A.K Mookerji, J.:— This appeal is by the State of West Bengal and it is directed against the judgment and order, dated 28 July, 1971, passed by Sankar Prosad Mitra, J. (as he then was), in an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution, holding that S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with S. 10 of the said Act is void and illegal as it offends against the provisions of Art. 14 of the Constitution, upon the view, that the power that the appropriate Government enjoys under S. 10 of the said Act, results in discrimination when applied to cases coming within the scope of S. 2-A.

2. On 20 May, 1970, by a letter, respondent 1, Jute and Jute Goods Buffer Stock Association, a trade union registered under the provisions of the Indian Trade Unions Act, 1926, terminated the services of respondent 2, Mrinal Kanti Bhowmick, a clerk in employ of respondent 1, with effect from 13 June, 1970. Thereafter, respondent 2 approached the secretary to the employer for reconsideration of the matter and recall the order of termination served upon him. The secretary, however, did not accede to accept the proposal. On or about 13 June, 1970, respondent 2 approached the Conciliation Officer of the Government of West Bengal with his grievances. The Conciliation Officer, the Assistant Labour Commissioner, West Bengal, wrote to respondent 1 on 15 June, 1970. In reply to the said letter, respondent 1's secretary, N.S Kothari, wrote on 25 June, 1970, that respondent 1 was not an “industry” within the meaning of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, as such, no “industrial dispute” could be raised by any of its employees. It was further stated in the said letter that respondent 1 was willing to give respondent 2 another chance on a trial basis for one month; but respondent 2 refused to avail himself of the chance and wanted to collect his dues within a couple of days. Thereafter, the appropriate Government by its order, dated 10 October, 1970, referred the dispute in exercise of its power conferred by S. 10 read with S. 2-A of he Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, to the second Industrial Tribunal for adjudication of he issue, viz.,

whether the termination of services of Mrinal Kanti Bhowmick was justified; to what relief, if any, he was entitled to?

Respondent 1, the employer, challenged the validity and legality of the said order of reference made by the Government and also the jurisdiction of the Industrial Tribunal to adjudicate upon that reference and moved this Court on an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution. A rule nisi was issued on 27 November, 1970; the said rule came up for final hearing before Sankar Prosad Mitra, J. (as he then was), who made the said rule absolute on 28 July, 1971.

3. The learned Judge is of opinion that the provisions of S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with its preamble and other sections, suggest that the Act was meant for settlement of collective disputes between the employers and the workmen and the enactment of S. 2-A destroys the concept of an industrial dispute as collective dispute; the provisions of S. 2-A appear to be against trade union rights and principles and do not fit into the general texture of the Act; in the provisions of S. 2-A one cannot find the qualities and characteristics of persons who may be grouped together that would be absent in persons standing outside the group; the criteria for exercise of discretion under S. 10(1) of the Act would no longer be applied in S. 2-A as there cannot be any threat of interruption of production or of industrial strife or breach of industrial peace. Therefore, in the case of S. 2-A, the Government's discretion under S. 10 becomes unguided as the Government has no yard-stick to judge the gravity or intensity of the peril. The Government is free to make a reference in the case of one workman and refuse a reference in the case of another although both of them are situated exactly in the similar circumstances and, for the above reasons, the learned trial Judge held that S. 2-A read with S. 10 offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and, as such, it is ultra vires.

4. Besides the point of ultra vires, two other points were also raised before the trial Court, viz., respondent 1 was not an “industry” within the meaning of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and, in fact, there was no “dispute” between the employer and the employee inasmuch as the employee made no demand to the employer but went straight to the Conciliation Officer. The learned trial Judge left the other two points raised by respondent 1 undecided, and decided only the vires of S. 2-A of the Act.

5. The State of West Bengal being aggrieved by the said order preferred this present appeal.

6. It is well settled that only a person who has been aggrieved by the discrimination alleged can challenge the validity of a law on the ground of violation of Art. 14 of the Constitution. In the petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution, there is no statement of facts how the employer has been discriminated against by S. 2 A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned Advocate-General, however, contended, and we think rightly, that where interest of a large number of persons has been involved upon the interpretation of S. 2-A read with S. 10 of the Act, appearing on behalf of the State, he should not take any technical objections with regard to the pleadings. Therefore, we do not express any opinion on that point.

