(1) The appellants' father, kalakata krishna reddy, instituted a suit for declaration of his title with respect to survey no. 28/4, with an extent of 0 - 65 cents, in nanjampet village, and for recovery of possession of the same. He died pending the suit, and the present appellants are his legal representatives.
(2) The plaintiffs' case is that the zamindar of punganur granted a patta to their predecessor - in interest, 25 years ago, with respect to the suit land and that, after the abolition of estates, the district collector, too granted a ryotwari patta to them under the proviso to section 11 of the estates abolition act. While they were in peaceful possession of the same, the defendants dispossessed them, denying their title. The defendants, in their written statement, disputed the plaintiffs' claim. They stated that the patta was granted to the 1st plaintiff by the zamindar not with respect to the suit land, but with respect to another land and that, by fraudulent misrepresentation, the plaintiffs got the petta with respect to the suit land, from the district collector, under section 11. Proviso. They submitted that the patta does not confer any title upon the plaintiffs, nor does it affect the pre - existing title of the defendants they stated that their father had purchased two plots in paimaesh no. 9 under a sale heed dated 6 7 1933; that, another small extent was sold by the plaintiffs' father to the defendants and that, the defendants have thus acquired title to, and have been in possession of ihe suit lerd for long
(3) Both the courts below have negatived the plaintiff's claim, and dismissed the suit both the courts have found that the suit land was purchased by the defendants as alleged by them and that the patta granted to ihe plaintiffs' father by the zamindar was in respect of anothar land. Accordingly they refused to grant the reliefs sought for by the plaintiffs
(4) In this second appeal, the principal contention of mr r. Vengopala raddy, the learned counsel for the appellants (plaintiffs) , is thai the ryotwari patta granted to the plaintiffs is conclusive proof of their title and that, the civil court can neither ignore it, nor can override it. In the face of the patta, the learned counsel submitted, the civil court hed no option but to decree the plaintiffs' suit. Counsel submitted that, just as a decision under section 56 (1) (c) or under section 15 of the act is conclusive on the question of title and cannot oe questiond in a civil court, so also ihe ryot was patta issued under sec. 11 proviso is equally conclusive on the ques tiou of title and that, the civil court cannot go behind it and invest gate the question of title learned counsel conceded that there is no di fect authority supporting his contention.
(5) I am not satisfied that the submission made by the learned counsel merits acceptance. So far as the decision under section 56 (1) (c) is concerned, there is a us between two or more persons claiming ryorwari patta, and that dispute is gone into and adjudicated upon by the secernent officer, against whose decision an appeal is also provided to the tribunal further sub - section (2) of section 56 declares that the decision of the tri bunal shall be final and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law. Similarly, a decision under section 15 is declared to be final, and not liable to be questioned in any court of law, by sub - section (2) (a) of section 15. There also an appeal is provided against the decision of the settlement officer, to the tribunal, and the decision of such tribunal declared to be final as aforesaid. But in the case of grant of patta under section 11 proviso, there is no such declaration of finality or is the jurisdiction of the civil court expressly excluded. Section 64 - a. Jntioduced by 1951 amendment act, also declares that the decision of a tribunal or a special tribunal under the act, shall operate as res judicata but , a decision of the government or it's delegate under the proviso to section 11 has not been declared to operate as res judicata. Section 65, which bars the jurisdiction of the courts, merely says that no suit or other proceedings shall lie against the government for any act done, or purport ing to have been done under this act or any rules made thereunder, and that no prosecution or other proceeding shall lie against any government servant for any act done, or purporting to have been done under the provisions of the act. Thus, there is no express provision, nor could mr. Venugopal reddy bring to my notice any provision in the act, expressly barring the jurisdiction of the civil court with respect to a decision under the proviso to section 11. Nor am i inclined to agree that such a bar arises by necessary implication. It may be noted that the proviso to section 11 does not contemplate a his between two persons claiming ryotwari patta. Once such a us arises, it has to be adjudicated under sec. 56 (1) (c). Accepting mr. Venugopala reddy's contention would amount to declaring a decision under the proviso to section 11 as more - or - less a judgment in rem. Persor s who are not parties to such decision would also be bound by that decision for which i do not see any warrant. I am supported in my conclusion by the decision of a division bench of this court, consisting of sharfuddin ahmed and parthasarathi jj , in a. S no. 352 of 1964, dated 19 - 4 - 69 where the learned judges observed as follows: -
' the changes that are brought about consequent on the issue of a pafta, leave unaffected the core of the title and the incidents of ownership enumerated above. Prior to the notification of the estate the common law right of ownership was associated with a particular form of tenure, i. E. Tenure under the permanent settlement when a tenure was terminated as a result of the abolition of the estate, the state became entitled to provide a different pattern for the mutual relationship between it and the subject who was entitled to a species of ownership de hors the estates land act and without reference to the provisions of that act. It is only to regulate the new pattern of relationship between the state and the owner in regard to the terms on which property is to be held, that section 11 as also some other provi - ions of the act, had been devised. The issue of patta under section 11 by the settlement officer is an internal part only of the conversion of the tenure and does not impair the substantive right or title to property which may be described as the ownership of the property"
Mr venugopala reddi contended that the above observations are of a general nature and that, their efficacy has been eroded by the subsequent decisions of this court, and supreme court holding that the decisions under sees 56 (1) (c) and 15 bar the jurisdiction of the civil court. It is difficult to appreciate this submission, since the decision expressly deals with the position with reference to section 11, and not with reference to section 15 or section 56. Learned counsel also pointed out that, in r. Elumalai chetty v. R. Rathnavelu chetty alias ratna chetty and another (1) (1971) - ii, an. W. R. 193, the learned judges left open the question whether, after the grant of a ryotwari patta undersection 11, after enquiry, by a competent authority, can the civil court decide upon the ownership of the land? learned counsel suggested at one stage that i may refer the matter for decision to a division bench. But, having regard to the principles discussed in the preceding paragraph i do not think that there is any such difficult question which requires to ba referred to a bench, i would require clear and unambiguous language in the act before i can hold that the title of a parson, who has not been heard or whose claim has not been adjudicated upon by an authority under the act, stands extinguished by virtue of a decision rendered without hearing him.
(6) Mr. Venugopala reddy, contended that under the rules fra med under section 11, a general notice is issued inviting objections from any interested person, before a decision is rendered undt r section 11 proviso. But that, in my opinion, is not a sufficient ground to invest the decision with the character of a judgment in rem. If the intention of the legislature was to confer such finality upon a decision under section 11 proviso also, they would have said so clearly, as they have done both in the case of section 15 and section 56. This very distinction is also a ground militating against the contention of the learned counsel.
(7) Second appeal, accordingly, fails and is dismissed but, in the circumstances, without costs.