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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal arises from convictions and sentences imposed on several appellants for offences relating to an assault that occurred during an attempt to desilt an irrigation channel (referred to as a "pyne"). The trial court convicted appellants Nos. 1 to 5 and 8 under Sections 148 and 326 read with Section 149 of the Penal Code and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment (one year under Section 148 and seven years under Section 326/149). Appellants Nos. 1 to 3 were additionally convicted under Section 324 and sentenced to two years; sentences were to run concurrently. Appellants Nos. 6 and 7 were convicted under Sections 148 and 326/149 and sentenced to two years under Section 326/149 (no separate sentence recorded under Section 148). Appellant No. 9 was convicted under Sections 147 and 326/149 and sentenced to two years under Section 326/149 (no separate sentence under Section 147).

The prosecution's narrated facts: on 23-9-1951, about 8 a.m., roughly 50 residents of village Dhangawan and neighbouring villages began desilting the pyne from the north side of a road. After progressing northwards, they were confronted by a mob of about 50–60 persons armed with lathis and sharp weapons. A violent assault followed; some prosecution witnesses and injured persons (including Jamuna Singh, Keshwar Mahto, Baldeo Singh, Ramkishun Ahir, Chandraman Mahto and Karu Singh) were injured, and a person named Ramjit (also called Jhapas) later died. First information was lodged the same day, an inquest and post-mortem were conducted, and a charge-sheet was presented leading to a trial in the Court of Session. At trial, four assessors assisted; the judge partly agreed and partly disagreed with their opinion, acquitting three accused persons (Ruplal alias Sarup, Bhausagar and Mahabir) but convicting the appellants as above. The appellants appealed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the appellants were members of the mob that assaulted the prosecution party and thereby liable for the injuries and death (i.e., whether the prosecution proved the appellants' presence and participation beyond reasonable doubt).
  2. Whether the failure to hold a test identification parade (TIP) materially prejudiced the accused and affected the reliability of identification evidence.
  3. Whether the evidence of the prosecution witnesses — including injured witnesses and other eyewitnesses — was sufficiently credible and consistent to sustain convictions under the charged sections.

Arguments of the Parties

Prosecution's Case

  • The prosecution presented a narrative that Dhangawan residents and neighbours were lawfully desilting a pyne to which they alone had rights; a mob of 50–60 persons approached and assaulted them with lathis and sharp weapons.
  • Several eyewitnesses and injured persons were produced; first information, injury reports, inquest and post-mortem were done and a charge-sheet filed.
  • The prosecution relied on identification evidence at trial to link specific appellants to particular acts of assault and to establish membership of the mob (and thereby constructive/common liability under Section 149).

Defence's Arguments

  • The accused maintained they were innocent and denied being present at the place of occurrence; they asserted that prosecution witnesses did not know them by name or by face.
  • The defence suggested an alternative source of the injuries — a scuffle between the prosecution party and people from Morasa and Anandibigha over a different plot — implying that injuries might have arisen in that incident.
  • Applications were made (on behalf of several accused) to the Magistrate for a test identification parade; the defence argued that the non-holding of a TIP prejudiced the accused because witnesses supposedly did not know them prior to the occurrence.

Appellants' Counsel's Noted Argument

  • Sir Sultan Ahmad, for the appellants, argued that when the evidence of a witness on a material point is disbelieved, it is unsafe to rely upon the remainder of that witness's evidence to convict the accused (i.e., parts of a witness's testimony should not be selectively accepted when material portions are rejected).

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Provash Kumar Bose v. The King, AIR 1951 Cal 475 Holding that a test identification parade was necessary where the accused was not known to the witnesses who subsequently identified him in court. The court cited this authority to support the proposition that a TIP is necessary in cases where the accused were not previously known to the witnesses, and hence that non-holding of a TIP is a significant feature when assessing identification evidence (though not necessarily fatal in law).
Narsingh Singh v. Emperor, AIR 1939 Pat 659 Emphasises that an apparently unjustified attack requires unambiguous and unimpeachable evidence to be believed. The court invoked this principle to note that, because the alleged attack seemed apparently unjustified (the accused had no claimed rights over the pyne), the prosecution needed very strong evidence to sustain the charge.
Leda Bhagat v. King-Emperor, AIR 1931 Pat 384 Where parts of the prosecution story are disbelieved, a court may, in some circumstances, rely on other parts for conviction. The court cited this case to acknowledge the authority that acceptance of a part of prosecution evidence is sometimes permissible despite disbelief of another part, but treated it as a limited principle and cautioned against relying on parts when material portions are discredited.
Mohinder Singh v. The State, AIR 1953 SC 415 When the prosecution has a definite or positive case, it must prove the whole of that case. The court used this authority to stress that a definite prosecution case must be proved in full, supporting the cautious approach to accepting selectively parts of the prosecution story when essential elements remain unproven or are disbelieved.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court primarily examined whether the prosecution had proved that the appellants were members of the mob that committed the assault. In approaching that question the court applied the following analytical steps, drawn from the opinion:

