Sudhanshu Sekhar Ganguly, J.:—This revisional application has been preferred from judgment and order dated 2.12.86 passed by Shri L.N Ray, Member, West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal in Appeal no. 69 of 1985 arising out of dispute case no. 1 CZ of 1983-1984/5 Cal of 1983-1984.

2. Admittedly the plaintiff-respondent-opposite party Ram Narayan Teckohand placed an order for 1500 bags of Mustard seeds at the rate of Rs. 225/- per quintal with the present defendant appellant-petitioner National Agricultural Co-operative Marketing Federation of India Limited a Co-operative Society registered in the State of Maharastra under the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act, 1925 and having its branch office at no. 20, British India Street, Calcutta. The opposite party deposited Rs. 10,000/- as advance. Subsequently, the price was reduced to Rs. 220/- per quintal in January, 1976. The opposite party took delivery of 710 bags and made payment on various occasions which together amounted to Rs. 1,32,000/-. It is not disputed that the opposite party did not make arrangement for taking delivery of the remaining bags on payment of the price thereof. As such an amount of Rs. 11,124.63 which remained due to it was ultimately forfeited by the present petitioner towards the loss allegedly suffered by It. The opposite party filed Money Suit no. 458 of 1979 in the City Civil Court, Calcutta, 6th Bench for recovery of this amount. The suit was dismissed on the ground of want of service of notice under s. 70 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act. Thereafter the opposite party filed dispute case no. 1 CZ of 1983-1984/5 Cal of 1983-1984 under s. 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act. The petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the Registrar under Co-operative Societies Act to entertain the dispute and the application of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 to it. It was also urged the claim that which was the subject matter of the dispute was hopelessly barred by limitation. While admitting that the respondent had a sum of Rs. 11,124.63 lying with it, it was urged that the same had been appropriated to cover up its losses and damages as the respondent in spite of notice containing a specific warning of forfeiture of the said amount refunded or failed to lift the remaining 782 bags of mustard seeds without any valid reason.

3. The dispute case was disposed of by the Deputy Registrar Co-operative Societies, Central Zone, Government of West Bengal. He held that with the lowering of the price per quintal of the mustard seeds a new contract come into being between the parties. While holding further that the dispute was maintainable and not barred by limitation the learned Deputy Registrar held that the present petitioner could not lawfully forfeit the amount. Hence he passed an award for Rs. 11,124.63 in favour of the opposite party.

4. The appeal from this award being appeal no. 69 of 1985 was beard and disposed of by Shri L.N Ray, Member, West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal on 24/1/86 and his findings are the following:—

1) There was only a variation in the agreed price and not in the quantity to be supplied. The contract entered into between the parties subsisted. The opposite party therefore committed a breach of contract by not taking delivery of the balance 782 bags or paying the price therefor.

2) The petitioner was not entitled to forfeit the amount in question without proving actual loss or without raising any counter claim.

3) The reference case was hit by res judicata in view of the decision of the City Civil Court in M.S no. 468 of 1979.

4) The Limitation Act did not apply to a claim for money filed against the Co-operative Society since the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Society was a quast judicial or Administrative Tribunal and not a court.

5) The dispute in the present case was not maintainable in view of the provisions of s. 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and the Registrar or the Deputy Registrar had no authority to entertain it.

5. In the result the learned Member set aside the award passed by the learned Deputy Registrar.

6. The aggrieved opposite party came up before this court in Revision which was numbered as C.R 1840 of 1986. This matter was heard and disposed of by a Division Bench presided over by Mr. Justice Chittatosh Mookherjee, (as His Lordship then was). The Division Bench decided that the reference under s. 86 of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act was perfectly valid and that it was not barred by res judicata. In the result the case was sent back for adjudication of remaining points, if any, in the appeal preferred by the opposite party. When the matter went back to the learned Member of the Co-operative Tribunal a petition was filed from the side of the petitioner for allowing them to adduce additional evidence for proving the actual loss.

The learned Member heard the learned Advocate of the two parties again.

7. On this occasion he held that since in his earlier judgment he had already held that the respondent was entitled to an award but for his findings on point of maintainability and res-judicata, and since his findings on the said two points had been set aside by this Court (i.e the High Court), the award passed by the learned Deputy Registrar had to be affirmed. The learned Member also rejected the petitioner's prayer for additional evidence since the petitioner's written statement before the learned Deputy Registrar did not contain any plea of actual loss or lay any counter claim. In coming to his conclusion in this regard the learned Member also relied upon the decisions reported in Natha Singh v. The Financial Commissioner, AIR 1976 SC 1053 and Associated Hotels v. Ranjit Singh, AIR 1968 SC 933. It is against this decision of the learned Member that the present revisional application has been filed.

