) stands. The Court ordered that there would be no order as to costs.

The opinion does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying established principles concerning joinder (Order 1 Rule 1 CPC) and the discretionary nature of Article 226 relief; it expressly relied on earlier decisions and an earlier judgment of this Court addressing substantially the same issues.

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Ajit Sanyal & Anr. v. Basiruddin Mondal & Anr.

2. M.M Dutt, J.:— In these three appeals, the facts and most of the points involved are the same as in two other appeals being F.M.A.T No. 1380 of 1980 and F.M.A.T No. 1499 of 1981, both of which were disposed of by this Court by the judgment dated January 11, 1982. These appeals have been preferred by the District School Board of Nadia against the judgment of B.C Ray J. making absolute the Rules Nisi issued on the applications of the respondents-writ petitioners under Article 226 of the Constitution.

3. The respondents-writ petitioners are primary teachers. In 1972-1973, a panel was prepared by the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal. The respondents-writ petitioners were included in the said panel along with others pursuant to their applications for appointment to the posts of primary teachers under the District School Board, Nadia. They were appointed in deputation vacancies arising out of deputation of teachers of Primary Schools for undergoing training in the Junior Basic Training Institute. But they were not appointed in the permanent vacancies in the posts of primary teachers. It is not disputed that the respondents-writ petitioners had been working in deputation vacancies from time to time since 1973 or 1974. The Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, by his memo. No. 6932(67) dated December 19, 1974 issued the following circular:—

“Government of West Bengal.

Education Directorate: Primary Branch.

Memo. No. 6923(67)Dated 19.12.74

From: D.P.I West Bengal.

To: District Inspector of Schools (Pry. Edn.)

Sub.: Instruction regarding Appointment of teachers serving in Deputation Vacancies.

The undersigned has to inform him that approved empanelled candidates appointed in deputation vacancies by the Dist. School Board may be absorbed in permanent posts during their service or within one year of expiry of the deputation term even if the validity of the panel where their names occur expires or a fresh panel is propared in the meantime.

S.N Das.

For D.P.I West Bengal.”

4. The said circular dated December 19, 1974 was from time to time, suspended and such suspensions were also relaxed, but ultimately, by an order dated November 3, 1978, the Government of West Bengal issued an order which has been impugned in the writ petitions. The said order is set out below:—

“Government of West Bengal.

Education Department.

Peimary Branch.

Dated, Calcutta, the 3rd Nov. 1978.

From: Shri M.N Sinha Roy

Deputy Secretary to the Govt. of West Bengal.

To: The Director of Primary Education, West Bengal.

Sub: Permanent absorption of Primary school teachers who worked in deputation vacancies.

The undersigned is directed to refer to this Deptt. Memo. No. 1496-Edn(P) dated 30.8.78 on the above subject and to state that the matter has been reviewed by Govt. and it has been decided that pending Government's full examination of the entire policy regarding ultimate absorption of deputation vacancy teachers on the mode and practice of such absorption, the final absorption of candidates who worked as primary teachers for one or more terms in deputation vacancies should be kept suspended until further orders.

It is also requested that information wanted in para 2 of this department Memo. No. 1653-Edn.(p) dated 7.10.78 may be furnished in order to examine the issue.

Meanwhile this Deptt. G.O No. 1496-Edn.(P) dated 30.8.78 referred to above should be treated as cancelled.

Sd/- M.N Sinha Roy,

Deputy Secretary.”

5. Before the impugned order dated November 3, 1978 was passed by the Government, another advertisement was published for preparation of a fresh panel of primary teachers. The impugned order of suspension of the circular dated December 9, 1974 of the Director of Public Instruction was permanent in nature, inasmuch as the Government had already taken steps for preparation of a fresh panel. It is not disputed that if the circular of the Director of Public Instruction had not been so suspended, the respondent-writ petitioners would have been absorbed in permanent vacancies on the strength of the said circular. In the circumstances, the respondents-writ petitioners moved this Court challenging the validity of the impugned order dated November 3, 1978.

6. The learned Judge, after considering the facts and circumstances of the case and the submissions made on behalf of the parties made the Rules Nisi, out of which these appeals arise, absolute. It was directed by the learned Judge that the appellants should consider and absorb the respondents writ petitioners in the permanent vacancies in the Primary Schools under the District School Board; such appointments should be made in the posts, which had been directed to be kept vacant by the interim orders passed by the learned Judge, within a period of four weeks from the date of the judgment of the learned Judge. It was further directed that the appointments should be given in schools nearer to the residence of the respondents-writ petitioners as far as possible. Hence, these appeals by the District School Board of Nadia.