7. It is contended by the learned Advocate-General in support of the appeal that the learned Judge erred in holding that S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is void and inoperative and that that section read with S. 10 of the Act confers an unfettered and unguided discretion on the appropriate Government without any yard-stick to judge the exigencies of the situation, upon misconstruing the decision of the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills, Ltd. v. Second Punjab Tribunal [1957—I L.L.J 460] that apparently discriminating provisions of S. 10(1) of the Act were saved by overriding conditions like imminence of industrial strife resulting in cessation of industrial production and breach of industrial peace endangering public tranquillity and law and order, as those considerations are absent in S. 2-A of the Act, that, therefore, S. 10(1) results in discrimination when applied to the cases coming within S. 2-A. It is further contended that provisions of S. 2-A do not violate Art. 14 of the Constitution inasmuch as in S. 2-A there is a reasonable classification and the said classification has a nexus with the object of the Act. Section 10 of the Act has been declared valid by the Supreme Court, so there is no further scope of challenging that section as ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. Provisions of S. 10. apply equally to all the industrial disputes including the individual dispute which is deemed to be industrial dispute by S. 2-A of the Act. When application of S. 10 is held to be valid in respect of disputes referred to in S. 2(k) of the Act, it should not be declared to be invalid in its application under S. 2-A of the Act.

8. The learned Advocate-General submits that different authorities mentioned in S. 10 of the Act have been set up for different ends in view and entrusted with powers and duties necessary for the purpose for which they are set up. Reference may be made to one or other authority according to exigency but that exigency cannot be limited only to the illustrations given by the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills case. [1957—I L.L.J 460] (vide supra). Discretion conferred on the appropriate Government to make a reference to one or other authority is not an unfettered or uncontrolled discretion nor an unguided one, because, criteria for exercise of such discretion are to be found within the terms of the Act itself. Section 2-A, the learned Advocate-General submits, neither destroys the “concept” of individual dispute as a collective dispute nor it infringes the fundamental right to form a union or association guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

9. Sri Chowdhury, appearing on behalf of respondent 1, the employer, supported the reasonings of the learned trial Judge that S. 2-A when applied to S. 10 of the Act results in discrimination and as such, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution. Sri Chowdhury, however, did not advance any new point or reason except submitting that guidance for exercise of discretion found in the Act was for collective dispute and that guidance could not be applied in cases of any individual dispute. So, the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills case [1957-I L.L.J 460] (vide supra), where S. 10 of the Act has been declared valid, was not applicable in the present case where vires of S. 2-A was challenged in its application under S. 10 of the Act.

10. To appreciate the contentions, it would be convenient to advert to the provisions of S. 2-A of the Act which reads as follows:

“2-A. Where any employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches or otherwise terminates the services of an individual workman, any dispute or difference between that workman and his employer connected with, or arising out of, such discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to the dispute.”

11. Parliament has power to make a particular law to attain a particular object and to achieve such purpose it can classify the persons to be brought under the provisions of the said law provided such classification has intelligible differentia and a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act. The Court can consider the statute from the limited point of view of rational classification and nexus. There is a presumption that legislature understands and correctly appreciates the needs of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its discretion is based upon adequate grounds. Section 2-A has been inserted by Act 35 of 1965. Before enactment of the said section, industrial dispute normally indicated a collective dispute either between workmen and employer or of a dispute in which the cause of one workman is supported by union of workmen or other workmen against the employer. A classification is sought to be made by Parliament in S. 2-A between a workman unaided by the union or other workmen to raise an industrial dispute relating to discharge, dismissal, retrenchment and termination of services and a workman or workmen espoused by the union or other workmen to raise all other disputes defined in S. 2(k) of the Act. It is true that quality and characteristic of the persons standing outside the group may be common with respect to certain matters but the fundamental difference between one class and the other is that with respect to one class, for the purpose of a reference, a dispute must be espoused by the union of workmen or other workmen but with respect to the other class, the dispute need not be supported by the union or other workmen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the above classification has no intelligible differentia.

