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  • parties.4. Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations,
  • Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations,
  • provisions of Rule 109 of the Jammu
  • Rule 108 sub-clause (b)(1)
  • Sections 409/420 R.P.C
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • parties.4. Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations,
  • Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations,
  • provisions of Rule 109 of the Jammu
  • Rule 108 sub-clause (b)(1)
  • Sections 409/420 R.P.C
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, who was serving as a Block Development Officer in village Tral in 1957, faced allegations of corruption and misappropriation of public funds. The matter was referred to the police under FIR No. 34 of 1957, leading to criminal charges under Sections 409 and 420 of the R.P.C. The petitioner was arrested and detained for seven days before being released on bail by the Sessions Judge on 8-7-1957. After investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet splitting the allegations into four separate cases, which were presented before the Additional District Magistrate, Anantnag. Upon hearing the prosecution evidence, the Magistrate discharged the petitioner in all cases by an order dated 15-11-1961. Subsequently, the petitioner was reinstated but was not paid arrears of salary for the suspension period, which the Government treated as leave.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the period of suspension of the petitioner should be treated as leave or as suspension with full pay under Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations.
  2. How the phrase "being acquitted of blame" in Rule 109 should be interpreted—whether it includes discharge orders or only formal acquittals under criminal law.
  3. Whether the petitioner is entitled to salary arrears for the period of suspension given his discharge by the Magistrate.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The petitioner argued that Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations entitles him to full pay during suspension if he is exonerated from the charges.
  • He contended that the phrase "being acquitted of blame" should be interpreted broadly to include discharge from charges, not just formal legal acquittal.

Advocate General's Arguments

  • The Advocate General submitted that the Government order predates October 1962 and thus the earlier version of Rule 109 applies.
  • He contended that "acquittal" should be understood in its strict legal sense and does not include discharge orders.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemanta Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Cal. 239 Suspension status and reinstatement do not legally terminate service; suspension is a state of "suspended animation". The court relied on this precedent to explain that suspension ends upon termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the employee and reinstatement is a formal step without legal significance.
Shyam Sunder v. Union of India, AIR 1965 Cal. 281 An employee cannot be deprived of emoluments by suspension based on mere allegations subsequently withdrawn. The court cited this case to support the proposition that the petitioner should receive full salary during suspension once exonerated.
Burma Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1320 Mandamus lies to direct refund of amounts collected under ultra vires orders. Used to justify directing payment of arrears where suspension order was not legally justified.
Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1438 Similar principle as Burma Construction regarding refund for ultra vires levies. Supported the court's authority to direct payment of salary arrears unlawfully withheld.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court focused on the interpretation of the phrase "being acquitted of blame" in Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations. It noted that the term "acquittal" in the rule should be understood in a broader, non-technical sense, as the rule uses the word "blame" rather than legal terms like "charge" or "offence." The court reasoned that the Government intended to provide protection to a servant exonerated of allegations, whether by formal acquittal or discharge.

The court distinguished between "acquittal" and "discharge" under the Code of Criminal Procedure and found that the discharge order by the Additional District Magistrate, which was based on no case being made out and absence of dishonest intention, amounted to exoneration or acquittal of blame under Rule 109.

Consequently, the court held that the Government was not entitled to withhold the petitioner’s salary for the suspension period. It further reasoned that suspension ends with termination of criminal proceedings in favor of the employee, and the employee is entitled to salary as if suspension had not occurred.

The court also relied on established precedents holding that suspension based on mere allegations, later withdrawn or found untenable, cannot deprive an employee of emoluments. Finally, it noted that while salary arrears must be claimed by suit, the court could direct the Government to comply with the statutory provisions and grant the petitioner his rightful emoluments.

Holding and Implications

DISPOSED OF

The court allowed the application and quashed the part of the Government order dated 3-10-1962 that treated the suspension period of the petitioner as leave of any kind due. The court directed the Government to apply Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations strictly and grant the petitioner full salary for the suspension period, as he was acquitted of blame by the Magistrate’s discharge order. This decision directly restores the petitioner’s salary rights without setting a new precedent beyond the interpretation of the applicable rule and facts of this case.

