These are two revisions filed by K. Ramakrishna Rao against the orders passed by the District Collector, East Godavari in S.A Nos. 3 and 4 of 1956 on his file:— C.R.P No. 1942 of 1957 is against the judgment of the District Collector in S.A No. 3 of 1956 regarding the lands concerned in the B Schedule of the plaint, C.R.P No. 1943 of 1957 against the judgment of the District Collector in S.A No. 4 of 1956 relating to the mesne profits which have been disallowed.

2. Both the Civil Revision Petitions have arisen out of a common judgment of the District Collector in Appeals S.A Nos. 3 and 4 of 1956 which had been filed against a single order of the Sub Collector, in S.S No. 6 of 1955 dated 7-6-1956.

3. These two Civil Revision Petitions were heard together and are disposed of by this judgment by common consent.

4. The relevant, facts of the case are as follows:—

5. One Mallayya was the registered holder of the office of blacksmith (artisan and was in possesion of the suit A and B schedule lands, which are the blacksmith service inam lands of Yempalli village, Ramachandrapuram Taluk in East Godavari District. The relationship of the parties is as shown in the geneological tree given below:—

6. The second respondent is in possession of B schedule lands of an extent of Acs. 4-69 1/2 cts. and the first respondent is in possession of A Schedule lands of an extent of Acs. 4-53 1, 2 cts.

7. Plaintiff's contention was to the following effect:—

8. Originally, the father of the plaintiff's paternal grandfather Latchanna held the Office. He was in possession of the entire lands of A and B schedules and rendered service. There after, Latchanna, the plaintiff's paternal grandfather (and son of Mallaiah) became entitled to the service and the inam lands described in the A and B schedules. Latchanna rendered service and enjoyed the said service inam. Later, Latchanna resigned the post. The office and the suit schedule lands passed to his sons Veerabhadrudu and Kesava Mallayya (D-1) (the first defendant) and they enjoyed the land jointly. The plaintiff, Kesava Ramakrishna Rao alias Ramakrishaiahy is the son of Veerabhadrudu. Veerabhadrudu resigned his office in 1948. Plaintiff was then a minor, having born on 26-4-1934. The resignation of Veerabhadrudu was accepted and the plaintiff and the first defendant (Kesava Malliah, were registered as the office holder by the Revenue Divisional Officer, Rajahmundry on 10-3-1948. The second defendant has no manner of right but still she is in possession of the B Schedule lands. Her possession is wrongful. Kesava Mallayya (1st defendant) along with Kesava Sathemma 2nd defendant) colluded and denied the plaintiff's rights and they ousted him (Plaintiff's father) from A and B Schedule lands. The first defendant is enjoying A Schedule lands with the third defendant as his tenant. D-2 is enjoying the lands through her tenants D-4, D-5 and D-6. Plaintiff became a major in 1952 and he filed the suit within three years after attaining majority.

9. The plaintiff prayed that he may be awarded mesne profits for three years (begining from 1952-1953) prior to the date of decree and also half share in the entire land of A and B Schedule) or at least the entire B schdule property may be decreed in his favour.

10. The first defendant contested the suit supporting the claim of the plaintiff to the extent of saying that the branch of the plaintiff and of the first defendant was entitled to the whole land of A and B schedules but pleading in addition that he (D-1) was entitled to be in possession of half the total lands and was, therefore, entitled to continue undisturbed of the A Schedule lands which constituted approximately half of the total artisan mam lands, D-3 filed a written statement supporting the case of D-1.

11. The second defendant pleaded that her branch (namely, her father-in-law's branch) was also doing service and was consequently in rightful possession of the B Schedule lands and that she had been in possession for a long time in her own right getting service rendered and was entitled to continue undisturbed. D-3, D-4, D-5 and D-6 adopted the written statement of D-2.

12. The learned Sub Collector framed the following points for decision:—

1. Whether the plaintiff has any title to the blacksmith service of the Village of Yempalli?

2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the declaration prayed for and ejection of the defendants from the plaint schedule lands?

