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  • provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 section 15
  • provisions of the National Security Act and the provisions of section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Act
  • provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 (the Meghalaya Act)
  • section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1985.
  • SECTION 21 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of article 22(5) of the Constitution.
  • provisions of the COFEPOSA Act/PIT N.D.P.S Act.
  • provisions of the COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act
  • parties.7. Section 3 of the Meghalaya Act,
  • NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
  • provisions of COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act
  • section 3(3) of the Meghalaya Act,
  • section 15 of the Meghalaya Act
  • provisions of section 3(1)
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 section 15
  • provisions of the National Security Act and the provisions of section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Act
  • provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 (the Meghalaya Act)
  • section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1985.
  • SECTION 21 GENERAL CLAUSES ACT 1897
  • Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972
  • provisions of article 22(5) of the Constitution.
  • provisions of the COFEPOSA Act/PIT N.D.P.S Act.
  • provisions of the COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act
  • parties.7. Section 3 of the Meghalaya Act,
  • NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
  • provisions of COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act
  • section 3(3) of the Meghalaya Act,
  • section 15 of the Meghalaya Act
  • provisions of section 3(1)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion by Ranjan Gogoi, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The writ petitioner, Shri Rongjam Momin, was detained by an order dated 17.5.2004 passed by the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District (William Nagar) under section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1985. At the time of this detention order the petitioner was already in judicial custody in connection with specified criminal cases. The detention order and the grounds were served on the petitioner in jail on 17.5.2004 together with a forwarding letter of the same date which informed him (inter alia) of (a) his right to make representations to the State Government, (b) his right to claim personal appearance before the Advisory Board, and (c) that his representative or counsel may inspect documents pertaining to the detention in the detaining authority's office.

The petitioner submitted a representation to the State Government on 1.6.2004; that representation was rejected by order dated 15.7.2004 (the rejection order was not filed by the petitioner but was present in official records produced to the court). Meanwhile, the Advisory Board considered the detention and recommended to the State Government that there were sufficient grounds for detention under section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Act. The State Government approved the detention (the approval is recorded as dated 27.5.2004 in the opinion).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the detenu (petitioner) was entitled under Article 22(5) of the Constitution to be informed of his right to make a representation to the detaining authority (District Magistrate or empowered officer) and whether failure to inform him of that right vitiates the detention order.
  2. Whether, under section 15 of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act read with section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972, the District Magistrate (or empowered officer) retains power to revoke, vary or rescind a detention order while it remains in force, and whether that gives the detenu a right to make a representation to the detaining authority.
  3. Whether, upon approval of a detention order by the State Government, the detenu acquires a right to make representation to the Central Government (and whether failure to inform him of that right vitiates the detention/approval).
  4. Whether the period of 45 days taken by the State Government to consider and dispose of the petitioner's representation (filed 1.6.2004 and disposed 15.7.2004) was inordinate and inadequately explained, such that the petitioner's Article 22(5) rights were infringed.
  5. Whether providing only an opportunity to inspect relevant documents in the detaining authority's office (rather than furnishing copies of requisite documents with the grounds of detention) satisfies Article 22(5) or whether non-supply of documents vitiates the detention order.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (Shri N. Dutta, senior counsel)

  • The petitioner was never informed of his right to submit a representation to the detaining authority (District Magistrate/empowered officer) or to the Central Government, and this omission infringed Article 22(5) of the Constitution and vitiates the detention order.
  • Reliance was placed on Thanglenmang Hangsiang v. District Magistrate (2004 (1) GLT 646) and Kamleshkumar Ishwardas v. Union of India ((1995) 4 SCC 51) to support the availability of representation and revocation rights.
  • Under section 15 read with section 35, the detaining District Magistrate has competence to vary or rescind his own detention order while it remains in force, thus a detenu must have the right to submit representation to the detaining authority; petitioner was not informed of this right and did not file such a representation.
  • The right to make representation to the Central Government arises after the District Magistrate's order is approved by the State Government; the petitioner was not informed of this right nor did he make such a representation.
  • The 45-day period taken by the State Government to dispose of the representation (1.6.2004 to 15.7.2004) was inordinate and not satisfactorily explained; furthermore, the forwarding letter permitting only inspection (and not supply) of documents indicates that the requisite documents were not supplied, prejudicing the petitioner's right to make effective representation.

