1. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by Dr. G.F Papali, questioning the termination of his services as Professor and Head of the Department of English in the Fatima Mata National College, Quilon. The Bishop of Quilon who is the 2nd respondent is impleaded as the proprietor and patron of the institution. The 3rd respondent is the College Managing Board represented by its Secretary and Principal. The main prayers in the petition are:

“(i) to issue a writ of certiorari or such other order or direction to respondent No. 3 in order to call up the records and proceedings of their relieving notice dated 29-2-1956 issued to the petitioner ??? to scrutinise and quash the same as being ultra illegal, inoperative and void” and:

“to issue a writ of mandamus or such other ion to respondents Nos. 2 and 3, so as to ??? them from terminating the services of the ??? and relieving him from office before the ??? of the contracted period of his service for five ears.”

The 1st respondent in the petition is the Syndicate of the Travancore University to whom the petitioner had made appeal in the matter still undisposed of. The further prayer is therefore made

(iii) “to issue a writ of mandamus or such other direction to respondent No. 1 so as to compel them to make an expeditious disposal of the appeal presented to them by petitioner on 23-4-1956”

2. The petitioner had taken the M.A degree in English language and literature and the Ph. D. (Internal Arts) in English of the University of London. He had, after a total of 34 years' service, retired in February 1953 as the Principal of the Government College, Chittur, Cochin. Soon thereafter the Fatima Mata National College, Quilon, which was then being started as a First Grade College affiliated to the University of Travancore requisitioned his services and he joined duty on 1-6-1953. Ext. VII is the order appointing him dated 28-5-1953. It mentioned the petitioner's tenure of service as permanent but it incorporated by reference Ext. IV the Service Rules of the College which provided for the termination of the appointment by 3 months' notice or either side. It is on basis of this liberty reserved in Ext. IV that Ext. II notice of termination of service, impugned herein, was issued by the College management to the petitioner on 29-2-1956 According to the petitioner his appointment was governed by special considerations and the terms, not all embodied in Ext. VII appointment order, were settled directly with the Bishop, Patron.

3. So much so the expression ‘permanently’ in Ext. Vlf really meant, ‘till 60’ — the age of superannuation of teachers' in Colleges admitted to the privileges of the University. The question of 3 months' notice could not and did not therefore arise in his case. The petitioner chacaeinited the procedure adopiod by the management as a manipulated affair and as wanting in good faith.

4. The main contest was raised by the 2nd and 3rd responden on the basis that the College was not mautianed out of a public trust or by any contribution from public funds but was owned by the Bishop it run entirely with his private lands end that therefore they were not amenable to the writ jurisdiction the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.

5. On the merits they asserted that the eider of appointment as explained by the Service Rules comprehended the entire terms and conditions of the petitioner's service and so understood, the termination of service was unquestionable. There was according to them, a breach of contract at worst, and the remedy of the petitioner lay if at all only by ordinary action in Court.

6. The first question for consideration is whether the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has been properly invoked. It may now be taken to be settled that even though Article 226 is wide in its terms, the High Court will not issue the writs mentioned therein by name to a private individual except in the case of the writ of habeas corpus. The expression “any person” in Article 226 has been interpreted to mean only a person to whom according to well-established principles a writ would lie.

7. Thus a writ of certiorari will issue only against, tribunals set up by law to determine questions affecting rights of parties. Similarly a writ of mandamus will issue only to a person holding a public office or an inferior tribunal or corporation but not to a merely private person. The question then is whether the respondents 2 and 3 are merely private persons as claimed by them or on the other hand a public or quasi-public body as alleged by the petitioner.

8. In the general portion of paragraph 10 of the main petition the allegation was made that respondents 2 and 3 are “public authorities functioning under statutory provisions” and the reasons were given as follows:

(b) Respondent No. 2 is the Proprietor and Patron of the Fatima Mata National College, Quilon, which has been admitted to the privileges of the State University of Travancore after securing the previous sanction of the Government. The College is entitled to Government grants and subsidies, and can retain the privileges of the University only so long as it conforms to and abides by the laws of the University of Travancore. (Vide Ch. XXII, Statutes-7, 8 and 9. University Calendar, 1952–1953, p. 124).

