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Case Number

Civil Revn. Petn. No. 123 of 1953

Attorney(S)

For the Appellant: M.S. Ramachandra Rao, Advocate.
For the Respondent: Alladi Kuppuswamy, Advocate.

Judges

Krishna Rao, J.

Acts

S. 13 (b) (III) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.
S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act; O. S. No. 611 of 1949
Section 3 (3) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
S. 3 (10) of the Madras Estates Land Act, cl. (b)
provisions of Act 26 of 1948. 3. Sri M. S.
110 (B). Section 15 of Act 26 of 1948
S. 3 (d) of Act 26 of 1948
S. 15 of Act 26 of 1948
cl. (d) of S. 3 of Act 26

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision is directed against the finding of the Additional District Munsif, Nellore on a preliminary issue in O.S. 712 of 1951, by which he negatived the 1st defendant's contention that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit.

The 1st respondent-plaintiff brought a suit for partition and recovery of possession of his one-third share in the plaint lands and for other incidental reliefs. The plaintiff's case was that he and defendants 1 to 5 were joint shrotriumdars of Kuricherlapad shrotrium; the plaintiff claimed a 4/12th share, the 1st defendant a 1/12th share, defendants 2 and 3 4/12th, and defendants 4 and 5 the remaining 3/12th. Two items of plaint lands (Survey Nos. 160 and 161) were alleged to be anadhinam (unoccupied) lands, progressively reclaimed by the joint shrotriumdars between 1940 and 1949 (S. No. 160 between 1940–1949 and S. No. 161 between 1945–1949).

The 1st defendant asserted exclusive title and possession as a ryot and had earlier filed two suits under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act (O.S. No. 611 of 1949 in respect of a portion of S. No. 160 and O.S. No. 608 of 1949 in respect of S. No. 161), which were decreed on 28-11-1950. The 1st defendant also denied co-ownership and contended that, because the inam estate of Kuricherlapad shrotrium was taken over by the Government on 1-10-1951 under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, XXVI of 1948 (Act 26 of 1948), only the special forums established by that Act had jurisdiction to try the subject-matter of the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, in view of the notification effecting takeover of the estate under the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 (Act 26 of 1948), the ordinary Civil Court is deprived of jurisdiction to try this suit between co-sharers concerning partition and possession.
Whether disputes that involve a contention that a party is entitled to a ryotwari patta (or that lands are ryoti lands) must be adjudicated exclusively by the special forums created under Act 26 of 1948 (e.g., under Ss. 11–15 or S.56) and thereby oust Civil Court jurisdiction.
Whether S.15 or S.56 of Act 26 of 1948 operate, by necessary implication, to bar the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in cases like the present one.

Arguments of the Parties

First Defendant (as stated in written statement)

Denied that he was a co-owner along with the plaintiff and others; contended that he had become solely entitled to occupancy rights as a ryot in respect of the lands.
Contended that the Court of the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit because the estate had been taken over by the Government on 1-10-1951 under Act 26 of 1948 and only the special forums set up by that Act had jurisdiction over the subject-matter.

Counsel for the Petitioner (Sri M. S. Ramachandra Rao)

