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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section of the Income Tax Act (no specific section/subsection/year mentioned)
  • Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section [not specified], Subsection [not specified] of [no specific Act mentioned]
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section of the Income Tax Act (no specific section/subsection/year mentioned)
  • Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act
  • Section [not specified], Subsection [not specified] of [no specific Act mentioned]
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Dalip Singh (“the appellant”) agreed on 25-5-1987 to sell 69 kanals 10 marlas of agricultural land in Village Bichhnari, District Gohana (Haryana) to Mehar Singh Rathee (“Respondent 1”) for Rs 1,70,000. The sale deed was to be executed by 25-7-1987, later extended to 25-8-1987, after the appellant obtained an income-tax clearance certificate and mutation of the land in his name.

Learning that the appellant intended to convey the land to third parties (Respondents 2–4), Respondent 1 sent several notices in mid-August 1987 demanding performance. On 24-8-1987 he discovered the appellant had purchased stamp papers for another sale. Respondent 1 appeared before the Sub-Registrar on 25-8-1987 with the balance consideration, but the appellant did not attend.

Respondent 1 first filed a suit for permanent injunction to restrain alienation and compel execution of the sale deed. After instituting a more comprehensive suit for specific performance on 23-11-1987 in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Sonepat, he withdrew the injunction suit on 10-12-1987.

The appellant challenged territorial jurisdiction; on 20-3-1989 the Sonepat court returned the plaint, which was re-presented the next day before the Additional Civil Judge, Gohana.

Meanwhile, the appellant executed a registered sale deed on 22-3-1988 in favour of Respondents 2–4. Respondent 1 amended the plaint to implead them and to seek a declaration voiding that transfer.

The trial court found the agreement genuine, held Respondent 1 ready and willing, rejected the defence of bona fide purchase, but dismissed the suit as barred by Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), even though that plea had never been raised or pleaded.

On first appeal, the dismissal was reversed: the bar under Order 2 Rule 2 was rejected and specific performance decreed. An additional defence under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC (based on withdrawal of the earlier injunction suit) was also rejected.

The appellant alone pursued a second appeal; the High Court affirmed the decree. The present opinion resolves the appellant’s further appeal, challenging the maintainability of the specific-performance suit under Order 2 Rule 2 and Order 23 Rule 1 CPC.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit for specific performance was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC because the earlier injunction suit had been withdrawn without leave of the court.
  2. Whether the suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC for omitting reliefs arising from the same cause of action in the earlier injunction suit.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The specific-performance suit was hit by Order 23 Rule 1 CPC; Respondent 1 withdrew the earlier injunction suit without permission and therefore could not institute a fresh suit on the same cause of action.
  • Independently, the suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC because Respondent 1 had earlier sought only an injunction and had omitted the relief of specific performance.

Respondent 1's Arguments

  • The defences under Order 23 Rule 1 and Order 2 Rule 2 were never pleaded in the written statement, nor were issues framed; they could not be introduced for the first time on appeal.
  • The two suits rested on different causes of action: the first sought preventive relief before the contractual date expired, while the second sought enforcement after breach.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court stressed that procedural bars under Order 23 Rule 1 and Order 2 Rule 2 CPC are pleadings-based defences requiring both an explicit plea and a framed issue so the opposing party can lead evidence on identity of cause of action.

Order 23 Rule 1 CPC: The appellant never pleaded this bar in his written statement; the issue was not framed; the point was raised only before the first appellate court and abandoned before the High Court. Consequently, the appellant could not revive the contention at this late stage.

Order 2 Rule 2 CPC: Likewise, the defence was absent from the pleadings and no issue was framed. The “sine qua non” for the rule—proof that both suits share an identical cause of action—was therefore unestablished. Without pleadings or evidence on sameness of cause of action, the bar could not apply. The High Court’s additional finding that the two suits were based on different causes of action was therefore left undisturbed.

The factual findings that (i) the agreement of sale was genuine, (ii) Respondent 1 was always ready and willing, and (iii) Respondents 2–4 were not bona fide purchasers protected by Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, had not been seriously challenged and were affirmed.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed.

