Subba Rao, C.J..:-

(1) These two appeals arise out of o. S. No. 73 of 1950 on the file of the district munsif's court, tenali, a suit filed by the ist respondent for a permanent injunction restraining the 4th defendant from assigning or otherwise alienating the suit site and "for a mandatory injunction directing defendants 1 to 3 to remove the encroachment. Over the said site.

(2) To appreciate the facts and the contentions of the parties, it will be convenient and necessary, at the outset, to notice the topography of the locality in question wherein the impugned encroachment is alleged to have been made. In tenali town, in ward no. 7 one of the main roads satyanarayana park road runs from north to south. An equally important road called andhra ratna road runs from west to east. The plaintiff's house is situated at the corner which the andhra ratna road makes with satyanarayana park road. Satyanarayana park road abuts the plaintiff's house on the east whereas the andhra ratna road abuts it on the south. The width of the andhra ratna road is 57 feet and that part of the road abutting the permises of the plaintiff is about 165 feet. The plaintiff has been using these premises for manufacturing olu paints since about 15 years prior to the suit. Except for a thatched shed, the southern portion of the plaintiff's house is an open site. South of that open site and abutting the andhra ratna road, the plaintiff erected a compound wall which runs from west to east. In the middle of the compound wall, there is a gate of the width of 5 feet leading into the andhra ratna road. He has also another egress on the eastern side of his house to satyanarayana park road. There was a big tree marked x in the plaint plan at the junction of the two roads. About 10 years prior to the filing of the suit, defendants 1 and 2 and others, who were members of the devi bhakta brundam, erected a small mandir abcd with brick and lime and a small pial - e - 1, f - 1, g - 1, and h - 1 shown in the plan. " the said mandir and the pial were built under the shade of the said tree. Subsequently, they made further encroachments both on the east and on the west of the first encroachment, shown in the plan as efgh and ijkl. Tne next step was that the tree was cut off and a shed was constructed with corrugated zinc sheets with eaves extending on all sides shown as tuvw in the plan and the floor of the entire area l - 1 - efghjk was slabbed. Later on, they levelled up the ground mnop and loose slabs were placed over the surface qmsr. The said encroachment is about 60 feet cutting the andhra ratna road near the premises of the plaintiff into two leaving a road of the width of 5 feet 6 inches between the southern boundary wall of the plaintiff and the encroachment. The encroachment into the western part of satyanarayana park road is about 6 feet 9 inches. The plaintiff alleged that the said unauthorised encroachment obstructed his access to the road and light and air to his premises, destroyed his right of prospect and became a source of several 'animosities'. He further pleaded that the said encroachment was a public nuisance inasmuch as it permanently blocked the use of the andhra ratna road to its entire width, prevented its improvement, proved dangerous to public traffic and became a rendezvous for all bad characters. Alleging further that the 4th defendant, the state, in whom the ownership of the site vested had no right to assign the site and that the 3rd defendant charged with the duty of removing the encroachments failed to do its duty, the suit was filed for a permanent injunction restraining the 4th respondent from alienating by gift, sale or otherwise the site marked ophtuvwn in the plan and for a mandatory injunction directing defendants i to 3 to remove the encroachment over ophtuvwn including all superstructures.

(3) Defendants 1 and 2 in their written statement stated that the said encroachments were made about ten years ago with the knowledge of the authorities concerned and that the plaintiff also had no objection to the same and indeed he took interest and contributed to the various functions and festivities of the devi mandir. They also denied that the said construction had, in any way, obstructed the plaintiff's access or violated any of his rights or that it was a public nuisance. They raised pleas that the suit was not maintainable without the consent of the advocate - general and that, in any event, the plaintiff was estopped by his laches and aquiescence to ask for the discretionary remedy of mandatory injunction.

(4) Defendants 3 and 4, in the main, supported the case of defendants 1 and 2 pleaded that the plaintiff was not entitled to any of the reliefs claimed against them. The learned district munsif, on a consideration of the evidence found that the encroachment was not causing any obstruction to light and air or the prospect of the plaintiff's house. He found that the loose slabs placed by defendants 1 and 2 before the eastern bigger gate of the southern compound wall of the plaintiff at the place marked qmsr in the plan caused obstruction to the plaintiff for taking his carts and, therefore, he directed them to be removed. The suit in other respects was dismissed against the defendants.

