R. GOGOI, J.

A learned Single Judge Of this Court in the West Bengal State Weaver's Cooperative Society Limited and others - Versus-Bibha Busu Chawdhury and others, reported in 2004 (1) GLT page 177, having held a Revision Application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of a final order passed by the appellate authority under Section 8 of the Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) to be not maintainable and another Single Bench consisting of the Hon'ble Chief Justice having taken the view that the conclusions recorded in West Bengal State Weaver's Cooperative Society Limited (Supra) require an authoritative decision by a Larger Bench of this Court, the following question has been referred for our consideration and decision:

Whether the decision or order passed in appeal under Section 8 of the Assam Urban Areas : Rest Control Act, 1972 is revisable by the High Court under Section 115 CPC; or Section 8 of the Act, 1972 completely debars the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the revision against the decision or order passed Appellate Court Under Section 8. of the Act,1972 ? "

2. Having sent out the question referred, it may be apposite at this stage, to briefly notice the provisions of the Act, which would be relevant to answer the question referred :

Soction 2(a) of the Act define "Court" in the following terms :

Section 2 (a)

"Court" means the Court of Ordinary Civil Jurisdiction in the area in which a house is situated which would be competent to pass a decree for the eviction of a tenant from that house",

Section, 3 and 4 of the Act deal with the subject of standard/fair rent and set out the procedure for determination of standard rent. Section 5 enumerates the circumstances in which an order or decree for recovery of possession, may be made by a Court. Section 6 of the Act enumerates me duties of the landlord and Section 7 confers power on the Court to require the landlord to perform his statutory duties Under Section 6, in case of neglect or refusal to do so at the request of the tenant Section 8 being the relevant provision of the Act with regard to the interpretation of which an authoritative pronouncement has been sought may best be extracted hereunder :

"8. Appeal : A landlord or a tenant aggrieved by any decision or order of the Court under the provisions of Section 4, 5 and 7 (2) of this Act shall have a right of appeal against the same as if such decision or order where a decree in a suit for ejectment of the tenant from the House and such appellate Court's decision shall be final."

3. Prior to the decision rendered by the learned Single Judge in the case of West Bengal State Weaver's Corporative Society Limited (supra), by virtue of the decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Basak -Vs.- Deo Narayan Prasad and others, reported in 1984 Gauhati High Court Cases, page 37, no Second Appeal against the appellate judgment rendered under Section 8 of the Act was maintainable and instead Revision Applications under Section 115 CPC against such appellate orders were being entertained by this Court. The decision in the case of West Bengal State Weaver's Cooperative Society Limited (supra); therefore, constitute a break with the practice prevailing in this Court for nearly two decades. As the said decision also had the effect of rendering a large number of pending Civil Revisions futile, the present Reference was considered necessary.

4. A reading of the judgment of the learned Single Judge rendered in the case of West Bengal State Weaver's Cooperative Society Limited (supra) would show that the learned Single Judge after holding that though the finality given by the statute to an appellate order, by itself, will not oust the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure unless such ouster is either expressly made or follows by necessary implication, took the further view that having regard to the scheme of the Act providing a hierarchy of Civil Courts to adjudicate disputes between the landlords and tenants at all levels and also keeping in mind that public policy and public interest demand quick disposal of Cases, the proper construction should be in fevour of "trimming of the proceeding and not in protracting the length of the litigation. " On that basis, the learned Single Judge came to the conclusion that the finality clause in Section 8 imposes a complete far to all further proceedings arising out of the dispute and that the only remedy of an aggrieved litigant against an appellate order passed under Section 8 of the Act is to file an application under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India.

