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Opinion Summary — Shiv Dayal, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This petition was brought under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the constitutional validity of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Tritiya Sanshodhan Adhyadesh, 1977) (M.P. Ordinance No.9 of 1977) which amends section 11 of the M.P. Krishi Upaj Mandi Adhiniyam, 1972. The Bench was constituted under Article 228-A.

The petitioner was elected Chairman of the Krishi Upaj Mandi Committee, Jora (District Morena) on 18 January 1976; the normal tenure is five years. On 19 September 1977 the State Government promulgated the Ordinance which provided that members of every market committee constituted under section 11 of the Act during the period of operation of the Presidential proclamation of emergency made on 25 June 1975 (Clause (1) of Article 352) would cease to hold office with effect from 19 September 1977 and every such market committee would stand dissolved on that date.

Consequent upon the Ordinance, the Deputy Director Agriculture, Morena, was appointed as Officer in Charge of the Jora Mandi Committee and the State authorised the Collector to take necessary actions and decisions for taking over charge of the committee.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance (Tritiya Sanshodhan Adhyadesh, 1977) which amends section 11 of the State Act is constitutionally invalid because it was promulgated by the Governor without the assent or instructions of the President in contravention of the proviso to Article 213(1) of the Constitution.
  2. Whether an Act of the State Legislature (or an Ordinance carrying like provisions) which abrogates membership and dissolves market (mandi) committees constituted under section 11 would have to be reserved for the consideration of the President and require the President's assent because the subject-matter falls within Entry 33 of the Concurrent List and is thereby repugnant to any provision of an Act of Parliament (in particular, whether repugnancy with provisions relating to foodstuffs in the Essential Commodities Act attracts Article 254(1)).
  3. Relatedly, whether the impugned provision is, in pith and substance, legislation with respect to a State List subject (Entry 28 — "markets and fairs") or whether it is predominantly a matter within the Concurrent List.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The Governor's promulgation of the Ordinance is constitutionally invalid because proviso (2) to Article 213(1) was not complied with; the Governor should not have promulgated the Ordinance without instructions from the President where an Act containing the same provision would have to be reserved for the consideration of the President and receive his assent.
  • Since the original State Act was enacted after obtaining the assent of the President, no amendment (by Ordinance or Act) that affects those provisions can be validly made without instructions or assent of the President.
  • The subject-matter of the State Act (regulation of buying and selling of agricultural products and establishment/administration of markets) falls within Entry 33 of the Concurrent List; therefore the State provision is inconsistent with provisions of the Essential Commodities Act relating to foodstuffs, and Article 254(1) would render the State provision void to the extent of repugnancy.
  • The petitioner's attack is confined to the abrogation of his membership and the dissolution of the Committee resulting from the impugned Ordinance.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
2nd G. I. Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Hazareth (reference as in text) Supports the approach of examining "pith and substance" of legislation when entries overlap. The court relied on the authority to justify focusing on the true subject-matter of the impugned provision to determine legislative competence.
State of Bombay v. P. N. Balsara (AIR 1951 SC 318) Affirms that an Act is not invalid if it only incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field; the need to determine pith and substance. Used to support the proposition that incidental overlap with another legislative entry does not invalidate the State provision; court applied this to conclude the impugned ordinance falls within the State List.
Prafulla Kumar v. Bank of Commerce Khulna (AIR 1947 PC 60 = 74 I A 23) Rejects simplistic application of a rule of priority between lists and endorses pith and substance inquiry. Quoted to reinforce that overlapping subject-matter must be resolved by identifying the true nature of the enactment rather than by formalistic list priority.
Subramanyam v. Muttuswami (AIR 1941 PC 47) (quoted in Prafulla Kumar) Supports the Judicial Committee's rule of examining pith and substance or 'true nature and character' of legislation. Reinforced the approach that legislation touching multiple lists must be classified by its true nature; applied to classify the ordinance as State List matter.
Gallagher v. Lynn ((1937) A C 363) Articulates the pith and substance principle — look at the substance of the legislation to determine validity. Cited as part of the line of authorities establishing that incidental effects outside the authorised field do not invalidate legislation that is in substance within competence.
M. P. S. R. T. C. v. Ramchandra (1977 MPLJ 341 = 1977 J L J 292) Demonstrates that a provision in a State Act is not invalid by virtue of Article 254 unless it is shown to be inconsistent with a provision in an Act of Parliament. Relied upon to note that petitioner had not shown any parliamentary provision inconsistent with the State provision and therefore Article 254 could not be invoked to invalidate the Ordinance.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a stepwise legal analysis addressing the specific challenges raised:

  1. Rejection of the preliminary contention that once an Act has received the President's assent it cannot be amended without the President's assent: The court held there is no such general rule. Instead, what matters is whether the provisions introduced by the amending legislation fall within the mischief of Article 254 (i.e., whether they are repugnant to an Act of Parliament).
  2. Interpretation of Article 254: The court observed that Article 254(1) renders only the repugnant provision void "to that extent" and emphasized that the enquiry under Article 254 must be confined to the particular provision alleged to be repugnant.
  3. Pith and substance inquiry: Because entries in the legislative lists can overlap, the court applied the pith and substance doctrine (supported by the cited authorities) to determine the true subject-matter of the impugned provision. The court examined the nature of the challenged proviso and its practical operation.
  4. Classification of subject-matter: The impugned provision dealt solely with dissolution of particular market committees constituted during a specified period and cessation of membership of those members. The court concluded the matter falls squarely within Entry 28 of List II ("markets and fairs") in the State List, notwithstanding an incidental connection to trade and commerce.
  5. Repugnancy / Article 254 application: The petitioner was required to show a provision in an Act of Parliament that is inconsistent with the impugned State provision. The court noted that no such repugnant parliamentary provision was pointed out; in particular, no provision of any Act of Parliament was shown that provides for constitution of a market committee. The court relied on M.P.S.R.T.C. v. Ramchandra to emphasize that Article 254 invalidates only those State provisions inconsistent with Parliament law.
  6. Scope and temporal effect of the Ordinance: The court observed that the impugned provision does not amend section 11 for all time; rather, it nullifies acts performed during the emergency period by dissolving committees constituted during that specified period and terminating the membership of persons selected in that period.
  7. Conclusion from analysis: Applying these principles, the court concluded that the Ordinance (insofar as it effects cessation of membership of committees constituted within the specified emergency period and dissolution of such committees) was within the competence of the State Legislature and would not have been required to be reserved for the President's assent if enacted as a statute; no repugnancy under Article 254 was shown.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The petition is dismissed. The Court held that the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi (Tritiya Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh, 1977, insofar as it effects the cessation of membership of a committee constituted within a particular specified period and the dissolution of the committee constituted during that period, is not invalid.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The impugned Ordinance stands; the dissolution of the Mandi Committee (Jora) and cessation of membership of those appointed during the emergency period remain effective. Consequential administrative measures taken (appointment of an Officer in Charge and authorisation of the Collector) are supported by the Court's dismissal of the petition.
  • Costs and ancillary directions: The parties were ordered to bear their own costs and the amount of security paid by the petitioner was directed to be refunded.
  • Precedential scope: The opinion does not announce a broader novel principle beyond application of established pith and substance and repugnancy analysis; the Court explicitly noted the absence of any shown repugnant parliamentary provision and decided the matter on that basis.

This summary is strictly confined to the information and reasoning contained in the provided opinion and does not include any material not present in the source text.

    Rasal Singh v. State Of M.P And Others

    Shiv dayal, J.

    1 By this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, the constitutional validity of the Madhya Pradesh Krishi Upaj Mandi [tritiya sanshodhan Adhyadesh, 1977 (M. P. Ordinance Mo.9 of 1977) herein-after called the 'ordinance'] has been challenged. This Bench was, therefore, constituted under Article 228-A of the Constitution.

    2 By this Ordinance, section 11 of the M. P. Krishi Upaj Mandi adhiniyam, 1972, (hereinafter called the 'act') has been amended. The only ground of challenge is that whereas the Act was enacted after obtaining the assent of the President, the Ordinance has been promulgated without the assent of the President.