(5) On appeal, the learned subordinate judge held that the encroachment constituted private as well as public nuisance, that the 3rd defendant had no right to allow the encroachment in question to stand and that the 4th defendant had no right to assign the site encroached upon in derogation of public and private rights. The learned judge found that the encroachment caused special damages to the plaintiff and that he did not acquiesce in the conduct of the defendants. In the result, he set aside the decree of the learned district munsiff and decreed the suit. Defendants 1 and 2 preferred second appeal no. 577 of 1954 against the said decree and the 4th defendant (the state) preferred second appeal no. 1008 of 1954 against the same decree.

(6) Learned government pleader contends that it has not been established by the evidence that the plaintiff's right to air or light or access was obstructed by the encroachment or that any special damage was caused to him and that, in any view, the plaintiff having acquiesced in the constructions, he is now estopped from claiming the discretionary remedy of injunction.

(7) That there was an encroachment over public highways admits of no doubt. The first question is whether the municipality or the state have any statutory power to authorise any such encroachment. Under section 61 of the district municipalities act, all public streets in a municipality vest in the municipal council though the state government may by notification withdraw any such street from the control of the council. No such notification withdrawing the control of the two highways, the andhra ratna road and the satyanarayana park road, was issued by the state government, and therefore, the said two highways vested and continued to vest in the tenali municipality. Section 163 (1) (c) of the act empower the municipal council permanently to close any public street or part thereof with the special sanction of the state government. There is nothing on record to show, and indeed it is not the case of the municipality, that that part of the road covered by the encroachment was closed with the special sanction of the state government. So long as the street continues to be a public street, section 180 imposes a prohibition against obstructions or encroachments over such streets. Section 182 enjoins a duty on the executive authority to remove or alter any such encroachment made. It is, therefore obvious that the municipality has no power to sanction the impugned encroachment on the main roads. See emperor v. Viswanatha nana korpe, (1926) i. L. R. 50 bom. 674. Nor does madras act iii of 1905, on which reliance is placed by the government pleader, empower the government to ignore the rights of the public so long as the street continues to be a public street. Under section 2 of the said act, all public roads, and streets are declared to be the property of the government except as may be otherwise provided by any law for the time being in force subject always to all rights of way and other public rights. The government's proprietary right over' public streets is, therefore, subject to all the rights of way and other public rights. So long as andhra ratna road and the satyanarayana park road continue to be public highways, the government also has no power to allow others to encroach upon the said roads causing public nuisance or to assign the same to them. The constructions made by defendants 1 and 2 and others cannot, therefore, be sustained on the ground that they were allowed in the exercise of a statutory power conferred either on the municipality or on the government.

(8) The next question is whether the said constructions infringed any right of the plaintiff. Though the learned subordinate judge, held that the plaintiff's right to air, light, frontage and access has been violated by the encroachments, the learned counsel for the respondents confined his arguments only to the plaintiff's right to access and frontage. Salmond on torts demies the scope of the right of the access to a highway at page 301 thus :

"every person who occupies land immediately adjoining a highway has a private right of access to the higway from his land and vice versa; and any act done without lawful justification whereby the exercise of this private right is obstructed is an actionable wrong"

At page 302, the learned author in bringing out the difference between the right of access to a highway and the right of passing along the highway says :

"the former is a private and the latter a public right, and for any infringement of the former an action will lie; whereas as we shall see in the next section, no action will lie for an infringement of the public right of passing except on proof of some special or particular consequential damage suffered by the plaintiff"

Peacock in his book ' law of easements' (3rd edition) states the law much to the same effect at page 240. The learned author says : "in the case of any ordinary highway the public are entitled to use of the entire width of it as the highway and are not confined to the part which may be metalled or kept in order for the more convenient use of the carriages and foot passengers ". At page 243, the following passage appears : "an owner of land which is contiguous to a public highway has the right of access to the highway from his land and vice versa at any point along the line of contact whether the soil of the highway vested in him or not. "

(9) The aforesaid passages lay down the law on the subject in such clear terms as to make any further citations unnecessary. But as the learned counsel placed before us a number of decisions on the subject, we shall briefly notice them. In chabdin and co. , ltd. V. The mayor of the city of westminster, l. R. (1901) 2 ch. 329, buckley, j. , in clear terms defines the right of access to a public highway. At page 334 the learned judge says:

"a person who owns premises abutting on a highway enjoys as a private right the right of stepping from his own premises on to the highway and if any obstruction be placed in his door - way or gateway,. So as to prevent him from obtaining access from his own premises to the highway, that obstruction would be an interference with a private right"

Contrasting this right with a public right to use the highway, the learned judge observes :