12. The learned trial Judge observed that S. 2-A destroyed the concept of an individual dispute as the collective dispute.

13. In the preamble of the Act the object is stated

“to make provisions for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes.”

Before the decision of the Supreme Court in Central Provinces Transport Services, Ltd. v. Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan [1957—I L.L.J 27], there was a considerable conflict of judicial decisions whether a dispute between an employer and a single workman could be an industrial dispute within the meaning of S. 2(k) of the Act. On a consideration of the various judicial opinions, the Supreme Court observed in that case that an individual dispute could not per se be an industrial dispute but might become one if it was taken up by a trade union or a number of workmen notwithstanding that the language of S. 2(k) was wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee. A Bench decision of the Mysore High Court in P. Janardhana Shetty v. Union of India [A.I.R 1970 Mys. 171] held that the words “individual dispute” occurring in the preamble of the Act are wide enough to cover dispute between employer and a single employee. Section 2-A, therefore, is neither outside the scope indicated in the preamble of the Act nor in consistent with the provisions of the Act.

14. The basis of classification, as observed by the Supreme Court, in Dalmia case [A.I.R 1958 S.C 538], may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to o??? brought to the attention of the Court. It appears to us that the object of making a classification in S. 2-A, is to protect an individual workman, deprived of his employment, to get the benefits of Industrial Disputes Act and to eliminate the seed of dissatisfaction and industrial unrest at their very root, before it is aggravated or spread over to a large body of workmen, apprehending threat of industrial strife. Where group interest of the union and other workmen does not support an individual dispute, substantive right has been created in favour of an individual worker to have recourse to redress his grievance before the Industrial Tribunal under the provisions of the Act. In S. 2-A, individual dispute is “deemed” to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that no other workman or any union of workmen is a party to the dispute. It fits in with the structure of the Act, for the reason that all other provisions of the Act are to be read as if S. 2-A were in the Act. That “deeming” is not merely for the purpose of making a reference under S. 10(1) of the Act, it also affects the object of the Act. Therefore, in our view, classification made in S. 2-A has a reasonable nexus with the object of the Act. Section 2-A, in our view, does not destroy the concept of industrial dispute as collective dispute because that concept still remains in the major class and in all other provisions of the Act. The new section only widens the concept of industrial dispute, so as to include the individual dispute, which was so long constricted by judicial pronouncements, within its fold, not even all individual disputes, only those specified in that section.

15. The fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution is to form association or union and that does not carry with it the right to represent a workman in an industrial dispute before an Industrial Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that S. 2-A which gives right to an individual workman to represent his case before an Industrial Tribunal infringes the fundamental right guaranteed under Art. 19(1)(c) of the Constitution.

16. The learned trial Judge in his judgment referred to the observations made by S.R Das, J. (as he then was), in State Of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar, [A.I.R 1952 S.C 75], that differentia constituting the basis of classification and the object of the Act are two dintinct things. Judged by that test, according to the learned Judge, the criteria, in the case of the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, seem to be the extent to which industrial peace would be interrupted and the object of the Act is the settlement of the industrial disputes. In other words, the classification is based on the extent of threat to industrial peace and the object is the settlement of the industrial disputes. The classification and the object cannot be mixed up. If five individual workmen entitled to invoke the provisions of S. 2-A approached the appropriate Government, under S. 10(1) of the Act, the State Government has the power to send four of them to four different types of authorities. In other words, five persons having the same grievances against the same employer or different employers, would receive widely divergent treatments from the appropriate Government. The power that the appropriate Government enjoys under S. 10 results in discrimination when applied to cases coming within the scope of S. 2-A; for that reason, the learned trial Judge struck down S. 2-A as unconstitutional.

