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  • section 10 (2) (i) and 10 (3) (i) (a) of the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act)
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  • section 10 (2) (i) and 10 (3) (i) (a) of the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion arises from two revision petitions filed by a tenant challenging an eviction order passed by the IV Additional Rent Controller, Hyderabad, in R.C. No. 361 of 1984 (renumbered as R.C. No. 1364/86), which was confirmed by the Chief Judge, City Small Causes Court, Hyderabad, in R.A. No. 381 of 1987. The tenant also challenged an order refusing to direct the landlord to file property tax receipts from 1984 onwards. The landlord filed a petition under sections 10(2)(i) and 10(3)(i)(a) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960, seeking eviction on grounds of wilful default in rent payment and bona fide requirement of the premises for personal occupation. The tenancy was oral, with the tenant originally renting from the landlord's vendor and continuing on the same terms after the sale. The Rent Controller and appellate court found the tenant wilfully defaulted on rent and held the landlord's bona fide requirement was genuine, leading to eviction orders which are under challenge in these revision petitions.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the eviction order against the tenant was justified on the ground of wilful default in rent payment under the oral tenancy.
  2. Whether the landlord’s bona fide requirement of the suit premises for personal occupation was genuine and reasonable.
  3. Whether the tenant was properly attorned to the landlord after the sale of the premises, given the oral nature of the tenancy and absence of written notice.
  4. Whether the rent payable was Rs. 300/- per month as claimed by the landlord or Rs. 150/- as contended by the tenant.
  5. Whether the tenant’s application for production of property tax receipts was relevant to determining the rent or eviction.

Arguments of the Parties

Tenant's Arguments

  • There was no proper attornment to the landlord because no written notice was issued; thus, eviction on default was unjustified.
  • The rent payable was only Rs. 150/- and not Rs. 300/- as alleged by the landlord.
  • There was no wilful default in payment of rent.
  • The landlord’s claim of bona fide requirement was not genuine as the suit premises was insufficient for a family of 17 members.

Landlord's Arguments

  • The tenancy was oral but the tenant was duly informed of the sale and attorned to the landlord orally.
  • The tenant wilfully defaulted on rent from March to August 1984, ignoring legal notices.
  • The agreed rent was Rs. 300/- per month, supported by oral evidence and notice issued.
  • The landlord had a bona fide requirement of the suit premises for personal occupation, being evicted from his rented accommodation and having a large family.
  • The tenant’s application for property tax receipts was irrelevant to the determination of rent or eviction.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Raju vs. Josyula Hanumayamma (Supreme Court) Effective possession and attornment require more than a paper attornment; possession must be actual and rent paid to the attorned person. Held that this precedent did not apply as the tenancy was oral and the tenant was orally informed of the sale and attorned accordingly, accepted by lower courts.
S. Sundaram Pillai vs. Kousalaya Devi (Supreme Court) Definition of wilful default: intentional, deliberate, calculated, and conscious failure to pay rent despite demands. Applied to find the tenant wilfully defaulted by not paying rent despite notices and legal proceedings.
Chityala Venkata Chalapati v. Alapaty Narasimha Murthy Bona fide requirement is a reasonable need based on circumstances, not absolute necessity; must be honest and without oblique motive. Used to assess landlord’s bona fide requirement as genuine and reasonable despite tenant’s objections.
K. Nagappa vs. T. D. Krishnasa Bona fide requirement means reasonable requirement for occupation without oblique motives to harass tenant. Supported the landlord’s claim of bona fide requirement and rejection of tenant’s argument on insufficiency of premises.
Vemuri Somisetti vs. Messrs Vegicherla Guravaiah and Sons Tenant initiating proceedings under section 8 must comply with obligations; onus is not on tenant to prove absence of landlord’s bona fide requirement. Applied to hold that the landlord proved bona fide requirement and tenant failed to disprove it.
K. Parasuramaiah v. Pokuri Lakshmamma (Division Bench) Balance of convenience: relative hardship to tenant weighed against advantage to landlord in eviction cases. Used to conclude that landlord’s hardship outweighs tenant’s hardship, justifying eviction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court examined the oral tenancy and attornment, holding that in the absence of a written lease, oral notice and evidence sufficed to establish attornment. The tenant’s claim of ignorance of the sale was rejected due to lack of explanation for non-payment of rent and refusal of rent by prior landlady after sale. The court found the rent amount of Rs. 300/- per month was established by credible oral evidence and the landlord’s notice, rejecting the tenant’s lower rent claim. The tenant’s wilful default was established by failure to pay rent despite legal notice and eviction proceedings, consistent with the Supreme Court’s definition of wilful default. Regarding bona fide requirement, the court held that the landlord’s need was genuine, reasonable, and made in good faith, supported by the landlord’s eviction from rented premises and family circumstances. The landlord’s requirement was not negated by the size of the premises or absence of expansion plans. The tenant’s application for property tax receipts was deemed irrelevant to rent determination. The court balanced hardships and found the landlord’s need outweighed the tenant’s inconvenience, justifying eviction. Both lower courts’ findings were affirmed as lawful and justified.