    Ghulam Nabi Baba v. State Of Jammu And Kashmir .

    1. This is an application for an appropriate writ in order to quash that part of the order of the Government dated 3-10-1962 by which the period of suspension of the petitioner has been directed to be treated as leave of whatever kind due.

    2. The petition arises in the following circumstances. The petitioner was working as Block Development Officer in village Tral in 1957. Allegations of corruption and mis-appropriation of public funds having been made against him the matter was referred to the police under FIR No. 34 of 1957 as a result of which the police registered a case under Sections 409/420 R.P.C against the petitioner. During the course of investigation, the petitioner was arrested by the police and was released on bail by the order of the Sessions Judge on 8-7-1957. According to the allegations made by the petitioner in his supplementary affidavit, he was detained in prison for seven days before he was released on bail. After investigation, the police submitted a charge sheet against the petitioner splitting up the allegations into four separate cases and the challans were produced in the court of the Additional District Magistrate Ananlnag. After taking the evidence of the prosecution before charge, the Additional District Magistrate Anantnag by his order dated 15-11-1961 discharged the petitioner in all the challans. Thereafter the petitioner was reinstated but he was not given the arrears of his salary during the period of his suspension and this period was to be treated as leave.

    3. It was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that his case clearly fell within the ambit of Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations, and the Government was not entitled to withhold his full pay during the period of his suspension. The Advocate General pointed out that as the order of the Government was passed prior to October 1962, the case of the petitioner would be governed by the provisions of Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir CSR as it stood before October 1962. On this point there appears to be no controversy between the parties.

    4. Rule 109 of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations, runs as follows:

    “A servant of the State committed to prison either for debt or on a criminal charge, should be considered as under suspension from the date of his arrest and not allowed to draw any pay until the termination of the proceedings against him, when an adjustment of his allowances should be made according to the circumstances of the case, the full amount being given only in the event of the officer being acquitted of blame or if the imprisonment was for debt of its being proved that the officer's liability arose from the circumstances beyond his control”.

    5. The decision in the present case turns upon the Interpretation of the words “being acquitted of blame” used in this Rule. The contention of the petitioner is that these words have been used in a wider and literal sense so as to signify that the servant should be exonerated from the charges or allegations level led against him. On the other hand, the Advocate General has contended that the word “Acquittal” has been used in its well known legal sense and would not include an order of discharge. No authority directly on the point has been cited by the learned counsel for the parties. I am inclined to agree with the view of the learned counsel for the petitioner it is true that the word “acquittal” has been used in this Rule, but at the same time the word “blame” and not charge or offence has been used herein. This shows that the intention of the Government was to use the word “acquitted” in a wider and general sense of the term and not in its strictly legal sense. There can be no doubt that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, there is a sharp distinction between “acquittal” and “discharge” and in my view this distinction was not kept in view by the Government when it framed the aforesaid rules, otherwise the word “acquitted” should have been followed by similar words of legal significance like charge, offence etc. My conclusion is reinforced by the language employed in the preceding Rule 108 sub-clause (b)(1) wherein the words “honourably acquitted” are used. This provision applies only to departmental proceedings and there can be no question of the application of “honourable acquittal” in the sense in which these words are used in the Code of Criminal Procedure, to departmental proceedings. It is obvious, therefore, that the word “acquittal” as applied to the departmental proceeding would only mean that the servant concerned has been clearly and fully exonerated of the charges levelled against him. It seems to me, therefore, that the word “acquitted” is used the very sense in which the word “acquittal” has been used in Rule 108 of the Regulations. All that the Government intended was that in order that the Rule should apply three conditions should be satisfied:

    i. That the servant of a state should be committed to prison.

    ii. That he should be committed to prison for debt or on a criminal charge.

    iii. That in the event of the servant being acquitted of blame, he would be entitled to full amount of his salary during the period of his suspension.