Respondents' Arguments (Shri U. Bhuyan, Government Advocate, Meghalaya)

  • The Meghalaya Act does not confer a power of revocation on the detaining authority (District Magistrate); section 15 should be read as conferring revocation power as expressly stated (on State Government and, in case of State Government orders, on Central Government) and not as implying wider powers for the District Magistrate.
  • Power of revocation conferred by section 15 on the Central Government applies where the initial order is passed by the State Government; where the initial order is by the District Magistrate or empowered officer and later approved by the State Government, section 15 does not vest revocation power in the Central Government.
  • The 45 days taken to consider the representation were genuinely used to process and consider the petitioner's entitlement at different official levels; records (affidavit and originals) show the representation was processed through designated channels.
  • The forwarding letter dated 17.5.2004 expressly stated that the petitioner's authorised representative or counsel could inspect the relevant documents in the office of the District Magistrate; therefore no prejudice was caused by not supplying copies, and inspection satisfied procedural requirements.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamleshkumar Ishwardas v. Union of India, (1995) 4 SCC 51 Supports the proposition that a detenu has a right to make representation where a power of revocation exists or is available; held that empowered officers do not become functus officio and that approval by the State Government makes the State the detaining authority from the date of approval. The court applied the principles in Kamleshkumar to hold that the law laid down by the Apex Court applies with full force to detentions under the Meghalaya Act; this supported the conclusion that a detenu must be informed of his right to represent both to the detaining authority and to the Central Government once approval is granted.
Thanglenmang Hangsiang v. District Magistrate, Senapati District, 2004 (1) GLT 646 Relied upon by the petitioner in support of the contention that Article 22(5) rights (representation) must be respected in preventive detention contexts. The court noted that the petitioner relied on this decision but did not elaborate or distinguish its content; it was cited in support of the petitioner's position.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the statutory framework (sections 3 and 15 of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act and section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972) and the relevant constitutional guarantee (Article 22(5)). It extracted and reviewed:

  • Section 3(1)–(3) of the Meghalaya Act (power to detain, reporting the order to the State Government, and limitation that a District Magistrate's order will not remain in force beyond the specified period unless approved by the State Government).
  • Section 15 of the Meghalaya Act (revocation/modification by the State Government of orders by District Magistrates or empowered officers, and by the Central Government in case of orders made by the State Government), together with the saving clause referencing section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act.
  • Section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, which allows a power to issue rules/notifications/orders to include power to add, amend, vary or rescind, unless a different intention appears.

Applying these provisions, the court reasoned as follows:

  1. Although section 15 does not expressly confer power of revocation on the District Magistrate or the empowered officer, the reference to section 35 (a general clauses provision) means that the absence of express power must be read in context: while the detention order passed by the District Magistrate remains in force (i.e., until approval by State Government), the District Magistrate (or empowered officer) would be competent to vary, rescind or modify the detention order. Consequently, a detenu has the right to file a representation to the detaining authority consistent with Article 22(5).
  2. Relying on Kamleshkumar, which dealt with analogous provisions in COFEPOSA/PIT/N.D.P.S and the National Security Act, the court held that the principles there apply equally to the Meghalaya Act because section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation Act is pari materia with section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. Thus, the detenu also acquires the right to make a representation to the Central Government upon approval of the District Magistrate's order by the State Government; approval makes the State the detaining authority from the date of approval and brings the Central Government's revocation jurisdiction into play.
  3. The court found, on the facts, that the petitioner was not informed of his right to file a representation to the detaining authority (the District Magistrate) and was not informed of a right to represent to the Central Government. The court held that these omissions infringed the petitioner's constitutional right under Article 22(5).
  4. Regarding the delay in disposal of the petitioner's representation to the State Government, the court examined the affidavit and original records produced by respondents showing the processing timeline. The court observed unexplained delays in transit/processing: specifically, a seven-day delay from 2.6.2004 to 8.6.2004 for the representation to reach the Inspector General of Prisons (despite short travel distance) and another seven-day delay from 8.6.2004 to 14.6.2004 to reach the Principal Secretary. These delays were not satisfactorily explained and led the court to conclude the representation was not processed with the required dispatch, infringing Article 22(5).
  5. On the supply of documents, the court held that Article 22(5) guarantees the detenu "every reasonable opportunity" to make representation and that furnishing of documents is a natural concomitant to that guarantee. Merely permitting inspection of documents at the detaining authority's office (by a representative or counsel) is an unacceptable substitute for supplying the requisite documents together with the grounds. Accordingly, the court found that non-supply of documents (and only offering inspection) infringed Article 22(5).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court concluded that the detention order dated 17.5.2004 passed by the District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, and the State Government's approval order dated 27.5.2004 were vitiated for failure to inform the detenu of his rights under Article 22(5), for inordinate/unexplained delay in processing his representation, and for non-supply of requisite documents (inspection alone being insufficient). Accordingly, the court set aside the impugned detention order dated 17.5.2004 and the approval dated 27.5.2004 and directed that the petitioner/detenu be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention is required in connection with any other case.

