1. On or about June 2, 1961, the respondent Regional Transport Authority, Burdwan, published, under Rule 55A of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, a notice inviting applications for grant of five stage carriage permits for Burdwan-Guskara route via Suri Road. In response to the notice, about 197 applications were received, amongst them there was one by the petitioner and another by respondent No. 3 firm. The Secretary of the Respondent Regional Transport Authority, thereupon, published the applications, under Rule 57 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, and invited representations in connection therewith. No representation, however, was received. Thereupon, on February 12, 1962, the Regional Transport Authority considered the application and passed the following resolution:
“Considered the cases of all applicants with due regard to their solvency and experience in transport business. Procedures laid down in secs. 47 and 57 of the M.V Act were duly followed.
Of the six temporary permit holders of the route, five (i.e, except M/s. Raghu Nath Transport) have no other permanent or temporary permits anywhere in the district. No complaints have so far been received against them. M/s. Raghunath Transport Co. hold a permanent Stage Carriage permit on the route “Bud-Bud Bolgona”.
Heard all the applicants who offered themselves for hearing. In consideration of all the particulars, offered by the applicants it appeared that five of the existing six operators were most suitable candidates and they were ready with vehicles and they also offered to produce new vehicles of 1956 or later models within a reasonable time.
Hence resolved that a permanent stage carriage permit on the route be granted to each of the following candidates on condition that the grantees would place a new vehicle of 1956 or later model by 31-3-62 failing which the permits will be liable to be cancelled.
(a) M/s. Subhajatra Transport Co.
(b) Sri Sushil Kumar Sen Gupta.
(c) Sm. Surekha Choudhury.
(d) M/s. Multifarious Trading Co.
(e) Judhisthir Dutta.”
2. The respondent No. 3 firm, namely Raghunath Transport Company, felt aggrieved by the resolution and preferred an appeal before the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority. That appeal was disposed of by the Sub-Committee, on April 24, 1963, with the following observations: “In disposing of such appeals it has been observed on many occasions that in selecting or rejecting a candidate the RTA should give specific reasons why a particular candidate is selected or rejected. The mere fact that one or some of them appear to be most suitable, is not considered sufficient by any Appellate Authority who should have the required data in the RTA's resolution to consider as to why a few were considered suitable and others were not. Having taken this view this Sub-Committee feels that this is a fit case where the RTA should consider the matter de novo and select the candidates after giving specific reasons for or against each. With these remarks the case is sent back to the RTA for reconsideration.” Aggrieved by the appellate order, the petitioner moved this Court, under Article 226 of the Constitution, praying for a Writ of Certiorari for the quashing of the appellate order and for a mandate restraining the respondents from giving effect or taking advantage of the order, and obtained this Rule.
3. Mr. Susil Kumar Biswas, learned Advocate for the petitioner, argued three points in support of this Rule. He contended that under Rule 84 (d) of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, the appellate authority may “confirm, vary or set aside the order” appealed against but has no power to remand. He further contended that the reasons given for directing a remand were untenable in law. He also contended that the order of remand should not have been made in the instant case, because the defect pointed out by the Appellate Sub-Committee was not such as occasioned a failure of justice and the order made by the Regional Transport Authority should not have been reversed, because of the provisions contained in section 134(2) of the Motor Vehicles Act.
4. The first point, in the form argued, does not appear to have been taken in the grounds. Nevertheless, Mr. Satish Chandra Roy, learned Advocate for the respondents, took time, on August 30, 1965, to argue in rebuttal of this point and invited a decision. Regarding being had to the importance of the point and regard being had to the attitude taken up by the learned Advocate for the respondents, I have decided to go into the point.
