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  • sub-s. (1) and (2) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • sub-s. (2A)of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • s. 17(2)(A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(2)(B) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenance Act
  • s. 17(2A) read with s. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT
  • Rent Restriction Act,
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  • sub-s. (1) and (2) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • sub-s. (2A)of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  • s. 17(2)(A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(2)(B) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act
  • s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenance Act
  • s. 17(2A) read with s. 5 of the Limitation Act
  • WEST BENGAL PREMISES TENANCY ACT
  • Rent Restriction Act,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Special Bench on s.17 — West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff landlords instituted an ejectment suit claiming reasonable requirement of the suit premises. The defendant tenant entered appearance and made an application under sub-section (2A) of s.17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. By an order dated 18 August 1978 the learned Munsif determined arrears of Rs. 1,750 and directed their deposit by instalments of Rs. 350 per month; the defendant complied with that instalment order under s.17(2A)(b).

The defendant also deposited current monthly rent under the second part of sub-s. (1) of s.17, but made late deposits of rent for October 1979 (deposited 23 November 1979), November 1979 (deposited 13 January 1980) and May 1980 (deposited 17 June 1980). At the time of those late deposits the defendant did not apply contemporaneously for condonation of delay or extension of time.

On 12 March 1982 the plaintiffs filed an application under s.17(3) to strike off the defence of the defendant for failure to comply with s.17(1). On 17 June 1982 the defendant filed a petition (described as under s.151 CPC) seeking condonation of delay and extension of time for treating the belated deposits for the three months as valid, alleging financial handicap/bona fide inability to arrange funds. The learned Munsif sustained the plaintiffs' objection and dismissed the defendant's petition for condonation. The s.17(3) application by the plaintiffs had not at that stage been disposed of.

Aggrieved, the defendant moved revision; a Single Judge issued a rule which was referred to a Division Bench and then to a larger Bench (Special Bench) for determination of whether poverty is a ground for condonation of delay in depositing monthly rent under s.17(1).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the court has jurisdiction to condone delay or to extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-section (1) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act.
  2. If such jurisdiction exists, whether poverty or financial handicap of the defendant tenant is a ground for condonation of delay or extension of time for making deposit or payment under sub-section (1) of section 17.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff-Landlords' Arguments

  • The plaintiffs applied under s.17(3) to strike off the defence on the ground that the defendant failed to comply with sub-s. (1) of s.17 by depositing rents within the prescribed time for the months in question.
  • The plaintiffs objected to the defendant's petition for condonation of delay and the learned Munsif sustained that objection, dismissing the condonation petition.

Defendant-Tenant's Arguments

  • The defendant petitioned under s.151 CPC (described in his petition) seeking condonation of delay and extension of time to treat the late deposits as valid, alleging financial handicap or bona fide financial reasons for inability to arrange funds at the relevant times.
  • The defendant had complied with the earlier court order for instalment payment of arrears under s.17(2A)(b) and had been depositing current rent, though the three months at issue were deposited late without contemporaneous condonation application.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court in This Opinion
B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010 The Supreme Court held that s.17(3) (which uses the word "shall") must be read as directory (i.e., as "may"); consequently the power to strike out defence is discretionary and the court has the implied power to condone default and extend time for deposit/payment of rent. The Special Bench treated itself as bound by this Supreme Court decision. It relied upon the decision to conclude that the court has jurisdiction to condone delay/extend time under s.17(1) and to apply the same legal tests when considering condonation as when exercising discretion under s.17(3). The reference was answered in light of this authority.
In re: Dwarka Das Raghubar Prasad, 1987 (1) CLJ 479 (1987 (II) CHN 75) (Mitra, J.) Mitra, J. held that the court possesses power under s.17(2A) read with s.5 of the Limitation Act to extend time for deposit/payment of sums mentioned in sub-s. (1) and (2) of s.17. The Bench noted this decision and the point it raises, but observed that for deciding the present reference it was unnecessary to pursue the point at length.
Sm. Sitala Debi v. Man Bahadur…, 76 CWN 435 (Division Bench) The Division Bench listed certain unforeseen or exceptional circumstances (e.g., civil commotion, general strike, natural calamity) which may justify condonation of delay in deposit/payment of rent. The Bench cited Sitala Debi as an example of authorities identifying exceptional circumstances capable of justifying condonation. It used the case to illustrate the kinds of unforeseen situations that may be considered by a court.
Ramendra Krishna Bose v. Sm. Manjushree Bhattacharya, 1978 (1) CLJ 393 (Division Bench) The Division Bench (referring to P.C. Borooah, J.'s earlier view in Sk. Shajahan) held that for ends of justice delay in deposit of rent for one or two months due to circumstances beyond the tenant's control may be condoned; the matter was remanded to allow the tenant to establish facts (illness was pleaded in that case). The Bench relied on this decision as authority that condonation may be granted in exceptional circumstances; it used the decision to reconcile when and how courts should exercise discretion to condone delays of short duration caused by circumstances beyond control.
Sk. Shajahan v. Sm. Shyama Devi, 1977 (2) CLJ 393 (P.C. Borooah, J.) P.C. Borooah, J.'s view (cited in Ramendra Krishna Bose) that, for ends of justice, delay in deposit may be condoned in exceptional circumstances. The opinion treats the case as an earlier authority supporting the proposition that courts may condone delay for ends of justice; it was cited and followed by subsequent Division Bench decisions referenced by the Special Bench.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Bench reformulated the reference into two precise questions (jurisdiction to condone/extend time under s.17(1), and whether poverty is a ground for condonation). The court then analyzed legal authority and applied legal principles to the facts as follows:

  1. Binding authority: The Bench observed that the Supreme Court decision in B.P. Khemka (supra) is binding and is decisive on the threshold question. That decision read the mandatory language of s.17(3) as directory, thus confirming judicial discretion not only to strike out a defence but, by necessary implication, to condone defaults and extend time for deposit/payment of rent.
  2. Scope of discretion: On the basis of B.P. Khemka and the cited Division Bench authorities, the court reasoned that the discretion to condone a delay in deposit or payment under s.17(1) must be exercised by applying tests similar to those used under s.17(3). The court emphasized that discretion must be exercised in the interests of justice and by reference to the facts of each case.
  3. Permissible grounds for condonation: The Bench listed categories of circumstances (as derived from precedent) that may justify condonation: mistake or error by the court; unforeseen events beyond the tenant's control (examples given in cited authorities included civil commotion, general strike, natural calamity); illness and other exceptional circumstances. The court explicitly stated that financial or economic position is not totally irrelevant and may be a relevant circumstance.
  4. Limits on poverty as a ground: The court cautioned that poverty or financial handicap is not an automatic ground for condonation in every case. If a tenant is a habitual or persistent defaulter, or if the tenant failed to avail himself of statutory provisions (for example, s.17(2A) instalment provisions) when appropriate, the court may rightly refuse condonation. The court must consider: period and extent of default, conduct of the tenant, whether the default was involuntary and unforeseen, and other case-specific circumstances.
  5. Application to present case and procedural direction: The Bench noted that the trial court had dismissed the defendant's condonation petition but had not disposed of the plaintiffs' s.17(3) application. The Bench explained that where a plaintiff applies under s.17(3) and the defendant simultaneously seeks condonation for belated deposits, both matters ought to be heard together. Following the legal principles above (and being guided by B.P. Khemka), the Bench set aside the order complained of and directed the learned Munsif to rehear the plaintiff's s.17(3) application together with the defendant's condonation petition, considering the matter afresh in accordance with the Supreme Court's observations. The Bench declined to express any opinion on whether condonation should ultimately be granted.

Holding and Implications

Core Rulings (Answers to the Reference):

  1. The Court has jurisdiction to condone delay or to extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-section (1) of section 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act — in the manner and to the extent indicated by the Supreme Court in B.P. Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick, AIR 1987 SC 1010.
  2. Poverty or financial handicap of a defendant tenant may, in appropriate circumstances, constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay and/or extension of time under s.17(1); however, whether it does so depends upon the circumstances of each particular case.

Practical Consequences Directed by the Bench:

  • The order of the trial court dismissing the defendant's condonation petition is set aside to the extent necessary, and the learned Munsif is directed to take up the plaintiffs' application under s.17(3) together with the defendant's petition for condonation of delay and to consider both matters afresh in accordance with the legal principles discussed (and the Supreme Court's decision in B.P. Khemka).
  • The trial court was given liberty to both parties to file affidavits in support of their respective cases and was directed to expeditiously dispose of the matter; the suit is to be disposed of by the trial court which has had the matter pending for nearly a decade.
  • There will be no order as to costs. The record and a copy of this order are to be sent down to the court below forthwith.

Observational clarification from the opinion: The Bench emphasized that condonation is discretionary and fact-specific; while poverty can be a relevant ground, habitual or voluntary late payment will weigh against granting condonation. The Bench expressly declined to state whether condonation should be granted in the present case and required the trial court to decide on the merits after rehearing.

    Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy & Ors.

    Mookerjee, C.J:—By their order dated the 10th August, 1984 of Anil Kumar Sen and S.R Roy, JJ., this revision has been placed before the Special Bench for answering the question whether or not poverty would be a ground for condonation of delay in depositing monthly rent in terms of s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. The plaintiff opposite parties have brought a suit for eviction of the defendant petitioner on the ground of their reasonable requirement for use and occupation of the suit premises. After entering appearance, the defendant had made an application under sub-s. (2A)of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. By his order dated the 18th August, 1978, the learned Munsif determined a sum of Rs. 1750/- as the total arrear rent due and the interest payable thereon and directed the defendant petitioner to pay or deposit the said amount by instalment of Rs. 350/- per month. It is not very much disputed that the defendant tenant had fully complied with the said order for deposit passed by the court below in terms of s. 17(2A)(b) of the said Act.

    2. The defendant tenant had been also depositing current rent in terms of second part of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. He had, however, deposited rent for October, 1979 on 23rd November, 1979. He deposited rent for November, 1979 on 13th January, 1980. The rent for May, 1980 was deposited on 17th June, 1980. But along with the said delayed deposit the defendant tenant did not apply for condonation of delay or for extension of time for depositing the said rent for months of October, 1979, November, 1979 and May, 1980.

    3. On 12th March, 1982 the plaintiff landlord opposite parties had filed in the trial court an application under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for striking off the defence of the defendant tenant on the ground that he had failed to comply with the requirement of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the said Act. At that stage, on 17th June, 1982 the defendant tenant petitioner filed in the trial court an application for treating the deposits for the months or October, 1979, November, 1979 and May, 1980 as valid deposits by extending the time and condoning the delay. In the first paragraph of the said petition, which was described to be under s. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the tenant alleged that he was financially handicapped and as such he could not arrange for the money in order to deposit the rents for the said three months. In paragraph 3 of the said petition under s. 151 of the Code the defendant tenant claimed that because of bona fide reasons of his financial ??? he could not deposit in time. Therefore, necessary orders might be passed for treating the said deposit as valid. The learned Munsif upheld the objection of the plaintiff landlords and dismissed the defendant tenant's petition for condonation of delay and for extension of time for depositing the rent for the aforesaid three months. No order as yet had been made upon the plaintiff's application under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. Being aggrieved, by the order of rejection of his prayer for condonation of delay, the defendant petitioner moved a revisional application upon which the learned Single Judge had issued the present Rule. The Rule was referred to the Division Bench and the Division Bench in its turn has referred the same for disposal by a larger Bench.

    4. Having heard the parties, we slightly re-formulated the points for decision as follows:

    1) Has the court any jurisdiction to condone the delay or to extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act?

    2) If the court has such jurisdiction, is poverty or financial handicap of the defendant tenant a ground for condonation of delay or extension of time in making deposit or payment under sub-s (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act?

    5. In view of the recent decision of A.P Sen and S. Natarajan, JJ. in the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick AIR 1987 SC 1010 it is no longer necessary for us to deal at length with the points which arise for decision in the present reference. For the same reason, it has become unnecessary for us to set out the various reported decisions of this court regarding the scope and effect of different sub-sections of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and also regarding the extent of the court's jurisdiction to condone the delay or to extend the time for deposit it or payment of the sums specified in sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. We are bound by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (supra). In B.P Khema Pvt. Ltd.'s case (supra), the defendant tenant had deposited under s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act rents for September, 1968 and March, 1969 beyond the prescribed time. Thereupon, the landlord had applied for strking off the defence of the defendant. On 13th June, 1970 the tenant had filed an application for extension of time for depositing the rents for the aforesaid two months. The trial court rejected the same and passed an order under s. 17(3) of the said Act. The Supreme Court allowed the tenant's appeal against the High Court's judgement dismissing the tenant's appeal from the ejectment decree. The Supreme Court held that the discretionary power of striking off the defence ought to have been exercised and an ejectment decree ought not to have been passed for delayed payment of rents for September, 1968 and March, 1969. In paragraph 15 of the judgement in the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (supra), it has been laid down:

    “Once the word ‘shall’ used in s. 17(3) is read as ‘may’ and consequently the provisions for striking out of the defence, is to be read as directory and not mandatory then it follows that the court is rested with discretion to order either striking out of the defence of the case and the interests of justice. This court has consistently taken the view that if the court has the discretion not to strike out the defence of the tenant committing default in payment or deposit of rent as required by a provision in any Rent Restriction Act, then the court surely has the further discretion to condone the default and extend the time for payment of deposit and such a discretion is a necessary implication of the discretion not to strike out the defence”