Implications: The immediate consequence is the release of the petitioner unless legally detained in other proceedings. The court's reasoning reiterates and applies established principles (notably from Kamleshkumar Ishwardas) concerning the right to representation, the role of approval by the State Government in converting the detaining authority, the availability of revocation powers while an order remains in force, and the procedural requirements of Article 22(5) (including timely disposition of representations and supply of documents). The opinion does not purport to announce any novel legal doctrine beyond the application of those principles to the facts of this detention; its direct effect is to invalidate the specific detention and approval challenged in this petition.

This summary is strictly confined to the material and rulings contained in the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts or holdings beyond what is stated by the court in the opinion itself.

    Rongjam Momin v. Union Of India And Ors.

    Ranjan Gogoi, J.:— The writ petitioner Shri Rongjam Momin has been detained in custody by an order dated 17.5.2004 passed by the learned District Magistrate, East Garo Hills District, William Nagar under section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1985. At the time of his detention, the petitioner was already in judicial custody in connection with certain specific criminal cases. Therefore, the order of detention dated 17.5.2004 along with the grounds therefor were served on the petitioner in Jail on 17.5.2004 itself together with a forwarding letter of the same date, i.e, 17.5.2004 The following contents of the forwarding letter dated 17.5.2004 being relevant for the purposes of the present case, are being reproduced herein below:

    “The following matters have a bearing on your detention and you may please make note of the same.

    (a) You have the right to make representation(s) to the State Government against the order of detention and your representation should he addressed to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Political Department, Shillong through the Superintendent of District Jas, Jaintia Hills. Jowai.

    (b) You have the right to claim for personal appearance before the Advisory Board which is going to decide the validity of the order of detention.

    (c) Your representation (sic) or counsel may inspect the documents pertaining to your detention in the office of the undersigned, if desired.

    This is for information and necessary action.”

    2. Against the detention made by order dated 17.5.2004, the petitioner submitted a representation to the State Government on 1.6.2004, which was rejected by an order dated 15.7.2004 The aforesaid order of rejection of the petitioner's representation though not brought on record by the writ petitioner, is available in the original records placed before the court on behalf of the official respondents it must also be noticed herein that in the meantime, the case of the petitioner was considered by the Advisory Board as per the provisions of the Meghalaya Preventive Detention Act, 1995 (‘the Meghalaya Act’) and the Advisory Board had recommended to the State Government that there were sufficient grounds for the detention of the petitioner under the provisions of section 3(1) of the Act.

    3. Assailing the detention order dated 17.5.2004, Shri N. Dutta, learned senior counsel for appearing, the petitioner has submitted that the petitioner, at no stage, was informed of his right to submit a representation to the detaining authority as well as to the Central Government and, therefore, the fundamental rights of the petitioner guaranteed under article 22(5) of the Constitution of India has been infringed, thereby vitiating the impugned detention order. In support, reliance has been placed on a judgment of this court in the case of Thanglenmang Hangsiang v. District Magistrate, Senapati District, reported in 2004 (1) GLT 646. A decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas v. Union of India, reported in (1995) 4 SCC 51, has also been placed. Shri Dutta has argued that under section 15 of the Meghalaya Act, the power of revocation of a detention order being without prejudice to the provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972, the District Magistrate would be competent to vary or rescind, an order of detention passed by him till such time that the order remains in force. A detenu, therefore, would have a right to submit a representation to the detaining authority for revocation of the detention order, it is submitted. In the present case, the petitioner was not informed of his right to file any such representation to the detaining authority. Neither was any such representation tried by the petitioner. Insofar as the right of the petitioner to submit a representation to the Central Government is concerned, Shri Dutta, learned senior counsel has argued that the right of the detenu to submit a representation to the Central Government, in cases where the initial detention is made by the District Magistrate, will arise as soon as such a detention order passed by the District Magistrate is approved, by the State Government under the provisions of the Meghalaya Act. Placing reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Kamleshkumar (supra), learned counsel has argued that upon approval of an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate by the State Government, the State Government becomes the detaining authority and file detention order becomes revocable by the Central Government under section 15 of the Meghalaya Act. A right of representation to the Central Government, therefore, accrues to a detenu under the Meghalaya Act. In the present case, admittedly, the petitioner was not informed of his right to make a representation to the Central Government; nor was any such representation filed by the petitioner. The impugned detention is, therefore, contended to be vitiated in law.