5. Every quasi-judicial tribunal has its own procedure and though, of course, there is a common basis, there is also plenty of divergence. Quasi-judicial tribunals must respect the rules of natural justice — this is the common basis. In other respects they are governed by their own procedure prescribed by law, often divergent in nature. Speaking about conditions in England, H.W.R Wade, in his book on “Administrative Law” (1961) observes (at pages 200-01):
“***tribunal system, so rapidly developed in modern times, has an inherent tendency towards chaos. In statute after statute Parliament has created new tribunals in legislation prepared by a wide variety of ministries. Each tribunal is part of a scheme of administration for which some ministry is responsible, and in particular it is for each ministry to appoint the members of the tribunal and to make regulations for its procedure. The natural movement is towards diversity, not uniformity. Until 1957 Parliament never stopped to look at its handiwork as a whole or to ask how these manifold tribunals fitted into our constitutional scheme of things. Yet in the aggregate they form a large and important part of the machinery of justice. It came to be realized that they could not be treated merely as separate appendages to their various government departments, unrelated to one another, any more than the divorce and admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court can be looked upon as unrelated to its other work. The business of dispensing justice must rest on common principles. The courts of law have brought this to a high pitch of refinement, and their experience shows the importance of settled rules of procedure. The tribunals, on other hand, were becoming a jungle, riddled with anomalies. Judged singly and apart, they were mostly working well, and the service given by their members, often at personal sacrifice, was of great value to the community. But order and consistency were lacking. The time had come when the administration of justice through tribunals needed a thorough review, so that by some kind of coordination they could be woven into a coherent system of jurisprudence.”
6. Tribunals in India have not a different complexion. They also do not function under any uniform procedural code.
7. Mr. Satish Chandra Roy, learned Advocate for the respondents, invited my attention to a decision by the Andhra Pradesh High Court in (1) P. Swarajyalakshmi v. The State of Andhra Pradesh (A.I.R 1959 A.P 321) in which dealing with the power of revision of the State Transport Authority, under section 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act, Satyanarayan Raju and Basi Reddy, JJ. held that the State Transport Authority was entitled to remand a case to the Regional Transport Authority. Their Lordships observed:
“.. Every Tribunal invested with a power to determine a controversy has inherent jurisdiction to pass such orders relating to the subject-matter of the controversy as would meet the ends of justice although there might be no direct statutory provision therefor. Similarly every authority empowered to entertain an appeal must ex necessitate have the power to review the order of the original authority and pass such orders in relation thereto which the justice of the case requires, though there is, of course, not to say that the appellate authority is invested with an arbitrary power. To hold otherwise would render infructuous the exercise of the appellate jurisdiction vested in the State Transport Authority under s. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
A revisional authority can exercise the power of remand which is a necessary incident of its power to revise an order or proceeding of subordinate authorities. The re-visional power conferred on the government under s. 64A of the Motor Vehicles Act is analogous to the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The words “may pass such order in reference thereto as it thinks fit” in sec 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act are in pari materia with the words “may make such order in the case as it thinks fit” contained in s. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
When once the jurisdiction to revise is established, there is no limitation imposed on the power of the authority as to the mode of disposal. The revisional authority may finally dispose of the case itself or pass any other order which may satisfy the justice of the case. What the order should be in any particular case would depend on the circumstances of that case.”
8. Although not called upon to decide the scope of the appellate jurisdiction of the State Transport Authority, their Lordships also made the following observations:
“There is thus no essential distinction between a remedy by way of appeal and revision. If so much is conceded, the question is what are the powers of an appellate tribunal under S. 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act ? That section merely says that a person aggrieved by the orders specified therein may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give to such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard.
It is axiomatic that a power to entertain an appeal must comprise within its ambit the power to dispose of the appeal in the manner known to law. An Appellate Tribunal has a right to set aside an order under appeal and substitute its own order. It may not go so far and may merely quash the order appealed against and automatically require the subordinate authority to restore the original proceeding and to decide it afresh”.
9. Mr. Roy also invited my attention to a decision by a Judicial Commissioner at Ajmer in (2) Yagsen Ram Prashad Khewat v. Chief Commissioner, Ajmer, (A.I.R 1956 Ajmer, 41) in which the following observation appears:
“The next contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the Chief Commissioner had no power to order a remand. It is urged that the Motor Vehicles Act is a self-contained Act and there is no provision for a reconsideration or a remand. It is faintly suggested that since the State Transport Authority could not have re-considered the matter itself a reconsideration could not have been ordered by the Chief Commissioner either.
I am unable to see any substance in this contention. In my opinion, the power of remand is inherent in the very constitution of an appellate Court. An appellate Court has the right to set aside the order of the trial court. When it does so, it may go further and substitute its own order for the order appealed against or it may not go so far and may merely quash the order appealed against and automatically require the subordinate authority to restore the original cause and to decide it afresh.