Contended that the dispute essentially resolves into whether the suit lands are private lands or ryoti lands; argued that on the plaint allegations the lands could not properly be said to be private land as defined in S. 3(10)(b) of the Madras Estates Land Act.
Observed that the plaint describes the lands as anadhinam (unoccupied) and reclaimed between 1940 and 1949, which, he submitted, did not bring them within the categories of private land; therefore they would be ryoti lands within S. 3(16), and the joint shrotriumdars would be entitled to a ryotwari patta under S. 13(b)(III) of Act 26 of 1948.
Raised the question whether, because the 1st defendant claims entitlement to a ryotwari patta under S. 11, the Civil Court was thereby deprived of jurisdiction by provisions of Act 26 of 1948 (specifically relying on S.3(d), S.15 and S.56).
Relied on S.3(d) to argue that the estate vested in the Government and that persons claiming possession must obtain a ryotwari patta under Ss. 11–14 before asserting rights to the lands.
Relied on S.15 and the duty of the Settlement Officer to examine the lands and determine claims for ryotwari patti to argue for implied exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction in such cases.
Also invoked S.56(D) to argue the Settlement Officer must decide disputes as to who is the lawful ryot of any holding after notification.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Gopalaswamy Ayyangar v. Athamanathaswami Dev, 1957-1 Mad LJ 104	That the expression "anadhinam" means unoccupied land and does not imply that it is domain or home-farm land (i.e., private land).	The court used this principle to treat the plaint allegations (that the lands were anadhinam and were brought under cultivation between 1940–1949) as indicating the lands were not private land but ryoti lands under S.3(16), supporting entitlement to a ryotwari patta under S.13(b)(III).
Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 (at p.110)	The exclusion of the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred; such exclusion must be explicitly expressed or clearly implied.	The court relied on this rule to require clear expression or implication before holding that S.15 (or other provisions) ousted Civil Court jurisdiction; used it to read S.15 together with S.3(d) and conclude that if the relief sought does not bear on the Government's right to take possession, Civil Court jurisdiction is not impliedly barred.
State of Madras v. Swammathan, 1955-2 Mad LJ 178	Where a plaintiff's real object is to obtain a ryotwari patta, he is not entitled to sue in a Civil Court for a declaration; the remedy lies by application under S.11 before the Settlement Officer.	The court distinguished this case: it held that unlike Swammathan (where plaintiff sought a patta), the plaintiff in the present suit seeks to enforce rights against an alleged co-sharer (partition and possession), and therefore the remedy is not one that the special forums alone can provide.
Parmeshari v. Krishna Kumer, AIR 1944 All 194	Where the special forums cannot grant the relief sought, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred.	The court cited this authority to support the proposition that because the special forums under Act 26 cannot grant reliefs of partition and possession, Civil Courts retain jurisdiction to decide such disputes.
Swaminatha Odayar v. Asan Muhammad Rowther, 1947-1 Mad LJ 83; AIR 1947 Mad 276 (FB)	Reinforces that when the special forums cannot grant the relief sought, Civil Court jurisdiction is not ousted.	Used alongside Parmeshari to demonstrate that S.15 does not operate to oust Civil Courts' jurisdiction where the special forums lack authority to grant the relief claimed (partition and possession).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court undertook a step-by-step analysis of the contention that Act 26 of 1948 ousted the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the present suit.

Nature of vesting under S.3(d): The court acknowledged that under S.3(d) of Act 26 the estate vests in the Government on notification, but emphasized that this vesting is subject to a proviso which prevents the Government from dispossessing any person who appears entitled to a ryotwari patta until the question is decided by the special forums constituted under the Act. The court therefore held that rights of possession and rights incidental to possession of persons who might be entitled to a ryotwari patta are preserved by the Act.
Effect of S.64: The court referred to S.64 as further emphasising that the rights of owners and occupiers are not affected by temporary discontinuance of possession immediately before notification, reinforcing that possession-related rights persist until decided by the special forums.
Scope of relief available before special forums: The court distinguished between two kinds of relief: (a) relief which is essentially an application for a ryotwari patta (enforceable only before the special forums), and (b) other reliefs flowing from possession (such as partition and recovery of possession against a co-sharer). The court held that while the remedy to obtain a ryotwari patta must be sought from the special forums, there is nothing in Act 26 to show that all other remedies flowing from possession are taken away from ordinary Civil Courts until a patta is obtained.
Interpretation of S.15 (Settlement Officer's role): The court noted that S.15 charges the Settlement Officer with examining the nature and history of lands in claims for ryotwari pattas. However, applying the principle that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction must be explicit or clearly implied (citing Secretary of State v. Mask and Co.), the court read S.15 together with S.3(d) and concluded that their purpose is primarily to determine whether the Government should take possession. If the relief claimed by the plaintiff does not bear on the Government's right to take possession, the Civil Court's jurisdiction is not impliedly barred.
Distinguishing precedents: The court considered State of Madras v. Swammathan where the plaintiff's suit was effectively an attempt to obtain a ryotwari patta; the court in that case held the remedy lay under S.11 only. The present suit was distinguished because the plaintiff was not seeking to obtain a patta from the Government but to enforce rights against an alleged co-sharer. Moreover, even if the plaintiff and co-sharers were ultimately found entitled to a patta, the special forums would not be able to grant the relief of partition and possession sought in the suit.
Application of authorities on availability of Civil reliefs: The court relied on Parmeshari v. Krishna Kumer and Swaminatha Odayar v. Asan Muhammad Rowther to the effect that where the special forums cannot grant the relief sought, Civil Court jurisdiction is not barred. On that basis the court concluded S.15 does not oust Civil Court jurisdiction in this case.
Application of S.56: The petitioner also relied on S.56(D), which provides that disputes as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of any holding are to be decided by the Settlement Officer. The court observed that a "holding" is a parcel or parcels held under a single patta (S.3(3)). The court found that the plaintiff's case was that the suit lands were not a holding but were in the possession and enjoyment of joint landholders; hence the gist and form of the dispute did not relate to who was the lawful ryot of a holding, and the dispute did not fall within S.56.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the preliminary finding of the District Munsif that he had jurisdiction to try the suit was correct. Accordingly, the revision petition is dismissed with costs.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The Civil Court (District Munsif) retains jurisdiction to try the suit for partition and recovery of possession between the co-sharers notwithstanding the notification under Act 26 of 1948; the revision challenging that preliminary jurisdictional finding has been dismissed with costs.
Scope of precedent: The opinion rests on established interpretive principles (e.g., that exclusion of Civil Court jurisdiction must be explicit or clearly implied) and distinguishes earlier authorities where the plaintiff's real remedy was to obtain a ryotwari patta. The court did not purport to lay down a novel, broad rule beyond its analysis; it confined the decision to the facts and statutory interpretation in this case. Therefore, no sweeping new precedent was announced beyond the application of the cited authorities.

