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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • sections 408, 409, 161, 477-k and 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with section 5(1)(d)/13(2) and section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • IV of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966
  • Rule 9(1 )(b) of M. P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966
  • section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh
  • Rule 9(1) of 1966 Rules.
  • Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (5) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (4)
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • sections 408, 409, 161, 477-k and 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with section 5(1)(d)/13(2) and section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • IV of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966
  • Rule 9(1 )(b) of M. P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966
  • section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh
  • Rule 9(1) of 1966 Rules.
  • Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (5) of Rule 9
  • Sub-rule (4)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Court Opinion (Dipak Misra, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005 and challenges the correctness of the order dated 21-01-2008 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 5173/2007(8).

The facts essential to the dispute, as recorded in the opinion, are:

  • The appellant is the M. P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. The respondent was an employee of this Corporation.
  • The respondent was placed under suspension by order dated 16-01-1996 (Annexure P/1) because a charge-sheet had been filed against him in Crime No. 24/1989 for offences under sections 408, 409, 161, 477-K and 120-B of the Indian Penal Code read with sections 5(1)(d)/13(2) and section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
  • The respondent was tried and acquitted by the competent criminal court by judgment dated 07-03-2007.
  • After acquittal the respondent moved W.P. No. 4220/2007(8) on 08-08-2007 seeking revocation of suspension; this Court directed consideration of the representation for revocation.
  • By order dated 01-09-2007 the employer rejected the representation on the ground that an appeal had been filed against the acquittal and therefore the suspension would continue pending the criminal appeal.
  • The respondent then challenged that rejection by filing the writ petition that resulted in the Single Judge's order (dated 21-01-2008) which is impugned in the present intra-Court appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, after an employee is acquitted in a criminal trial, the employer may lawfully continue the order of suspension on the ground that an appeal has been preferred against the acquittal.
  2. Whether the direction to reinstate the respondent and to settle consequential benefits (by directing the employer to pass a reasoned and speaking order) improperly curtailed the employer's discretion or amounted to an order to pay arrears.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (M. P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd.)

  • The Corporation has an inherent jurisdiction to put an employee under suspension by withholding work, and therefore the Single Judge's order revoking suspension was erroneous and should be interfered with in the intra-Court appeal.
  • Because an appeal had been preferred against the judgment of acquittal, the order of suspension could lawfully be continued pending final adjudication of the criminal appeal.
  • The respondent would not be entitled to all consequential benefits automatically; Fundamental Rules of service may limit entitlement.
  • Before the Single Judge the Corporation also contended that the respondent's conduct caused loss to the Corporation, justifying continuation of suspension.

Respondent's Arguments

  • The respondent had been acquitted in the criminal case and no other proceeding was pending; therefore the order of suspension could not be permitted to stand.
  • Reliance was placed on the decision in Ram Ratan Tiwari vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2002(4) MPLJ 401, to support the position that suspension ends once the investigation/enquiry/trial is over and it cannot be continued merely because an appeal is pending.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ram Ratan Tiwari vs. State of M.P. and Others, 2002(4) MPLJ 401 That suspension under Rule 9(1) of the 1966 Rules is tied to the period when investigation, enquiry or trial is pending, and that once judgment is announced (i.e., investigation/enquiry/trial is over), the provision enabling suspension stands exhausted; suspension should not be continued during the pendency of an appeal. The Court relied on and reproduced the Division Bench's reasoning to support the conclusion that continuation of suspension after acquittal — merely because an appeal is pending — is impermissible, and this supported quashing the suspension and directing reinstatement.
L. K. Verma vs. HMT Ltd. and another, (2006) 2 SCC 269 Classification of suspension: (1) suspension by way of punishment under conduct rules, (2) suspension by employer as an exercise of inherent power (with full salary payable), and (3) suspension when rule provides for subsistence allowance rather than full salary. The Court cited this case to elucidate the different facets of suspension and to distinguish the present case: to note that inherent power exists but that payment and scope differ; the case was used to understand suspension types while rejecting the applicability of deemed suspension after acquittal in the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by first identifying the governing statutory/regulatory provision: Rule 9(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 ("1966 Rules"), which permits placement under suspension where a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or pending or where a criminal case is under investigation, enquiry or trial. The Court reproduced Rule 9(1) and reviewed related sub-rules (sub-rules (2) to (5)) to understand deemed suspension, consequences where punishment is set aside on appeal/review, and the continuing effect of suspension orders until modified or revoked.

The Court observed that Rule 9 is silent with respect to the specific situation where the accused employee has been acquitted by a criminal court. The Division Bench decision in Ram Ratan Tiwari was examined and quoted: that the investigation/enquiry/trial finishes on announcement of judgment and, therefore, the suspension provision stands exhausted at that point; to hold otherwise would be to read into the rule something not provided and could cause hardship by making the employee wait for final adjudication on appeal.