  1. Context and prima facie facts: It was undisputed that only residents of Dhangawan and neighbouring villages had rights over the pyne and that many such residents were engaged in desilting when an armed mob attacked, causing injuries and the death of Ramjit.
  2. Identification procedure and its omission: The court scrutinised the non-holding of a test identification parade (TIP). The investigating officer had not held a TIP despite directions from the Sub-divisional Magistrate; he justified non-holding by noting the charge-sheet had already been submitted and suggested the parade be held in court. The trial judge described that excuse as untenable and acknowledged that a TIP is a prudent and important measure, especially where the accused are said to have been unknown to witnesses prior to the incident. However, the judge below had concluded that non-holding of the TIP did not legally prejudice the accused. The appellate court agreed that while TIP is not an absolute legal right, its omission is a significant consideration when assessing identification evidence.
  3. Assessment of witnesses generally: The court catalogued the witnesses — 27 prosecution witnesses (including the investigating officer), with 11 witnesses tendered only for cross-examination. The court distinguished injured eyewitnesses (P.Ws 1, 4, 6, 10, 11, 15) and other eyewitnesses (P.Ws 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 16, 22, 23, 24). Several witnesses had delayed statements (e.g., P.W.5, P.W.2, P.W.7 were examined five days after the occurrence) without explanation, undermining their reliability.
  4. Specific evaluation of injured witnesses and identification: The court examined in detail P.W.1 (Jamuna Singh) and P.W.4 (Keshwar Mahton), the two injured witnesses whose evidence on assault remained after other injured witnesses' identification testimony was rejected by the trial judge. The appellate court found inconsistencies and improbabilities in P.W.1's account: particular injuries' locations and character did not match the alleged weapons or assailants (e.g., an incised cut separating two fingers did not match the described garasa blow on the right palm; a lacerated wound on dorsum could not have been caused by a garasa). Additionally, P.W.1's failure to mention certain alleged assaults to the investigating officer immediately after the event was noted as undermining his credibility. For P.W.4, the court highlighted contradictions about the timing of his flight during the assault, inconsistencies between his testimony at the committal stage and trial, and the investigating officer's denial of certain earlier statements attributed to him.
  5. Evaluation of other eyewitnesses relied upon for constructive liability: The court examined the witnesses relied upon by the trial judge to establish mob membership (P.Ws 1, 2, 4, 7, 23, 24). Several of these were found unreliable or of doubtful value: untimely recording of statements, failure to mention identification earlier, tendering only for cross-examination before the committing magistrate, and implausible distances claimed by witnesses which the trial judge himself found improbable (e.g., P.Ws 23 and 24 claiming to have been 150–160 feet away yet able to observe individual assaults).
  6. Principles on selective acceptance of evidence: The court considered the tension between authorities permitting reliance on part of a prosecution story when other parts are disbelieved (Leda Bhagat) and authorities requiring the prosecution to prove its whole definite case (Mohinder Singh). The court held that although it is not an absolute rule that parts cannot be accepted if other parts are disbelieved, as a rule of prudence it is unsafe to rely on portions of a prosecution story when material parts are discredited.
  7. Conclusion from the cumulative assessment: Given the importance of TIP (and its non-holding), the contradictions, delays and implausibilities in key witnesses' testimonies, injuries inconsistent with the alleged weapons/assailants, and the lack of unimpeachable evidence linking appellants to individual assaults or to membership of the mob, the court concluded the prosecution had not proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal was allowed; the convictions and sentences imposed on the appellants were set aside. The court ordered cancellation of the bail bonds.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The appellants' convictions and sentences as recorded by the trial court were quashed and the appellants were effectively relieved of the sentences (the appeal was allowed and conviction and sentence set aside).
  • The opinion emphasises evidentiary standards for identification and the prudential value of test identification parades in cases where accused are said not to have been known to witnesses. It also reiterates the caution that a court should exercise before accepting selective portions of testimony when material parts are disbelieved.
  • The opinion does not purport to lay down a new legal precedent; it applies and reconciles existing precedents to the facts and concludes that the prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt in this case.

