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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(12) and Section 2(13) of the Act
  • Section 2(12), Section 2(13), and Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 18 of the Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 53 of the Act
  • Section 2(k) of the Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 2(12) of the Act
  • Section 2(10) of the Act
  • Section 2(24), C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 16(2) of the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 2(k) of Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 53, C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Article 136
  • Section 2(k) of the Indian Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 41, C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 41 of the Madras Shop and Establishments Act 36 of 1947, Act 14 of 1947
  • Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946
  • Sections 31 and 32 of the Act
  • Section 16, sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Act
  • Section 16(2) of the Act
  • Section 16(2), C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 16(5) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947, Section 16(2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 2(12) and Section 2(13) of the Act
  • Section 2(12), Section 2(13), and Section 16 of the Act
  • Section 18 of the Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 53 of the Act
  • Section 2(k) of the Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 2(12) of the Act
  • Section 2(10) of the Act
  • Section 2(24), C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 16(2) of the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 2(k) of Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 53, C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Article 136
  • Section 2(k) of the Indian Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 41, C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947
  • Section 41 of the Madras Shop and Establishments Act 36 of 1947, Act 14 of 1947
  • Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946
  • Sections 31 and 32 of the Act
  • Section 16, sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Act
  • Section 16(2) of the Act
  • Section 16(2), C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947
  • Section 16(5) of the Act
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • The C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947, Section 16(2)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, a mechanic employed by Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was dismissed on 28 June 1950 for alleged gross negligence and misconduct following the theft of company goods. He was criminally prosecuted for theft but was acquitted on 3 March 1952. After unsuccessful attempts to secure reinstatement directly from the company, he filed an application on 1 October 1952 before the Assistant Labour Commissioner under Section 16(2) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947 (“the Act”) seeking reinstatement and compensation.

The Assistant Labour Commissioner dismissed the application, holding that the respondent was no longer an “employee” and that no “industrial dispute” existed. On revision, the Provincial Industrial Court (5 February 1954) ruled in the respondent’s favour, set aside the dismissal, and remanded the matter. The Labour Appellate Tribunal (10 October 1954) affirmed that decision. The company—later taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh during liquidation—invoked the Supreme Court’s discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136, resulting in the present appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a person who has already been dismissed falls within the definition of “employee” in Section 2(10) of the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947.
  2. Whether a dispute raised solely by such a dismissed person constitutes an “industrial dispute” under Sections 2(12) and 2(13) of the Act, thereby permitting an application for reinstatement and compensation under Section 16.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • A pre-condition to invoking Section 16 is the existence of an “industrial dispute” touching the dismissal of an existing employee; once dismissed, the respondent ceased to be an employee.
  • The inclusive clause in Section 2(10) (referring only to employees discharged under Sections 31 and 32) implies that all other ex-employees are excluded.
  • Even if the respondent were deemed an employee, a dispute by a single individual is an individual dispute, not an industrial dispute within Section 2(12).

Respondent’s Arguments

The opinion does not set out the respondent’s submissions in detail.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1949) FCR 321; AIR 1949 FC 111 A claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman is an “industrial dispute” under Section 2(k) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Adopted; its ratio was held to apply equally to Sections 2(12) & 2(13) of the present Act, supporting inclusion of dismissed employees.
Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal (1949) 2 MLJ 789; AIR 1951 Mad 611 View that individual disputes are outside the Act, suggesting reinstatement claims are not industrial disputes. Not followed; cited as representing one strand of conflicting authority.
Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd. v. Commissioner of Labour AIR 1951 Mad 141 Similar view that individual disputes lie outside industrial-dispute machinery. Not followed; referenced as obiter support for appellant’s stance.
J. Chowdhury v. M.C. Banerjee (1950-51) 55 CWN 256 Held dismissal dispute of a single employee not an industrial dispute. Not followed; cited as further support for appellant’s view.
Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P. AIR 1954 All 516; (1954) 2 LLJ 263 Held that a dispute between an employer and a single employee can be an industrial dispute. Noted as representing the second judicial view; court did not rely on it for final ratio.
Swadeshi Cotton Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen (1953) 1 LLJ 757 Same principle as above (single-employee dispute may suffice). Referenced in survey of authorities.
Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. AIR 1953 Cal 613 Industrial dispute arises only if the individual’s cause is espoused by co-workers/union. Cited as part of predominant third view; ultimately distinguished on statutory grounds.
New India Assurance Co. v. Central Govt. Industrial Tribunal AIR 1953 Pat 321 Same “requirement of espousal” principle. Cited; not adopted.
Lakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami (1955) 2 LLJ 477 Follows “requirement of espousal” approach. Cited; not adopted.
Gordon Woodroffe & Co. Ltd. v. Appa Rao (1955) 2 LLJ 541 Industrial dispute only when dispute taken up by group/union. Cited; not adopted.
Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta (1956) 2 LLJ 89 Same as above. Cited; not adopted.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

