Divatia, J.:— This appeal has been preferred by the Government in a suit filed by the plaintiffs who were sureties of one Ganpat Prabhu. The plaintiffs' case was that certain property belonging to their principal-debtor was sold at the instance of Government for certain forest dues, that the plaintiffs had become sureties for Ganpat for another claim, which defendant 2, the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank, had against Ganpat as well as his joint brother Govind, and that the excess amount which remained after the sale was held to satisfy forest dues, was liable to be applied for the debt which the plaintiffs' principal-debtors owed to the Bank with the result that the plaintiffs' liability would be discharged to that extent but that as the excess was applied by Government to another forest claim known as the sutiksal dues against the same person Ganpat, the Bank could not get anything from the excess amount with the result that the plaintiff's liability continued, and hence they asked for a declaration that the amount of the decrees obtained by the Bank against the plaintiff had been fully paid, and also for an injunction restraining the Government, defendant 1, from taking any coercive measures against the plaintiffs for the recovery of the amount due by them under the decrees as arrears of land revenue or otherwise. The facts which have led to this litigation can be shortly narrated thus:
Ganpat had taken advances from Ankola Firewood Depot, and on 21st May 1925, the Divisional Forest Officer sent a claim for Rs. 1,844 against Ganpat to the Collector in order that the said amount may be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Code. On 2nd August 1926, the sale proclamation of Ganpat's property was issued, and the sale was ultimately held on 15th and 17th September 1926. But before the sale took place, in July 1926 there were award decrees passed against Ganpat and his brother as the principal-debtors and the plaintiffs as sureties for Rs. 2,011 and odd in favour of the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank. It is provided in Section 59 of the Bombay Co-operative Societies Act 7 of 1925, that those claims were to be realised according to the law and under the rules for the time being in force for the recovery of arrears of land revenue, and therefore, those decrees were sent by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies to the Collector to be realised as arrears of land revenue. The proceedings were sent to the Mamlatdar who received them on 3rd August, before the sale actually took place. In the meanwhile on 6th September 1926, Ganpat's brother Govind applied to the Conservator of Forests that the amount of Rs. 5,971 which was jointly and severally payable by both these brothers to the Government for the Sunksal dues may be realised from the excess remaining with the Mamlatdar in the sale proceedings to be held for the realisation of the Ankola Forest dues by the sale of Ganpat's property.
2. The application was forwarded by the Collector to the Conservator of Forests on 15th September and it was stated therein that the excess of that sale may be kept in revenue deposit for those dues, and the Mamlatdar made a report on 1st October, that the balance of the sale which was held in the meanwhile on 15th and 17th September, consisting of Rs. 2,756 was credited as revenue deposit. Then on 4th October 1926 the Collector sent a memo to the Mamlatdar to the effect that the said revenue deposit be kept as such pending further orders and that no amount out of should be restored to the defaulter or given to the Ankola Bank, and on the same day the Collector wrote a letter to the Conservator of Forests to the effect that a regular requisition for the Sunksal dues was not received in proper form, and that unless a demand was received in proper form and properly verified, any order to recover the Sunksal dues as arrears of land revenue from the deposit money might be irregular and perhaps illegal, and that, therefore, the requisition should be sent at once, and on 12th October the formal requisition was sent by the Forest Officer, and ultimately on 21st October the Collector wrote to the Conservator of Forests that the balance of Rs. 2,756 was credited to the Forest Department for the Sunksal dues, and as the dues of the Bank were taken as not satisfied out of the sale proceeds, a notice was issued on 12th January 1927, by the Collector to the present plaintiffs as well as to Ganpat as to why the property should not be attached for recovery of the claims of the Bank which were to be recovered as if they were arrears of land revenue. The plaintiffs have, therefore, filed the present suit for the declaration and injunction as stated above.