    4. Arguing further, Shri Dutta has contended that in the present case, consideration of the representation of the petitioner filed before the State Government was inordinately delayed. The aforesaid representation filed on 1.6.2004, was disposed of by the competent authority of the State Government on 15.7.2004 According to the learned counsel, the period of 45 days taken to consider and dispose of the petitioner's representation to the State Government has not been adequately and satisfactorily explained, Shri Dutta has also argued that in the forwarding letter dated 15.7.2004 served on the petitioner, it has been clearly mentioned that the authorised representative of the petitioner may inspect the relevant documents in the Office of the District Magistrate. The aforesaid fact, according to the learned senior counsel for the petitioner would go to show that the documents relevant to the detention of the petitioner were not served on the petitioner and, therefore, even his right to file a representation to the State Government has been materially affected by such omission, thereby vitiating the impugned order of detention.

    5. Controverting the submissions advanced on behalf of the petitioner, Shri U. Bhuyan, learned Government advocate, Meghalaya has submitted that the Meghalaya Act does not confer power of revocation on the detaining authority. The power of revocation of an order of detention is contained in section 15 of the Meghalaya Act and the said power must be understood to be confined to only what has been expressly conferred by section 15 of the Meghalaya Act. Learned Government advocate, Meghalaya has further argued, that the power of revocation conferred by section 15 of the Meghalaya Act on the Central Government is available only where the initial order of detention is passed by the State Government; where the initial order is passed by the District Magistrate or by the empowered officer and subsequently approved by the State Government, no power of revocation of such orders can be read to have been vested in the Central Government by section 15 of the Act. In so far as the time taken for disposal of the petitioner's representation filed before the State Government is concerned, Shri Bhuyan has drawn the attention of the court to the averments made in the affidavit of the official respondents in this regard and has also relied on the records produced, in original, to show that the matter was processed at different levels and the period of 45 days was genuinely utilised to process, consider and finalise the petitioners entitlement for revocation of the detention order. Insofar as the non-submission of requisite documents along with the grounds of detention is concerned, learned Government advocate has contended that in the forwarding letter dated 17.5.2004, it has been clearly mentioned that the petitioner could authorise his counsel or any other person to inspect the requisite documents in the Office of the District Magistrate, and therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner in this regard, which could justify an interference of the order of detention.

    6. We have given our deep and anxious consideration to all the arguments advanced on behalf of the rival parties. Though our acceptance of any one of the arguments raised on behalf of the petitioner would enable us to interfere with the impugned order of detention, yet in view of the elaborate arguments advanced and particularly as the provisions of the Meghalaya Act has certain special features, we have considered in appropriate to give our views on all the questions raised by the rival parties.

    7. Section 3 of the Meghalaya Act, which confers the power to detain and section 15 which deals with the power of revocation; of an order of detention passed under section 3 of the Act may be usefully extracted herein below:

    “3(1). The State Government or a District Magistrate may, if he is satisfied with respect to any person that with a view to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or to the maintenance of public order or of supplies and services essential to the community it is necessary so to do, make an order directing that such person be detained.

    (2) The powers under sub-section (1) may also be exercised by such officer of the State Government not below the rank of a Secretary (hereinafter referred to as empowered officer) as may be specially empowered by it in this behalf.

    (3) When a detention order is made under this section by a District Magistrate or officer, as the case may be, shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as in his opinion have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless in the meantime it has been approved by the State Government:

    Provided that where the grounds of detention are communicated under section 8 to the person detained after five days net later than ten days, from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that for words “twelve days” the words “fifteen days” shall be substituted.”