Disposition: Appeal allowed.

    Awadh Singh And Others v. The State

    1. The appellants Nos. 1 to 5 and 8 have been convicted under Ss. 148 and 326/149, Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year each under the former section and for seven years each under the other sections. The appellants Nos. 1 to 3 have also been convicted under S. 324. Penal Code, and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years each under that section. The sentences are to run concurrently. The appellants Nos. 6 and 7 have been convicted under Ss. 148 and 326/149, Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for two years each under Ss. 326/149, Penal Code, but no separate sentence has been passed under S. 148, Penal Code. The appellant No. 9 has been convicted under Ss. 147 and 326/149. Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years under Ss. 326/149, Penal Code, but no separate sentence has been passed under S. 147. Penal Code.

    2. The prosecution case is as follows. Dhangawan ‘pyne alias’ Darbasain ‘pyne’ starts about 8 or 9 chains south of the injunction of three villages, namely, Marsua, Morasa and Asiawan, and after passing through several villages towards the north terminates in village Dhargawan. The surplus water of adjacent fields known as Nigar is discharged into the mouth of this ‘pyne’. The residents of Dhangawan and neighbouring villages are alone entitled to the water discharged in this ‘pyne’. and admittedly the residents of Asiawan. Morasa and Marsua have no right to irrigate their fields from it. On 23-9-1951, at 8 a.m about 50 persons, residents of village Dhangawan and the neighbouring villages started desilting the pyne just from the northern side of the road pyne. After they had desilted at places where it was found necessary to desist and had proceeded about 175 places north of the crossing they heard people shouting towards the south and they saw a mob numbering 50 or 60 armed with various weapons approaching towards them.

    3. At this Jamuna Singh (P.W 1) who was supervising the work told his men to leave digging, whereupon they left the work and shifted to an adjacent ‘marua’ field towards the east of the ‘pyne’. The armed mob reached near the place where these persons were and the appellant Awadh Singh asked Jamuna Singh to stop digging. The latter asserted his right, and thereupon the appellant ordered assault. The mob thereafter began to assault. The appellants Awadh Singh. Rajdeo Singh and Keshwar Mahton struck Kamjit with garassas and the appellants Awadh Singh, Rajdeo Singh and Deonandan Mahton struck Jamuna Singh (P.W 1) with garassas. The appellants Sheoratan Singh also gave a earasa blow to Baldeo Singh (P.W 6). Keshwar Mahton (P.W 4). Ramkishun (P.W 10). Chandraman (P.W 11) and Kara Singh (P.W 15) also received injuries in the scuffle. Several other persons who, being frightened, took to their heels, were also chased and assaulted by the members of the mob. After the mob left the place, the prosecution party arranged for cots and bearers and took the injured persons to the nearest police station at Jehanabad which is at a distance of six miles from the place of occurrence and first information was lodged by Bhagwat Singh (P.W 24) at 2 P.M on the same day. After recording the first information and preparing the injury reports, the investigating officer sent the injured persons to the hospital where Ramjit died. On receipt of this information the investigating officer reached the hospital at about 3 P.M and having prepared an inquest report forwarded the dead body of Ramjit for ‘post mortem’ examination. After investigation the police submitted charge-sheet against the appellants along with three other persons, namely Ruplal alias Saroop, Bhausagar and Mahabir. On preliminary enquiry having been held they were committed to the Court of session for trial.

    4. The defence of the accused persons was that they were innocent and that they had not gone to the place of occurrence at all. They also asserted that none of the prosecution witnesses knew them either by name or by face. Their case is that the prosecution party wanted to dig a parti plot bearing No. 431 which starts from the trijunction of the three villages and proceeds to the Morasa ‘pyne’ and that there was some scuffle between the men of the prosecution party and some people of villages Morasa and Anandibigha and they suggested that the injuries might have been caused in that scuffle.