7. It has been stated already that the facts and most of the points involved in these appeals are the same as in F.M.A.T No. 1380 of 1980 and F.M.A.T No. 1499 of 1981. The subject matter of those appeals also was the validity of the impugned order dated November 3, 1978. On behalf of the District School Board of Hooghly, Mr. Arun Prakash Chatterjee, learned Senior Standing Counsel had advanced several contentions in one of those appeals. The said contentions were, however, overruled by the Court in the said judgment dated January 11, 1982. The learned Senior Standing Counsel who also appears on behalf of the appellants in these appeals adopts and reaffirms the contentions advanced by him in one of those appeals. But as those contentions have been already dealt with in the said judgment, he has not made any argument on the same. In other words, the learned Senior Standing Counsel does not give up the said contentions, but he reiterates the same. It is not necessary for us to refer to the said contentions, for they are already covered by the said judgment.

8. Besides the said contentions, the learned Senior Standing Counsel has, in these appeals, raised three other points. The first of such points relates to the question as to the maintainability of the Writ petition out of which F.M.A.T No. 1544 of 1981 arises. It appears that before the learned Trial Judge an affidavit of facts was filed on behalf of the District School Board, Nadia and the President of the Ad hoc Committee of the Board. The affidavit was affirmed by Sri Ajit Sanyal, the President of the Ad hoc Committee. In that affidavit, it has been alleged that out of the 23 Writ petitioners 15 applied for being included in the panel for appointment to the posts of primary teachers pursuant to the notification or advertisement dated November 27, 1978. Out of the said fifteen Writ petitioners seven have been already appointed and two others have been included in the panel. It is contended on behalf of the appellants that, as the said seven writ petitioners who have been already appointed to the post of primary teachers under the District School Board, Nadia are disentitled to relief, the entire Writ petition should fail and should be dismissed on that ground. In support of the said contention, the learned Senior Standing Counsel has placed strong reliance on a judgment of Sinha J. (as His Lordship then was) in Ganesh Nayak v. Land Acquisition Collector 65 CWN 908. In that case, by a Writ petition twentyfive persons jointly challenged the Award made by the Land Acquisition Collector under S. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Some of them had made applications for a reference under S. 18 of the said Act and some had preferred objections to the acquisition. They were not jointly interested in any land or structure. They had independent causes of action. It was held by Sinha J. that they could not combine themselves and make one single application under Article 226 of the Constitution. Further, the learned Judge observed that if, however, it was permissible for the said persons to join in one application, the application was not maintainable at least with regard to four applicants who had made applications under S. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, inasmuch as they had chosen to avail themselves of an alternative remedy granted to them under the law. It was held that as the case of the said four applicants failed, the joint application must necessarily fail. On that technical ground the Writ petition was dismissed.

9. It may be pointed out that in holding that a joint writ petition was not maintainable, Sinha J. did not consider the provision of Order 1 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which was admittedly applicable to writ proceedings. If the right to relief of more then one person arises out of an act or transaction or series of acts or transactions involving common questions of law and fact such persons may join in one application. The Code of Civil Procedure does not contain any provision providing for the dismissal of a suit or proceeding on the ground that it has failed in respect of one of the joint plaintiffs or petitioners. If the filing of a suit or proceeding jointly by two or more persons is in accordance with the provision of Order 1 rule 1, it is difficult to lay down a proposition of law that if one of the joint plaintiff's or petitioners is or becomes disentitled to relief, the whole suit or proceeding must fail. We may, at this stage, refer to a decision of Salil Kumar Datta, J. in N.N Singh v. General Manager, Chittaranjan Locomotive Works, 77 CWN 334. In that case, the learned Judge on a review of all the decisions on the point including the decision in Ganesh Nayek's case (supra) held that if the claim for relief made by the petitioners be joint and it is not possible to make any severance of the claims of each petitioner, in such case if one petitioner is disentitled to the claim, the entire petition would fail. But where the claim of the petitioners for relief is joint and arises out of the same act or transaction or involves common questions of fact or law and the relief claimed by one petitioner is severable from the other petitioners' claim, in such a case even if the petition fails in respect of some such petitioners, the entire petition will not fail. In our opinion, Salil Kumar Datta, J. seems to have laid down the law correcrly on the basis of the principles of Order 1 rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