Holding and Implications

The revision petitions are dismissed.

The eviction order against the tenant is upheld on grounds of wilful default and bona fide requirement by the landlord. The tenant is directed to vacate the premises by April 1, 1990, subject to regular rent payment until then. This decision directly affects the parties by confirming the eviction but does not establish any new legal precedent beyond reaffirming existing principles regarding oral tenancy, wilful default, and bona fide requirement under the A.P. Buildings Control Act.

    Mohammed Habeeb v. Khaja Moinuddin .

    (1) A short but simple point arises in these two revision petitions. The unsuccessful tenant, who suffered an order of eviction passed by the iv additional rent controller, hyderabad, in r. C, no. 361 of 1984 (renumbered as r. C. No. 1364/86) which has been confirmed by the chief judge, city small causes court, hyderabad, in r. A. No. 381 of 1987, filed c r. P. No. 1487 of 1989. C. R. P. No. 2096 of 1989 is also filed by the tenant against the order of the learned chief judge, city small causes court, hyderabad, in i. A. No. 1502 of 1988 in r. A. No. 381/87 refusing to issue a direction to the landlord to file the property tax receipts relating to the suit premises from 1984 onwards. As the two revision petitions related to the same issue, the same can conveniently be disposed of by a common order.

    (2) The respondent - landlord filed a petition under section 10 (2) (i) and 10 (3) (i) (a) of the a. P. Buildings (lease, rent and eviction) control act 1960 (hereinafter referred to as 'the act) against the petitioner - tenant seeking his eviction from the suit premises bearing house no. 1 - 5 - 454, situated at bakaram, musheerabad, hyderabad, on the ground of wilful default in payment of rent and also on the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises to live in.

    (3) The facts in a nutshell are ; the landlord purchased the suit premises from one smt. Meherunissa begum, who is examined as rp. W - 3 in the case, under a registered sale deed dated 12 - 3 - 1984. The petitioner was the tenant of the landlord's vendor at that time on a monthly rent of rs. 300/ - under an oral agreement of tenancy. The tenancy was attorned and the tenant continued as such after the sale on a monthly rent of rs 300/ - under oral agreement of tenancy. As the tenant committed wilful default in payment of rent right from 12 - 3 - 1984 to 11 - 8 - 1984, the landlord got a legal notice issued, ex. P - 1. The tenant neither paid arrears of rent act replied to the notice. It is the case of the landlord that he has been living in a rented premises on a monthly rent of rs. 55/ - and his landlord filed eviction petition and obtained an order of eviction against him and the same has been confirmed by the appellate court. He also submitted that his family consists of 17 members and, therefore, he requires the suit premises bona fide for his personal occupation.

    (4) The rent controller found that the tenant has committed wilful default in payment of rent and he has not remitted the rent in time and it was only after the notices have been given and after filing of the eviction petition, the amount has been paid. He also found that the landlord requires the building bona fide for his personal occupation. It w is also found that the agreed rent is rs. 300/ - and not rs. 150/ - as alleged by the tenant and the tenancy is an oral tenancy. The findings of the learned rent controller have been confirmed by the learned chief judge, city small causes court. The learned appellate judge also refused to direct the landlord to file the property tax receipts in a separate proceedings as stated above, hence these two revision petitions.

    (5) Sri n. Raghavan, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that there is no proper attornment and in the case of attornment a written notice must be there and as the written notice has not been issued, the two courts below were not justified in ordering eviction on the ground of default. He also contended that the rent is only rs. 150/ - and not rs. 300/ - and that there is no wilful default on the part of the tenant, in regard to the bona fide requirement, the learned counsel contended that the suit premises is not at all sufficient for a family consisting of 17 members and, therefore, the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide.