    5. The trial was held with the and of four assessors, according to whose opinion the appellants Awadh Singh and Sheoratan were guilty under Ss. 326 and 148, Penal Code and the appellants Raideo, Deonandan, Sagar and Brahamdeo were guilty under S. 148, Penal Code, but all the above appellants were not guilty under any other charge. According to their opinion, however, the other accused persons were not guilty under any charge. The learned Additional Sessions Judge partly agreeing and partly disagreeing with their opinion acquitted the accused Ruplal alias Sarup, Bhausagar and Mahabir, but convicted and sentenced the appellants as stated above.

    6. In this case it is not disputed that only the residents of Dhangawan and neighbouring villages are entitled to the water flowing in the pyne in question and the residents of Morasa, Marsua, and Anandibigha have no claim to the water of this pyne. It is also admitted that at the material time a large number of residents of village Dhangawan and neighbouring villages came to desist the pyne and they were assaulted by a mob with lathis and various sharp cutting weapons resulting in the death of Ramjit, who was also called Jhapas, and causing injuries to Jamuna Singh (P.W 1), Keshwar Mahto (P.W 4), Baldeo. Singh (P.W 6), Ramkishun Ahir (P.W 10), Chandraman Mahto (P.W 11) and Karu Singh (P.W 15).

    7. The question to be determined, however, is whether the appellants were in the mob which causetf the injuries. In considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution to establish the guilt of the appellants certain facts and circumstances have to be kept in mind. Admittedly, the appellants have no manner of rights in the ‘pyne’ in question, and, according to the prosecution case itself, they before the date of occurrence, never interfered with the exercise of the right of the prosecution party in getting the pyne desilted. It is on this occasion only when the appellants and their men are said to have taken into their heads to put obstruction to the desilting of the pyne for the first time.

    8. On behalf of the accused persons several petitions were filed before the Magistrate for holding a test identification parade but for reasons best known to the authorities concerned, no test identification parade was held. It may be remembered that the definite case of the defence was that ??? of the prosecution witnesses knew them either by name or by face and, therefore, it was all the more necessary to have a test identification parade held, especially when applications were made to the Magistrate on behalf of the defence for that purpose. It appears that an order was passed by the Sub-divisional Magistrate asking the investigating officer to arrange to hold a test identification parade.

    9. Even the senior Sub Inspector of police gave such a direction to the investigating officer, but the investigating officer submitted a note that as he had already submitted the charge-sheet, the test identification parade might be held in Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has characterized the excuse of the investigating officer for not holding the test identification parade as untenable and in his opinion, the investigating officer could have held it if he was serious enough to do so. He has also held that in such cases it was necessary to hold a test identification parade, but, in his opinion, the non-holding of the test identification parade could not, in law, be said to have prejudiced the accused persons. The following passage from his judgment may be quoted in this connection.

    “However negligent the conduct of the investigating officer in not carrying out the orders of the Magistrate might have been, it must be held that the accused had no legal ‘right’ to claim that test identification parade he held at the investigation stage or even at the stage of inquiry and, therefore, it cannot be held that the non-compliance of the Magisterial order in this regard has caused any prejudice to the accused persons.”

    The accused persons may or may not have legal right to claim for test identification and the holding of test identification may or may not be a rule of law, but it is a rule of prudence, no doubt, that in such cases test identification parade should be held, especially when the accused persons definitely assert that they were unknown to the prosecution witnesses either by name or be face and they requested the authorities concerned to have the test identification parade held. In — ‘Provash Kumar Bose v. The King’, AIR 1951 Cal 475 (A), the holding of a test identification parade was considered to be necessary as the accused was not known to the witnesses (who had identified him in Court) from before the occurrence.

    10. The non-holding of a test identification parade therefore, in my opinion, though may not be a ground to vitiate the trial, is undoubtedly a very; important feature in considering the credibility of the witnesses on the point of identification it may also be remembered that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has himself discarded the evidence of the most of the prosecution witnesses on the point of identification and assault and, in that view of the matter, it will all the more be necessary for me to consider very cautiously and carefully the evidence of the ??? witnesses on whom reliance has bee placed by the Court below. Moreover, it has also to be remembered in this case that for no apparent reason the applicants suddenly appeared and forcibly attempted to prevent the prosecution party from desisting the pyne when they do not claim to have any right over the water of that pyne. In order to believe a story of an apparently unjustified attack, as the present one, it must be supported by unambiguous and unimpeachable evidence, vide — ‘Narsingh Singh v. Emperor’, AIR 1939 Pat 659 (B).

