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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause
  • 38, rule 3 of the CPC,
  • Order XXIII, rule 3,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Order XLIII, rule 1, clause
  • 38, rule 3 of the CPC,
  • Order XXIII, rule 3,

    Gulabchand Ramsukh v. Ramsukh Rampratap

    Macleod, C.J:— There were three suits pending in the Court of the First Class Subordinate Judge at Jalgaon. On March 7, 1923, a consent decree was passed in terms of a certain compromise signed by all the parties including the present appellant except a formal party against whom no relief was claimed. The Judge said:—

    “These three suits have been amicably settled by throwing the whole responsibility for the amount payable to plaintiff on defendant No. 1. So the minors defendant's share or interests in no way to prejudiced. The plaintiff has been given in addition some property, but even then it would be within the limits of defendant No. 1's share.”

    2. The plaintiff has now filed an appeal against this consent degree and in the grounds of appeal it is stated as follows:—

    (1) The order recording the compromise in the aforesaid suits is illegal and improper. (2) It is not proved to the satisfaction of the Court that the three suits were adjusted wholly or in part by a lawful agreement or compromise. (3) Under order 38, rule 3 of the CPC, the Court has to satisfy itself by positive proof that there has been a lawful agreement to adjust the suit before ordering the agreement to be recorded. In the present case the Court passed the order without any inquiry, or proof on this point. (4) The said compromise was brought about by the appellant's pleader Mr. Juwekar with undue haste, without mature deliberation, and without giving the appellant sufficient time to think or judge for himself or non-suit his friends or relations is the matter. (5) The appellant was quite unwilling to enter into the compromise, but his pleader threatened him that if he did not sign the agreement of compromise as proposed by him, he would be ruined. (6) The circumstances under which the appellant was forced to sign the agreement of compromise against his will are fully sat out in the appellant's affidavit. They clearly show that the suits were not adjusted by a lawful agreement. The said agreement is therefore not binding on the appellant.

    3. A preliminary point was taken that an appeal from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties is barred by section 90, sub-section 3. The appellant urges that the Court has passed an order under Order XXIII, rule 3, and that an appeal lies under Order XLIII, rule 1, clause (m), from such an order.

    4. But in this case there was no question whether an agreement had been arrived at, the terms were signed by the parties and all that the Court had to do was to pass a decree according to the terms to which the parties had agreed. There was no adjudication, therefore, on the question whether a lawful agreement had been arrived at, because it was never disputed that the parties before the Court had come to an agreement. It was open to any one of the parties before the decree was passed to contend that a lawful agreement had not been arrived at.

    5. Under these circumstances we think that no appeal is competent. There are other remedies open to the appellant if he thinks fit to pursue them. The appeal will be dismissed with costs.

    6. Appeal dismissed.

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    Gulabchand Ramsukh v. Ramsukh Rampratap
    (Jul 29, 1925)