5. The learned Single Judge in coming to the above conclusion relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the Case of South Asia Industries (P) Limited - Versus S.B. Sarup Singh and others (AIR 1965 SC 1442). Another decision of the Apex Court in the case of Chaganmal -Vs- Municipal Corporation, Indore (AIR 1977 SC 1555) as well as the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Aundal Ammal -Vs- Sadasivan Pitiai, (1987) 1 SCC 183, also relied on by the learned Single Judge, an order of the Apex Court dated 18.3.2002 in Civil Appeal No. 2260/2002 (Subodh Chandra Deb -Vs- State of Assam and others) holding that a Writ petition against a final order in a proceeding between landlord and a tenant, under the provisions of the Act, will be maintainable was particularly relied on by the learned Single Judge while rendering the decision in the case of West Bengal State Weaver's Cooperative Society Limited (supra).

6. A brief examination of the several case laws felled oh by the learned Single Judge to arrive at the conclusions as noticed will perhaps be appropriate at this stage.

In South Asia Industries (supra), the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal under Clause 10 of the Letters Patent for the High Court of Lahore as against a judgment of a Single Judge of the High Court in a Second Appeal under Section 39 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 was in question. The decision rendered in a Second Appeal was made final by Section 43 of the Act. The Letters Patent Appeal was held by the Apex Court to be not maintainable by holding that the expression, "final" used in Section 43 should mean that an order passed on appeal under the Act is conclusive and no further appeal lies against it. In Chaganlal (supra), against an assessment made by the authority under the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Act, 1956, there was a provision for appeal to the Municipal Appeal Committee and there was a further right of appeal to the District Court. Against the order passed by the District Court in Second Appeal, interference was made by the High Court in an application under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The matter having reached the Apex Court, the Apex Court took the view that the power of revision would be available, inasmuch as, the District Court is a Court subordinate to the High Court. In Aundal Ammal (supra), the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 came under consideration. Under the provisions of the said Act, the District Munsiff was the Rent Control Court at the base level and appeals to the Subordinate Judge or a Judicial Officer higher than a Subordinate Judge, as the case may be, were provided against the decision of the Rent Control Court. Section 18(5) of the Kerala Act made the decision of the appellate authority final and further provides that the same shall not be liable to be called into question in any Court except as provided in Section 20. Section 20 confers the power of revision in the District Court in cases decided by the Subordinate Judge as the appellate authority and to the High Court in cases decided by an appellate authority, higher than a Subordiate Judge. The question mat arose in Aundal Ammal (supra) is whether against an order passed by the District Court in exercise of its revisional power under Section 20 of the Act, a further revision under Section 115 CPC would lie to the High Court. The Apex Court in paragraph 20 of the judgment, taking into account the provisions of Sections 18(5) and 20 together, took the view that as the order of the appellate authority was made final and was not liable to be called into question except in the manner prescribed by Section 20, acknowledgment of a power of Second Revision in the High Court would be repugnant to the scheme of the Act and, therefore, a Second Revision to the High Court Would not lie.

In Subodh Chandra Deb -Vs.- State of Assam and others (supra), a tenant who was found to be a defaulter by the appellate Court acting under the provisions of the Act, moved the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Writ Petition was dismissed in limine holding that a revision would be maintainable. The order was confirmed by the Appellate Bench in a Writ Appeal filed by the aggrieved tenant whereafter the matter was taken to the Apex Court. The Apex Court by its order dated 18.3.2002 took the view that a final order passed by the appellate authority under the Act could be challenged by means of a writ petition and, therefore, remanded the matter to the High Court for consideration of the writ proceedings filed by the tenant on its merit. The order of the Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra), reliance on which has been placed by the learned Single Judge, may be usefully extracted hereunder:

"By order dated 4th September, 2001 this Court issued notice limited to the question why the case should not be remanded back to the High Court for deciding the case treating the petition as revision. It is however to be noted that proceedings were between landlord and tenant under the provisions of Assam Urban Areas Rent Control Act hence a writ petition will be maintainable against the final order of the authority under the Act.

The writ appeal was disposed of by the division Bench of die High Court in limine agreeing with the learned Single Judge holding that no writ petition was maintainable against respondent No. 3 and 4 who are landlords of the petitioner.