    “15.(1) Without prejudice to the provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 a detention order made by a District Magistrate or by the empowered officer may, at any time, be revoked or modified by the State Government and, in case of a detention orders made by the State Government, by the Central Government.

    (2) The revocation or expiry of a detention order shall not bar making of a fresh detention order against same person in any case where fresh facts have arisen after the date of such revocation or expiry and on which the State Government a District Magistrate or empowered officer, as the case may be is satisfied that such an order, should be made.”

    Section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 is in the following terms:

    “35. Power to make rules, etc., includes power to add, amend, vary or rescind rules, etc. — Where, by any enactment, a power to issue rules, notifications, orders, schemes, forms or bye-laws is conferred, then, unless a different intention appears that power includes a power to add, to amend, vary or rescind any rules, notification. Orders, schemes, forms or bye-laws so issued in the same manner and subject to the same sanction and condition (if any) as the power to issue the rules, notifications, orders, schemes, forms or bye-laws.”

    8. The power of revocation of an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or an empowered officer, undoubtedly, is not expressly conferred by section 15 on the District Magistrate or the empowered officer, who may have passed the initial order of detention. The absence of an expressed conferment of power to revoke, however, must be considered in the context of the provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 section 15 having made it clear that the power conferred by the said provision of the Act being without prejudice to the provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972, till such time that the order of detention passed by the District Magistrate or the empowered officer remains in force under section 3(3) of the Meghalaya Act, the District Magistrate or the empowered officer, as the case may be, would be competent to vary, rescind or modify the detention order. As, till such time that an order of detention passed by the District Magistrate remains in force, the District Magistrate would be competent to revoke the order a detenu under the Meghalaya Act must be understood to have a right to file a representation to the detaining authority consistent with the provisions of article 22(5) of the Constitution. This is the view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas (supra) though the said view of the Apex Court was in the context of such a claimed right on the part of the detenu under the provisions of the COFEPOSA Act/PIT N.D.P.S Act. In the aforesaid case, the Apex Court took the view that though under the aforesaid two Acts in question no power of revocation has been specifically conferred on any detaining authority other than the State and the Central Governments, yet such a power would be available as the power of revocation specifically conferred on the State and Central Governments, is without prejudice to the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897. The provisions of section 35 of the Meghalaya Interpretation and General Clauses Act, 1972 being perimateria with the provisions of section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it is our considered view that the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Kamleshkumar Ishwardas (supra) would apply in all its vigour to a detention under the Meghalaya Act. In the present case, we have noticed that though the order of detention dated 17.5.2004 passed by the District Magistrate remained in force on its own strength till it was approved by the State Government on 27.5.2004, the petitioner detenu was not informed of his right to file a representation to the detaining authority, i.e, the District Magistrate and no such representation was actually filed by the petitioner.

    9. The next point that should engage the attention of the court is the right of the petitioner-detenu to file a representation to the Central Government. Admittedly, the petitioner was not apprised that he has any such right and no representation was filed by the detenu-petitioner before the Central Government. The arguments advanced on this question by the rival parties have been elaborately noticed in a preceding paragraph of this order. In the case of Kamleshkumar (supra), the hon'ble Supreme Court, inter alia, was required to consider the question as to whether an officer empowered by the State Government under the provisions of COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act to pass an order of detention, becomes functus officio after passing of law order so as to denude any power in the said empowered officer to vary or revoke the detention made. While answering the aforesaid question, the hon'ble Supreme Court exhaustively considered the provisions of the COFEPOSA/PIT N.D.P.S Act as well as the National Security Act and took the view that notwithstanding the fact that under the aforesaid Acts, there was no provision for approval by the State Government of the order of detention made by the officer empowered by the State Government as in the National Security Act, it cannot be said that an order of detention passed by such an empowered officer is so passed on the basis of a deemed approval by the State Government so as to denude the empowered officer of any power to revoke the detention order passed by him. While considering the provisions of the National Security Act in the above context, the following observations made by the Apex Court would be relevant to the point at issue in the present case:—

    “34 In the National Security Act, there is an express provision, section 3(4) in respect of orders made by the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police under section 3(3) and the District Magistrate or the Commissioner of Police, who has made the order is required to forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate. The said provision further as prescribes that no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. This would show that it is the approval of the State Government which gives further life to the order which would otherwise die its natural death on the expiry of twelve days after its making. It is also the requirement of section 3(4) that the report should be accompanied by the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in the opinion of the said officer, have a bearing on the matter which means that the State Government has to take into consideration the grounds and the said material while giving its approval to the order of detention. The effect of the approval by the State Government is that from the date of such approval the detention is authorised by the order of the State Government approving the order of detention and the State Government is the detaining authority from the date of the order of approval.”