In my opinion, the absence of a power of remand would limit and to some extent negative the completeness of the power of the appellate authority and I am, therefore, of opinion that whether there is a specific provision or not, the power to order a remand must be taken to be inherent in every appellate Court in its very constitution as an appellate authority.”
10. Basing his arguments on the two authorities, mentioned above, Mr. Roy contended that the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority must be conceded to have the inherent power to make an order of remand to the Regional Transport Authority.
11. In trying to repel this argument, Mr. Biswas contended that importation of an implied or inherent power in an administrative tribunal should not be too readily made. He relied on a Bombay decision in (3) Haji Zakeria Suleman v. The Collector, Yeotmal*, Yeotmal (A.I.R 1963 Bom., 233) in which Kotval and Shikhare, JJ. observed:
“Inherent power can only be implied in the Civil Courts having general jurisdiction but where, as here, special authorities are constituted under a special statute and for special object, it is not possible to imply inherent powers in them. We must turn to the statute itself to find a power either in its express terms or by necessary implication.”
12. The observations were, no doubt, made by their Lordships in the context of a different law, namely, C.P and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949, but, nevertheless, their Lordships intended to lay down a rule of construction of statutes of general application, with which I find myself in complete agreement. The reason why I am of that opinion is this. Courts in India are both Courts of Equity and of Law. As such, courts have to, where circumstances require, proceed on the assumption of possession of inherent powers to act ex debitio justice and to do that substantial justice for the administration of which alone they exist. Thus, it is said, that section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not confer any power on courts but merely saves their equitable power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or for prevention of the abuse of the process of Courts. Tribunals are not courts. The reasons which endow courts with inherent powers do not apply to tribunals. As such, it cannot be conceded that statutory tribunals have inherent, powers to make orders not provided for by the enabling statutes, on the plea of serving the ends of justice.
13. Although this is so, certain powers, not expressly conferred upon tribunals by statutes may, be implied. The law on this point is succinctly stated in Craies on “Statute Law” (Fifth Edition), at page 105, in the following language:
“If a statute is passed for the purpose of enabling something to be done, but omits to mention in terms some detail which is of great substance (if not actually essential) to the proper and effectual performance of the work which the tribunal has in contemplation, the Courts are at liberty to infer that the statue by implication empowers that detail to be carried on.”
14. This is also the view expressed by this Court in (4) Bengal Border Transport (Private) Ltd. v. Chairman, Regional Transport Authority (A.I.R 1963 Cal., 592).
15. The question for my consideration, therefore, is whether there is anything in section 64 of the Motor Vehicles Act or in Rule 84 of the Bengal Motor Vehicles Rules, which justify, by implication, a power of remand in the Appellate Sub-Committee. Now the material portion of section 64 is couched in the following language:—
“Any person—
(a) aggrieved by the refusal of the State or a Regional Transport Authority to grant a permit, or by any condition attached to a permit granted to him, or
(b) ***
(c) ***
(d) ***
(e) ***
(f) ***
(g) ***
(h) ***
(i) ***
may, within the prescribed time and in the prescribed manner, appeal to the prescribed authority who shall give such person and the original authority an opportunity of being heard.”
16. The prescription is to be found in Rule 84 of the Motor Vehicles Rules which reads as follows:
“84. (a) The authority to decide an appeal against the orders of a Regional Transport Authority in respect of any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (b), clause (c), clause (d), clause (e), clause (f), clause (g) or clause (h) of section 64 of the Act, including an order passed under sub-rule (h) of rule 64 and based on a resolution of the joint conference recorded under sub-rule (g) of the said rule in respect of any of the matters referred to in clause (a), clause (d) or clause (f) of the said section, shall be a Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority consisting of—
(1) the Chairman of the State Transport Authority as Chairman,
(2) the Secretary of the State Transport Authority as Member Secretary,
(3) one non-official member of State Transport Authority nominated by the State Government,
(4) The Commissioner of the Division having jurisdiction over the regions to which the appeal relates or, where the appeal relates to inter-regional routes falling both within the Presidency Division and the Burdwan Division, the Commissioners of both the Divisions.