1. Definition of “Employee”: The Court, relying on Western India Automobile Association, held that the term encompasses dismissed workers. The inclusive clause in Section 2(10) was viewed as inserted ex abundanti cautela and not as limiting the main definition; otherwise Section 16 would be rendered ineffectual.

2. Meaning of “Industrial Dispute”: While acknowledging divergent authorities under the central Industrial Disputes Act, the Court emphasised that the C.P. & Berar Act is wider in scope—it amalgamates features of both the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946. Provisions such as Sections 41 and 53 show legislative recognition of individual employee rights. Accordingly, “industrial dispute” in this Act was construed to include a claim by a single dismissed employee.

3. Statutory Context: The Court reasoned that a narrower reading would defeat the express remedial purpose of Section 16, which specifically empowers the Labour Commissioner to order reinstatement and compensation for dismissed employees.

4. Precedential Balance: While the Court surveyed conflicting High Court and Tribunal rulings, it ultimately found the Federal Court’s decision in Western India Automobile Association persuasive and aligned with the statutory framework at hand.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed with costs.

Immediate Effect: The respondent’s application for reinstatement and compensation under Section 16 is maintainable; the matter stands remanded for adjudication on merits as directed by the lower forums.

Broader Implications: The Supreme Court confirms that under the C.P. & Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act, 1947, dismissed employees qualify as “employees” and may individually invoke the Act’s dispute-resolution machinery. The decision clarifies the Act’s wider protective scope but does not purport to settle definitively the position under the central Industrial Disputes Act.

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    Central Provinces Transport Service Limited, Nagpur v. Shri Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan .

    Venkatarama ayyar, J.— The Central Provinces Transport Services Ltd., Nagpur, was, at the material dates, a public limited company, and the respondent was employed as a mechanic therein. In June 1950, goods belonging to the Company were stolen, and suspicion fell on the respondent. There was an enquiry into the matter, and that resulted in his dismissal on June 28, 1950, on the ground of gross negligence and misconduct. He was then prosecuted on a charge of theft, but that ended in his acquittal on March 3, 1952. Thereafter, he applied to the Company to be reinstated, and failing to get redress, filed on October 1, 1952, an application before the Labour Commissioner under Section 16(2) of the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Act 23 of 1947, hereinafter referred to as the Act, for reinstatement and compensation. The Company resisted the claim on the ground, inter alia, that as the applicant had been dismissed on June 28, 1950, he was not an employee on the date of the application, that accordingly there was no “industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee” as required by Section 16, sub-sections (1) and (2) of the Act, and that, in consequence, the proceedings under that section were incompetent. The Assistant Labour Commissioner, before whom the matter came up for hearing, agreed with this contention, and dismissed the application. The respondent preferred a revision against this order to the Provincial Industrial Court under Section 16(5) of the Act, and by its order dated February 5, 1954, that Court held that a dismissed employee was an employee as defined in Section 2(10) of the Act, that a dispute by such an employee was an industrial dispute within Section 2(12) of the Act, and that the application under Section 16(2) of the Act was therefore maintainable. In the result, the order of dismissal was set aside and the matter remanded for enquiry on the merits. Against that order, the Company appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal which by its order dated October 10, 1954, affirmed the decision of the Provincial Industrial Court, and dismissed the appeal. The Company has preferred the present appeal against this order under Article 136. Pending the appeal to this Court, the Company went into liquidation and has been taken over by the State of Madhya Pradesh, and is now being run under the name of Central Provinces Transport Services (under Government ownership), Nagpur. On the application of the respondent, the record has been suitably amended.