    3 The Act provides inter alia for establishment of markets and Constitution of market committees. The petitioner's case is that Mandi Committees throughout the State of Madhya Pradesh were established and incorporated under this Act. The Mandi Committee, Jora (District Morena) (Krishi Upaj mandi Committee, Jora) is one of such committees. In the month of December 1975, under the provisions of the Act election to the Mandi Committee was held on January 18, 1976. The petitioner was elected Chairman. The tenure of office is five years. However, on September 19, 1977, the Government of Madhya Pradesh promulgated the Ordinance which, inter alia, provides that the members of every market committee constituted in accordance with the provisions of section 11 of the Act, during the period of operation of proclamation of emergency made by the President on June 25, 1975, under Clause (1)of Article 352 of the Constitution shall cease to hold office with effect from september 19, 1977, and every such market committee shall on that date stand dissolved.

    4 Consequent upon the promulgation of the Ordinance the Deputy director Agriculture, Morena, has been appointed as Officer in Charge of the aforesaid Jora Mandi Committee. The State Government has authorised the collector to take all necessary actions and decisions for the purpose of taking over charge of the aforesaid Mandi Committee.

    5 Under Article 213 of the Constitution the Governor is empowered to promulgate an Ordinance when the State Legislature is not in Session. However, certain conditions are imposed in the Proviso to Article 213 (1 ). Shri Anand Bihari Mishra, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the Ordinance is constitutionally invalid inasmuch as the requirement of proviso (2) was not fulfilled. That Proviso enacts that the Governor shall not, without the instructions from the President promulgate any such Ordinance if an Act of the Legislature of the State containing the same provision would have to be reserved for the consideration of the President and such assent has been received.

    6 The learned counsel for the petitioner confines his attack solely to the abrogation of his membership and the resolution of the Committee in pursuance of the Ordinance. Further, it must be mentioned that the only ground of attack is that if that provision had been made in an Act of the legislature the provision would have been constitutionally invalid for want of assent of the President. The question for our enquiry is, therefore, restricted to this whether an Act of the Legislature which would abrogate membership and dissolve the Mandi Committee constituted under section 11 of the Act would require the assent of the President. Shri Mishra's argument is that since the Act was enacted after obtaining the assent of the President no amendment can be made in the Act either by an Ordinance or an Act without the instructions or assent respectively. It is further argued that the object of the act is to provide for better regulation of buying and selling of agricultural products and the establishment and proper administration of markets of agricultural products in the State of Madhya Pradesh and since a Mandi Committee deals with buying and selling, the subject matter of the Act falls within Entry 33 of Schedule 3 of the Constitution. That being so, the provisions of the Act are inconsistent with provisions of Essential Commodities Act relating to food stuffs, and Article 254 (1) of the Constitution is attracted.

    7 The first part of the argument is misconceived. There is no such requirement of the law that if an Act has been enacted after it received the assent of the President, then no amendment of any kind can be made without the President's assent. What is to be seen is whether the provisions introduced by the amending Act fall within the mischief of Article 254 of the Constitution.

    8 As regards the second part of the contention, the enquiry has to be confined to the particular provision which is attracted. Under Article 254, what becomes void is the particular provision which is repugnant to a provision, contained in an Act of Parliament. Again, the words "to that extent" in article 254 (1) are significant.

    "254. (1) If any provision of a law made by the Legislature of a State is repugnant to any provision of a law made by Parliament which Parliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existing law with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, then subject to the provisions of Clause (2), the law made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the law made by the Legislature of such State or, as the case may be, the existing law, shall prevail and the law made by the legislature of the State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void. (2) Where a law made by the Legislature of a State, ( AIR 1970 s c 999.) (***)-with respect to one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List contains any provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law made by Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then, the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it has been received for the consideration of the President and has received his assent, prevail in that State provided that nothing in this Clause shall prevent Parliament from enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matter including a law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the law so made by the legislature of the State."

    9 The provision under challenge by which membership of the petitioner has ceased to continue and the dissolution of the Mandi Committee Jora by virtue of the impugned Ordinance relates to the Constitution of market committees. Now this subject falls under Entry 28 of List II "markets and Fairs. "

    10 It is well known that sometimes entries in the Legislative lists are overlapping. To examine whether a particular provision talis within the competence of the Legislature which passed it, the Court has to consider what constitutes in pith and substance the true subject matter of the legislation, and whether that particular subject matter is covered by the entries in the relevant legislative list. The validity of a provision is not affected even if it incidentally trenches upon a subject matter of another list. There is a string of Supreme court decisions in support of this proposition In 2nd G. I. Officer, Mangalore v. D. H. Hazareth1 Hidaytullah C J. Speaking for the Court said :-

    "since they (entries) are likely to overlap occasionally, it is usual to examine the pith and substance of legislation with a view to determine to which entry they can be substantially related, a slight connection with another entry in another list notwithstanding."