"but immediately that he has stepped on to the highway and is using the highway, what he is using is not a private right but a public right"

(10) Where the plaintiff and the defendant were the respective owners and occupiers of two adjoining houses abutting on a street which was a public highway, and the plaintiff affixed boards at right angles to the front of his house and close to the defendants' side wall covering the wall to a height of twenty - two feet from the payment, rowlatt, j. , in cobb v. Saxby, l. R. (1914) 3 k. B. 822 held in a counter - claim, made by the defendant that the act of the plaintiff was wrongful interference with the private right of the defendant. He extended the scope of a party's right of access to the highways to the right to pass from the premises to the highway and vice versa including the right of access to a wall of the premises in which there is no door or other opening. At page 826, the learned judge observes :

"although no authority precisely in point has been cited, i am of opinion that the owner of a house adjoining a public highway has precisely the same rights as regards the highway with respect to the wall of his house sa he has in the case of a door or other entrance leading from his house on to the highway. He has the right to do anything he likes to the wall, for example to display advertisements upon it, and if these rights are invaded or obstructed, he has in my opinion a good cause of action against the person causing the interference with his rights"

(11) This decision is pressed into service by the learned counsel for the respondent in support of his contention that the right of access recognised by law prohibits interference with his right at any point of his premises abutting a highway whether there is an opening into the highway from his premises or not. The house of lords in marshall v. Blackpool corporation, l. R. (1935) a. C. 16, authoritatively considered the scope of that right. There, the appellants were motor coach proprietors and owners of premises no. 1, st. Chad's road, blackpool. St. Chad's road was a road running into the blackpool promenade. The premises no. 1 had a narrow frontage to the promenade and a long frontage to st. Chand's road. They abut on the road, the foot - way about 8 feet wide intervening between the premises and the roadway which is about 20 feet wide. The appellants' who wished to have access from their premises to the roadway in st. Chad's road for the purpose of their vehicles and who have to cross the foot - path, asked for permission which was refused by the corporation. The house of lords held that thq petitioner had a right of access and that the corporation in the circumstances, was not authorised under the statute to refuse the permission. In that context, lord atkin stated the legal position thus :

"the owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of a access to the highway from any part of the premises. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of accesss : just as the right of access is subject to the rights of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway. Apart from any statutory provisions, there is no obligation upon an adjoining owner to fence his property from the highway. Subject to special statutory provisions protecting foot - paths, the right of access is not affected by the fact that part of the highway is only dedicated as a footway or is otherwise lawfully appropriated to foot passengers"

The law in india is not in any way different from that obtaining in england. In dwarka prasad singh v. Patna city municipality, (1938) 177 i. C. 315, the dispute related to a strip of land lying immediately to the east of the compound wall of the plaintiffs. Between that strip and the public road there was a drain which received drainage from the plaintiff's ground through the openings in the compund well. The municipality leased out the said strip to the and defendant and some more land to the east of it to the 1st defendant for the erection of petrol pump. The plaintiffs claimed easements of drainage, passage, road frontage, etc. , and asked for restoration of the strip and the drain to their former condition. Dhavele, j. , held that the municipality exceeded their statutory right in allowing the construction to be put up by the defendants interfering with the plaintiff's right of access. As regards the plaintiff's right of access, the learned judge observes at page 317 :

"as to the right of road frontage and of access to the road, there was no dispute in the trial court that an owner of land abutting on a public road is entitled to access to such road at any point were his land actually touches it"

(12) The patna high court in district board of manbhum v. Bengal and nagpur rly. Co. , (1944) i. L. R. 23 pat. 931, accepted the view that the right of access to a highway at all points belongs not only to an owner but also to an occupier of land adjacent thereto and the latter is entitled to sue for the removal of any construction thereon if his right is interrupted thereby. At page 939, manohar lall, j. , says :

"even so the plaintiff, in my opinion has a right of access to the road, to every part of the road side land which abuts on to his land even though he may have fenced it off or raised a wall for the convenience and the enjoyment of his contractors or servants and even if he had opened a gate - way towards the south"

(13) From the aforesaid discussion, it may, therefore, be accepted as settled law that the owner of a land which is contiguous to a public highway has a right of access to the highway from his land and sice versa at any point along line of contact though he may have fenced his land off or raised a wall for his convenience. In the present case," the plaintiff has certainly a right of access to the highway from his premises at any point which is in contact with the highway. But the question is whether the undoubted right of access has, in any way, been interfered with by any of the defendants.