3. The defence of the Government to the suit was that the claims of the Crown were paramount and had priority over other claims, that the Sunksal dues had, therefore, a priority over the claims of the Bank, and that, therefore, the Government was entitled to appropriate the whole of the excess to the Sunksal dues, and the plaintiffs were not entitled to the reliefs asked for. The learned trial Judge, after framing the appropriate issues, came to the conclusion that the claims of the Government were paramount under S. 137, Land Revenue Code, and that the Collector had, therefore, the power to give the forest out standings, i.e, the Sunksal dues, precedence over all other claims including those of the Bank even though the dues of the Bank were recoverable as the arrears of land revenue. He, therefore, dismissed the suit. The plaintiffs appealed against the decree, and the learned District Judge varied it by holding that the claims of the Government for the Sunksal dues had no priority over the claim of the Bank, but that both these claims were entitled to rateable distribution under S. 183, Land Revenue Code, and that, therefore, the society was entitled to Rs. 694-11-5, and to this extent the Bank, and therefore, the plaintiffs must be given credit out of the excess amount lying with the Collector. The reasoning of the learned Judge was that the Government had priority as to their claims only with respect to the demand of the current arrears of revenue, but that subject to that all claims were to be rateably distributed between all persons who had claims against the excess from the sale-proceeds, that under S. 183, Land Revenue Code, Ganpat could have asked for the return of the whole of the balance and he could have got that balance, but that as there were two other claims, that balance could not be given to him, but that balance should be rateably distributed between the two rival claimants. Against this decree of the appellate Court the present appeal has been filed by the Government and the plaintiffs have also filed cross-objections.
4. It has been contended by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the decree of the lower Court was not correct because it ignored the imperative provisions of S. 137, Land Revenue Code, according to which the claim of Government to any moneys recoverable under the provisions of Ch. 11 shall have precedence over any other debt, demand or claim, and he says that S. 183 which speaks of the balance of the sale-proceeds being liable to the payment of claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue, has to be read as subject to the provisions of S. 137, with the result that if there was any competition between a Government claim and a private claim even though that private claim was to be realised as if it was an arrear of land revenue, the Government in all cases is entitled to have priority, and it is only after the claim of the Government was satisfied that a private creditor was entitled to have his claim satisfied from the balance thereof, and that, therefore, the order of the trial Court was correct. On the other hand, it has been contended on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs that S. 137 is not to be read by itself but is to be read with three other sections appearing in the same chapter, namely Ss. 150, 151 and 183; and S. 183 speaks of the payment of the arrears due by a defaulter recoverable as arrears of land revenue, and they were to be recovered under any of the sis modes laid down in S. 150, Land Revenue Code, and though S. 151 expressly enacts that the said modes or processes may be applied in the recovery if arrears of former years as well as for the current year, the preferences given by Ss. 137 and 138 would apply only to demands for the current year, and that, therefore, where there was a rival claim between several persons, one of whom may be the Government as against a private creditor, and where all the claims were to be recovered as arrears of land revenue, then in that case the Government's claim to priority under S. 137 had been modified by S. 151 to this extent that it is only for the demand for the current year that the Government would have priority, but that with respect to the rest there is no such priority and that the demands of all those persons were to be rateably distributed and divided under S. 183. It is further contended that, really speaking, in this case the Sunksal dues had not been properly and legally notified before the sale took place and that the regular, requisition was sent after the sales were held, and that, therefore, the Sunksal dues cannot be regarded as the dues for which the excess of the sale proceeds was liable, and that therefore the whole of the remaining amount should be devoted for the liquidation of the Bank's claim. It is urged in the alternative that if the excess lying in the Court is liable to be rateably distributed then it is to be distributed not simply between the Bank and the Government for the Sunksal dues but for the claims of all the three dues, namely, the Ankola forest dues, the Sunksal dues as well as the Bank's dues, because S. 183 speaks of the arrears due by a defaulter at the date of the confirmation of such sale, and that all the three claims for arrears were sent to be realized before the sale took place. Therefore, if there is to be any distribution, then the excess is to be distributed rateably for all the three claims.