10. It is however, contended on behalf of applicants that in view of the amendment of S. 141 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the procedure provided in the Code for suits is no longer applicable to the writ proceedings. This contention is without any substance. Even though the procedure regarding suits is not applicable to writ proceedings, there is no bar to the court adopting such procedure, if thought necessary in the discretion of the Court. The grant of relief under Article 226 of the Constitution is discretionary and in exercise of such discretion the Court will act in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. The Court, in our opinion, should not be guided by technicalities, but by the spirit of doing justice. To hold that the entire writ petition should be dismissed as one of the joint petitioners is disentitled to relief would be against the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. At this stage, it will be profitable to refer to the following observation of Sir Ashutosh Mookherjee in Beehu Singh v. Bicharam Sahu, 10 CLJ 91:—

“….the Court has, where the circumstances require it, an inherent power to do that justice for the administration of which it alone exists……………. where the Legislature has provided no procedure to be followed in cases which must and do arise, the Courts must be taken to have inherent power to decide the question of procedure, and, if necessary, to invent a procedure for themselves.

It is not to be supposed that a Court in the administration of justice will refuse an application, which on the merits it ought to grant, simply because the applicant asks the Court to exercise its admitted powers under a wrong section. Judicial procedure has been framed for the furtherance of justice and not to defeat it, and the Court cannot refuse to act in aid of justice on merely technical grounds”.

11. It in a particular case, it appears to the Court that justice demands that the writ petition should be dismissed, it will do so. But the Court should not dismiss the writ petition on the ground that one of the joint writ petitioners is disentitled to relief if the Court considers that the remaining writ petitioners should be granted the relief prayed for. If the contention of the learned Senior Standing Counsel is accepted, the State Government or any other authority may by granting relief to one of the several joint writ petitioners get the entire writ petition dismissed. In the instant case also, the District School Board concerned has appointed some of the respondents writ petitioners in F.M.A.T No. 1544 of 1981 during the pendency of the Rule Nisi. In our opinion, it does not lie in the mouth of the District School Board, that as they have appointed some of the respondents-writ petitioners, the entire writ petition should fail. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention.

12. The next point that has been urged on behalf of the appellants is that, as the names of respondents writ petitioners were included in the additional penal prepared in 1973, they are not entitled to be appointed primary teachers. It is contented that there was no scope for preparation of any additional panel and, accordingly, the Director of Public Instruction had no authority to prepare an additional panel. Further, the respondents writ petitioners were not selected by the Advisory-cum-Selection Committee before their names were included in the additional panel. In the circumstances, it is contended that the respondents-writ petitioners cannot have any claim to be absorbed in permanent vacancies by virtue of the said circular dated December 19, 1974 of the Director of Public Instruction.

13. The learned Senior Standing Counsel has produced before us the records of the District School Board, Nadia. It appears from the records that a list of 2032 candidates were prepared for inclusion in the panel. The said list is dated July 27, 1973. Another list was also prepared containing the names of 199 candidates including the respondents-writ petitioners. This list is dated July 29, 1973 and has been termed by the learned Senior Standing Counsel as “additional panel”. The Director of Public Instruction by his letter dated August 14, 1973 addressed to the District Inspector of Schools (Primary Education), District School Board, Nadia, forwarded the panel of 2231 (2032+199) candidates of 18 circles for appointment of primary teachers as prepared by the Advisory-cum-Selection Committee of the District School Board, Nadia. It is apparent from the letter of the Director of Public Instruction that one panel was prepared and not a panel and an additional panel. It is urged on behalf of the appellants that as the names of 199 candidates were included in a separate list two days after the preparation of the first list, it should be treated as an additional panel. We are unable to accept this contention. Merely because the names of candidates were included in two liste on two dates, the two lists cannot, in our opinion, be considered to constitute two panels—one original and the other additional. In this connection, we may refer to Rules 3A and 3B as it stood in 1973. Rules 3A and 3B are as follows:—

“3A. No name shall be forwarded by the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, for appointment under a Board unless it has been included in the panel of qualified teachers prepared for the district after adequate publicity and in the manner provided in rule 3B.