    11. There are 27 prosecution witnesses, one of whom is the investigating officer, (P.W 27). Out of the remaining 26 witnesses, 11 witnesses have been tendered only for cross-examination. Six witnesses are the injured persons and eight witnesses are the other eye-witnesses who did not receive any injury. The injured witnesses are P.Ws 1, 4, 6, 10, 11 and 15 and the other eyewitnesses are P.Ws 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 16, 22, 23 and 24. P.Ws 2, 3, 7, 12, 16 and 22 did not see the assault. The witnesses who deposed to have seen the assault are the aforesaid six injured persons and Mathura Singh (P.W 5). Though, after the occurrence, this Mathura Singh was all along present in the village, he was examined by the investigating officer, for the first time, five days after the occurrence. No explanation has been given as to why he was produced before the investigating officer so late.

    12. Then remains the evidence of the injured persons. They are no doubt competent to speak about the assault. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has not, however, accepted the evidence even of identification by Baldeo Singh (P.W 6), Ramkishan (P.W 10) and Chandraman Mahton (P.W 11). Karu Singh (P.W 15) did not identify any one. Thus, I am left with the evidence of only two witnesses, namely, P.Ws 1 and 4, amongst the injured persons. P.W 1, Jamuna Singh, received as many as 13 injuries. According to him, the appellant Awadh Singh struck him in his right dorsum and palm with a garasa, the appellant Rajdeo Singh struck him at his neck with a garasa and the appellant Deonandan struck him in his left arm with a garasa. He could not, however, identify his other assailants.

    13. Injury No. 9 on the person of this witness is an incised cut on the left palm between the middle and ring fingers separating the two fingers for a depth of 1¼ inches. This cannot be the injury caused by the appellant Awadh as the injury given by him was on the right palm. Injury No. 5 is a lacerated wound on the dorsum of the right hand about 1 inch below the wrist joint ½″ × ¼″ skin deep. The appellant Awadh is said to have caused an injury in the right dorsum of this witness, but it was caused with a garasa which could not produce a lacerated wound and, therefore, this injury also could not have been caused by the assault of the appellant Awadh. The prosecution has not been able to show any other injury on the person of this witness which could be caused by the garasa used by the appellant Awadh.

    14. Deonandan Singh is said to have struck him with a garasa in his left arm. Injuries Nos. 6 and 7 are no doubt on the left arm, but they are lacerated wounds and could not have been caused by garasa blows. The appellant Rajdeo Singh is alleged to have struck this witness at his neck with a garasa. Injuries Nos. 12 and 13 are on the neck which could have been caused by the blow said to have been given by the appellant Rajdeo. P.W 1, however, did not state before the investigating officer that the appellant Awadh Singh hit him in his palm. His attention was drawn to this fact, but he said that he did not tell the Sub Inspector about it. The investigating officer (P.W 27), however, has denied that this witness made any such statement.

    15. If really the appellant Awadh gave him a garasa blow, this witness would not have forgotten to mention this fact to the investigating officer soon after the occurrence. The only other witness is Keshwar Mahton (P.W 4). At one place he has stated that when the assault commenced on Jamuna Singh he started fleeing, that Jamuna Singh was, first, to be assaulted and after the assault on Jamuna was over, assault on Jhapas began. Therefore, according to this evidence he started fleeing before the assault on Jhapas began. But at another place, on the court question, he-has stated that he started fleeing after Jhapas had fallen on the ground on receiving the assault.

    16. Before the Committing Court he identified one Jodha as being Keshwar. At the trial, however, he has denied to have done so. His evidence before the Committing Court has been tendered on behalf of the accused persons under Section 288 of the Cr PC, and it appears from it that he did, in fact, identify Jodha as Keshwar. He did not state before the police that Keshwar struck Ramjit. His attention was drawn to this fact, but he asserted that he did so before the police. The investigating officer, however, has denied that he made any such statement. Even the learned Additional Sessions Judge does not seem to be inclined to place much reliance on his evidence which will appear from the following passage of his judgment:

    “Later on, however, he discovered that his previous answer would go to show the improbability of his having witnessed the assault on Ramjit and, therefore, he modified his statement by saying that he started fleeing after assault on Ramjit was over.”