17. In Anwar Ali Sarkar case [A.I.R 1952 S.C 75] (vide supra), the validity of S. 5(1) of the West Bengal Special Courts Act (Act 10 of 1950) was challenged as ultra vires Art. 14 of the Constitution. The majority of the learned Judges of the Supreme Court held that S. 5(1) conferred unfettered and arbitrary power on the Government to classify offences or cases at its pleasure, since the Act did not disclose or lay down any policy to guide the discretion of Government in classifying cases or offences. To find out the differentia, preamble of the Act was relied upon S.R Das, J. (as he then was), held that the part of S. 5(1) which referred to “cases” was outside the preamble, which referred only to “offences” and “classes of offences.” The speedier trial mentioned in the preamble was the object of the impugned law and the object by itself would not be the basis of the classification.

18. The learned trial Judge sought to find out the basis of classification in S. 2-A in the object of the Act which, according to him, is the basic idea underlying the provisions of the Act, as found by the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills, Ltd. case [9957—I L.L.J 460] (vide supra). Where classification is found to be based on intelligible differentia, as we have found in the present case, it is not necessary to find out its basis in the object of the Act but only its nexus with the object. Therefore, the observations of Das, J., in Anwar Ali Sarkar case [A.I.R 1952 S.C 75] (vide supra) cannot be relied upon to find out the basis of classification in S. 2-A.

19. The idea and object of an Act are two different things. Basic idea may vary according to different interpretations given to it at different times. Before enactment of S. 2-A, basic idea underlying all the provisions of the Act was the settlement of industrial disputes and the promotion of industrial peace so that production might not be interrupted and the community in general might be benefited, as observed by the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills case [1952-I L.L.J 460] (vide supra). But that basic idea had undergone a radical change when individual dispute has been brought in within the ambit of industrial disputes. Therefore, those observations of the Supreme Court are to be read in the context of the Act before its amendment and unless there is any inconsistency, the principle laid down therein must be applied in S. 2-A for the reason that by enacting the said section Parliament has only removed the clog between collective and individual dispute and puts certain specified individual disputes at par with collective disputes. Accordingly, we find no reason why the principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills case (vide supra), is also not applicable in a case under S. 2-A of the Act.

20. Let us now consider how far S. 2-A when applied to S. 10(1) of the Act results in discrimination so as to violate right to equality under Art 14 of the Constitution. In F.N Balsam v. State of Bombay [1961 S.C.R 682], the Supreme Court observed that in enacting a general law, it is not possible to foresee every situation or to envisage every contingency and to provide specially for it by excluding the operation of the law wholly or in part in respect of such situation or such contingency.

21. Provisions of S. 10 of the Act were challenged before the Supreme Court, that the discretion conferred on the appropriate Government to refer an industrial dispute to one or the other authority set up under the Act violates Art. 14 of the Constitution. In upholding this discretion, the Supreme Court in Niemla Textile Finishing Mills, Ltd. v. Second Punjab Tribunal [1957—I L.L.J 460] (vide supra), held that the criteria for exercising the discretion in S. 10 were enacted in the Act itself and it was not possible to lay down further rules for the exercise of that discretion as no two cases of actual or apprehended industrial disputes were alike and in such disputes in a particular establishment or undertaking, each dispute had to be treated according to the situation prevalent in the undertaking. The learned trial Judge was of the view that apparently discriminatory provisions of S. 10(1) of the Act were saved by overriding considerations, like the imminence of industrial strife resulting in cessation or interruption of industrial production and breach of industrial peace endangering public tranquillity and law and order, as those considerations were absent in a case under S. 2-A of the Act so that the power the appropriate Government used to enjoy under S. 10 resulted in discrimination when applied in S. 2-A.

