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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (A.K. Shrivastava, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two accused, Raees (driver) and Abdul Gani (pillion rider), were tried in Special Case No. 2/97 by the Sessions Judge, Mandsaur, for an offence under section 8/21 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act ("the Act"). According to the prosecution, the police stopped a motorcycle being driven by Raees after information that someone was carrying brown sugar. Abdul Gani allegedly held a container in which a plastic bag containing brown sugar was found. A notice under section 50 of the Act was recorded and from the bulk two samples of 20 grams each were taken, sealed and sent to the chemical examiner. The samples (or at least one reported result) indicated presence of brown sugar, and the accused were charge-sheeted. The trial court convicted both accused and sentenced them to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment each and a fine of Rs. 1 lac each (with default terms), which led to these appeals.

At trial the prosecution examined eight witnesses and produced documents; the accused claimed maladroit implication and did not call any defence witnesses. Both accused appealed the convictions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether there was non-compliance with section 50 of the NDPS Act and, if so, whether that non-compliance vitiates conviction.
  2. Whether the prosecution's failure to produce the seized contraband material in court (mark it as material exhibit) undermines the prosecution's case.
  3. Whether sending two samples to different forensic laboratories and the non-production of the report from FSL Indore (first sample) permits drawing an adverse inference under section 114 of the Evidence Act.
  4. Whether timing discrepancies between seizure and the recording of the section 50 notice (seizure at 17:20 hrs; notice at 17:30 hrs as per documents) cast doubt on the prosecution's version.
  5. Whether Raees, as driver, had "conscious possession" or knowledge of the contraband (i.e., whether he can be held liable where another person actually carried the contraband).
  6. Whether the long delay between seizure (14-10-1996) and sending the material to the FSL (11-12-1996) affects the reliability of the prosecution case.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • There was non-compliance with section 50 of the NDPS Act; this non-compliance should prevent conviction (counsel: Z. A. Khan and Sanjay Sharma).
  • The seized contraband was not produced as material exhibit in court, which, relying on the Apex Court decision in Jitendra & another v. State of M.P., undermines the prosecution's case.
  • Two samples were taken and sent to different FSLs (Indore and Neemuch); the report from FSL Indore was not produced and no explanation for its absence was given—this omission suggests the absent report may have been unfavorable.
  • The notice under section 50 (Ex. P-8) was recorded at 17:30 hours while the seizure (Panchanama Karyawahi, Ex. P-3) was recorded at 17:20 hours, creating a timing discrepancy that raises doubt as to the prosecution's truthfulness.
  • Raees specifically argued he was only the driver and unaware of the contraband, relying on the decision in Narcotics Control Bureau v. Murlidhar Soni and others to contend he lacked conscious possession.
  • The delay between seizure (14-10-1996) and dispatch to the FSL (11-12-1996) is unexplained and materially undermines the prosecution's case.

Respondent (State / Government) Arguments

  • The prosecution's case was that Raees drove the motorcycle while Abdul Gani carried the container holding the contraband; because Abdul Gani physically carried the container, compliance with section 50 of the Act was not necessary in the State's submission.
  • The Government Advocate also noted that the point on section 50 has been referred to a larger bench of the Apex Court (as per the respondent's representation in court).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Jitendra and another vs. State of M.P., 2004 (1) EFR 22 Prosecution's obligation to produce seized materials as the best evidence; failure to produce seized drugs and non-examination of investigating officer weakens the prosecution's case under the NDPS Act. The court held that, as in Jitendra, the contraband in the present case was not produced in court and therefore the ratio of Jitendra applied squarely to the present facts, undermining the prosecution's case.
Narcotics Control Bureau, Jodhpur vs. Murlidhar Soni and others, 2004 (2) EFR 416 Where an accused's role is limited (e.g., only to drive or transport another person) and there is no material showing conscious possession or knowledge of contraband, conviction cannot be sustained for that accused. The court found this ratio applicable to Raees, reasoning that Raees was only the driver and there was insufficient material to show his conscious possession of the contraband; this supported setting aside his conviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court considered the contentions advanced by counsel and addressed them sequentially:

  1. Non-production of seized contraband: The court observed that the prosecution could not point out that the seized contraband had been produced in court. It relied on the Apex Court's reasoning in Jitendra (para 6 quoted in the opinion) that where seized drugs are not produced, the prosecution fails to meet its heavy burden. The court concluded that Jitendra's ratio "squarely covers the point in hand" because the contraband was not produced as a material exhibit in the present case (paras 14–16).
  2. Missing FSL Indore report: The seizing officer (P.W.8) admitted that the first sample was sent to FSL Indore but he "cannot say what report was received" from that FSL (para 16; P.W.8, para 17 in the record). The court held it was incumbent on the investigating agency to explain why the Indore report was not filed; in the absence of such explanation an adverse inference is permissible under section 114 of the Evidence Act (para 16).
  3. Timing discrepancy between seizure and section 50 notice: The court examined the two documents—Panchanama Karyawahi (Ex. P-3) and the notice under section 50 (Ex. P-8, styled "Panchanama Sahmati")—and found they recorded seizure at 17:20 hours and the section 50 notice at 17:30 hours. The court regarded this inconsistency as raising "a heavy doubt" about the truthfulness of the prosecution's account, noting that suspicion however strong cannot substitute for strict proof (para 17).
  4. Driver's knowledge / conscious possession: Applying the principle from Murlidhar Soni (para 9 of that decision quoted), the court accepted the submission that Raees was only the driver and that there was no material to show his conscious possession of the contraband. The court found Murlidhar Soni's ratio applicable to the present facts (paras 18–19).
  5. Delay in forwarding material to FSL: The court noted the prosecutorial timeline—seizure on 14-10-1996 and sending to FSL on 11-12-1996—and observed that the intervening period was unexplained, which further created "a big question mark" and added to the doubts about the prosecution's case (para 19).
  6. Overall conclusion: Considering the above defects—the non-production of the seized material, the missing Indore FSL report (invoking adverse inference), the timing discrepancy in section 50 notice, the unexplained delay in sending samples to FSL, and the absence of material to prove conscious possession by Raees—the court held that the prosecution's case was not proved. The court expressly stated that "without taking into consideration about the compliance of section 50 of the act, otherwise also the case of prosecution is not proved and it raises a heavy doubt" (para 20).

Holding and Implications

Holding:

Both appeals are allowed; the convictions of the appellants are set aside.

Direct consequences ordered by the court (as stated in the opinion):

  • Appellant Abdul Gani, who was in custody, is to be set at liberty forthwith if he is not required in any other case (para 21).
  • Appellant Raees, who was on bail, need not surrender and his bail bonds are discharged (para 21).

Implications:

The court's decision directly affects the parties by quashing the convictions and ordering release/discharge as above. The opinion applied established precedents (Jitendra; Murlidhar Soni) to the present facts; the judgment does not purport to lay down a novel precedent beyond applying those authorities. No broader new precedent was claimed to be set by this opinion.


This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion by A.K. Shrivastava, J., and does not introduce information beyond that text.

    Abdul Gani v. State Of M.P .

    A.K. Shrivastava, J.-

    (1) These two appeals are preferred by two accused persons jointly who were tried in special case no. 2/97 by sessions judge, mandsaur. The accused persons are convicted for 10 years r. I. Each and fine rs. 1 lac each, in default, further r. I. Of two years r. I. Each for the offence under section 8/21 of the narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances act (in short "the act").

    (2) In brief the case of prosecution is that police station incharge a. K. Mishra stopped the motorcycle which was being driven by accused raees on which accused abdul gani was a pillion rider. The station officer incharge a. K. Mishra stopped the motorcycle as he was informed by the informant that somebody is carrying brown sugar on a motorcycle. According to the prosecution, accused abdul gani was holding a box in which a plastic bag was kept which was containing the brown sugar. A notice under section 50 of the act was given and from the bulk, two samples of contraband article of 20 gms each were taken out and sealed and were sent to chemical examiner. Since the presence of brown sugar was found in the sample, accused persons were charge - sheeted and were tried.

    (3) The trial court on going through the charge - sheet framed charge punishable under section 8/21 of the act which the accused persons denied.

    (4) In order to prove the charges, prosecution examined as many as 8 witnesses and placed certain documents on record.

    (5) The defence of accused persons is of maladroit implication, however, in support of their defence hey did not choose to examine any witness.