Leave granted.

The impugned order is set aside and the writ appeal is restored to file and remanded with request to the High Court to dispose of the writ appeal as early as possible preferably within a period of six months on merits.. The appeal is disposed of."

7. The learned Single Judge on a consideration of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the cases of Chaganlal and Aundal Ammal (supra) noticed, and perhaps rightly, a difference between the provisions of the two statutes that were considered by the Apex Court in the above two cases. In Chaganlal (supra), the primary authority as well as the first appellate body were executive authorities Sunder the Madhya Pradesh Municipal Act, 1956. It is only at the stage of Second appeal that a judicial authority, i.e., District Court was contemplated. On the other hand, in Aundal Ammars (supra), both the Rent Control Court and the appellate authority as well as the revisional authorities were judicial forums deciding the lis between the parties by following the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure; besides the revision, either to the District Court or to the High Court is provided, manifesting intention of the legislature when it is read with Section 18(5) of the Act to give finality to the revisional order. The learned Single Judge was, therefore, of the view that the ratio of the decisions of the Apex Court in the cases of Chaganlal and Aundal Ammal (supra) must be construed in the light of the above difference in the respective statutes. As under the Assam Act of 1972 both the proceedings, i.e. at primary stage as well as the appellate stage were judicial proceedings, coupled with the decision of the Apex Court rendered in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra), the learned Single Judge took the view that the finality clause in Section 8 of the Act should be construed to mean that with the decision passed in an appeal under the Assam Act, all causes of action between the landlord and tenant must come to an end and no revision under Section 115 CPC will be maintainable against such final appellate decision passed under Section 8 of the Act. The order of the Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra) was then read by the learned Single Judge to mean that as the Apex Court has held a Writ Petition to be maintainable against an appellate order passed under Section 8 of the Act, it would necessarily follow that no revision against such appellate order would be maintainable.

8. Our quest to accurately answer the question referred will have to take us to a consideration o a few other decisions of the Apex Court, having relevance to the subject matter, which have been cited at the Bar.

The maintainability of a second Revision under Section 115 CPC read with Section 50(1) of the Karnataka Rent Control Act (as amended in 1975) to the High Court against an order o the District Judge passed in revision proceeding under Section 50(2), which order was declared by the provision of Section 50(2) to be final, was considered by the Apex Court in the case of Shyama Raju Hegde -Vs- U. Venkatesha Bhat and others, (1987 (Supp) SCC 321). Though the question was answered in the affirmative by an earlier Full Bench Decision of the High Court in Krishnaji Venkaresh Shirodkar Vs. Gurupad Shivram Kavalekar, the same question was again referred to the another Full Bench for consideration in view of the Supreme Court's decision in Vishesh Kumar Vs Shanti Prasad (AIR 1980 SC 892) and the Apex Court decision in Aundal Ammal (Supra). Under the Karnataka Rent Control Act, Civil Judges manned the Rent Control Courts or areas within the City of Bagalore and District Munsiffs constituted the Rent Control Courts for areas outside the City of Bangalore. Against the order of the Rent Control Court, the amended Act did not provide for any appellate authority but under Section 50(1) of the Act, a Revision could be filed to the High Court where the decision is rendered by a Civil Judge whereas under Section 50(2) of the Act a revision could be filed before the District Judge, if the decision at the base level was rendered by the District Munsiff. The Apex Court upheld the view of the First Full bench in Krishnaji's case holding a Second Revision to the High Court to be maintainable. In coming to the above conclusion, the Apex Court primarily took into account an unreported decision of the Apex Court in the case of Krishnadas Bhatija Vs A.S. Venkatachala Shetty (dead) by L.Rs. (legal representatives) holding a Second Revision under the Karnataka Act to be maintainable. What is of significance for the purpose of present case is the view expressed by the Apex Court in paragraph 14 of the judgment, which is to the following effect :