    In State of Bombay V/s. P. N. Balsara, (AIR 1951 S C 318.), Mr. Justice Fazl Ali observed :-

    "it is well settled that the validity of an Act is not affected if it incidentally trenches on matters outside the authorised field, and, therefore, it is necessary to inquire in each case what is the pith and substance of the act impugned. If the Act, when so viewed, substantially falls within the powers expressly conferred upon the Legislature which enacts it, then it cannot be invalid, merely because it incidentally encroaches on matters which have been assigned to another Legislature."

    In Prafulla Kumar V/s. Bank of Commerce Khulna, (air 1947 p c 60=74i A 23 ). their Lordships rejected the argument that the rule of priority should be applied. Their Lordships held:-

    "the overlapping of subject-matter is not avoided by substituting three lists for two or even by arranging for a hierarchy of jurisdictions. Subjects must still overlap and where they do, the question must be asked what in pith and substance is the effect of the enactment of which complaint is made and if what list is its true nature and character to be found. If these questions could not be asked, much beneficent legislation would be stifled at birth, and many of the subjects entrusted to Provincial Legislation could never effectively be dealt with."

    In that case, observations of Gwyer C. J. , in Subramanyam V/s. Muttuswami, (air 1941 P C 47.), were quoted:-

    "it must inevitably happen from time to time that legislation, though purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches also on a subject in another list and the different provisions of the enactment may be so closely inter twined that blind adherence to a strictly verbal interpretation would result in a large number of statutes being declared invalid because the legislature enacting them may appear to have legislated in a forbidden sphere. Hence the rule which has been evolved by the judicial Committee whereby the impugned statute is examined to ascertain its 'pith and substance' or its 'true nature and character', for the purpose of determining whether it is legislation with respect to matters in this list or in that."

    Lord Atkin in Gallagher V/s. Lynn, ( (1937) A C 363.) observed: -

    "it is well established that you are to look at the 'true nature and character of the legislation'; Russell V/s. The Queen, (7 A C 839.) 'the pith and substance of the legislation'. If, on the view of the statute as a whole, you find that the substance of the legislation is within the express powers, then it is not invalidated if incidentally it affects matters which are outside the authorised field. The legislation must not under the guise of dealing with one matter in tact encroach upon the forbidden field."

    11 Since the impugned proviso does not deal with any other matter, except the dissolution of particular market committees which were constituted during a specified period and cessation of membership of those members only who became member during that specified period the matter undoubtedly falls within Entry 28 in the State List, and not under Entry 33 of the Concurrent list, although incidentally the market committee is connected with trade and commerce. Applying the pith and substance rule, we hold that the impugned ordinance, if it had been incorporated in an Act of the M. P. State Legislature, was not necessarily to be reserved for the assent of the President. When a subject matter is within the competence of the State Legislature and it is not repugnant with any provision of a law made by Parliament within the meaning of Article 254 of the Constitution, assent of the President is not necessary. No such repugnant provision has been shown to us by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

    12 Besides, the learned counsel for the petitioner has not shown us any provision in any Act of Parliament which provides for Constitution of a market committee. A provision in an Act of the State Legislature is not invalid by virtue of Article 254 of the Constitution unless and until it is shown that it is inconsistent with a provision in an Act of the Parliament. See, M. P. S. R. T. C. V/s. Ramchandra, (1977 MPLJ 341=1977 J L J 292. ). On this short ground also the petitioner's contention cannot be upheld.

    13 It must be remembered that the impugned provision in the Ordinance does not amend section 11 of the Act for all times. All that the amendment does is to set at naught what was done during the emergency. The committee which was constituted during the period of emergency has been dissolved and the members selected during that period have ceased to be members.

    14 We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Madhya Pradesh Krishi upaj Mandi (Tritiya Sanshodhan) Adhyadesh 1977, in so far as it effects the cessation of membership of a committee constituted within a particular specified period and the dissolution of the committee constituted during the period is not invalid.

    15 The petition is dismissed. Parties shall bear their own costs. The amount of security shall be refunded to the petitioner.

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    Rasal Singh v. State Of M.P And Others
    (Feb 27, 1978)