    (6) The trial court after scanning the evidence came to hold that appellants did commit the offence of which they were charged and eventually convicted them and passed the sentence which i have mentioned hereinabove. Hence this appeal.

    (7) It has been contended by shri z. A. Khan, sr. Advocate and shri sanjay sharma, learned counsel for accused persons that there is non - compliance of section 50 of the act and if that is the position, no conviction could be accorded against them.

    (8) Per contra, learned govt. Advocate has contended that the case of prosecution is that appellant raees was driving the motorcycle and appellant abdul gani was possessing the contraband article in his hand in one container in which a plastic bag was kept and in that bag the contraband article brown sugar was there.

    (9) According to the learned government advocate since the container was being carried by abdul gani, there was no necessity of any compliance of section 50 of the act. Learned counsel submits that this point has been referred to larger bench by the apex court.

    (10) Facing this tight situation, shri z. A. Khan, learned sr. Advocate for appellant abdul gani has submitted that apart from the non - compliance of section 50 of the act, if the entire case is considered in proper perspective, it would be difficult to uphold the conviction and it is difficult to hold that appellants committed any offence. Learned counsel has contended that the contraband article which was alleged to have been seized from the possession of appellant abdul gani was not brought before the court and, therefore, no offence is proved. Learned counsel has placed heavy reliance on the decision of apex court in the case of jitendra and another vs. State of m. P. , 2004 (1) efr 22. Apart from this, it has also been contended by learned counsel that it has come in the evidence that two samples were sent to different chemical laboratories. First sample was sent at fsl indore and another at neemuch. It has been proponed by learned counsel for appellant abdul gani that the report of fsl, neemuch was produced, however, what happened to first report which was sent to fsl indore which has not been produced, there is no explanation to it. According to learned counsel since the report did not confirm the presence of the brown sugar, for this reason the same was not produced in the court. Learned counsel shri khan has further invited my attention to section 50 (ex. P - 8) and has submitted that the notice was given at 17. 30 hours while earlier to giving the notice the seizure was made at 17. 20 hours. In this regard, he has invited my attention to panchnama karyawahi (ex. P - 3).

    (11) Shri sanjay sharma, learned counsel for appellant raees by placing reliance on the decision of apex court in the case of narcotics control bureau, jodhpur vs. Murlidhar soni and others, 2004 (2) efr 416, has contended that raees was only a driver and he was not knowing that abdul gani was possessing the contraband article. It has also been canvassed by the learned counsel that according to prosecution's own case the contraband article was seized on 14 - 10 - 1996 and it was sent to the fsl on 11 - 12 - 1996 and if that is the position, according to learned counsel it is difficult to uphold the conviction.

    (12) On these premised submissions, it has been contended by learned counsel for appellants that looking to the facts and circumstances it creates heavy doubt that appellants committed the offence.

    (13) After having heard learned counsel for the parties, i am of the view that the appeal deserves to be allowed.

    (14) The first contention of learned counsel shri khan is taken into consideration. It has been contended that the contraband article which was seized was not produced in the court. Learned govt. Advocate after going through the record could not point out that the same was produced in the court. In the case of jitendra (supra) , the apex court in para 6 has held as under : -

    "6. In our view, the view taken by the high court is unsustainable. In the trial it was necessary for the prosecution to establish by cogent evidence that the alleged quantities of charas and ganja were seized from the possession of the accused. The best evidence would have been the seized materials which ought to have been produced during the trial and marked as material objects. There is no explanation for this failure to produce them. Mere oral evidence as to their features and production of panchnama does not discharge the heavy burden which lies on the prosecution, particularly where the offence is punishable with a stringent sentence under the ndps act, in this case, we notice that panchas have turned hostile so the panchanama is nothing but a document written by the concerned police officer. The suggestion made by the defence in cross - examination is worthy of notice. It was suggested to the prosecution witnesses that the landlady of the house in collusion with police had lodged a false case only for evicting the accused from the house in which they were living. Finally, we notice that the investigating officer was also not examined. Against this background, to say that, despite the panch witnesses having turned hostile, the non - examination of the investigating officer and non - production of the seized drugs, the conviction under the ndps act, can still be sustained, is far fetched."