Revision dismissed.

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Dhulipalla Ramayya And Another v. Kota Brahmayya And Others

Judgement

This revision is directed against the finding of the Additional District Munsif, Nellore on a preliminary issue in O. S. 712 of 1951 on his file, by which he negatived the 1st defendants contention that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The 1st respondent-plaintiff brought the suit for partition and recovery of possession of his one-third share in the plaint lands and for other incidental reliefs. His case is that he and defendants 1 to 5 are joint shrotriamdars of Kuricherlapad, shrotrium, that he owns 4-12th share in the shrotrium, that the 1st defendant is entitled to 1/12th share and the defendants 2 and 3 to 4/12th share and defendants 4 and 5 to the remaining 3/12th share, that the two items of plaint lands consisting of survey Nos. 160 and 161 were anadhinam lands, that S. No. 160 was progressively reclaimed at the joint expense of all the shrotriumdars between 1940 and 1949 and that Survey No. 161 was similarly re-claimed by all of them between 1945 and 1949.

Although the lands were jointly owned and enjoyed by them, the 1st defendant began to assert exclusive title and possession in himself in respect of both the lands on the ground that he had been let into possession and cultivated them as a ryot. He filed two suits against his coshrotriumdars and their lessees for recovery of possession under S. 9 of the Specific Relief Act; O. S. No. 611 of 1949 in respect of a portion measuring Ac. 3-16 cents in S. No. 160 and O. S. No. 608 of 1949 in respect of the entire Survey No. 161. These suits were decreed on 28-11-1950 and the 1st defendant has been subsequently trying to get possession of the entire Survey Nos. 160 and 161. On these allegations the plaintiff claimed partition and recovery of possession of his share in the lands.

The 1st defendant in his written statement denied that he was a co-owner along with the plaintiff and defendants 2 to 5 and contended that he had become solely entitled to occupancy rights as a ryot in respect of the lands. He contended further that the Court of the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to try the suit. This contention was founded on the fact that the inam estate of Kuricherlapad shrotrium was taken over by the Government on 1-10-1951 under the Madras

Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948. His position was that only the special forums set up by the Act had jurisdiction to try the subject-matter of the suit.

2. Sri M. S. Ramachandra Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner, argued that the plaintiffs case is that the suit lands are private lands and chat the dispute in the suit resolves itself to a determination of the question whether the suit lands are private lands or ryoti lands. But he hag been unable to show how on the plaint allegations, the suit lands can possibly be said to be private lands, as defined in S. 3 (10) of the Madras Estates Land Act, cl. (b) of which is the relevant clause. According to the plaint, they were merely Anadhinam or unoccupied lands which were brought under cultivation between 1940 and 1949. -

The expression anadhinam does not imply that it is domain or home-farm land of the landholder and therefore private land-Gopalaswamy Ayyangar v. Athamanathaswami Dev, 1957-1 Mad LJ 104 (A). It merely means unoccupied land and the plaint allegations are in effect that the suit lands were cultivated lands which were brought under cultivation by the landholders between 1940 and 1949. The plaint allegations dp,, not bring them within any of the categories of private land set out in S. 3 (10) (b). It follows] that they would be ryoti lands within the meaning of S, 3 (16). On the plaint allegations, the! joint shrotriumdars would be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the lands under S. 13 (b) (III) of the Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948.

The defence of the 1st defendant is in effect that he is entitled to a ryotwari patta under S. 11 of that Act. The question is whether on account of this dispute which arises from the contentions of the 1st defendant, the Civil Court is deprived of the jurisdiction under the provisions of Act 26 of 1948.

3. Sri M. S. Ramachandra Rao points out that under S. 3 (d) of Act 26 of 1948 the entire estate has vested in the Government and contends that persons claiming possession of lands in such an estate have to obtain a ryotwari patta from the Government, under one or the other of Ss. 11 to 14 of the Act, before they can assert any rights to the lands. I am unable to agree with this contention. No doubt under cl. (d) of S. 3 of Act 26 of 1943 the consequence of the notification is that the Government becomes entitled to take possession of the estate. But this is subject to the proviso that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land in respect of which he appears entitled to a ryotwari patta until the question is decided by the special forums set up by the Act.