3. Whether the suit is barred by res judicata?

4. To what mesne profits, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? and

5. To what relief, if any, are the parties entitled?

13. The learned Sub-Collector held on Issue No. 1 that the plaintiff was entitled to half the share of the blacksmith Inam Service land of Yempalli village and that the fact that the second defendant had proved by documentary evidence that she and her branch have been enjoying B Schedule lands for the last 30 years was not coupled with proof of any right to be in possession. He found on Issue No. 3 that the suit was not barred by res judicata and was in time. In view of his findings, he decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff as against D-2 alone as follows:—

“In the result………the plaint ‘B’ schedule land of Acs. 4-69 ½ cts. is decreed without costs, in favour of the plaintiff with past profits, at the rate of to bags of paddy per acre per year calculated for 4 ½ acres of land for the past three years 1952 to 1955 (at the rate of Rs. 15/- per bag of paddy) requiring the second defendant to put the plaint ‘B’ schedule land in possession of the plaintiff failing which future profits would accrue at the same rate, in favour of the plaintiff, from D-2, from the date of pronouncement of this judgment.”

14. He did not award decree against the other defendants.

15. As against that judgment, the second defendant filed S.A No. 3 of 1956. Plaintiff filed S.A No. 4 of 1956 as regards the extent to which his claim in his plaint for mesne profits and for decree against defendants 4, 5, and 6 had been disallowed. The learned District Collector allowed S.A No. 3 of 1956 (the defendant's appeal) and dismissed S.A No. 4 of 1956 the plaintiff's appeal) on the following grounds:—

(a) The Plaintiff had been awarded decree by the Sub-Collector on the main ground that the plaintiff was registered as an office-holder along with Mallayya on 6-4-1948.

(b) Succession to the office of an artisan under the Rules did not contemplate or authorise Registration. Consequently, the Registration of the Plaintiff (which was not under the statute) did not confer any right under the statute.

(c) The Revenue Divisional Officer had no power to remove a village artisan. So, he could not accept the resignation of any village officer. Therefore, any acceptance of such resignation does not create a cause of action.

(d) So long as Veerabhadrudu, father of the plaintiff is alive, there can be no cause of action for his son to file a suit for the office held by Veerabhadrudu.

16. In view of his allowing S.A No. 3 of 1956 and dismissing the suit, he dismissed S.A No. 4 of 1956.

17. I am dealing below with the arguments actually urged before me.

18. It is contended on behalf of the plaintiff petitioner that he was entitled to succeed to an office when vacancy existed under Section 12 of the Madras Hereditary Village Offices Act (Madras Act III of 1895) (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) irrespective of the question of registration. It is further argued that a village artisan belonging to class 4 was competent to resign from his post of artisan, that thereupon, a vacancy would arise and consequently there would be scope of succession. On the other hand, the learned Advocate for the second defendant contends that from the wording of Section 12, it is clear that the word ‘succession’ contemplates only a state of affairs arising on the death of the office-holder and does not leave any scope for a vacancy arising by resignation. Consistent with this contention, he says that a hereditary village artisan cannot resign his job and when once he becomes a nartisan, he remains so till he dies. The contention would mean that an accident of birth can endow a man with a right to an office which he has no volition to surrender during his lifetime, in the eye of law. There may be occasions when a man who has become a blacksmith (artisan) by birth may not like to continue to be a blacksmith, on considerations of health, physical capacity, temperament, taste or inclination. If he does not wish to continue an artisan, he would certainly have a right to cease to be an artisan. Nobody can lawfully compel him to do the work of an artisan or get it done. The way in which he can cease to do the work of an artisan or to enjoy the rights of an artisan can ordinarily be by resigning the office and surrendering the concerned inam property. There is no provision in Act III of 1895 which can prevent him from doing so but the question is whether, even if he resigns, that resignation would not be recognised, by law, whether no vacancy would arise in the concerned village office and whether there could be no succession under Act III of 1895.

19. The Learned Advocate for the second defendant has taken some pains to point out the various provisions in Section 10 of the Act which relate to village offices of Class I under Section 3. It is mentioned in Section 10(2) that

“Succession shall devolve on a specific heir according to the general custom and rule of primogeniture governing succession to impartible Zamindaries in Southern India.”

20. Section 10(4) says:

“If a vacancy is caused by the resignation………of the post of an office………the Collector……shall fill up the vacancy in accordance with the provisions of this section as if it had been caused by the death of the said holder.”

21. The filling up of the vacancy caused by resignation is governed by sub-section (2) which mentions that ‘the succession shall devolve’. Sub-Section (6) refers to a vacancy which arises by resignation, dismissal, removal or suspension and says that the vacancy in such cases, shall be filled up ‘as if it had been caused by the death of the said holder’. Sub-section (6) provides for appointment to a vacancy which had arisen otherwise than by the death of the last holder and even during the lifetime of the last holder. Such succession also is covered by the Preamble which says:—

“Whereas it is expedient to provide more precisely for the succession to certain hereditary village-office………”

22. Section 12 with which we are now concerned also say:

“12. The succession to village-offices forming Class (4) shall devolve in accordance with the law or custom applicable thereto at the date on which this Act comes into force.”