The decree for specific performance in favour of Respondent 1 stands, and the transfer to Respondents 2–4 remains ineffective. No costs were awarded. The decision rests on established procedural principles and sets no new substantive precedent.

    Dalip Singh v. Mehar Singh Rathee And Others

    Order

    1. Dalip Singh, the defendant-appellant (hereinafter referred to as “the appellant”) was the owner of land measuring 69 kanals 10 marlas situated in the area of Village Bichhnari, District Gohana in the State of Haryana. He entered into an agreement for sale of the suit land on 25-5-1987 with Mehar Singh Rathee, plaintiff-Respondent 1 (for short “Respondent 1”) for a consideration of Rs 1,70,000. As per agreement the sale deed was to be executed on or before 25-7-1987. The appellant was required to obtain clearance certificate from the Income Tax Department for the sale of the suit land and also to get mutation of the land sanctioned in his favour before the execution of the sale deed because he had received the land through a civil court decree in Civil Suit No. 122 dated 19-3-1984 titled Dalip v. Sarti. The date for execution of the sale deed was extended by mutual agreement on 18-7-1987 to 25-8-1987.

    2. It came to the knowledge of Respondent 1 that the appellant was trying to sell the property to Respondents 2 to 4. He issued registered A/D notices dated 17-8-1987, 19-8-1987, 20-8-1987 and telegram dated 19-8-1987 calling upon the appellant to execute the sale deed in terms of the agreement to sell. The appellant did not give any reply to the same nor did he give any information as to whether he had obtained the income tax clearance certificate and got sanctioned the mutation in his name. On 24-8-1987 it came to the knowledge of Respondent 1 that the appellant had purchased three stamp papers of the value of Rs 3250, Rs 3250 and Rs 6000 for selling the land to Respondents 2 to 4. The appellant appeared before the Sub-Registrar on 25-8-1987 along with balance consideration for execution of the sale deed but the appellant did not come to execute the said sale deed.

    3. Apprehending that the appellant may sell the land to someone else, Respondent 1 filed a suit for permanent injunction in the Court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Gohana praying for a decree for permanent injunction restraining the appellant from selling the property to any other person and for mandatory injunction directing him to execute the sale deed in his favour only.

    4. On 23-11-1987 Respondent 1 filed a suit for specific performance of the agreement dated 25-5-1987 in the Court of Senior Sub-Judge, Sonepat. On 10-12-1987 Respondent 1 withdrew the suit for permanent injunction filed in the Court of Sub-Judge, First Class, Gohana as he had already filed a suit for specific performance. The trial court dismissed the suit as withdrawn and passed the following order:

    “Learned counsel for the plaintiff has made his statement that he withdraws his suit as the party has filed the suit for specific performance at Sonepat. In view of his statement, the suit of the plaintiff stands dismissed as withdrawn. File be consigned to the record room after due compliance.”

    5. On 8-3-1988 the appellant filed a written statement in the suit for specific performance contending inter alia that the Court of Senior Sub-Judge at Sonepat did not have the territorial jurisdiction to try the suit. On 20-3-1989 the Court at Sonepat returned the plaint to Respondent 1 for presentation before the appropriate court having jurisdiction. Immediately after the return of the plaint Respondent 1 presented the plaint in the Court of Additional Civil Judge, Gohana on 21-3-1989.

    6. The suit land was sold by the appellant to Respondents 2 to 4 through a registered sale deed on 22-3-1988. Respondent 1 moved an application for amendment of the plaint seeking impleadment of Respondents 2 to 4 and the sons and daughters of the appellant as Respondents 5 to 10 being necessary parties and also seeking amendment in the plaint including the relief clause. Additional prayer for declaration that the sale deed dated 22-3-1988 executed in favour of Respondents 2 to 4 was null and void and not binding on him was made.

    7. Upon notice the appellant entered appearance and contested the suit. He denied the execution of the agreement of sale. It was also stated that Respondent 1 was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. Respondents 2 to 4 in their joint written statement took up similar pleas. In addition, they took the plea that they were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice and therefore protected under Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act.

