Bhlmasankaram, J.:-

(1) The suit out of which this appeal arises was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that it is not maintainable. As we have also reached the same conclusion, although for different reasons, this judgment will deal only with that question to which, indeed, the argument before us have been confined. The point arises in this way : there is in the town of eluru in west godavari district a registered society known as the " eluru besta mahajana sangham" of which the two plaintiffs are the president and the secretary. It is described in the plaint as having been formed in or about the year 1935 " for the social, economic and educational uplift of the members of the besta community ". A site called " besthala panja " (the extent of which is 300 square yards) owned by the community was dedicated by them " as a religious or charitable endowment " ; to quote from the plaint, "the members of the community were installing peers during the moharrum festival every year in the said panja, and were also using the said panja as a meeting place of all their caste men, and for all other allied and common purposes of the community ".

(2) In due course, two buildings were constructed upon the site from contributions raised from the caste men and one of the buildings has four rooms that can be let out for use as shops. The president of the sangham was authorised to let them out and spend the income therefrom as well as that from the general contributions for the common purposes of the community. But one mahankali ramachandra rao (the daughter's son of vaddi satteyya, a former president, claiming to be the owner, in his right as heir to the said satteyya) purported to dispose of a part of the site and the building thereon in favour of one mahankali sreeramulu. Mahankali sreeramulu who purchased it from him was also a president of the society and the sale - deed is described in the plaint as " fraudulent, collusive, devoid of any consideration, and is not at all binding on the members of besta community ". The plaint adds : "the action of satteyya's heir and late sreeramulu constituted breaches of trust ".

(3) It goes on to make the following allegations : -

"the first defendant, narasimha rao, who is the son of sreeramulu, after the death of his father in november, 1942, acted for three or four years as manager and trustee for the abovesaid endowed properties, and was spending the income from them and contributions from caste men for the common purposes of the community including celebration of ' peerla utsavam ' during moharrum festival. But, later on, taking advantage of the dissensions in the community men, he began to misappropriate the incomes of the properties for himself. Added to that, the plaintiffs understand that the said narasimha rao illegally and unauthorisedly sold away by a sale - deed, dated 30th january, 1946 to the second defendant the tiled building and a site of about 116 sq. Yds. Out of the said site, belonging to the community. The first defendant also mortgaged the remaining site and the terraced building with shops to the third defendant. The said sale and mortgage are not true and valid, and are not supported by consideration and are collusive and not binding on the community."

The plaint then avers that the members of the community demanded of sri narasimha rao to hand over the properties and render a proper account of his and his father's management and that although he agreed by a letter, dated 6th february, 1946, to do so, he has not done it. After obtaining therefore, the permission of the advocate - general, the plaintiffs instituted the present suit in paragraph 12 of which they asked for the following reliefs : -

" (1) for removing the present trustee, mahankali narasimha rao ; (2) for framing a scheme for the management of the trust properties ; (3) for appointing for the " eluru bestha mahajana sangham " its president or secretary as the new trustee or trustees and for vesting the trust properties in the new trustees ; (4) for directing the accounts and enquiries of the management by first defendant and his father, late sriramulu garu of the trust properties ; (5) for costs and other incidental reliefs which this honourable court may think fit and proper ; (6) for declaration that the plaint property is trust property for the benefit of the bestha community of eluru ; and (6 - a) for possession of the above trust property to the president and the secretary of the said sangham the new trustee or trustees. "

The tenants of the shops and the house are impleaded as defendants 4 to 7 (who were set ex parte at the trial) and defendant 8 is the wife of late mahankali sreeramulu and mother of the first defendant. The contesting defendants raised various pleas in their written statements and among them is the plea that because of the provisions of the madras act xix of 1951 the suit could not be entertained by the civil court. The question for our determination is whether the contention is sound. Section 93 of the act upon which reliance is placed in support of the contention runs as follows : -

"no suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in this act shall be instituted in any court of law, except under, and in conformity with the provisions of this act"

(4) The question is whether the present suit is in respect of the administration or management of a religious institution or any other matter or dispute for determining or deciding which provision is made in the act. Before discussing the question, it is necessary to refer to section 3 of the act, whereby the government is empowered by notification in the local gazette to extend " all or any of the provisions of the act and of any rules made thereunder" to any hindu or jain public charitable endowment which they have reason to believe is being mismanaged, if they are satisfied that in th'e interests of the administration of such a charitable endowment it is necessary to do so. This section states that upon such notification the provisions so extended shall apply to such an endowment as if it were a " specific endowment ".