22. The Supreme Court distinctly said in Neimla Textiles Finishing Mills case [1957—I L.L.J 460] (vide supra), that there was no discrimination in S. 10. When the Act furnishes a guide for exercise of the powers, an exigency may be one of the various considerations for exercising such powers but such considerations cannot be limited only to the four illustrations of exigencies given by the Supreme Court. A law cannot be struck down on assumption that in case of individual dispute the potentiality of mischief would be less than in collective dispute, so, in that case, the appropriate Government is free to make a reference without any yard stick. Where an Act laid down a policy or principle for the guidance or exercise of discretion by Government in the matter of selection, as in the present case, law cannot be declared as invalid. If the appropriate Government exercises the power arbitrarily or capriciously in a particular case, the Court shall strike down such exercise of power and not the law which confers such powers on the appropriate Government.

23. In Neimla Textiles Finishing Mills case [1957-I L.L.J 460] (vide supra), the Supreme Court observed that different authorities which are constituted under the Act are set up with different ends in view and are invested with powers and duties necessary for the achievement of the purpose for which they are set up. The appropriate Government is invested with the discretion to choose one or the other authority for the purpose of investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and whether it sets up one authority or the other for the achievement of the desired ends, depends upon its appraisement of the situation as it obtains in a particular industry or establishment.

24. In S. 10(1) four different authorities are mentioned:

(a) Board;

(b) Court of enquiry;

(c) Labour Court; and

(d) Tribunal.

25. Section 4 deals with Conciliation Officer; S. 5 sets up the Board of Conciliation; duties of Conciliation Officer are enumerated in S. 12. Ordinarily, before making a reference to a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal, a pursuasive method is adopted to arrive at a settlement by conciliation proceedings. When a conciliation fails, the Conciliation Officer sends a report to the Government. On receipt of such a report, the appropriate Government, if satisfied that there is a case for reference to a Board, Labour Court or Tribunal, it may make such reference. Where the Government does not make such reference, it shall record its reasons therefor and communicate the same to the parties concerned. This is a statutory obligation under S. 12(5) of the Act. If the reasons are irrelevant, or have no bearing or connexion with the dispute in question, then those are not reasons contemplated under S. 12(5) of the Act, and it would be open to the Court by a writ of mandamus to ask the appropriate Government to give proper reasons required under the law, although the Government cannot be compelled to make a reference under S. 10 of the Act.

26. Section 6 of the Act sets up a Court of enquiry to enquire into any matter appearing to be connected with or relevant to an industrial dispute. Labour Court's jurisdiction is for adjudication of industrial disputes relating to any matter specified in Sch. II to the Act. Schedule II includes six matters of which item 3 relates to discharge or dismissal of workmen including reinstatement of, or grant of relief to, workmen wrongfully dismissed. Tribunal comes in S. 7-A of the Act. The jurisdiction of the Tribunal is confined to matters specified in Sch. II or III to the Act. Schedule III is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal and includes eleven items “Retrenchment” comes in item 10. With regard to Sch. II there is overlapping of jurisdiction between the Labour Court and Tribunal. A choice between the two, viz., a Labour Court or a Tribunal in the matter of reference under S. 10 with regard to item 3 in Sch. II or item 10 in Sch. III, as only those two items are covered in S. 2-A of the Act, has necessarily got to be determined by the Government in exercise of its best discretion, taking into account various factors, relevant for settlement of a particular dispute in a particular industry. In the present case, as soon as conciliation failed, the appropriate Government referred the matter to an Industrial Tribunal which has jurisdiction to adjudicate both dismissal and retrenchment as well. Having regard to the various provisions of the Act set out hereinabove, with great respect, we are unable to share the views of the learned trial Judge, that the power that the appropriate Government enjoys under S. 10 of the Act results in discrimination when applied to cases coming within the scope of S. 2-A. Apart from S. 10, in our view, provisions of S. 2-A becomes nugatory.

27. For ail the above reasons, we hold that neither S. 2-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor when it is read with S. 10 of the said Act, offends Art. 14 of the Constitution, and as such it is not void and illegal.

28. In the result, this appeal is allowed, the judgment and order of the learned trial Judge, dated 20 July, 1971, are set aside and the case is remitted to the trial Court for determination of other two points left undecided.

29. There will be no order as to costs.

30. A.C Roy, J.:— I agree.