8. It is urged from the side of the petitioner that since both the Deputy Registrar and the learned Member found that there had been a breach of contract by the opposite party, the points which were left to be adjudicated upon were as to (1) whether the petitioner had suffered any actual loss due to the said breach of contract, and, if so, (2) whether the petitioner was justified in adjusting the said advance-deposit towards compensation for the loss. This was, so it is urged, the intent and purport of the Hon'ble Court's order of remand and it is contended that since old records were involved, the learned Member should have allowed the petitioner to prove the actual loss by adducing additional evidence. It is also urged that in any way the claim was barred by limitation, and further that the provisions of s. 86(d) of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 stood in the way of the application of the said Act to the facts of this case. All these points are contested from the side of the opposite party.

9. In this case the last transaction took place between the parties in January, 1976 when the opposite party lifted 718 bags out of 1520 bags and it is not disputed that the claim would be hopelessly barred by limitation the day on which the dispute case was lodged on or about 15th December, 1985 in case the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 applied to the facts of the present case. This point was also agitated before the learned Member on the earlier occasion Observing that since as the decision of the Supreme Court in Sakur v. Tanaji AIR 1985 SC 1219 the Limitation Act applied only to Courts and not to any quasi judicial Tribunal or an Executive Authority unless specifically provided by the Special Act prescribing the quasi-judicial Tribunal or the Executive Authority and further that the Special Act in this case viz. the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, did neither apply the Limitation Act to the disputes covered by it, nor provide any period of limitation for money-claims against a Co-operative Society held that the reference in this case was not barred by limitation. The Division Bench hearing the earlier Revisional application (C.R 1840 of 1986) did not set aside this conclusion of the learned Member. However, to set the controversy at rest we feel inclined to entertain the objection even at this stage.

10. The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 is a Special Act. A close study of the relevant provisions of the Act reveals that though by s. 86(2) it has provided a time-limit specifically for referring a dispute other than a dispute relating to the recovery of money it nowhere has provided any time limit for referring a dispute relating to recovery of money from any Co-operative Society. The Act also nowhere provides for application of the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 to the disputes relating to the affairs of a Co-operative Society. Section 46 of the Act refers to the Limitation Act, 1963 only to prohibit the application of its provisions in relation to the period of limitation for the institution of a suit to recover any sum due to a Co-operative Society by a member thereof. Under such circumstances can it be held that the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act apply to the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act and the disputes contemplated by it?

11. The law by now is well settled that the provisions of the Limitation Act apply to a court and not to a quasi-judicial Tribunal or an Executive Authority, Smt. Sushila Devi v. Ramananda Prasad (1976 1 SCC 361, Sakuru v. Tanaji, AIR 1985 SC 1279, Nitayanada v. The LIC, AIR 1970 SC 209. That leads to the question if the Deputy Registrar who heard and disposed of the dispute was a “court” or not. In Nirmal v. Panihati Municipality AIR 1977 Calcutta 246, Nowda, Thana Co-operative v. West Bengal Co-operative Tribunal, AIR 1979 Cal 818 and Smt. Sujata Moitra v. West Bengal, 1978 CHN 831 all cited from the Bar, it was held that the Co-operative Tribunal contemplated by the Act (section 133 of the 1973 Act) is a Court. These decisions weighty as they are have no relevance for our present purpose for obvious reasons.

12. Two decisions of the Supreme Court viz. Jugal Kishore v. Sitamartri Central Co-operative Bank, AIR 1967 SC 1494 and Ramrao v. Narayan, AIR 1969 SC 724 are however very much relevant for the purpose of our present enquiry. What fell for decision in the first was as to whether the Assistant Registrar discharging functions of a Registrar under s. 48 read with s. 6(2) of the Bihar & Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, 1835 was a “Court” or not. The observations of the Supreme Court as brought out in the headlines are as follows:—

A Registrar exercising powers under s. 48 must be held to discharge the duties which would otherwise have fallen on the ordinary civil and revenue courts of the land. The Registrar has not merely the trapping of a Court but in many respects he is given the same powers as are given to ordinary civil courts of the land by the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to summon and examine witnesses on oath, the power to order inspection of documents, to hear the parties after framing issues, to revise his own order and even exercise the inherent jurisdiction of Courts mentioned in s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In adjudicating upon a dispute referred under s. 48 of the Act, the Registrar is to all intent and purpose, a Court discharging the same functions and duties in the same manner as a Court of law is expected to do. Therefore, an Assistant Registrar discharging the functions of Registrar under s. 48 read with s. 6(2) of Bihar and Orissa Co-operative Societies Act, is a Court”.

13. What fell for decision in the second case was as to whether the Registrar's nominee appointed under s. 95 of the Maharastra Co-operative Societies Act (24 of 1961) was a ‘Court’ within s. 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It was observed in this case that even though the nominee of the Registrar was required to act judicially and make an award, he derived his authority not from the statute but from investment by the Registrar in his individual discretion—the power so invested being liable to suspension and withdrawal—and further that since he was not entrusted with the judicial power of the State he was merely an arbitrator his position being analogous to that of an arbitrator designated under a statutory arbitration to which the provision of s. 47 of the Arbitration Act applied.