(b) Any person aggrieved by any such order may, within thirty days of receipt of such order, prefer an appeal in writing by presenting a memorandum in duplicate to the Secretary to the State Transport Authority, and such memorandum shall set forth concisely the grounds of objection to such order, and shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the said order and, in the case of an order passed under sub-rule (h) of rule 64 and based on a resolution of the joint conference recorded under sub-rule (g) of that rule, also by a certified copy of the resolution of the joint conference on which the order is based.
(c) Upon receipt of an appeal in accordance with sub-rule (b), the appellate authority shall appoint a time and place for the hearing of the appeal giving, the appellant not less than thirty days' notice, and shall issue notices to the Regional Transport Authorities concerned.
(c1) The number of members of the said Sub-Committee whose presence shall constitute a quorum shall be two.
(c2) The Chairman or, in his absence from any meeting, one of the members present at the meeting chosen, by such members in such manner as they think fit, to act as the Chairman at the meeting, shall have a second or casting vote in all cases of equality of votes.
(c3) The decision of the majority of the members present shall be final and binding in all cases.
(d) The appellate authority, after giving an opportunity to the parties to be heard and after such further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary, may confirm, vary, or set aside the order against which the appeal is preferred.
(e) The provisions of sections § and 12 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, shall apply to appeals preferred under sub-rule (b).”
17. Rule 84 thus contains the complete code and authorises the Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority to make further enquiry, if any, as it may deem necessary. Thus, if it appears to an Appellate Sub-Committee that the Regional Transport Authority did not properly do its duty or did not consider the applications properly, the Appellate Sub-Committee may itself make further enquiries and pass such orders as may be proper. This is also the view expressed by the High Court at Assam in (5) Dhananjoy Das v. Chairman, Appellate Board (A.I.R 1961 Assam, 56). It is not necessary for the Appellate Sub-Committee to remand the matter to the Regional Transport Authority for reconsideration. Therefore, I am not in a position to hold that the power of remand by the Appellate Sub-Committee is implied in Rule 84. The view that I take finds support from (6) P. Abdul Azeez v. Mysore Revenue Appellate Tribunal, (A.I.R 1962 Mysore, 31). I, therefore, hold that the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority has neither statutory nor inherent jurisdiction to make an order of remand to the Regional Transport Authority. It must decide the case itself, even if it has to make further enquiries, keeping in view the considerations in section 47 of the Motor Vehicles Act. Transportation by stage carriage is a national necessity. Motor Vehicles Act prescribes the manner in which stage carriage permits shall be granted and the considerations, which must be kept in view. If the Regional Transport Authority errs, the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority may correct the Regional Transport Authority, even after making further enquiries and on further facts so collected. The Appellate Sub-Committee must not escape from this duty by making an order of remand to a Regional Transport Authority and asking that body to arrive at a correct decision. To do so will entail unnecessary delay in granting stage carriage permits and further appeal to the Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority against the decision of the Regional Transport Authority on remand. This may put off the grant of stage carriage permit indefinitely. This is to be avoided at all costs.
18. Then again, the reason actuating the Appellate Sub-Committee to remand the case is not a good reason. In (7) Gopal Chandra De v. State of West Bengal, (A.I.R 1962 Cal., 183 — per P.B Mukharji and Niyogi, JJ.) and in (8) Shaik Md. Shaffi Barry v. Income-tax Officer, (69 C.W.N 984 — per Bose, C.J and B.C Mitra, J.) this Court has held that an administrative tribunal is not (unless required by the statute) obliged to set out in its adjudication the reasons which led it to its decision. That being the legal position, the respondent Appellate Sub-Committee should not have found fault with the Regional Transport Authority because of paucity of reasoning in the order granting permit.
19. I do not, however, find substance in the last argument of Mr. Biswas.
20. I am not sure whether on merits the Regional Transport Authority came to a correct decision, because I have neither the power nor the materials to go into the merits of the respective applications.
21. For the reasons stated above, I quash the order of the respondent Appellate Sub-Committee of the State Transport Authority and direct that body to dispose of the appeal according to law, bearing in mind the observations contained in this judgment.
22. I make no order as to costs.
S.K.B