(5) A proviso with which we are not concerned states that the issue of such a notification is subject to notice being given to the persons interested in the endowment. We must now turn to the definitions of the terms and phrases contained in the act. They are contained in section 6 and for our purposes, the following definitions are relevant: -

"6. (4) ' charitable endowment' means all property given or endowed for the benefit of, or used as of right by, the hindu or the jain community or any section thereof, for the support or maintenance of objects of utility to the said community or section, such as rest - houses, choultries, patasalas, schools and colleges, houses for feeding the poor and institutions for the advancement of education, medical relief and public health or other objects of a like nature ; and includes the institution concerned ; (6. (15) ' religious institution ' means a math, temple or specific endowment ; (6. (16) ' specific endowment' means any property or money endowed for the performance of any specific service or charity in a math or temple, or for the performance of any other religious charity, but does not include an inam of the nature described in explanation (1) to clause (14) ;"

(6) Now the effect of the statutory provisions may be summarised thus : where the government have reason to believe that any hindu (or jain) charitable endowment is being mismanaged and are satisfied that in the interests of the administration of such charitable endowment it is necessary to do so, they may notify that all or any of the provisions of this act shall apply thereto and thereupon such provisions shall extend to it as if it were a specific endowment ; that is to say, as if it were any property or money endowed for the performance of any ' religious charity', (a phrase which, too, is defined in clause 13 of section 6, a definition, however, which we need not cite). Now the words " religious institution " include a specific endowment. So, by section 93, any suit or other legal proceeding in respect of the administration or management of a specific endowment is expressly barred. It cannot be seriously disputed that the property to which the suit relates is a charitable endowment within the meaning of the definition, although mr. Virabhadrayya contended at one stage that it is partly charitable and partly religious and is therefore neither a religious endowment as defined in clause (14) of section 6 nor a charitable endowment as defined in clause (4) and that therefore it is outside the purview of the act. As to this contention, it will have been noticed that the plaint itself described it as a ' charitable or religious endowment ' ; further, the mere fact that once a year ' peerlu ' are installed in the place during the moharrum does not, in our opinion, affect its charitable nature, even assuming that doing so brings the endowment within the definition'of a religious endowment as being " property given or endowed for the performance. Of any. Religious charity ".

(7) The argument on behalf of the appellants is that no provision of the act can apply to a charitable endowment until after a notification is made by the government extending specified provisions, and that not having been done with respect to the suit endowment section 93 does not apply to it.

(8) It seems to us, however, that the language of section 93 is wide enough to cover a suit like the present ; it excludes from the jurisdiction of the civil court any suit relating to hindu charitable endowment if any of the reliefs asked for in that suit are based upon allegations of mismanagement. The relief prayed may be a general one such as the framing of a scheme in the interests of the administration of the endowment or it may be something particular such as the removal of a trustee. But in either case, if the ground of the relief sought is mismanagement, the civil court's jurisdiction must be held barred. When a question arises as to whether a charitable endowment is being mismanaged, the government are empowered to deal with the matter under section 3 of the act. They are also empowered to determine whether the framing of a scheme is necessary in such a case in the interests of the administration of the endowment and further to decide whether it is necessary to extend all or any of the provisions of this act to that institution. In our opinion, all these are " matters or disputes for determining or deciding which provision is made " in the act. The argument that section 93 which is one of the provisions of the act cannot apply before a notification is made by the government under section 3 of the act seems to us to be without force. It is true that before all of any of the provisions of this act are made applicable, the conditions specified in section 3 must be fulfilled. But the conditions laid down by section 3 can be fulfilled only by the government applying is mind to any allegations made before them concerning the institution. Whether it is being mismanaged and whether it is necessary to make a notification, are matters expressly committed to the decision of the government. Thus, the ascertainment of the facts upon which a notification could be based is a matter which is to be determined by the government. Section 93 of the act, in our opinion, clearly interdicts the determination of such a matter by the civil court.