    (6) Admittedly the tenancy is an oral tenancy. No written agreement was entered into by the tenant even with the vendor of the landlord and after the suit premises was purchased by the landlord also no written agreement was entered into between the landlord and the tenant. The landlord has examined himself as p. W - 1 and also examined his vendor as p. W - 3. Their evidence show a that immediately after the purchase of the suit premises by the landlord, both of them went and informed the tenant about the sale transaction. Simply because a sale deed has been executed between the landlord and his vendor, it does not mean that it has to be construed as a constructive notice to the tenant. If there is any written lease deed, it is desirable for the parties to give a notice to the tenant in writing. In the case of oral tenancy and in the absence of any written agreement, the court has to consider the oral evidence that has been let in by the parties with regard to the attornment. In the case of oral tenancy, an oral intimation is sufficient. The oral evidence adduced by the parties has to be scrutinised with great care and caution and there is every possibility of the landlord creating a sale deed behind the back of the tenant and then file an application for eviction through the purchaser after 3 or 4 months. In this case the evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 3 is consistent that the tenancy is oral and the same has been accepted by the two courts below. The contention of the tenant that he was not aware of the sale deed executed by the original landlady in favour of the present landlord, cannot be accepted. If he has no notice about the same, there is no explanation forthcoming from the side of the tenant as to why he has not sent the amount by m. O. From march, 1984 onwards till the date of issue of notice either to p. W - 3 or to p. W - 1. The refusal to receive the rent sent by the tenant from august, 1984, by the original landlady supports the version of the landlord about the attornment of the tenancy. The fact of sale transaction was in fact brought to the notice of the tenant by p. W - 3 in the presence of p. W - 1 in march, 1984 itself. The tenant also never cared to give a reply to the notice issued by the landlord on 20 - 8 - 1984. The tenant might have a grievance because he could not purchase the suit premises but that is not a ground to for not paying the rent which ultimately resulted in the pain of eviction for him.

    (7) In support of his contention, the learned counsel has relied upon a judgment of the supreme court reported in uppalapati veera venkata satyanarayana raju vs. Josyula hanumayamma the supreme court observed that.

    ". A mere paper attornment would not be enough to establish as against third parties the possession of the person in whose favour attornment has been made and it will still have to be shown that the possession was effective in the sense that the person who attorned also paid rent voluntarily or under a decree to the person in whose favour he made the attornment."

    It was a case filed by the plaintiffs for possession of certain properties and the main contest centered round possessory title which was asserted by both the parties in that case. The so called reversioners in that case managed to obtain a kadapa from the two tenants and they have also executed a cowle in favour of the tenants. In this case there is no written agreement between the original landlady and the tenant. The tenancy is an oral lenaacy. The above decision do not apply to the facts of this case. The evidence of p. Ws. 1 and 3 clearly establishes that the tenant was intimated in march, 1984, immediately after the sale transaction and a proper attornment has been made in this case.

    (8) Nextly it is contended that the rent is only rs. 150/ - per month and not rs. 300/ - per month as claimed by the landlord. Admittedly no written lease deed has been entered into between the parties and no receipt also has been passed by the previous landlady. In the notice ex. P - 1 also the landlord has mentioned that the rent is rs. 300/ - per month. No tangible material has been elicited in the cross - examination of either p. W - 1 or p. W - 3 to discredit their testimony that the rent is rs. 150/ - but not rs. 300/ - as stated by them in their chief - examination both the courts below, on a proper assessment of the evidence on record came to the conclusion that the rent is rs. 300/ - per month and not rs. 150/ - per month as alleged by the tenant.

    (9) In the lower appellate court, the tenant has come forward with an application to call for the tax receipts relating to the suit premises from the m. C. H. As per the statement given by the landlord. The question is that in the absence of any written lease deed, what is the agreed rent payable to the suit property. The entries in the property tax register and the rateable value fixed for a building cannot be taken as a guiding principle for determining the rent payable for a particular building. The agreed rent will depend upon the terms of the lease, either oral or written, but not the entries in the municipal records. The original landlady has deposed that the agreed rent is rs. 300/ - per month. The tenant cannot gain strength on account of any entries made in the municipal registers. The learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the punjab and haryana high court in smt. Sant kaur v. Balwant singh wherein it was held that the entry in municipal assessment supported by ocular statement of witness can be relied to ascertain as to rate of rent of premises. But this decision is of no avail to the facts of the present case.

    (10) With regard to wilful default the learned counsel has relied upon' a decision of the supreme court in s. Sundaram pillai vs. Kousalaya devi. In that case the tenant committed default after default despite oral demands or reminders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause. While interpreting the expression 'wilful' under section 10 (2) on the tamil nadu buildings (lease and rent control) act the supreme court observed :

    "thus, a consensus of the meaning of the words 'wilful default' appears to indicate the default in order to be wilful must be intentional deliberate, calculated and conscious, with full knowledge of legal consequences flowing therefrom. Taking for instance a case where a tenant commits default after default despite oral demands or remainders and fails to pay the rent without any just or lawful cause, it cannot be said that he is not guilty of wilful default because such a course of eonduct manifestly amounts to wilful default as contemplated either by the act or by other acts referred to above."