"It is one of the essential requirements of the administration of justice that judgrnents rendered by superior courts and particularly with the approval of the apex court should not be frequently changed so as to unsettle settled positions. The fact that the State legislature has not thought it necessary to amend the law and set at naught Krishnaji 2 or Bhatija5 is indicative of the position that this Court had not taken a wrong view of the legislative intention. In these circumstances we feel advised not to enter into an analysis of the provisions of the Act for a-fresh, look at the matter and prefer to follow Bhatija 7. We rnake it clear that we have not felt it necessary to examine whether the ratio of Aundal Ammal7 is binding or requires reconsideration in the presence of Bhatija5 in the field as a direct Authority."

9. In M/s. Jetha BaiandSom, Jew Town, Cochin and others -Vs- M/s Sunderdas Raihenai and others, (1988) 1 SCC 722, the question of maintainability of a Second Revision under Section 115 GPG Against a revisional order passed by the District Judge under the provisions of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 again came up for consideration before the Apex Court from the perspective of whether there was any conflict between the earlier decisions of the Apex Court in Aundal Ammal and Shyama Raju Hedge (supra).

The Apex Court in M/s. Jetha Bai and Sons (supra) held that there was no conflict between the two decisions rendered by the Apex Court as noted above as the provisions of the statutes considered in the two cases were different. Yet the Apex Court took pains to go into the specific details of the two statutes. In so far as the Kerala Act is concerned, the Apex Court virtually reiterated me view taken in Aundal Ammal that on a reading of Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act together, it was clear that not only is the older of the appellate authority made final but it was further provided by the stature that the appellate decision Was not open to challenge in any Court of Law except as provided in Section 20. As Section 20 carved out two mutually exclusive areas of revisional jurisdiction, one for the High Court in certain cases and the other for the District Court in other cases, the words used in Section 18(5), i.e., shall be final and shall not be liable to be called in question in any Court of law, except as provided in Section 20", it was held, clearly spelt out a prohibition or exclusion of a Second Revision to the High Court against the order of the District Court.

10. In so far as the provisions of the karnataka act and the decision in Shyama Raju's case is concerned, it must be noticed that though the Apex Court took into account the fact that under the Karnataka Act, the right of appeal had been completely taken away by the amendment and the proceedings under the Act were restricted to a two-tier system as distinguished from the three tier system envisaged under the Kerala Act, what was eventually held by the Apex Court is that the finality clause contained in Section 50(2) of the Karnataka Act has to be reckoned at a lesser degree than the terms in the Kerala Act because the words of finality in the two Acts under the relevant provisions present distinctly different perspectives . It must be noticed at this stage that while under the Kerala Act, Section 18(5) after making the appellate order final had further provided that the same was not liable to be called into question in any Court except as provided in Section 20. Section 20 which carves out two different areas of revisional jurisdiction or the District Judge and the High Court did not contemplate a further revision to the High Court against the revisional order passed by the District Judge. In the Karnataka Act, it must be noticed, what has been provided by Section 50(2) is that the order of the District Judge is final and the further limitations as contained in the Kerala Act are conspicuously missing in the Karnataka Act. This, according to us, is the basic difference between the two statutes and the said difference is fundamental to a proper understanding of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the two cases.

11. What transpires from the above discussion is that the finality attached to an appellate order by the Statute would ordinarily mean that any further appeals against such appellate order would be barred but to further hold that a revision petition under Section 115 CPC against an appellate order would also be barred, would normally call for an express or very strong implied prohibition. A reading of the judgment of the Apex Court in Jetha Bai's case would go to show that while under Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act a sufficiently strong legislative intent to bar a second revision to the High Court was perceived, whereas the same was found to be absent in section 50(2) of the kamataka act.

