1. This appeal arises out, of a suit brought by the respondents for a declaration that a certain plot of land situate in the village of Kankanpur, in, the Godhra taluka, belonged to plaintiff 1, plaintiff 2 and defendant 2. The plaint avers that “plaintiff 1 served defendant 1 with a notice on 4th October 1927, under section 80 of the cpc and no reply was received from defendant 1 even after the expiry of two months. Defendant 1 denied the title of the plaintiffs and defendant 2 to the plot and further contended that the notice, Ex. 13, was not proper and sufficient within the meaning of section 80 of the cpc. Both the Courts repelled the contentions of defendant 1. The Secretary of State for India in Council now appeals and raises the same questions.
2. The first question is, whether the notice purported to have been given under section 80 of the cpc, was sufficient within the meaning of that section. The notice, on the face of it, was given by plaintiff 1 only. The learned District Judge, with regard to this contention, held that the omission in not joining plaintiff 2 and defendant 2 was not fatal to the sufficiency of the notice, and relied upon the decision in 24 Mad. 279 (1). It may however be pointed out that this case was decided before the decision of the Privy Council in 1927 P.C 176 (2). It was held by their Lordships, in that case, that S. 80 imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court and is to be strictly complied with; it is not merely procedure. It is true that the precise point, which is raised in this case, was not before their Lordships of the Privy Council in that case. But once it is realized that S. 80 is imperative and imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the Court to see that its terms are complied with, I think the position becomes clear.
3. The object of S. 80 is to give the Secretary of State for India an opportunity of settling the claim, if so advised, without litigation, or, to enable him to have an opportunity to investigate the alleged cause of complaint and to make amends, if he thought fit, before he was impleaded in the suit. This object would be completely frustrated, if it was maintained that a notice, which contained the names, descriptions and places of residence of some only of the plaintiffs in the suit, was sufficient. The word “plaintiff” in the singular must be construed in the plural. This is the view which has been taken in 1931 Mad. 175 (3) and 40 Cal. 503 (4) and that view is correct. It may be that this view may lead to some complications, but I am not concerned with them for the present in this appeal. In this view it is, not necessary for me to go into the other question which was raised by the appellant in this appeal, and I express no opinion on it in this case. The appeal, therefore, must be allowed, the decree of the Courts below must be reversed, and the suit dismissed with costs throughout.
K.S
4. Appeal allowed.