    6. In the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (supra), the Supreme Court did not indicate whether also in exercise of its inherent powers, the court can condone a default in payment of rent or extend the time to deposit rent prescribed by sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. In the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. the court held that because s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act is discretionary, therefore, by implication the court has power to extend time under s. 17(1) of the said Act for depositing the rent or condonation of delay in making the said deposits. In the said reported case while making belated deposits of rent for two months, the tenant did not simultaneously apply for condonation of delay or for extension of time. The tenant had made such prayer for condonation of delay only after the landlord applied under s. 17(3) of the said Act. Therefore, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that a belated deposit of rent under s. 17(1) of the said Act maybe also accompanied by an application for condonation of delay. If the court is satisfied it may condone the delay or extend the time, as the case may be Attention has been drawn to the recent decision of Mitra, J. in the case of In re: Dwarka Das Raghubar Prasad reported in 1987 (1) CLJ 479 : (1987 (II) CHN 75) Mitra, J. has inter alia held that the court possesses power under s. 17(2A) read with s. 5 of the Limitation Act to extend the time for deposit or payment of the sums mentioned both in sub-s. (1) and (2) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act. For deciding this reference, it is unecessary to pursue at length this point.

    7. In the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the Supreme Court at page 1014 paragraph 15 indicated the exercise of court's discretion under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in the interests of justice. It necessarily follows that also in deciding whether a delay in making deposit or payment under s. 17(1) of the Act, the court ought to apply the same legal tests. It is neither possible nor desirable to exhaustively mention the circumstances under which delay in deposit or payment of rent as required by s. 17(1) of the said Act may be condoned Obviously, when such a delay occurs because of any mistake or error on the part of the court itself, the same ought to be condoned. There may also be other circumstances beyond the control of the defendant which may result in causing delay in deposit or payment of rent under s. 17(1) of the Act, viz., civil commotion, general strike, natural calamity, etc. Some of these unforeseen circumstances were mentioned by the Division Bench in the case of Sm. Sitala Debi… v. Man Bahadur…Opposite Party. 76 CWN 435 at page 443 Financial or economic position of a tenant is also not totally irrelevant for the purpose of deciding whether in a particular case circumstances exist for condoning delay or extending the time for deposit of rent. We may note that the legislature in s. 17(2)(A)(b) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act mentioned circumstances of the tenant and also of the landlord as relevant considerations for making an order permitting the tenant to deposit the anear rent by instalment. In the case of Ramendra Krishna Bose v. Sm. Manjushree Bhattacharya 1978 (1) CLJ 393 the Division Bench had referred to the decision of P.C Borooab, J. in the case of Sk. Shajahan v. Sm. Shyama Devi 1977 (2) CLJ 393. The Division Bench in Ramendra Krishna Bose's case (supra), concurred with the view of Borooah, J. that for ends of justice delay in deposit of rent for one or two months due to circumstances beyond his control may be condoned. In Ramendra Krishna Bose's case (supra), the tenant had pleaded his illness as a ground for condoning the delay in deposit. The Division Bench while recognising when there were extraordinary circumstances the court might condone the delay, had remanded the matter for giving an opportunity to the tenant to establish his claim that at the relevant time he was ??? at Madras. Both the Division Bench in the case of Ramendra Krishna Bose and the Single Bench case in Sk. Sahajahan (supra) are authorities for the proposition that for ends of justice delay in deposit of rent made under s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenance Act may be condoned if there were exceptional circumstances. The Division Bench in the later case of Ramendra Krishna Bose v. Sm. Manjushree Bhattacharya (supra), did not differ from the views expressed by the Division Bench in earlier case of Sm. Sitala Debi… v. Man Bahadur…Opposite Party. (supra). In fact, in their judgment in Ramendra Krishna Bose's case (supra), the Division Bench had referred to the earlier Division Bench decision in Sitala Devi's case (supra). It is quite possible to reconcile the aforesaid two Division Bench decisions. Whenever a tenant applies for condoning the delay in deposit of rent he must establish that there were extraordinary circumstances which caused the tenant to involuntarily commit a breach of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and to deposit the rent for the month or months in question beyond the prescribed time. When voluntarily and by his own laches a tenant deposits the rent or pays rents beyond the time fixed by section 17(1) of the said Act, the court would certainly refuse to exercise its discretion in favour of such a defaulting tenant, and would reject his prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposit. The Division Bench in the case of Sitala Devi (supra), was not wrong in pointing out that the liability of a tenant to deposit rent is a recurring one and the same is always a part of the consideration for allowing him to use and occupy the premises let out to him. Therefore, in the event a tenant persistently and repeatedly makes late deposits or does not at all deposit or pay rent without any valid and sufficient cause, his plea for condonation of delay or for extension of time on the ground of his poverty may not be considered as sufficient ground for exercising court's discretion in favour of a habitual defaulter. On the other hand, a tenant who had been regularly depositing or paying rent under-sub-s. (1) of the s. 17 of the said Act, due to financial or economic difficulties makes delayed deposit or payment of rent on a single or a few occasions, the court may consider the said circumstances of the tenant to be an unforeseen one warranting exercise of court's power to condone the delay in making the said deposits or payments. We may point out that in case a tenant because of his poverty or other reasons had been unable to pay or deposit in time rent prior to the institution of the ejectment suit against him, he may within the time prescribed by s. 17(2)(B) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act apply either under clause (a) or under clause (b) of s. 17(2)(A) of the said Act. In making an order allowing instalment under s. 17(2A)(b) of the Act, the court is required to take into consideration the circumstances both of the tenant and of the landlord. The expression ‘circumstances’ in said clause (b) is wide enough to include financial or economic conditions. Therefore, in spile of his alleged financial or economic difficulties, when a tenant did not in time avail of the provisions of s. 17(2A) of the said Act and did not also deposit or pay arrear and current rent in terms of sub-s. (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the court ought not to exercise its discretion in favour of such a tenant by extending the time for deposit or payment. Therefore, it would depend upon the facts of each particular case relating to the period of default, extent of the default, the conduct of the tenant, and other relevant circumstances whether the principles laid down in Sitala Devi's case (supra) ought to be applied or the court would condone the delay or extend the time in the light of the law laid down by the later decision in the case of Ramendra Krishna Bose v. Sm. Manjushree Bhattacharjee (supra).