    (11) Lastly it is contended that the bona fide requirement as pleaded by the landlord is not correct. Admittedly the landlord was residing in a rented premises on a monthly rent of rs. 55/ - and an eviction petition was filed against him and an order of eviction was also passed and the same was also confirmed by the appellate court. The revision petition filed by the present landlord was also dismissed. Therefore, the landlord has no other alternative except to vacate that premises and occupy the suit premises purchased by him. The tenant set up a plea that the landlord has got big family consisting of 17 members and the suit premises is too small a building consisting of one living room, a kitchen and varandah in a total area of 95. 3 sq. Yards. Sufficiency or insufficiency of a premises cannot be determined by means of number of family members which the landlord is having, in a rent control proceedings. After all it is the desire of every human citizen to have his own shelter irrespective of its size. The landlord was living in a rent premises on a monthly rent of rs. 55/ - only and the present property was purchased for a consideration of rs. 20,000/ -. Here it is a case of a landlord who is now threatened with a decree of eviction by his landlord. The dire necessity of the landlord makes him to adjust himself with the large family even in a small building of his own. It is for the landlord to make a living within the space available for him and it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as to the way of living. The landlord has purchased the suit premises to suit his purse. The suit premises consists of two rooms and a big varandhah with separate bath and w. C. There is an open yard also. Simply because the landlord has not come out with any intention of expanding the rooms in the open space available, it does not mean that the requirement of the landlord is not bona fide. Considering the status of the petitioner, we cannot say that the suit premises that was purchased by the landlord is not at all sufficient for his occupation. The insufficiency of accommodation cannot be a guiding factor to determine the bona fide nature of the claim that has been made by the landlord who is in dire necessity to have a shelter on the threat of eviction order passed against him by a competent court.

    (12) This court in chityala venkata chalapati v. Alapaty narasimha murthy held :

    "there is no yardstick for measuring the genuiness of the plea for bona fide need. It should necessarily depend on the circumstances in each case. It is not absolute necessity that has to be looked for but a requirement that is reasonable. What has to be looked into is whether there is a genuine present need for the building and whether the honestly and in good faith, is asking for the same and not with any oblique motive i. E. , just to evict the tenant and release it to other."

    (13) In k. Nagappa vs. T. D. Knshnasa it was held :

    "bona fide requirement of the landlord does not mean his absolute requirement without which it is impossible for him to get on. Bona fide requirement is no other than reasonable requirement. The requirement of the tenant may be greater than that of the landlord but being the owner so long as the right of private ownership is recognised by law the requirement of the landlord, so long as it is reasonable and bona fide and if it is for occupation and the requirement is not vitiated by any oblique motive intended to harass the tenant to extract more rent or otherwise to let out to some others tenant, and things like that, the requirement of the landlord should be supreme."

    (14) It is not the case of the tenant that the eviction petition is filed with any oblique motive for getting a higher rent. The landlord who is under threat of an eviction order passed by a competent court honestly and in good faith asked for the accommodation for his own occupation and he is a genuine need of the building.

    (15) In vemuri somisetti vs. Messrs vegicherla guravaiah and sons it was observed that if a tenant chooses to take advantage of the provisions of section 8 and initiates proceedings, then it becomes obligatory on him to observe the requirements of the section. If he does not do so, he will then be a defaulter, subject to the determination by the rent controller whether he is a wilful defaulter. The onus certainly cannot be cast on the tenant to prove the absence of bona fide of the landlord. The provisions do not cast an obligation on the part of the tenant to prove a negative viz. , the absence of bona fide.

    (16) In this case the landlord has proved his bona fide requirement of the suit premises. The evidence adduced by him is consistent with regard to his plea of bona fide requirement as well as the wilful default committed by the tenant.

    (17) In k. Parasuramaiah v. Pokuri lakshmamma a division bench of this court observed that all factors weighing relative hardship of tenant with likely advantage of landlord have to be considered but in this case the hardship that is being caused to the landlord is more than the hardship that will be caused to the tenant. The landlord is of course having a big family and his requirement is not only genuine but also reasonable. The facts and circumstances of this case do not title the balance of convenience in favour of the tenant. On the other hand, it is clearly established that the advantage of the landlord certainly out - weighs the hardship which the tenant is likely to suffer because of the eviction.

    (18) It is feebly contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the matter ought to have been remitted back to the trial court to find out the exact rent. This contention has no force at all. In the written statement filed by the tenant in a suit he merely stated that he issued a reply notice to the landlord. But no such reply notice has been filed in this petition. The suit filed by the tenant, it appears, was dismissed on 22 - 10 - 1989.

    (19) Both the courts below have given cogent and consistent reasons for ordering eviction and therefore, the order does not suffer from any illegality and it cannot be said that the order has been passed without any jurisdiction. There are no grounds for interference in these two revision petitions. They are, therefore, dismissed. No costs.

    (20) Time for eviction is granted till the end of march, 1990 on the condition of payment of rent regularly. The tenant is directed to put the landlord in vacant possession of the suit premises on or before 1st april, 1990.

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    Comments

    Mohammed Habeeb v. Khaja Moinuddin .
    (Dec 1, 1989)