    8. On the pleadings of the parties, the following issues were framed:

    1. Whether Defendant 1 entered into an agreement for sale on 25-5-1987 in respect of the suit land with the plaintiff? OPP
    2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to specific performance of the contract dated 25-5-1987? OPP
    3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD
    4. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the present suit? OPD
    5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD
    6. Whether the plaintiff has suppressed the material facts of the case? If so, its effect? OPD
    7. Whether Defendants 2 to 4 are bona fide purchasers? If so, its effect? OPD
    8. Relief.

    9. The trial court held that the appellant had entered into agreement of sale on 25-5-1987 in respect of the suit land with Respondent 1 voluntarily of his own free will. That Respondent 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the obligation under the agreement to sell but the appellant was not prepared to execute the sale deed in favour of Respondent 1. Respondents 2 to 4 were held not to be the bona fide purchasers. The trial court further held that the transfer in their favour was hit by the doctrine of lis pendens. The suit was, however, dismissed by holding that the suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Plea that the suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was neither taken in the written statement nor was an issue struck on this point.

    10. Aggrieved against the order of the trial court, Respondent 1 filed the appeal. The first appellate court did not agree with the finding of the trial court that suit was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and held that the finding in this regard was erroneous and accordingly, set it aside. Additional plea raised by the appellant that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC for having withdrawn the suit for permanent injunction without obtaining the permission of the court to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action was rejected. All other findings recorded by the trial court were affirmed. Resultantly, the suit filed by Respondent 1 was decreed and specific performance of the agreement of sale dated 25-5-1987 was ordered on payment of balance amount of consideration.

    11. Aggrieved against the order of the first appellate court, the appellant filed the second appeal. Respondents 2 to 4 accepted the judgment of the first appellate court and did not file any appeal. The High Court in the second appeal affirmed the findings of the courts below that Respondent 1 was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract whereas the appellant was not ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement. This finding being on facts was not seriously challenged before us. Otherwise also, there is no scope to interfere with this finding. The High Court on reappreciation of the evidence on the record has come to the firm finding of fact that Respondent 1 was always ready and willing to perform his part of the agreement but correspondingly the appellant was not ready to execute the sale deed as per agreement. Plea that the suit was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 CPC was rejected on merits as well as on the ground that such plea having not been taken in the written statement and the fact that no issue was struck on this point, it was not open to the appellant to raise such a plea. It seems that the plea that the suit was barred by Order 23 Rule 1 CPC was not raised before the High Court.

    12. Counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC as Respondent 1 had withdrawn the suit filed by him for permanent injunction and filed the suit for specific performance without seeking permission of the court. According to him, since the second suit was filed without obtaining the leave of the court the same was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC. We do not find any substance in this plea. The plea that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC was not taken in the written statement and no issue was framed to that effect. This plea was raised for the first time before the first appellate court which was negatived. Plea that the suit was barred under Order 23 Rule 1 CPC was not taken before the High Court. Under the circumstances the appellant cannot be permitted to take this plea before us. Contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the suit filed by Respondent 1 was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is not sustainable on two counts. Firstly, the plea of applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC and the subsequent suit being barred was not taken by the appellant in his written statement filed in response to the notice of the suit nor was any issue framed on the point. The sine qua non for applicability of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is that a person entitled to more than one relief in respect of the same cause of action has omitted to sue for some relief without the leave of the court. When an objection regarding bar to the filing of the suit under Order 2 Rule 2 CPC is taken, it is essential for the court to know what exactly was the cause of action which was alleged in the previous suit in order that it might be in a position to appreciate whether the cause of action alleged in the second suit is identical with the one that was the subject-matter of the previous suit. As the plea had not been raised in the written statement and no issue framed on this point, no opportunity was provided to Respondent 1 to lead evidence to rebut the same. In the absence of pleadings and proof of identity of cause of action, the appellant could not be permitted to raise the plea of bar of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC. The High Court had gone into merits as well and held that the two suits filed by Respondent 1 were not based on the same cause of action. We need not examine this on merit as we have held that in the absence of pleadings or the issue regarding the bar of Order 2 Rule 2 CPC in filing the suit the appellant cannot be permitted to raise such a plea.

    13. For the reasons stated above, we do not find any merit in this appeal and dismiss the same with no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Dalip Singh v. Mehar Singh Rathee And Others
    (Jul 15, 2004)