“(c) Respondent No. 3 is a statutory body constituted as per provisions in Ch. XXI, 2, (a) of the Statutes of the University, and at present the Principal of Fatima Mata National College, Quilon, is, its Secretary.”

9. It was with reference to this allegation that the respondent No. 3 asserted in paragraph 1 of his counter-affidavit of 4-6-1956.

“The Managing Board is not a statutory body. It is an advisory body constituted by His Excellency, the Bishop of Quilon who is the owner of the; Fatima Mata National College for helping His Excellency, the Bishop in conducting the College.”

10. And again in paragraph 15:

“The Fatima Mata National College which is affiliated to the Travancore University is not maintained out of any public trust or by any contribution from any public fund. It is not governed by any scheme framed by any Court. This College is maintained entirely from the private funds of His Excellency the Bishop of Quilon.”

11. And the 2nd respondent adopting the 3rd respondent's counter-affidavit also affirmed in paragraph 3 of his affidavit of the same date.

“The Fatima Mata National College is maintained out of the private funds belonging to me. I am not amenable to the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.’

12. I should not omit to mention in this connection the attempt of the petitioner to withdraw the admission he had made as above as to the 2nd respondent's proprietorship of the institution, by his statements, in paragraph 3 of his reply affidavit dated: 10-6-1956 that

“The statement of the second respondent that the College is maintained out of private funds belonging to him is incorrect. The College is being run with public funds in the form of fee collections, donations from the people of the Diocese and elsewhere, grants obtained from the State Government etc. Vide Ch. XXI, 1, iv of the Statutes of the University of Travancore.”

“He being a Statutory Authority to whom an appeal is provided for under the Service Rules of the College (Ex. IV, para 24), he is amenable to the jurisdiction of this Hon'ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

13. Now it is clear that to the extent that disputed questions of fact are sought to be relied on by the petitioner as above, for purpose of relief herein, this Court cannot render him any aid. I shall therefore assume the factual foundation as admitted by the respondents and also such likely inferences as may be possible and proceed to dispose of the matter. The question, to my mind, then reduces itself to whether the factum of the affiliation of the Fatima Mata National College to the University of Travancore and the consequences resulted therefrom will bring its authorities within the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226.

14. This precise question came up for consideration before a Bench of this Court in Joseph Mundassery v. Manager, St. Thomas College, 1953 Ker LT 773 : (AIR 1954 Trav-Co 199 (A)). There also the private ownership of the College was assumed and the argument proceeded that in spite of this, matters relating to education being of paramount importance to the body politic, an educational institution affiliated to a statutory body like the University of Madras and enjoying the benefits of such affiliation should be deemed to be a public institution and its management at least a quasi-public authority, and reliance was placed on certain observations of Subba Rao, J. in C.D Sekkilar v. Krishnamoorthy, AIR 1952 Mad 151 (B). It was held overruling the argument:

“that the mere factum of affiliation is insufficient to make the management of a private college maintained entirely from private funds a quasi-public authority amenable to the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.”

15. The receipt of grant from the University or the obligation to conform to conditions by virtue of affiliation, stressed by learned counsel does not also affect the question. The institution will still be a private educational institution, imparting education on its own responsibility. See University of Madras v. Shantha Bai, AIR 1954 Mad 67 (C), where it was held that the University of Madras would not be considered as exercising any governmental function although there was provision for contribution by Government to its funds under the Statute of which the University was the creature.

16. It follows therefore that this Court's jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution has not been properly invoked in the instant proceedings so far as the respondents 2 and 3 are concerned and as the substance of the matter cannot be dealt with in the circumstances above mentioned there is no reason to entertain the petition as against the 1st respondent University alone. In the light of my conclusions as above on the main question as to jurisdiction it is unnecessary to consider the merits of the petition as to wheal the issue of the notice of termination was at all proper. The petition is therefore dismissed ??? the circumstances without costs.

17. Petition dismissed.