    In view of the aforesaid enunciation of the law under the provisions of the National Security Act and the provisions of section 3(1) of the Meghalaya Act being pari materia with the relevant provisions of National Security Act there can be no manner of doubt that after the approval was granted in the present case by the State Government by order dated 17.5.2004, the Central Government was competent to revoke the detention order of the petitioner and, therefore, the petitioner had a right under article 22(5) of the Constitution to be informed of his entitlement to file a representation to the Central Government. The stage at which the petitioner should have been apprised of the aforesaid right, a point on which much emphasis has been laid by Shri U. Bhuyan, learned Government advocate, according to us, would be of no consequence. It is not difficult to visualize a situation where the stage at which such a right of a detenu accrues can be appropriately transposed.

    For the aforesaid reasons, we unhesitatingly take the view that on both counts, i.e, the failure of the detaining authority to inform the detenu/petitioner of his right to file a representation to the detaining authority as well as to the Central Government, the fundamental right of the petitioner under article 22(5) of the Constitution has been infringed thereby vitiating the impugned order of detention dated 17.5.2004 as well as the order approving the same passed by the State Government on 27.5.2004

    9. Insofar as the time taken for disposal of the petitioner's representation is concerned, we have noticed from the averments made in paragraph 14 of the affidavit of the official respondents that the petitioner's representation dated 1.6.2004 was forwarded by the Superintendent of District Jail, Jowai, to the Inspector General of Prisons at Shillong on 2.5.2004 The same was received by the Inspector General of Prisons on 8.6.2004 and was forwarded to the Principal Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Political Department on 14.6.2004 The official records produced show the manner in which the said representation was processed on and from 16.6.2004 leading to the order dated 15.7.2004 rejecting the said representation filed by the petitioner. Even if we are to accept the case of the respondents that the time taken was required for processing the petitioner's entitlement at different levels of the State Government, we fail to comprehend as to why 7 days time was taken (from 2.6.2004 to 8.6.2004) for the representation of the petitioner to reach the Inspector General of Prisons, though admittedly the distance between Jowai and Shillong can be covered in ⅔ hours. We also fail to see why it took another 7 days time from (8.6.2004 to 14.6.2004) for the petitioner's representation to reach the table of the Principal Secretary to the Government of Meghalaya, Political Department. The aforesaid facts have not been satisfactorily explained by the respondents in the affidavit filed nor are the same explained by the official records. We, therefore, unhesitatingly take the view, that the petitioner's representation dated 1.6.2004 was not dealt with by the respondents with it most dispatch and expedition thereby infringing, the petitioner's fundamental right under article 22(5) of the Constitution.

    10. Before parting, with the record, the point regarding non-supply of documents to the petitioner, as raised, may also be answered even if it be for the purpose of completing the catalogue of arguments raised. article 22(5) of the Constitution confers on the petitioner a fundamental right guaranteeing him every reasonable opportunity of making a representation against his detention made under a Preventive Detention Law. Furnishing of documents on the basis of which an order of preventive detention has been passed is a natural, concomitant to the said guarantee. All opportunity of inspection to be carried out in the Office of the detaining authority by the representatives/counsel of a detenu will not satisfy the requirement imposed by article 22(5) of the Constitution. Such an opportunity of inspection will be a legally unacceptable substitute for what has been mandated. We, therefore, again take the view that the non-supply of requisite documents along with the grounds of detention and a mere opportunity to inspect the documents as afforded in the present case infringes the petitioner's fundamental rights guaranteed under article 22(5) of the Constitution.

    11. For all the aforesaid reasons, we consider the present to be a fit and appropriate case for interference. Accordingly, we set aside the impugned order of detention dated 17.5.2004 passed by the District Magistrate, Garo Hills District as well as the order of approval dated 27.5.2004 passed by the State Government and direct that the petitioner/detenu be set at liberty forthwith unless his detention or custody is required in connection with any other case.

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    Rongjam Momin v. Union Of India And Ors.
    (Oct 1, 2004)