5. Now, as between these rival contentions, I think, looking to the scheme of the Code for realisation of claims as arrears of land revenue, there is force in the contention of the respondents that in settling the claims of all those persons who are entitled to have the claims satisfied as arrears of land revenue, and therefore to seek the help of the revenue authorities under S. 150 of the Land Revenue Code, the right of priority given to the Government under S. 137 has been curtailed and limited only to the demands for the current year, and if these sections are to be read together, and if SI 151 is to have any meaning at all, it can have only this meaning that Government has no right of priority as against claims recoverable as arrears of land revenue except to the extent of the demand for the current year. When the legislature has given certain rights to persons, namely that their demands are to be realised as arrears of land revenue, then it must be regarded that they are given a substantial right under S. 183 of the Land Revenue Code which clearly says that the sale-proceeds were to be distributed between all those who were entitled to have their claims satisfied as arrears of land revenue. No such distinction is made in this section between Government claims on the one hand and private claims on the other. S. 151 also does not make any such distinction, and I, therefore, think that instead of regarding S. 183 as being governed by and subject to the provisions of S. 137, the proper construction of this section is that the right of priority given to Government has been modified by the two Ss. 151 and 183. I, therefore, think that there is force in the respondent's contention that the Government is not entitled to priority but that there should be a rateable distribution between these claims.
6. I think there is force also in the further argument that the sale-proceeds should be distributed among all the three claims and not between only Sunksal dues and the Bank's dues. S. 183 clearly speaks of the arrears due by a defaulter at the confirmation of the sale, and as I have stated above, all these three arrears were before the Collector at that time. Therefore, it would follow that all the three claims must be rateably satisfied out of the sale-proceeds. I do not accept the respondents' contentoin that the Sunksal dues cannot be satisfied at all from the sale-proceeds, because there had been he regular requisition before the sales were held. No provision in the Forest Act or any other enactment is pointed out to show that before a property can be sold as arrears of land revenue for the forest dues a regular requisition should have been sent. The Collector's letter shows that he was apprehensive that course may be irregular, but it does not follow that because a regular requisition had not been sent, the sale could not take place as if it was for arrears of land revenue. On the other hand, it appears that before the sale was held, an application by Govind, Ganpat's brother, that the Sunksal dues should be satisfied out of the excess of the sale-proceeds, was forwarded by the Collector to the Conservator of Forests on 9th September, and therefore the Sunksal dues would certainly be those dues which are to be rateably distributed under S. 183. The result, therefore, will be that the decree of the lower appellate Court will be set aside and in its place the following decree would be substituted, that the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration that the proceeds of the sale for the Ankola forest dues, which took place on 15th and 17th September 1926, shall, after defraying the expenses of the sale, be applied to the payment of the Ankola forest dues, the Sunksal forest dues and the dues under the award decree obtained) by the second defendant Bank, against Ganpat and others, and that the sale-proceeds shall be rateably distributed between these three creditors, with the result that the second defendant Bank would be entitled to recover Rs. 962-15-0 out of the sale-proceeds and to an injunction restraining defendant 1 from taking any coercive measures against the plaintiffs to recover any amount in excess of the amount due after credit is given to the Bank for the said sum of Rs. 962-15-0. As each party has partly succeeded, there will be no order as to costs of the appeal as well as of the cross-objections. The Secretary of State for India in Council appealed under the Letters Patent.
Letters Patent Appeal.
Barlee, J.:— This is an appeal from a judgment of Divatia, J. The facts on which his decision is based are shortly these: The Divisional Forest Officer had a claim against one Ganpat under the Forest Act for Rs. 1,844 in respect of advances from the Ankola Firewood Depot, and he sent his claim to the Collector in order that the said amount might be recovered as arrears of land revenue under the Land Revenue Code. Ganpat's property was sold and thereafter two other claims were put forward, one claim in respect of money due to the Forest Department from Ganpat and his brother, known as Sunksal dues, and a claim made on behalf of the Ankola Urban Co-operative Credit Bank. Before the sale had taken place this Bank had obtained award decrees against Ganpat and his brother, and the plaintiffs, their sureties, and they claimed a share of the proceeds of the sale. The question for determination was whether the claims made by Government were to be preferred to the claims that were made by the Bank, which was a private person. Divatia, J., held that the right of priority given to Government by S. 137 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code was curtailed by S. 151 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, and on reading these two sections together he decided that the Government had a right of priority only for the land revenue demand for the current year. He therefore ordered that the decree of the lower appellate Court should be set aside and that the sale-proceeds should be applied, after defraying the expenses of the sale, to the payment of Ankola Forest dues, the Sunksal Forest dues and the dues under the award decree obtained by the Bank rateably. The Government of Bombay have appealed.