The Court also considered L. K. Verma (SCC) to clarify the different kinds of suspension (including suspension imposed by withholding work as an exercise of inherent power). The bench noted that while inherent power to suspend by not assigning work exists, the consequence is payment of full salary unless a rule provides otherwise.

Applying these authorities and the text of Rule 9, the Court addressed the central contention of the appellant: that an appeal against acquittal justified continued suspension. The Court rejected the notion of "deemed suspension" in the circumstances of acquittal because:

  • The rules do not provide for deemed suspension in the event of an acquittal; sub-rules that provide for deemed suspension apply in other contexts (for example, when a punishment of dismissal is set aside), and no material was placed to show any action that would attract deemed suspension here.
  • Continuation of suspension solely because an appeal is pending would be contrary to the reasoning in Ram Ratan Tiwari and would amount to extending suspension beyond the period envisaged by Rule 9 when investigation/enquiry/trial has concluded with acquittal.

Regarding the Single Judge's order directing reinstatement and settlement of consequential benefits within four months by a reasoned and speaking order, the Court examined the challenge that such direction curtailed employer discretion or amounted to an order to pay arrears. The bench held that:

  • The direction to reinstate the employee was beyond challenge given the acquittal and the Rule interpretation.
  • The Single Judge did not issue an unconditional mandate to pay arrears or remove employer discretion; instead, the court directed the employer to settle consequential benefits by passing a reasoned and speaking order. The language used differs from an absolute command to pay arrears and leaves the employer's statutory discretion intact.

The Court therefore concluded there was no merit in the intra-Court appeal and dismissed it in limine.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED

Direct legal effect on the parties (as recorded in the opinion):

  • The order of suspension was quashed and the respondent was directed to be reinstated.
  • The appellant employer was directed to settle all consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order — the Court did not mandate an automatic payment of arrears but required reasoned consideration by the employer.
  • The Court clarified that the employer's discretion under the law remains intact despite the reinstatement direction; the Single Judge's direction did not amount to an unconditional command to pay arrears that would oust employer discretion.

The opinion did not purport to lay down a novel or broader precedent beyond applying the existing rules and the cited authorities; its practical consequence was limited to quashing the suspension in the present facts and directing reinstatement with consequential benefits to be considered and determined by the employer through a reasoned order.

Disposition: Appeal dismissed in limine (order affirmed as set out above).

    M.P State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Save .

    Dipak Misra, J.:-

    In this appeal preferred under section 2(1) of Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyaya Peeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, the correctness and soundness of the order dated 21-1-2008 passed by learned Single Judge in W. P. No. 5173/2007(8) is called in question by the M. P. State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation").

    2. The facts which are requisite to be exposited for appreciating the stands put forth in appeal are that the respondent who was an employee of the appellant Corporation, was put under suspension as per order dated 16-1-1996, Annexure P/1, on the base that a charge-sheet was filed against him in Crime No. 24/1989 for the offences punishable under sections 408, 409, 161, 477-k and 120-B of Indian Penal Code read with section 5(1)(d)/13(2) and section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The respondent faced trial and eventually, by judgment dated 7-3-2007, he was acquitted of the charges levelled against him by the competent criminal Court. After being acquitted, the respondent preferred W. P. No. 4220/2007(8) on 8-8-2007 for revocation of the order of suspension and this Court had directed to consider the representation preferred for revocation of the said order. After the order was passed in the writ petition, the employer by order dated 1-9-2007 rejected the representation on the ground that against the order of acquittal, an appeal has been preferred before the competent Court and till the decision is taken in criminal appeal, the order of suspension was to remain in vogue. Being aggrieved by the said order, the present writ petition was filed for quashment of the same appropriate direction.

    3. Before the learned Single Judge it was contended that the order of suspension could not be allowed to stand as the respondent has been acquitted in the criminal case and there is no other proceeding pending against him. To buttress the said stand, reliance was placed on the decision in Ram Ratan Tiwari vs. State of M. P. and others, 2002(4) MPLJ 401. The said submission was criticised on the foundation that due to the conduct of the respondent, the appellant Corporation had been put to loss and once an appeal has been filed, there was no warrant for revocation of the order of suspension.

    4. Learned Single Judge took note of the fact that the respondent had been acquitted; that the employee was put under suspension as per Rule 9(1 )(b) of M. P. Civil Services (CCA) Rules, 1966 which entitles the employer to put an employee under suspension where a criminal case has been instituted against him or any criminal offence which is under investigation or trial; that there is no provision enabling the employer to put the employee under suspension under these circumstances; and that the order of suspension during the pendency of appeal against the judgment of acquittal is impermissible. Being of this view, the learned Single Judge quashed the order of suspension and directed appellant employer to reinstate the respondent and settle all the consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order.

    5. We have heard Mr. Vinay Zelawat, learned counsel for appellant-Corporation on the question of admission. It is submitted by Mr. Zelawat that the appellant has inherent jurisdiction to put an employee under suspension by not taking work from him and, therefore, the order passed by learned Single Judge is erroneous and deserves to be interfered with in this intra-Court appeal. It is also his submission that the respondent would not be entitled to all consequential benefits as the Fundamental Rules would come into play.