(14) The evidence adduced and the plan filed in the case clearly show that the plaintiff's right of access to the public highway was only interfered with at the place qmsr by the defendants putting loose slabs therein. The learned district munsif directed those slabs to be removed. If those slabs were removed, there would be no further obstruction to his right of access. He can step into the highway at any point from his premises without any obstruction. But what is contended is that he has the right of access to the entire width of the road but, in view of the construction put up by the defendants the plaintiff is precluded from coming directly into the highway wherein the construction is put up. The right of access into the highway is different from the right of user of the public highway. The former is a private right and the latter a public one. The construction put up by the defendant leaves unaffected 5 feet 6 inches of road abutting the plaintiff's premises and is only of the length of 25 - feet whereas the southern boundary of the plaintiff's premises is of the length of about 165 feet. The plaintiff has access to every bit of the highway abutting the premises and, even if he gets into the highway from the south - eastern corner of his premises by passing westwards about 25 feet, he can use the entire road. We cannot, therefore, hold that the plaintiff's right of access into the public highway has been interfered with in any way by the constructions put up by the defendants the next question is whether the plaintiff's right of prospect has been affected by the constructions. Does the law recognise any right of prospect ? is it a legal injury if a person intercepts the prospect of another ? in butt v. Imperial gas company, l. R. (1866 - 67) 2 ch. App. 148, the lord chancellor ruled that the erection of a building will not be restrained because it injures the plaintiff by obstructing the view of his place of business. At page 161, lord chelmsford, l. J. , observed :

"i suggested, in the course of the argument, that if the building of a wall which merely intercepts the prospect of another, without obstruction to his light and air, is not a legal injury, it was very difficult to see how a building which merely obstructed premises from the view of the passers - by could be the subject of an action"

So too, banerji, j. , in gopi nath v. Munno, (1906) i. L. R. 39 all. 22, held that no action would lie for the removal of erections in front of a shop merely on the ground that such erctions obstruct the view which passers - by formerly had of the shop. At page 23 banerji, j. , observed :

"the only right claimed is that the plaintiffs are entitled to undisturbed prospect of their shop from the road. It is admitted that access to the plaintiffs' shops has not been obstructed. All that is complained of is the interruption to the view of the shops from the neighbouring road. This would not entitle the plaintiffs to have the construction removed"

(15) In smith v. Owen, (1866) 35 l. J. Ch. 317, it was held that the court will not restrain the erection of buildings 4 which merely prevent goods displaced in a shop from being seen from places whence they would previously have been seen. The law on the subject is clearly stated in goddard on easements (6th edition) , pages 116 to 118. It is, therefore, clear that a mere obstruction to the view of another's building or place of business does not per se give rise to a cause of action unless the obstruction affects his right of access or if it otherwise causes damage to his building or business. In the plaint, it is stated that, by the impugned construction on the highway, the plaintiff's right of prospect was completely destroyed and that though the wanted to construct demonstration rooms on the southern side of his premises for the purpose of promoting his industry and business, he had to give up the idea on account of the said encroachment. The learned district munsif found that the plaintiff gave up the idea of constructing demonstration rooms because of the encroachment. He also found that there was not enough space on the site lying to the east of the main house for the construction of demonstration rooms and, if he wanted, he could have built the demonstration rooms at a place in his premises the view whereof was not obstructed by the suit shrine. The learned subordinate judge, while recognising that the encroachment did not affect the living portion of the plaintiff's house in any way, held on some hypothetical considerations that it might affect the vacant site. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff, in law, has no right of prospect in this case, it has not been established that the constructions put up on the highway in any way interfered with his right of prospect or caused him damage.

(16) It is then said that encroachment is a public nuisance and that it has caused special damage to the plaintiff. In salmond on torts, nuisance to a highway is described as "an act done without lawful justification whereby the exercise of the public right of passage is obstructed or rendered dangerous". The same author points out the nuisance to a highway is not actionable unless it causes special damage to the individual. In the words of the learned author, 'no such action will lie save at the suit of a person who can show special and particular damage suffered by himself and distinct from the general inconvenience endured by him in common. With the public at large. The special damage that is necessary and sufficient to support an action must be of a substantial character, not fleeting or evanescent. See benjamin v. Storr, (1874) l. R. 9 c. P. 400. The aforesaid english doctrine has been accepted and followed in india. A division bench of the madras high court in khajl sayyad hussain saheb v. Naraslmhappa, (1913) 23 m. L. J. 539 : 1913 m. W. N. 991, pointed out that: "the english rule that an action for the obstruction of a public highway is not maintainable unless special damages are alleged and proved has been so long accepted in this country that it is impossible to question it now ". Adverting to the question of damage, sundara iyer, j. , states at page 992 thus : "it seems to me to be clear that the mere fact that a person has to use a way more often than another and is therefore put to more inconvenience will not entitle him to maintain an action for obstruction of the way". Saclasiva iyer, jj. , adds that the special damage, which the plaintiff alleges in such causes, should be of a substantial character. Collins, c. J. , and benson, j. , in queen empress v. Virappa chetty, (1896) i. L. R. 20 mad. 433, laid down the amplitude of the right to use a public highway at page 434 thus :