    2. The point for decision in this appeal is whether an application for reinstatement and compensation by a dismissed employee is maintainable under Section 16 of the Act. That section, so far as is material to the present question, runs as follows:

    “(1) Where the State Government by notification so directs, the Labour Commissioner shall have power to decide an industrial dispute touching the dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension of an employee working in any industry in general or in any local area as may be specified in the notification.
    (2) Any employee, working in an industry to which the notification under sub-section (1) applied, may within six months from the date of such dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, apply to the Labour Commissioner for reinstatement and payment of compensation for loss of wages.”
    The argument of Mr Umrigar for the appellant is that it is a condition pre- requisite to the entertainment of an application for reinstatement under this section that there should be an industrial dispute touching the dismissal of an employee, that there was none such in this case, because the respondent was not an employee on the date of the application, having been dismissed long prior thereto and further because his dispute was an individual and not an industrial dispute.

    3. It will be convenient at this stage to refer to the relevant provisions of the Act, as they stood on the material dates. Section 2(10) defines an employee as follows:

    “‘employee' means any person employed by an employer to do any skilled or unskilled manual or clerical work for contract or hire or reward in any industry and includes an employee discharged on account of any dispute relating to a change in respect of which a notice is given under Section 31 or 32 whether before or after the discharge”.
    Section 2(12) defines “Industrial dispute” as meaning “any dispute or difference connected with an industrial matter arising between employer and employee or between employers or employees”. Under Section 2(13), “industrial matter” means “any matter relating to work, pay, wages, reward, hours, privileges, rights or duties of employers or employees, or the mode, terms and conditions of employment or refusal to employ and includes questions pertaining to (a) the relationship between employer and employee, or to the dismissal or non-employment of any person....”

    4. It is not disputed that a question of reinstatement is an industrial matter as defined in Section 2(13) of the Act. The controversy relates to the question whether it is an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(12) of the Act. The contention of the appellant is that it does not fall within that definition, because the further condition prescribed by Section 2(12) that it must be between an employer and employee is not satisfied. It was argued by Mr Umrigar that when the respondent was dismissed on June 28, 1950, his employment came to an end, and that he could not thereafter be termed an employee, as that word is ordinarily understood, that it could not have been the intention of the legislature to include in the definition of an employee even those who had ceased to be in service, as otherwise there was no need for the further provision in Section 2(10) that discharged employees would in certain cases be employees; and that, in any event, the inclusive portion of the definition would, on the principle expressio unius est exclusio alterius, operate to exclude all ex-employees, other than those mentioned therein.

    5. The question whether a dismissed employee is an employee as defined in Section 2(10) of the Act must be held to be practically concluded by the decision of the Federal Court in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1949) FCR 321, AIR 1949 FC 111. There, the point for determination was whether a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman was an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Indian Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947. It was held that the definition in Section 2(k) including as it did, all disputes or differences in connection with employment or non-employment of a person was sufficiently wide to include a claim for reinstatement by a dismissed workman. Counsel for the appellant sought to distinguish that decision on the ground firstly, that it was given on a statute different from what we are concerned with in this appeal, and secondly, that the reference there, included other items of dispute, which undoubtedly fell within the Act, and the question of reinstatement took its complexion from those items. We do not see any force in either of these contentions. Section 2(12) and Section 2(13) of the Act are substantially in pari materia with Section 2(k) of Act 14 of 1947, and the ratio of the decision in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1949) FCR 321, AIR 1949 FC 111 will be as much applicable to the one enactment as to the other. Nor does it make any difference that there were comprised in the reference other items which fell within the definition under Section 2(k), because if the Government had no jurisdiction under the Act to refer the question of reinstatement of dismissed employee for adjudication, then the reference must, to that extent, be treated as a nullity, and it would be immaterial that it was intra vires as regards the other items of dispute.

    6. We are also unable to accede to the contention of the appellant that the inclusive clause in Section 2(10) of the Act is an indication that the legislature did not intend to include within that definition those who had ceased to be in service. In our opinion, that clause was inserted ex abundanti cautela to repel a possible contention that employees discharged under Sections 31 and 32 of the Act would not fall within Section 2(10), and cannot be read as importing an intention generally to exclude dismissed employees from that definition. On the other hand, Section 16 of the Act expressly provides for relief being granted to dismissed employees by way of reinstatement and compensation, and that provision must become useless and inoperative, if we are to adopt the construction which the appellant seeks to put on the definition of employee in Section 2(10). We must accordingly hold agreeing with the decision in Western India Automobile Association v. Industrial Tribunal, Bombay (1949) FCR 321, AIR 1949 FC 111 that the definition of “employee” in the Act would include one who has been dismissed and the respondent cannot be denied relief only by reason of the fact that he was not in employment on the date of the application.