3B.(1) The Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal may with the approval of the State Government, set up a Selection Committee in each district to assist him in selecting suitable persons from amongst the candidates for inclusion in the panel of qualified teachers for the district.

(2) The Selection Committee may hold such tests including interview, as they may deem proper and necessary for the candidates but it is open to Selection Committee to call only those amongst the candidates, they may consider suitable. The interview and other test shall be held at a convenient place or places in the district or, with the prior approval of the State Government outside the district.

(3) The Selection Committee shall send their list of names of qualified persons recommended be them to the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, who may modify or alter the list. Only the names as finally approved by the Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, shall be included in the panel for the district.

(4) The panel may show separately the names of qualified (1) women teachers, (2) Scheduled Tribe teachers, (3) Scheduled Caste teachers and (4) other teachers.

(5) The Director of Public Instruction, West Bengal, may remove at any time the name of any person from the panel for ??? of the person to accept or join, in time an appointment offered to him by the Board or on other good and adequate reasons.”

14. Much reliance has been placed on behalf of the appellants on the provision of Rule 3A which refers to the ‘panel’ in singular. It is submitted that only one panel could be prepared by the Director of Public Instruction containing the names of candidates selected by the Advisory Committee. In our opinion, there is no substance in this contention. The names of the candidates may be included in more than one lists, and there is no bar to treat all the lists as constituting one panel. Indeed, the Director of Public Instruction in his said letter dated August 14, 1973 refers to one panel consisting of the names of 2231 candidates which are admittedly included in two lists—one dated July 27, 1973 and the other July 29, 1973.

15. It is next contended that the candidates including the respondent-writ petitioners whose names have been included in the list dated July 29, 1973 were not selected by the Advisory Committee and, as such, they are not entitled to be appointed to the posts of primary teachers. This contention is also devoid of any merit. Even assuming that these candidates did not appear before the Advisory Committee for their selection, the District School Board having appointed them from time to time in deputation vacancies is precluded from raising the plea of ineligibilty of those candidates for appointment to the posts of primary teachers. The Advisory Committee or the Selection Committee is only to assist the Director of Public Instruction in selecting suitble persons for inclusion in the panel of qualified teachers for the district. The panel will be prepared by the Director of Public Instruction. In the absence of any proof or even any allegation or bias on the part of the Director of Public Instruction, we are of the view that the District School Board cannot challenge the validity of the panel prepared by the Director of Public Instruction. Apart from that there is nothing on record to show that the Advisory Committee had not selected the 199 candidates including the respondents-writ petitioners for inclusion in the panel. The learned Senior Standing Counsel has drawn our attention from the records of the District School Board, Nadia, to the proceedings of the meeting of the Advisory Committee held on July 12, 1973. He has particularly referred to paragraph 7 of the proceedings.

16. It is true that in paragraph 7, a resolution was recorded to the effect that the total number of the empanelled candidates of different circles should not exceed the number as noted against the names of each circle. The total number as mentioned against the names of each circle comes to 2032. It is, accordingly, submitted that the Advisory Committee did not select the 199 candidates whose names wose included in the list dated 29th July, 1973. We are unable to accept this contention. There is nothing in paragraph 7 of the proceedings, which shows that the Advisory Committee did not select the said 199 candidates. The resolution might have been passed for future guidance of the District School Board. Moreover, the Advisory Committee or the Selection Committee has no authority to limit the total number of candidates to be empanelled. We, therefore, overrule the contention of the appellants in this regard.

17. The last point that has been urged on behalf of the appellants is that the candidates approved for appointment in one circle should not be appointed to the posts of primary teachers in any other circle. We do not think that we are called upon to decide this point. All that we say that the appointments should be made in accordance with the provision of Rule 3(2) of the Rules, which has also been directed by the learned Judge. No other point has been urged on behalf of the appellants.

18. For the same reasons as in the said appeals being F.M.A.T No. 1380 of 1980 and F.M.A.T No. 1499 of 1981 and also for the reasons as aforesaid, we dismiss these appeals. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

19. Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.:— I agree.

Appeals dismissed.

Ajit Sanyal & Anr. v. Basiruddin Mondal & Anr.

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (District School Board of Nadia)

Respondents' Position (Writ Petitioners / Primary Teachers)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Ajit Sanyal & Anr. v. Basiruddin Mondal & Anr.

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