7. The view taken by Divatia, J., has been taken by the learned Chief Justice in 36 Bom LR 1103 (1), where he held that Ss. 137 and 151 should be read together and that they confer priority only in respect of arrears for the current year and not for arrears of past years. This is the only decision of our own Court on this point which has been brought to our notice. It is not disputed that the Crown is given priority by common law. 5 BHC (OCJ) 23 (2) is the leading case on the subject. There it was held, after an exhaustive survey of the authorities:
A judgment-debt due to the Crown is in Bombay entitled to the same precedence in execution as a like judgment-debt in England, if there be no special legislative provision affecting that right in the particular case.
8. But this common law priority is confined to unsecured debts: cf. 45 Cal 653 (3), where it is held:
that so far as the immoveable properties were concerned including the fixtures, the Grown was not entitled to priority, that the Alliance Bank as first mortgagee ranked first, but the Delhi and London Bank as second mortgagee was not entitled to priority over the drown.
9. It follows that the priority given to the claim of Government by S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, is very much more extensive than that given by the common law, since it creates on behalf of the Government a right to priority over all debts of every kind whether secured or unsecured, and the learned Advocate General contends that S. 151 which restricts the preference given by S. 137 to the demands for the current year, merely takes away this statutory priority and does not interfere with that given by common law. It is common ground that the Crown has a common law priority and that it exists until it is modified by the legislature; and it is not denied that the provincial legislature had power to modify the common law prerogative. The narrow question before us, then, is whether the legislature has not interfered with the common law prerogative. In my opinion it has done so. S. 137 does not merely create additional rights in excess of those given by the common law but embodies a declaration of the whole of the rights of the Crown to priority. It includes not only the right of priority over secured debts which is new, but also declares the right of priority over debts of all sorts. Therefore S. 151 which confines the preference given or declared by S. 137 to demands for the current year, does in terms restrict what was the common law prerogative of the Crown. The learned Advocate-General has pointed out that this may lead to awkward results, but where a section is dear—and in this case we think the section is clear—we cannot allow such considerations to influence our decision. For this reason we agree with the former decision of Divatia, J., and dismiss this appeal with costs (two sets).
N.J Wadia, J.:— It has been held in 36 Bom LR 1103 that Ss. 137 and 151, Bombay Land Revenue Code, should be read together, and they confer priority only in respect of arrears for the current year and not for arrears of past years. The contention of the learned Advocate-General is that apart from S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, the Crown has under its prerogative a right to precedence for its debts over the unsecured debts of private persons, and that this right which is independent of S. 137, Bombay Land Revenue Code, cannot be affected by S. 151. S. 137 admittedly goes further than the ordinary prerogative of the Crown, and gives to the claims of Government under the provisions of Chap. 11 precedence over any other debts, secured or unsecured. S. 151 provides that the preference given by S. 137 to Government claims shall apply only to demands for the current year. It, therefore, expressly takes away the precedence which S. 137 gives to Government demands for arrears other than those of the current year, and it takes away that precedence without any qualification, i.e, with regard to unsecured as well as secured debts. It undoubtedly has the effect of reducing the right of precedence for its debts over unsecured debts of private persons which the Grown would have under its ordinary prerogative. But we cannot, merely because it has this result, assume in the face of the express language of the section that such a result was not intended by the section. The prerogatives of the Crown can be affected with the consent of the Crown, that is by statute. I am, therefore, of opinion that the view taken by Divatia, J., is correct, and that the appeal must be dismissed with costs.
V.B/R.K
10. Appeal dismissed.