    7. It was next contended that even assuming that the respondent was an “employee” as defined in Section 2(10) of the Act, his dismissal could not be held to be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(12), because that term properly meant that the dispute was one between employer on the one hand and the industry represented by its workmen as a class on the other, and that a dispute between the employer and a single employee would be an individual dispute and would therefore be outside the purview of Section 2(12). It was argued in support of this contention that the object of all labour legislation was not so much to deal with individual rights of workmen, for the enforcement of which there was an appropriate forum in the ordinary courts of the land, as to regulate the relation between capital and labour, treating them as distinct entities, so that public peace and order might not be disturbed and production might not suffer, and for that end, to recognise the right of labour to speak and act as a body for the protection of its common interests and to provide a machinery for speedy settlement of disputes which that body might raise; and that it could not have been the intention of the legislature, where the above considerations did not operate, to interfere with the normal relations between employer and employee under the law and to provide an additional forum to the employee to vindicate his rights. Reliance was placed in support of this contention on decisions of the Madras, Calcutta and Patna High Courts and of Industrial Tribunals.

    8. The question whether a dispute by an individual workman would be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k) of the Act 14 of 1947, has evoked considerable conflict of opinion both in the High Courts and in Industrial Tribunals, and three different views have been expressed thereon: (i) A dispute which concerns only the rights of individual workers, cannot be held to be an industrial dispute. That was the opinion expressed in Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal (1949) 2 MLJ 789, AIR 1951 Mad 611. There, Rajamannar, C.J observed that though the language of the definition in Section 2(k) was wide enough to include such a dispute, the provisions of Section 18 suggested that something more than an individual dispute between a worker and the employer was meant by an industrial dispute. The other learned Judge, Mack, J., was more emphatic in his opinion, and observed that the Act was “never intended to provide a machinery for redress by a dismissed workman”. It became, however, unnecessary to decide the point, as the court came to the conclusion that the reference itself was bad for the reason that there was no material on which the Government could be satisfied that there was a dispute. The views expressed in Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal (1949) 2 MLJ 789, AIR 1951 Mad 611 were approved in Manager, United Commercial Bank Ltd v. Commissioner of Labour AIR 1951 Mad 141 but here again, the observations were obiter, as the point for decision was whether a right of appeal conferred by Section 41 of the Madras Shop and Establishments Act 36 of 1947 was taken away by implication by Act 14 of 1947. The question, however, arose directly for decision in J. Chowdhury v. M.C Banerjee (1950-51) 55 CWN 256 in which the order of the Government referring the dispute of a dismissed employee to the adjudication of a Tribunal was attacked as incompetent, and it was held by Mitter, J., following the observations in Kandan Textile v. Industrial Tribunal (1949) FCR 321, AIR 1949 FC 111 that the dispute in question was not an industrial dispute, and that the reference was, in consequence, bad.

    (ii) A dispute between an employer and a single employee can be an industrial dispute as defined in Section 2(k). That was the decision in Newspapers Ltd., Allahabad v. State Industrial Tribunal, U.P AIR 1954 All 516, (1954) 2 LLJ 263 In that case, a reference of a dispute by a dismissed employee and the award of the Tribunal passed on that reference were attacked as bad on the ground that the dispute in question was not an industrial dispute within Section 2(k) of Act 14 of 1947, and it was held by Bhargava, J. that an industrial dispute could come into existence even if the parties thereto were only the employer and a single employee and that the reference and the award were, in consequence, valid. A similar decision was given by a Full Bench of the Labour Appellate Tribunal in Swadeshi Cotton Mills Company Ltd. v. Workmen (1953) 1 LLJ 757.