In other words, the right of possession and the rights incidental to possession of persons who might be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of the land are not taken away but are preserved by the Act. This situation is emphasized by S. 64 which provides that the rights of owners and occupiers of lands will not be affected by temporary discontinuance of possession or occupation immediately before the notified date. If the special forums set up under the Act finally decide that the person is not entitled to a ryotwari patta the restriction in the proviso to S. 3 (d) ceases to have effect and the Government becomes entitled to dispossess him.

But this cannot be construed to mean that everybody can dispossess him meanwhile and that he is deprived of all his rights flowing from possession, until he obtains a ryotwari patta ; of course the right to obtain a ryotwari patta can be enforced only before the special forums set up under the Act and that relief cannot directly or indirectly be sought elsewhere. But there is nothing in the Act to show that until the ryotwari patta is obtained, all reliefs in respect of other rights flowing from possession are taken away and cannot be claimed in the ordinary Civil Courts.

4. The next submission of Sri M. S. Ramachanara Rao is that under S. 15 of Act 26 of 1948 the Settlement Officer is charged with the duty of examining the nature and history of all the lands in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta under Ss. 12, 13 and 14 and of deciding in respect of which lands the claim should be allowed. He contends,, that the jurisdiction of Civil Courts is impliedly barred in respect of such lands when the claim involves, as here, the grant of a ryotwari patta under S. 13.

It is well settled that the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is not to be readily inferred, but such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly implied. Secretary of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 at p. 110 (B). Section 15 of Act 26 of 1948 must be read along with S. 3 (d) from which it appears that the purpose of deciding whether a ryotwari patta should be granted is to determine whether the Government may take possession of the land. If the relief sought does not bear on the Governments right to take possession it cannot be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is impliedly barred.

The learned counsel strongly relies on the decision in State of Madras v. Swammathan, 1955-2 Mad LJ 178 (C). There a suit was filed by the plaintiff against the Government for declaration that certain lands registered as tank bed lands were the plaintiffs ryoti lands and for a permanent injunction restraining the Government from interfering with his enjoyment. It was held that the plaintiff really wanted a ryotwari patta and therefore he was not entitled to file a suit for declaration in a Civil Court and that the plaintiffs remedy was by way of an application under S. 11 before the Settlement Officer.

This decision has no bearing because the plaintiff here has not brought the suit with the object of obtaining a ryotwari patta from the Government. He is merely seeking to enforce his right as against an alleged co-sharer of the plaintiffs lands. No doubt if the plaintiff and his co-sharers are ultimately found to be entitled to a ryotwari patta the Government would be able to dispossess them of the lands and the reliefs sought in the suit would be illusory and ineffective. But even if they are ultimately found to be entitled to a ryotwari patta, the special forums under the Act would not be able to give them the reliefs of partition and possession claimed in the suit.

It is well settled that when the special forums cannot grant the relief, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not barred. Parmeshari v. Krishna Kumer. AIR 1944 All 194 (D) and Swaminatha Odayar v. Asan Muhammad Rowther, 1947-1 Mad LJ 83 : AIR 1947 Mad 276) (FB) (E) Hence there is no substance in the contention that S. 15 operates to oust the Civil Courts jurisdiction.

5. Sri M. S. Ramachandrarao finally called in aid S. 56 (D of the Act 26 of 1948 which provides that after the notification of an estate when a dispute arises as to who is the lawful ryot in respect of any holding the dispute shall be decided by the Settlement Officer. A holding means a parcel or parcels of land held under a single patta or engagement in a single village- Section 3 (3) of the Madras Estates Land Act. No doubt the 1st defendant appears to claim that the suit lands constitute a holding in respect of which he is lawful ryot. But the plaintiffs case is that the suit lands are not a holding at all, but have been in the possession and enjoyment of the joint landholders.

Neither the gist nor the form of the dispute relates to the question who is a lawful ryot of a holding and the dispute does not therefore come within S. 56.

6. The preliminary finding of the District Munsif that he has Jurisdiction to try the suit is right. This revision petition is dismissed with costs.

Revision dismissed.

Dhulipalla Ramayya And Another v. Kota Brahmayya And Others

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

First Defendant (as stated in written statement)

Counsel for the Petitioner (Sri M. S. Ramachandra Rao)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Dhulipalla Ramayya And Another v. Kota Brahmayya And Others

Comments