Narasimham, J.:-
(1) This is an appeal against the order of gopal rao ekbote, j. By which he dismissed w. P. No. 403 of 1962 for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing g. O, ms. No. 1097, education department, government of andhra pradesh, dated 2oth april, 1961 and g. O. Ms. No. 3382, education department, government of andhra pradesh, dated ist november, 1961.
(2) The appellant filed the writ in the following circumstances: when he was serving as the principal, government training college, nellore, in 1956, certain allegations of corruption and mal - practices were made against him. The then deputy director of public instruction (personnel) conducted a preliminary enquiry into the allegations and submitted his report to the government. As the government saw a prima facie case of corruption, etc. , it directed an enquiry by the tribunal for disciplinary proceedings. Finding him guilty of seme of the charges, the tribunal made its recommendations. The government considered the report of the tribunal for disciplinary proceedings and its recommendation, consulted the departmental head, the director of public instruction and came to a provisional conclusion that the officer should be compulsorily retired from service with such pensionary benefits as might accrue to him. The officer was given an opportunity of showing cause against the proposed punishment, and by its order g. O. Ms. 1097, education department, dated aoth april, 1961, the government directed his compulsory retirement from service.
(3) Against the said order, the petitioner - appellant preferred an appeal as provided under the rules which was rejected by g. O. Ms. 3382, education department, dated 1st november, 1961. The writ petition was filed on 18th april, 1962 seeking the removal of the said orders on certiorari. Ekbote, j. , who heard the writ petition, saw no case for interference and dismissed the writ petition on 19th march, 1964. The present appeal is filed on 29th june, 1964 against the said order dismissing the writ petition. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant died on 7th april, 1966 and his legal representatives, who were brought on record by the orders of the deputy registrar, purport to continue the appeal.
(4) A preliminary objection is raised by the learned government pleader that the cause of action did not survive and the writ appeal abated. It is the contention of the learned government pleader that the writ petitioner challenged the orders of the government compulsorily retiring him from service, which related to a purely personal and individual right of his, and that on his death the cause of action did not survive, but died with him. As this is a vital matter touching the maintainability of the appeal, it is necessary that we decide this question.
(5) The learned government pleader cited in his support a recent decision of the madras high court in u. Vridachalam and others v. The state of madras represented by secretary to government home department, madras, 1965 2 mlj 302 : air 1966 mad. 260. The facts in that case present a similarity and we consider that the decision is of some relevancy. The petitioner in that case was a police head constable against whom certain charges were fiamed. A departmental enquiry against him resulted in the order of dismissal from service. He exhausted his remedies otherwise provided and ultimately sought the issuance of a writ of certiorari on certain grounds. After filing the writ petition, he died, and his legal representatives were brought on record. A preliminary question arose, as now, whether the writ proceedings were maintainable in the changed circumstances caused by the death of the writ petitioner. The learned judge held that the relief sought was purely personal to the delinquent officer and that such personal right, which involved the continuance in service or otherwise of a person would not survive to the legal representatives. The learned judge further observed that the state would also be placed in a some what anomalous position in not being able to continue the proceedings even if the writ could be granted. The learned judge further observed that if the legal representatives were regarded as third parties, they could not claim to seek the issuance of a writ to displace the offending order, for unless the person had a legal right, he could not seek the exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction of the court under article 226 of the constitution.
(6) The learned government pleader has relied on the said decision as on all fours with the facts of the present case. Here also, the writ petitioner sought a relief which was purely personal to him which involved his continuance in service. Even if the prayer in the writ was granted by the court, the allegations against him were not wiped out, and no fresh proceedings could be initiated against the petitioner who is dead. The cause of action, which was purely personal to the writ petitioner, would not survive to his legal representatives and the legal representatives, who must be deemed to be third parties, cannot be persons aggrieved who could seek reliefs under article 226 of the constitution alleging infraction of their personal or individual rights.
(7) The learned counsel for the writ petitioner has placed reliance on a decision of the allahabad high court; jagdish prasad mathur and others v. United provinces government, air 1956 all 114 that was a case of a suit filed by a dismissed government official against the government after due notice under section 80, civil procedure code praying for a declaration that his order of dismissal was wrongful, and for consequential reliefs such as arrears of pay with damages as well as future pay and interest on arrears of pay and costs of suit. The suit was dismissed by the trial court. He preferred an appeal and during the pendency of the appeal, he died. His widow and sons were substituted in, his place as his legal representatives. The learned judges gave a declaration that the dismissal was wrongful and remanded the suit for ascertaining the amounts due to the plaintiff as and for arrears of pay and on other counts.
(8) The facts of the said case were basically different. The subject - matter of the suit was not merely the legality or otherwise of the order of dismissal of the plaintiff but also the money due to him as arrears of pay or otherwise. There can be no question that the legal representatives would be entitled to the money that the deceased was entitled to.
(9) The writ petition, which concerns us, is fundamentally different. It involves no question of money payable to the deceased. The considerations that applied to the suit for the reliefs prayed for which we have set out, cannot apply to the continnuance of the writ. We are therefore unable to find support for the continuance of this writ appeal from the facts and the law stated in the allahabad case cited to us.
(10) We are satisfied that the reasoning of the madras case cited to us by the learned government pleader applies on all fours. We find adopting the reasoning, in the said case that the relief sought by the writ petitioner since dead was purely personal to him as it involved his continuance in service and could not survive to the legal representatives.
(11) We uphold the preliminary objection and find that the appeal has abated and has become infructuous. We dismiss the appeal but in the circumstances, there will be no order as to costs. Appeal dismissed as abated.