    (iii) A dispute between an employer and a single employee cannot per se be an industrial dispute, but it may become one if it is taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. That was held by Bose, J. in Bilash Chandra Mitra v. Balmer Lawrie & Co. AIR 1953 Cal 613, by Ramaswami and Sarjoo Prasad, JJ. in New India Assurance Co. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal AIR 1953 Patna 321 and by Balakrishna Ayyar J. in Lakshmi Talkies, Madras v. Munuswami (1955) 2 LLJ 477 and by the Industrial Tribunals in Gordon Woodroffe & Co. (Madras) Ltd. v. Appa Rao (1955) 2 LLJ 541 and Lynus & Co. v. Hemanta Kumar Samanta (1956) 2 LLJ 89.

    9. The preponderance of judicial opinion is clearly in favour of the last of the three views stated above, and there is considerable reason behind it. Notwithstanding that the language of Section 2(k) is wide enough to cover a dispute between an employer and a single employee, the scheme of the Industrial Disputes Act does appear to contemplate that the machinery provided therein should be set in motion, to settle only disputes which involve the rights of workmen as a class and that a dispute touching the individual rights of a workman was not intended to be the subject of an adjudication under the Act, when the same had not been taken up by the Union or a number of workmen. If that were the correct position, the respondent was not entitled to apply under Section 16(2) of the Act as the workmen in the industry had not adopted his dispute as their own and chosen to treat it as their casus belli with the company. But then, we are directly concerned in this appeal not with the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 but with the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947, and in the view which we take of the rights of the respondent under that statute, there is no need to express a final opinion on the question whether a dispute simpliciter between an employer and a workman would be an industrial dispute within Section 2(k) of Act 14 of 1947.

    10. Now, the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947 with which we are concerned, is not in pari materia with Act 14 of 1947. It no doubt covers the ground occupied by that Act, and contains provisions relating to arbitration, adjudication, awards, strikes and lock-outs. But it contains more. It enacts in Chapter IV provisions which are intended to regulate the contract of employment between employer and workmen, a subject which is covered by a distinct piece of Central legislation, Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act 20 of 1946. The object of that Act was, as appears from the preamble thereto, “to require employers in industrial establishments formally to define conditions of employment under them”, whereas the object of the Industrial Disputes Act 14 of 1947 is, as set out in its preamble, “to make provision for the investigation and settlement of industrial disputes and for certain other purposes”. Thus, even though the two enactments are pieces of what is termed labour legislation, their objects and their vision are different. While Act 14 of 1947 may be said to be primarily concerned with disputes of labour as a class, Act 20 of 1946 is directed to getting the rights of an employee under a contract defined. Now, as the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947 covers the ground occupied by both Act 20 of 1946 and Act 14 of 1947, it would be proper to interpret the expression “industrial dispute” therein in a sense wider than what it bears in Act 14 of 1947, so as to cover not only disputes of workmen as a class but also their individual disputes. And this view receives considerable support from other provisions of the Act. Section 41 enacts that an application under that section can be made either by an employer or employee concerned or by a representative of the employees concerned. Section 2(24) defines “representative of employees” as meaning a union or where there is no union, persons elected by the employees not exceeding five. Thus, there is a clear recognition of the rights of an individual employee as distinguished from a class of employees, to move for redress. It is argued by Mr Umrigar that this recognition is only for the purpose of Section 41 and that no inference can be drawn therefrom that the employee has a similar right to apply under Section 16(2). But the importance of Section 41 consists in this that it indicates that the Act has in contemplation the enforcement of individual rights of workmen also. Then we have Section 53, which runs as follows:

    “Save with the permission of the authority holding any proceeding under this Act, no employee shall be allowed to appear in such proceeding except through the representative of employees:
    Provided that where only a single employee is concerned he may appear personally.”
    This section again recognises the rights of employees to agitate their individual rights under the provisions of the Act. Section 16 is intended, in our opinion, to enable an employee to enforce his individual rights when there is an order of dismissal, discharge, removal or suspension, and in the context, “industrial dispute” must be interpreted as including the claim of an employee who has been dismissed, for reinstatement and compensation.

    11. The view taken by the Industrial Court and the Labour Appellate Tribunal as to the meaning of “industrial dispute” in the C.P and Berar Industrial Disputes Settlement Act 23 of 1947 is therefore correct, and this appeal must be dismissed with costs.

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    Central Provinces Transport Service Limited, Nagpur v. Shri Raghunath Gopal Patwardhan .
    (Nov 6, 1956)