    6. It is not in dispute that the respondent was put under suspension because of the initiation of the criminal case against him. It is not controverted that he has been acquitted on 7-3-2007. There is no cavil over the fact that the respondent was suspended taking recourse to the provisions contained in 1966 Rules. Under these circumstances, the pivotal question that emerges for consideration is whether after acquittal, the employer can be permitted to contend that as an appeal has been preferred in a higher forum, the order of suspension shall be allowed to continue.

    7. In this context, we think it apt to refer to Rule 9(1) of 1966 Rules. The said Rule is reproduced below :-

    "9. (1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or the disciplinary authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Governor, by general or special order, may place a Government servant under suspension :-

    (a) Where a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or

    (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial:

    Provided that a Government servant shall invariably be placed under suspension when a challan for a criminal offence involving corruption or other moral turpitude is filed against him:

    Provided further that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the appointing authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the appointing authority the circumstances in which the order was made. "

    We have reproduced the said Rule to understand the basic tenor of it. In this context it is essential to scan the other rules so that a complete picture is projected. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 deals with the concept of deemed suspension and other aspects relating to the same. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 9 provides the consequences when the punishment imposed against a Government servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or in review. Sub-rule (4) deals with the situation where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by a decision of Court of law. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 9 stipulates that an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under Rule 9 to continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so. The aforesaid are the basic features of Rule 9. The Rule is absolutely silent as regards the situation when a judgment of acquittal is recorded against the accused employee.

    8. The Division Bench of this Court in a case of Ram Ratan Tiwari after referring to the Rule expressed the opinion as follows :-

    "One of the circumstances for placing the Government servant under suspension is when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation, inquiry or trial. Part IV of Madhya Pradesh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 deals with suspension. Rule 9(1) provides for circumstances when a person can be placed under suspension by the Government. Petitioner was placed under suspension under the above quoted Rules which means he remains under suspension when criminal offence against him is under investigation, enquiry or trial. Investigation, enquiry or trial is over after announcement of judgment dated April 30, 2001. Therefore, this provision stands exhausted and petitioner can revert back to service. To hold otherwise would mean reading something in the provision which it does not provide. Further it may cause immense hardship to person to wait for the final adjudication of the matter by the final Court. Therefore, submission of Shri P. D. Gupta, learned Dy. A. G. cannot be appreciated to the extent that once a person is placed under suspension, he continues under suspension during the appeal as well."

    9. In this regard, we may fruitfully refer to certain observations made in L. K. Verma vs. HMT Ltd. and another, (2006) 2 SCC 269, wherein their Lordships have held thus :-

    "17. Suspension is of three kinds. An order of suspension may be passed by way of punishment in terms of the conduct rules. An order of suspension can also be passed by the employer in exercise of its inherent power in the sense that it may not take any work from the delinquent officer but in that event, the entire salary is required to be paid. An order of suspension can also be passed, if such a provision exists in the rule laying down that in place of the full salary, the delinquent officer shall be paid only the subsistence allowance specified therein."

    10. We have reproduced the above solely to understand the various facets of an order of suspension. As has been stated earlier, there has been a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondent. It is submitted by Mr. Zelawat that the concept of deemed suspension is attracted. In a case when an order of dismissal is set-aside and the matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority for fresh consideration, the delinquent may be deemed to be under suspension depending upon the language in which the rule is couched or the action taken by the employer. But, when there is an order of acquittal in a criminal case and there is nothing in the rule relating to the spectrum of deemed suspension and nothing has been brought before us that any action has been taken, we are of the considered opinion that there cannot be deemed suspension.

    11. We will be failing in our duty if we do not take note of the other submission canvassed by Mr. Zelawat, learned counsel for the appellant. He has invited our attention to the last paragraph of the order, whereby the learned Single Judge has directed the appellant to reinstate the petitioner by revoking the suspension and to settle all consequential benefits within four months by passing a reasoned and speaking order. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned Single Judge has granted all financial benefits to the respondent by which the power/authority of the employer under the law has been totally curtailed. A close and studied scrutiny of the order would clearly reveal that there is a direction for reinstatement. The same is beyond assail.

    12. As far as second plank of submission of Mr. Zelawat is concerned, as is perceived, learned Single Judge has directed the employer to settle all consequential benefits by passing a reasoned and speaking order. The terms used in this direction are quite different than issuing a mandamus or a command to pay the arrears. Hence, the submission put forth by learned counsel for the appellant is sans substance. We hasten to clarify that discretion as per law still rests with the employer.

    13. Consequently, we find no merit in this intra-Court appeal and accordingly the same stands dismissed in limine.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    M.P State Civil Supplies Corporation Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Save .
    (Jul 22, 2008)