    (15) If the ratio decidendi of the case of jitendra (supra) is tested on the anvil of the factual scenario, it would reveal that in the present case also the contraband article was not produced in the court and was marked as article. Thus, the decision of jitendra (supra) squarely covers the point in hand.

    (16) The second contention which has been raised by learned senior counsel shri khan is that two samples were taken out from the bulk and they were sent to different fsl. The first sample was sent at fsl, indore and second was sent at fsl, neemuch. To substantiate the argument, learned senior counsel has invited my attention to para 17 of p. W. 8, seizing officer a. K. Mishra in which he has admitted that first sample was sent at fsl indore but he cannot say what report was received from the said fsl. According to me, it was incumbent upon the investigating agency to give explanation that why the report of first sample which was sent to indore was not filed. Indeed, it was the bounded duty of the investigating agency to submit the report of the first sample which was sent to fsl at indore. Having not done so, an adverse inference is drawn under section 114 of the evidence act.

    (17) So far as the third contention of learned counsel for appellants that there is variation in the timings in giving the notice under section 50 of the act and the seizure. In order to appreciate the contention of learned counsel, i have kept ex. P - 8 which is a notice under section 50 though name and styled "panchanama sahmati" in juxtaposition to "panchanama karyawahi" ex. P - 3. On reading these two documents jointly, it is gathered that notice under section 50 was given at 17. 30 hours and earlier to it at 17. 20 hours the contraband article was seized. This raises a heavy doubt in regard to the truthless of the case of the prosecution. The law is well settled in this regard. The suspicion however strong it may be, cannot take place of strict proof.

    (18) It has been contended by shri sharma, learned counsel for raees that he was only a driver of the motorcycle and therefore, he was not aware that the contraband article is being possessed by abdul gani and thus he was not having conscious possession about the contraband article. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the decision of murlidhar soni (supra) which is quite relevant. Para 9 of the said decision reads thus : -

    "9. We are in agreement with this finding of the high court, it is also to be noted that even though these accused persons were arrested on 24 - 9 - 1994, they were produced before the court only on 27 - 9 - 1994 on which date both the accused submitted before the court that they had suffered injuries at the hands of the investigating agency and it is under such physical threat their statements were recorded under section 67 of the act. The said court had directed a medical examination of these accused on that day itself. The medical report and the evidence of d. Ws. 1 and 2, the doctors who examined them, clearly shows that these accused had suffered injuries and murlidhar soni had actually suffered a fracture of the 10th left rib. The defence of the prosecution that these injuries might have been suffered by an accidental fall of the accused, cannot be accepted, thus, we are in agreement with the finding of the high court that the statements of these accused persons have been obtained by the prosecuting agency under duress. It is also to be noted that even according to the prosecution case so far as this respondent is concerned, his only role in regard to the contraband was to take his father on his scooter to the place where they were allegedly arrested. The bundle in question which contained the contraband was carried by murlidhar soni and there is no materials whatsoever to show that the present respondent had the knowledge that the bundle contained any contraband. In our opinion since the prosecution has not placed any material to show the conscious possession of the contraband by the respondent herein and since murlidhar soni is dead, we think the contentions advanced on behalf of the respondent as to the possession of the contraband by the respondent has to be accepted."

    (19) If the ratio decidendi of the case of murlidhar soni (supra) is tested on the touchstone of the present facts and circumstances, one can safely say that this decision is applicable to the present case also. The next contention of shri sanjay sharma, learned counsel for appellant raees is also having sufficient merit. It has been contended by him that according to the prosecution's own case the contraband article was seized on 14 - 10 - 1996 and the same was sent to fsl on 11 - 12 - 1996. What transpired in between the two months, there is a big question mark and there is no satisfactory explanation much than any explanation by the prosecution.

    (20) In view of the above said discussion, without taking into consid - eration about the compliance of section 50 of the act, otherwise also the case of prosecution is not proved and it raises a heavy doubt in regard to the implication of accused persons in the said offence.

    (21) Resultantly, both the appeals stand allowed, the conviction of appellants are set aside. Appellant abdul gani is in custody, he be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Appellant raees is on bail, he need not to surrender and his bail bonds are discharged. Criminal appeals allowed.

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    Abdul Gani v. State Of M.P .
    (Mar 16, 2005)