    The evidence of these two witnesses, who are no doubt competent witnesses to speak about the occurrence, is not, in my opinion, for reasons given above, worthy of acceptance to prove individual assault.

    17. Then remains the question of these appellants being members of the mob so as to apply the principle of constructive liability on them. On the question of identification the learned Additional Sessions Judge has relied on the evidence of the prosecution witnesses Nos. 1, 2, 4, 7, 23 and 24. Prosecution witness No. 2, as already stated, was examined five days after the occurrence, and I have already observed that there is no explanation for his belated statement. P.W 7 Sidheshwar Singh, was also examined by the investigating officer five days after the occurrence, and in his case also there is no explanation as to why he was examined so late, though, according to him, he was all along present in his village till at least for seven days after the occurrence.

    18. Before the Committing Magistrate he was only tendered for cross-examination. Hence these two witnesses appear to be got up witnesses. P.W 23, Rajaram Singh, did not identify Sarup before the Committing Magistrate. Though he had gone to the police station along with Bhagwat Singh (P.W 24) at the time of lodging the first information, his statement was recorded by the investigating officer on the next day, that is, on 24-9-1951. He also deposed about the appellants Awadh, Raideo and Deonandan giving blows to Jamuna with garasas, but before the investigating officer he did not say that he witnessed the occurrence at all.

    19. He claims to have known the accused persons from before, but he did not state as before the investigating officer or the Committing Magistrate. Therefore, the evidence of this witness also is not such as to the truth of which there can be no doubt. P.W 24, Bhagwat Singh, is the informant. He also deposed about the assault given by the appellants. He also claims to be an eye-witness of individual assaults, but his evidence on that point has not been accepted by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. His observation with regard to the evidence of this witness and the previous witness is as follows:

    “I am unable to accept the evidence of P.Ws 23 and 24 that they stood at a distance of about 150 to 160 feet from the place where Jamuna Singh was being assaulted. If they would have been there, I am sure the accused party would not have spared them. Obviously, they must have failed at a sufficiently long distance.”

    He also claims to have known the accused persons from before, but he did not state this fact before the Committing Magistrate. The testimony of this witness also, therefore, seems to be doubtful. The evidence of the other two witnesses, namely, the injured witnesses, has now to be examined. As already stated, their evidence on the question of individual assaults has not been accepted, and Sir Sultan Ahmad appearing for the appellants has argued that where the evidence of a witness on a material point has been disbelieved, it is not safe to rely on the rest of his evidence to convict the accused persons.

    20. Of course, it is true that where the prosecution story is disbelieved as to its essential details, it is still open to the court to rely on a part of the story for the purpose of convicting the accused persons, vide — ‘Leda Bhagat v. King-Emperor*’, AIR 1931 Pat 384 (C). But, at the same “time, it is elementary that where the prosecution has a definite or positive case it must prove the whole of the case vide, — ‘Mohinder Singh v. The State’, AIR 1953 SC 415 (D). In my opinion though it cannot be laid down, as a law of general application, that, in no case, a judge can accept a part of the prosecution story when he has disbelieved its other part, as a rule of prudence it will not be safe to rely on the evidence of witnesses on one part of the prosecution story when it has been disbelieved as to its material part.

    21. In this case, as already observed, the evidence of P.Ws 1 and 4 is not worthy of credence so far as the question of individual assaults is concerned. It has also been shown that they have attempted without any reason to attribute the particular act of assaults to the different appellants. I am not, therefore, inclined to rely on their evidence even on the question of identification, especially when, as already observed, the appellants have never put forward any claim over the water of this pyne and their prayer for the test identification parade was ignored.

    22. Considering the entire evidence on the record I am satisfied that the prosecution has not established its case beyond reasonable doubt. I will, therefore, allow the appeal and set aside the order of conviction and sentence passed on the appellants.

    23. The bail bonds stand cancelled.

    V.R.B

    24. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Awadh Singh And Others v. The State
    (Nov 9, 1953)