    8. Now we come to the facts of the present case. The trial Court had rejected the defendant tenant's prayer for condonation of delay and/or for extension of time for deposit of the rent for the aforesaid three months. The trial court, however, did not simultaneously dispose of the plaintiff's application under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act for striking off the defendant's defence on the ground that the defendant did not make timely deposits of rent for the aforesaid three months. In case the plaintiff applies for passing of an order under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the defendant prays for condonation of delay and/or for acceptance of rent which had been deposited beyond time, in the interest of justice both the matters ought to be heard together. As observed by the Supreme Court the power to condone delay in deposit or payment of rent and/or to extend the same is a corollary to court's discretionary power to strike off the defence of a defendant who has failed to comply with s. 17(1) of the said Act. The plaintiff's prayer under s. 17(3) of the Act and the defendant's prayer for condonation of delay in making the deposits for the aforesaid three months ought to be considered afresh in the light of the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. Ltd. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick (supra). Therefore, we set aside the order complained of and direct the learned Munsif to again take up the plaintiff's application under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act and the defendant's petition for condonation of delay. The court below will consider in accordance with law whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the defendant's prayer for condonation of delay ought to be rejected and his defence ought to be struck off or his said prayer for condonation ought to be allowed and the plaintiff's application under s. 17(3) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act ought to be rejected. We ourselves express no opinion on the above question. We give liberty to both parties to file affidavits in support of their respective cases. After disposing of the said matter, the trial court will expeditiously dispose of the suit which has been pending for nearly a decade.

    9. We answer the reference in the following manner.

    (1) The Court has jurisdiction to condone the delay or to extend the time for deposit or payment of sums specified in sub-s (1) of s. 17 of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act in the manner and to the extent indicated in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of B.P Khemka Pvt. v. Birendra Kumar Bhowmick AIR 1987 SC 1010.

    (2) In exercising its power to condone delay or to extend time for delayed deposit or payment of rent under s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, the court is bound to take into consideration the circumstances of each particular case. Poverty or financial handicap of a defendant tenant who may have deposited or paid rent beyond the time prescribed by s. 17(1) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act may constitute sufficient cause for condonation and/or extension of time by the court.

    We dispose of the reference and the revision case in the above terms. There will be no order as to costs.

    Let a copy of this order along with the records be sent down to the court below by special messenger expeditiously, if costs be put in by either of the parties.

    Monoranjan Malliok, J.: I agree.

    Sudhanshu Sekhar Ganguly, J.:—I agree.

    Order set aside direction given.

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    Comments

    Krishna Gopal Ghosal v. Mihir Baran Nandy & Ors.
    (Aug 25, 1987)