"thus the public is entitled to the use of the full width of the public street however wide it may be. Whoever appropriates any part of the street by building over it infringes the right of the public quoad the part built over. The act must necessarily cause obstruction to persons who may have occasion to use their public right over the part encroached upon"

Viswanatha sastri, j. , in ramabrahma sastri v. Lakshminarasimham, (1956) an. W. R. 578 : 1956 a. L. T. 492, repelled the argument advanced before him, namely, that it is open to an individual member of the public to maintain a suit for the removal of an obstruction to a public highway which constituted public nuisance without proof of special damage. ' after considering the case law on the subject the learned judge observed :

"i am humbly of the opinion that apart from section 91, civil procedure code and in conformity with its provisions no action can be maintained by an individual against another for obstruction to a public highway without proof of special damage. This rule is founded on adequate reasons of public policy that a man who may have committed some public injury shall not be harassed by innumerable actions by persons who have not sustained any damage or injury peculiar to themselves. It had been enforced by indian courts as a rule of justice, equity and good conscience till 1924 and in my judgment has not been abrogated by the decision of the privy council in munzur hasain v. Muhammad zaman, (1924) 48 m. L. J. 23 : l. R. 53 i. A. 61 : i. L. R. 47 all. 151 (p. C.)."

(17) We respectfully accept and adopt the aforesaid observations. Section 91 of the civil procedure code recognises the said legal conception and creates a right of action to remedy a public nuisance with certain limitations. Under the section, in the case of a public nuisance, the advocate - general or two or more persons having obtained the consent in writing of the advocate - general may institute a suit, though no special damage has been caused, for a declaration and injunction or for such other relief as may be appropriated to the circumstances of the case. Apart from this section, no individual can maintain an action against another for a relief against public nuisance except on proof of special damage. The law vis - a - vis public nuisance has been firmly established. The public and every member thereof has a right to use the entire width of a public highway without obstruction. Any person or body of persons or even a public body cannot interfere with that right unless statutorily or otherwise legally empowered to do so. Such an obstruction without any averment of special damage could be removed by following the procedure prescribed under section 91, civil procedure code. But an individual cannot maintain a suit to remove it unless by reason of such obstruction special damage of a substantial character has been caused to him or to his premises.

(18) In the present case, we have no doubt that the constructions, put upon the highway constitute public nuisance, for it cannot be denied that they interfered with the use of the highway by the public and they were put up without any legal authority. But the plaintiff cannot sustain the present action unless he proves that, by the said encroachment on the highway, special damage of a substantial character has accrued to him. In the plaint, the plaintiff alleges that the encroachment caused him the following special damage :

"1. It obstructs the access to the plaintiff's premises from the south and is causing a lot of inconvenience in taking in stocks and clearing them from his premises. It obstructs all vehicular traffic into the plaintiff's premises and is causing loss to the plaintiff in his business. 2. It prevents the plaintiff in having the full use of the andhra ratna road, i. E. , from having access to the road from any point on the plaintiff's premises. 3. It obstructs light and air to plaintiff's premises and it is likely to result in injuring the health of the inmates of the plaintiff's premises. 4. On account of the encroachment the value of the plaintiff's premises has been adversely affected. 5. Plaintiff's right of prospect was completely destroyed. Though plaintiff wanted to construct demonstration rooms on the southern side of his premises for the purpose of promoting his industry and business, he had to give up the idea on account of the said encroachment. Thus he was precluded from expanding his industry or improving his business. 6. The encroachment became a source of several animosities on account of which the persons belonging to the "brundam " are behaving in utter disregard of the legal rights of others".