14. It may be concluded from the above that where apart from having the usual trappings of a Court as contemplated by the Civil or the Criminal Procedure Code, the Authority acting judicially derives his authority to adjudicate from the statute such an authority may be considered to be a Court.

15. Turning our attention to the case at hand we find that the Registrar under West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 has also almost all the trappings of a civil or a criminal court with this difference only that he has not been given the inherent jurisdiction as mentioned in s. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code. The Registrar along with certain other authorities was given the power to summon and enforce the attendance of witnesses and parties concerned and to examine them upon oath and to compel the production of any books, accounts, documents, securities, cash and other papers by the same means and, as far as may be, in the same manner, as provided in the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, (Section 123)—He was also given the power to direct conditional attachment (section 125) and power to distrain (section 99). Subject to appeal to the Co-operative Tribunal (section 133, the award or order passed by the Registrar was to become final (section 134(1)(3). No civil court was to exercise any jurisdiction in respect of any dispute required under s. 86 to be referred to the Registrar (section 152(d) the Registrar was also given the power to revise any order passed by him (section 135). The Deputy Registrar in this case must have received his authority to adjudicate under s. 87(1)(b) read with s. 10(a) of the said Act. In view of the decision of the Supreme Court mentioned above, it must be held, therefore, that the Deputy Registrar adjudicating upon the dispute under s. 87(1)(b) of the Act in this case was a “Court” and not a mere quasi judicial tribunal.

16. It remains to be decided if the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to the disputes contemplated by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act.

17. As stated above the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act does neither apply nor withhold specifically the provisions of the Limitation Act to the provisions of the Act and especially the disputes contemplated by s. 86 of the Act. The Act provides periods of limitation specifically for certain contingencies. Section 86(2) mentions such a contingency and other contingencies are mentioned in the Third Schedule of the Act.

18. The language of s. 46 of the Act, however, clearly shows what was the intention of the legislature in this regard. The section runs thus:

“Section 46”—Limitation—Notwithstanding any of the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, the period of limitation for the institution of a suit to recover any sum, including interests thereon due to a Co-operative Society by a member thereof or any other person having transaction with the Society shall be computed from the date on which such member or person concerned dies or ceases to be a member of, or as the case may be, closes transaction with, the Society”.

19. It is obvious that the legislators felt that the relevant provision of the Limitation Act would apply as a matter of course to the contingency contemplated by the section and hence the specific prohibition. It follows, therefore, that it was within the contemplation of the legislators that the relevant provision of the Limitation Act would apply to all other possible cases to which were not appended any specific period of limitation at in s. 86(2) or a clear cut prohibition as in s. 46. A dispute relating to the recovery of money from a Co-operative Society is obviously such a case and hence it may be safely concluded that such a case would attract the relevant provision of the Limitation Act.

20. On the day the dispute case was presented before the Registrar in this case, therefore, the claim was hopelessly barred by limitation. There was no application filed before the learned Registrar under s. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay. The learned Registrar could have therefore, refused to entertain the claim of the respondent on this ground alone.

21. We hasten to add, however, that the learned Member did nothing wrong by refusing the petitioner's prayer for allowing it to adduce fresh or additional evidence. The Civil Procedure Code may or may not apply in toto to the proceedings contemplated by the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, but its spirit will certainly apply. The relevant provision in this regard is contained in Order 41, Rule 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Code which runs as follows;—

“27(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court. But if—

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgments or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced or witness to be examined”.

22. The learned Member felt that he could pronounce judgment in this case even without the additional evidence sought to be adduced by the petitioner. The law is well settled that in such a case additional evidence should not be accepted, Arjun Singh v. Kartar Singh, AIR 1951 SC 193, State Of U.P v. Manbodhan Lal Srivastava, AIR 1957 SC 912, Smt. Pramod Kumari v. Om Prakash, AIR 1980 SC 446. The decision of the learned Member in this regard does not deserve to be interfered with.

23. In view of what has been stated above we are of the view that the appeal from the decision of the learned Deputy Registrar should not have been allowed by the learned Member of the Co-operative Tribunal and that the learned Member should have held that claim of the respondent was hopelessly barred by limitation on the day it was lodged with the learned Registrar. The present revisional application must, therefore, be allowed which we hereby do. The judgment and order passed by the learned Member in Appeal No. 69 of 1986 are hereby set aside and the dispute case preferred by the respondent giving rise to Dispute case No. 1-C2 of 1983-1984/5 Cal. of 1983-1984 is hereby rejected. Parties do bear their costs.

Monoj Kumar Mukherjee, J.:—I agree.

Impugned order set aside.