    6. The intention of the Government in my opinion, therefore, clearly was to give benefit of this Rule to any servant once he is exonerated of the allegations levelled against him. Under the Code of Criminal Procedure, which stood before it was amended, an accused could be discharged under Section 253 of the Cr PC if upon taking the evidence of the prosecution, the Magistrate found that no case against the accused was made out. In the instant case, it would appear from the order of the Magistrate, which has been filed by the petitioner, that he discharged the accused on the ground that no case was made out against him and that there was no evidence of dishonest intention on his part. The effect of the order of discharge, therefore, clearly, is that the petitioner was acquitted or exonerated of the blame or of the allegations which were made against him by the prosecution. Such a discharge, therefore, in my opinion, is clearly covered by the words “acquitted of blame” as used in Rule 109 of the said Rules. Once this interpretation is placed on the words “acquitted of blame” there can be no room for doubt that the Government was not entitled to withhold the salary of the petitioner during the period of his suspension. Moreover, it seems to me that where an order of suspension is passed in view of serious charges levelled against a public servant, the order comes to an end on the termination of criminal proceedings in favour of such servant. I am fortified in this view by a decision of the Calcutta High Court, Hemanta Kumar v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Cal. 239, where Sinha, J. observed as follows:

    “If a person is merely suspended he still continues to be in service but is in a state as it were of suspended animation. When the period is over, he has simply to be allotted a job. The word ‘reinstatement’ if used in this respect, is only loosely used and has no legal significance.”

    7. It follows, therefore, that when the petitioner was discharged by the Magistrate and was exonerated of tine allegations or charges levelled against him, the period of suspension came to an end. This being the position, there is no reason, why he would not be entitled to the emoluments to which he would have been entitled had the order of suspension not been passed. In Shyam Sunder v. Union of India, AIR 1965 Cal. 281, it was clearly held that an employee of the government could not be deprived of Ms. emoluments by an order of suspension which was founded on mere allegation and which the Government had subsequently withdrawn. In this connection Basu, J. observed as follows:

    “On the other hand, the substantial reliefs prayed for, namely revocation of the order of suspension and re-instatement have been conceded, during the pendency of these applications. But no reason has been assigned as to why the petitioners should not get their pay and allowances during the period intervening the suspension and the reinstatement when they have been prevented from rendering their services owing to their suspension pending in fructuous proceedings brought by the respondent. As matters stand there is no blemish established against the petitioners with respect to that period. An employee of the government cannot be deprived of his emoluments by an order of suspension which was founded on mere allegations and which the government has withdrawn finding it untenable, after the employee has taken resort to a court of Justice for relief

    A claim for recovery of arrears of salary can, of course, be made only by suit. What the petitioners seek in the present proceedings is only a direction to pay. It is now established that when an order behind a levy is found to be ultra vires mandamus lies for directing the authority to make a refund: Burma Construction Co. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1962 SC 1320, Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. State of Orissa, AIR 1961 SC 1438. If so, there is no reason why an authority cannot be directed to pay arrears of pay and allowance which the petitioner could have earned unless suspended without any lawful justification.”

    8. In fact, when by the order of discharge, the very basis of the order of suspension disappears, there is no reason why the servant should be deprived of his full salary during the period of suspension.

    9. In the instant case, on my interpretation of Rule 109 of the Regulations, it is absolutely clear that once the servant is acquitted of blame, he would be entitled to his full salary during the period of his suspension.

    10. For these reasons, therefore, I would allow this application and quash that part of the order of the Government dated 8-10-1962 which directs the suspension period of the petitioner Shri Ghulam Nabi Baba to be treated as leave of whatever kind due. This order is obviously not warranted by any provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Service Regulations and is, therefore, not tenable in law.

    11. In these circumstances, it is not necessary for me to issue a writ of Mandumus, but it is sufficient to give a direction to the respondent Government to follow the statutory provisions of Rule 109 of the said Regulations in order to grant the petitioner his emoluments as indicated in this Rule. In the circumstances of the case, there will be no order as to costs.

    KI/V.S.B/D.V.C

    12. Application allowed.

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    Comments

    Ghulam Nabi Baba v. State Of Jammu And Kashmir .
    (Sep 29, 1965)