12. Another decision of the Apex Court in the case of/. T.I. Ltd. - Vs. - Seimns Public Communications Network Ltd., reported in (2002) 5 SCC 510 may be noticed at this stage. In I.T.I. (Supra), the Apex Court was considering the maintainability of a Revision application under Section 115 CPC against an order passed by a Civil Court in an appeal under Section 37(2) (b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. In I.T.I. Ltd. (supra), an earlier decision of the Apex Court in Nirma Ltd. -Vs.- Lurgi Lentjes Energietechnik GMBH and another, reported in (2002) 5 SCC 520 holding a revision under Section 115 CPC to be maintainable against an order passed in appeal under the provisions of Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, was contended not to be laying down the correct law as the decision in the case of Nirma Ltd. (supra) was founded on a judgment in the case of Shyam Sundar Agawalla -Vs.- Union of India in which decision the maintainability of a revision petition under Section 115 CPC was decided in the affirmative under the provisions of the Old Act, i.e., Arbitration Act, 1940. The Apex Court turned down the plea in the following terms:

"10. We do not agree with this submission of the learned counsel. It is true in the present Act application of the Code is not specifically provided for but what is to be noted is: is there an express prohibition against the application of the Code to a proceeding arising out of the Act before a civil court ? We find no such specific exclusion of the Code in the present Act. When there is no express exclusion, we cannot by inference hold that the Code is not applicable. 11. It has been held by this Court in more than one case that the jurisdiction of the civil court to which a right to decide a Us between the parties has been conferred can only be taken by a statute in specific terms and such exclusion of right cannot be easily inferred because there is always a strong presumption that the civil courts have the jurisdiction to decide all questions of civil nature, therefore, if at all there has to be an inference the same should be in favour of the jurisdiction of the court rather than the exclusion of such jurisdiction and there being no such exclusion of the Code in specific terms except to the extent stated in Section 37 (2), we cannot draw an inference that merely because the Act has not provided CPC to be applicable, by inference it should be held that the Code is inapplicable. This General principle apart, this issue is now settled by the judgment of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Bhatia International V. Bulk Trading S.A. 6 wherein while dealing with a similar argument arising out of the present act, this Court held: (SCC p. 116, para 15)

"While examining a particular provision of a statute to find out whether the jurisdiction of a court is ousted or not, the principle of universal application is that ordinarily the jurisdiction may not be ousted unless the very statutory provision explicitly indicates or even by inferential conclusion the court arrives at the same when such a conclusion is the only conclusion."

The observations contained in the separate but concurring judgment of Dharmadhikari, J. May also be usefully extracted hereunder:

"19. Revisional jurisdiction of a superior court cannot be taken as excluded simply because subordinate courts exercise a special jurisdiction under a special Act. The reason is that when a special Act on matters governed by that Act confers a jurisdiction on an established court, as distinguished from a persona designata, without any words of limitation, then the ordinary incident of procedure of that court including right of appeal or revision against its decision is attracted. The right of second appeal to the High Court has been expressly taken away by sub-section (3) of Section 37 of the Act, but for that reason it cannot be held that the right of revision has also been taken away.