The learned district munsif found that the plaintiff's business did not receive any set - back because of the encroachment, that sufficient space had been left between the temple and the southern compound wall of the plaintiff to enable him to reach the andhra ratna road from every point in his compound, that it had not been made out that there was any obstruction of light and air to the plaintiff's premises, that the encroachment did not prevent the plaintiff's men and carts from reaching the small gate, that there was no possibility of any bad characters entering and committing actionable nuisances and that it had also not been established that the value of the premises had gone down. The learned subordinate judge does not give any definite findings but on a consideration of the evidence assumes that the plaintiff's rights must be affected by the encroachment. We agree with the learned district munsif that except the encroachment shown as opmn in the plan, it has not been proved that the rest of the encroachment has in any way caused substantial damage to the plaintiff. If that encroachment is removed, as it was directed to be removed by the court below, apart from some vague allegations and the apprehensions of the plaintiff, the record does not disclose that either the plaintiff or the members of his family have been physically affected, that the plaintiff's business, which the evidence shows was conducted on a very modest scale had got a set - back, that his prospects of improvement had been retarded or that the plaintiff's building has depreciated in value by the aforesaid encroachment. We, therefore, agree with the learned district munsif that it has not been established that the plaintiff has incurred any special damage of substantial character to enable him to maintain the suit.

(19) Finally, we are also satisfied that the conduct of the plaintiff, disentitles him to the discretionary relief of injunction in the present case. The construction of the temple was a gradual process. The 3rd defendant in his written statement traces the origin and the development of the temple thus :

"the municipal council by its resolutions no. 404 (1) , dated 30th march, 1939, resolved to construct a platform around the nidraganneru tree to serve as a halting'place to the passers - by. Subsequently the public of the locality arranged for the study of puranam by learned men and gradually the place acquired importance. As devi puranam was recited there for long time raja rajeswari's picture was placed in a small enclosure to import sanctity and spread its benign influence and heavenly bliss. On a petition from the citizens of the place, the council passed resolution no. 354, dated 2nd november, 1940, for the construction of mandiram for the devi"

(20) After the mandiram was put up, the temple gained importance, daily worship was conducted and utsavams were being performed during dasarah. The plaintiff along with p. Ws. 3 and 4 paid subscriptions for the performance of the festivities. Exhibits b - 4, b - 5 and b - 6 of the years 1945, 1946 and 1947 show that the plaintiff paid subscriptions for the festivities, exhibit b - 1 of the year 1945 indicates that the plaintiff had painted the shrine. We are satisfied that the plaintiff also had taken, part in the development of the temple and that he adopted the present attitude only in the year 1947 because defendants 1 and 2 filed petitions for the removal of his cottage industries. Though he started filing petitions from 1947 to the authorities he did not think fit to file a suit till 1950. The suit was filed eight years after the shrine had come into existence. When a party having a right stands by and sees another dealing with the property in a manner inconsistent with that right and makes no objection while the act is in progress, it has been held in shand v. Henderson, (1814) 2 dow. 519 : 3 e. R. 952, that he loses the remedy by injunction which he would otherwise have. Cotton, l. J. , in russel v watts, (1884) l. R. 25 ch. D. 559, states the doctrine of acquiescence thus :

"the doctrine as to a person lying by so as to create an equity against him arises, if either he does something from which it can be reasonably inferred that he induced the other person to think he would raise no objection to what they were doing or if he knows facts which are unknown to the other persons acting in violation of the right which those facts give and does not inform him about it, but lies by and by lets them run into a trap"

(21) In the present case, the shrine and the structures were the result of the common venture of the residents of the loality undertaken in a mood of religious ferver. The plaintiff was an active participant in the joint endeavour and consciously stood by for a period of above 10 years during the gradual progress of the institution. The later improvements are not of such a magnitude that it could be reasonably held that what in the beginning was a permissible encroachment subsequently affected his rights to force him to take a contrary attitude. The somersault in his attitude is prompted more by his estranged feelings towards defendants 1 and 2 than by any attempt on his part to redress an otherwise innocuous act suddently developing into an act threatening damage to his person and property. We are satisfied that the plaintiff who was an active participant in the encroachment and who stood by for a long period of time has so acquiesced in the act and is so guilty of laches that he would not be entitled to any equitable relief.

(22) We should not be understood to have approved of the act of defendants 3 and 4 in allowing encroachments to be made in public highways even in the name of religion. The encroachment is certainly a public nuisance, but the plaintiff has no right or at any rate has disentitled himself to get any relief. The decree of the lower court is set aside and both the appeals are allowed. But, in the circumstances, the parties will bear their costs throughout. Appeals allowed.