(9) Now the suit is entirely based on allegations of breach of trust and every one of the reliefs prayed lor in the plaint can flow from appropriate action that officers named, in the act may take. The first relief sought in the present plaint can result from action taken under section 45 of the act ; the second and third reliefs from action under section 58 ; the fourth from action under section 60; the 6th relief from action under section 57 and the relief numbered and lettered as 6 (a) from action under section 87. There are other provisions too which could be invoked. But it is pointed out by mr. Veerabhadrayya for the appellants that while subsection (3) of section 5 expressly provides that sections 92 and 93 of the code of civil procedure, 1908, shall cease to apply to hindu religious institutions and endowments there is no similar provision with regard to charitable endowments and that therefore a suit like the present is still governed by section 92 of the civil procedure code. We have already held that section 93 of the act excludes the jurisdiction of the civil court. Section 92 of the civil procedure code can only apply where a suit is triable by the civil court ; it specifics the reliefs to be obtained and the conditions subject to which such reliefs may be obtained where there is a breach of trust of a charitable or religious nature or where the direction of the court is deemed necessary for the admin'stralion of any such trust. But under the act, in the case of a hindu or jain charitable trust where there is an alleged breach of trust or where directions are necessary for its administration, the government is the authority to take appropriate action. The jurisdiction, therefore, under section 92, civil procedure code, is taken away by the combined effect of sections 3 and 93 of the act. Mr. Veerabhadrayya has referred to the decision in ayisomma v. Kunhali, (1957) 1 m. L. J. 5. There the learned judges held that a "civil court has jurisdiction to decide whether a particular institution is a public temple or not when such a question arises incidental to other disputes in the case before the court ". In that case, their lordships were dealing with section 84 of the madras hindu religious and charitable endowments act (ii of 1927). It is true that a dispute as to whether a property is or is not a charitable endowment within the meaning of the act may be determined by the civil court, because the act applies only to charitable endowments and wheie for instance the government purports to exercise its power under section 3 to what is not a charitable endowment, a person interested may seek relief in the civil court. But in the present case the plaintiff do not raise any dispute as to the character of the trust. The fact that the defendants do so in their written statements does not bear upon the question of jurisdiction of the court to try the suit as constituted by the allegations in the plaint because in deciding that question, we must assume that the allegations in the plaint are true. Further, if resort to the civil court for the positive declaration that " the plaint property is trust property, for the benefit of the besta community of eluru" is permissible even before the government are approached first, that relief is only incidentally asked in the plaint, as was done in the case before the supreme court in mahant pragdasji v. Narsibhai, (1952) s. C. J. 224, where their lordships observed as follows :

"where in a suit brought under section 92, civil procedure code, the defendant denies existence of the trust and denies further that he was guilty of misconduct or breach of trust and it is found by the courts that the allegations of breach of trust are not made out, and it is not the case of the plaintiffs that any direction of the court was necessary for proper administration of trust, the very foundation of a suit under section 92 becomes wanting and the plaintiffs have no cause of action for the suit they instituted. In such a case, a finding about the existence of a public trust is wholly inconsequential and as it is unconnected with the grounds upon which the case is disposed of, it could not be made a part of the decree or final order in the shape of a decree in favour of the plaintiffs. When the defendant denies the existence of a trust, a declaration that the trust does exist might be made as ancillary to the main relief claimed under the section if the plaintiff is held entitled to it ; but when the case of the plaintiff fails for want of a cause of action there is no warrant for giving him a declaratory relief under the provisions of section 92, civil procedure code."

Applying the reasoning of their lordships to the present case, if the suit cannot be maintained with respect to the other reliefs, and the mere fact that there is an incidental prayer for declaration assuming that it can be granted - does not render it maintainable. Therefore this contention too fails.

(10) In the result, we agree with the trial court that the present suit cannot be tried by a civil court. The appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. One set. Appeal dismissed.