13. While considering the question as to how readily an implied exclusion of the remedy of revision under Section 115 CPC should be inferred, due regard also must be had to the nature of revisional power that the High Court exercises under Section 115 CPC. It is a limited power to be exercised by the High Court to correct errors of juridiction and right from the decision in Hari Shankar and others-Vs-. Rao GirdhariLal Chowdhury, reported in AIR 1963 SC 698, Section 115 CPC has been understood to be essentially a source of power of the High Court to supervise the working of the Subordinate Courts. Section 115 CPC does not offer on any litigant any right to approach the High Court as in the case of an appeal. In the ultimate analysis, it is a power to be exercised to prevent failure of justice. Having regard to the nature of the power conferred by Section 115 CPC, in cases where there is no express bar, very strong circumstances must exist to read any implied prohibition on the exercise of such power. It is our considered view that merely because a hierarchy of judicial forums have been provided by the act of 1972, no such implied prohibition ought to be read. It is our further view that it is not the hierarchy of judicial forums available under the Kerala Act that prevailed with the Apex Court in Aundal Ammal (Supra) to hold a Second Revision to be not maintainable under the Kerala Act; rather it is the express language contained in Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerela Act that had led to the above conclusion. The observations of the Apex Court in Aundal Ammal (supra) that public policy and public interest requiring speedy disposal of cases should lead the Court to take a view that would trim the proceedings rather than protracting the same, must therefore be understood to have been made in view of the language contained in Sections 18(5) and 20 of the Kerala Act. No such language is discernible in Section 8 and the words used in Section 8, in our considered view, would attract the ratio laid down in Jetha Bai (supra) while interpreting Shyama Raju Hedge (supra) and in Changanlal (Supra). The fact that after the decision of this Court in Ramesh Chandra Basak (supra), the practice consistently followed has been to entertain Revision Applications against appellate orders passed under Section 8 of the Act of 1972 and that there has been no legislative enactment to the contrary for the last two decades, would, in our view, attract the analogy of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Shyam Raju Hedge's case (paragraph 14), to fortify the conclusion that a Revision Application under Section 115 CPC against an appellate order passed under Section 8 of the Act would be maintainable in law.

14. The order dated 18.3.2002 rendered by the Apex Court in Subodh Cbandra Deb (supra) has been relied upon by the learned Single as laying down, a clear proposition that against a final order passed in an appeal under Section 8 of the Act, no Revision Petition will be maintainable and the only remedy of an aggrieved litigant is to bring an action under Article 226/227 of the Constitution against such an order, On perusal of the order dated 18.3.2002 passed by the Apex Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra), we do not find that the Apex Court has in any way held a revision Application to be not maintainable What the Apex Court had held is that a Writ Application against a final order passed in a proceeding between the landlord and tenant under the Assam Act of 1972 would be maintainable. In view of the orders passed by the High Court in Subodh Chandra Deb (supra) holding the writ petition to be not maintainable as it was open for the aggrieved tenant to file a Revision Application against the appellate order, Court was whether a Revision Application or a Writ Petition, was maintainable. The conclusion that a Writ Petition was maintainable without a decision on the corollary question, i.e., whether a Revision Petition is maintainable or not, according to us, would not be a binding precedent on the question of the maintainability of the Revision Petition in view of the decision of the Apex Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi -V- Gurnam Kaur [1989 (1) SCC 101]. The following passage from Salmond's on Jurisprudence (12th Edition page 153) quoted with approval in Municipal Corporation of Delhi (supra), would, in our considered view, succinctly sum up the situation.

"A decision passes sub-silentio, in the technical sense that has come to be attached to that phrase, when the particular point of law involved in the decision is not perceived by the courts present to its mind. The court may consciously decide in favour of one party because of point A, which it considers and pronounces upon. It maybe shown, however, that logically the court should not have decided in favour of the particular party unless it also decided point Bin his favour; but point B was not argued or considered by the court. In such circumstances, although point B was logically involved in the facts and although the case had a specific outcome, the decision is not an authority on point B. Point B is said to pass sub silentio."

15 The feeble attempt made in support of the contention that unless the power of revision is specifically conferred, the same must be understood to have been prohibited, can hardly be accepted in view of the elaborate discussion that has taken place and particularly as the decisions cited in support, i.e., Laxmikant Revichand Bhojwani and another -Vs.- Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in (1995) 6 SCC 576 and Koyilerian Janaki and others -vs.- Rent Controller (Munsiff), Cannanore and others, reported in (2000) 9 SCC 406, do not lay down any such proposition. In fact the proposition advanced runs contrary to the law laid down by the Apex Court in I.T.I. Ltd., (supra) - para 11)

16. On the basis of the discussion that has preceded, we take the view that a Revision Application under Section 115 CPC against an appellate decision under Section 8 of the Act of 1972 is maintainable and we answer the question referred accordingly. The revision petitions will now be listed for hearing.