23. So, succession is to an office. Consequently, Section 12 is not inconsistent with succession taking place to an office which has arisen by resignation and, therefore, does not mean by implication that succession can take place only on the death of the previous holder and not on the resignation of the incumbent - as is contended by the learned Counsel for the 2nd defendant.

24. The learned District Collector is right when he says that the Revenue Divisional Officer has no power to remove a village aritisan and, therefore, he cannot accept the resignation of any village artisan. But the fact that he cannot accept the resignation of a village artisan cannot affect the right of a village artisan to resign his office or the effect of such resignation by causing a vacancy in the office.

25. One obvious and important feature about Section 12 is that succession takes place automatically in accordance with the law or custom, applicable on the date on which Act III of 1895 came into force. The plaintiff and the defendants are Hindus and are, beyond doubt or dispute, governed by the Hindu Law. The succession to the office which became vacant and which becomes vacant would naturally devolve automatically under the Hindu Law. In Krishna Reddi v. Pedasatyam . A.I.R 1941 Mad. 643. it was held as follows:—

“Where succession to an office is governed by Section launder which 110 registration is necessary, but persons who are entitled to succeed to the office are registered, under the mistaken idea that S. 10(5) applied to the case, the fact that their names were registered does not in any way affect their legal position.”

26. The result is as follows:—

27. The plaintiff relied on the registration for the relief which he claimed. The Sub Collector allowed the relief on the basis of registration. The District Collector held that the registration was not authorised under the Act (regarding the office namely, Village artisan and that it did not confer any right. The view of the learned District Collector, that the registration does not confer any right, is right. The plaintiff did not get any right to succession to the village office of artisan on the basis of registration. But that did not stand in the way of the petitioner getting a right to a village office under Section 12 (under the Hindu Law) independent of the registration. The question is whether he did get a right in such manner.

28. If the plaintiff is to get a right under Section 12, there must be a vacancy in the office so that he may succeed to it. If there was a vacancy by resignation of Mallayya and later of Veerabhadrudu, beyond doubt, under Section 12 and the Hindu Law which governs the parties, the plaintiff would get a right to the office and in fact would automatically succeed to the office without being appointed any body. The point is whether vacancy did arise by the resignations of Mallayya and Veerabhadrudu.

29. It has already been pointed out that succeession is to the office and not to a person. Consequently, even when a village officer is alive, a vacancy can arise. In other words, a vacancy arises not only by an incumbent ceasing to exist as human being i.e, by death but by an incumbent ceasing to be an: incumbent though he continues to he alive. This is particularly clear regarding the village officers of Class I in Section 3, regarding whom provisions, are made in Section 10. It contemplates the various contingencies and circumstances under which a vacancy can arise which are mainly as follows:—

I By death of the incumbent.

II By dismissal, removal or suspension.

III By resignation.

I. Death: This applies to village artisans just as well as it does to the village officers in Class (1). There is no dispute about this. It is the case of the defendants that a vacancy can arise for Class (4) only under this clause and not other clauses. Death as creating vacancy and an occasion for succession is an event which is sure to happen as regards every village officer (as a mortal human being) and is permanent and irrevocable and not an act completely in the hands of the village Officer and dependent on his volition or subject to the control of any superior authority.

II. Dismissal, Removal or Suspension: Vacancy can arise in this manner only by an act of a superior authority who has been empowered by the Act to exercise disciplinary control over and inflict punishments on the village officers concerned and to make appointments. This certainly applies under Section 10 and corresponding Board Standing Orders to village officers of Classs (I) in Section III. There is provision regarding them as to who are the authorities to exercise control, make appointments, inflict the concerned punishments so as to cause a vacancy temporary or permanent. No such cause can exist as regards village officers of Class 4. Under this Clause there is no provision under the Act or the Rules for Officers who can lawfully cause such vacancies in such manner or fill them up or can exercise any disciplinary control over such officers (Class 4).

III. Resignation: This can certainly arise in cases of officers under Class (1) in Section 3. The question is whether it can arise in class (4).

30. The essential feature about resignation is that it is an act of volition on the part of the incumbent of any office irrespective of the question whether that act is itself due to pressure from others. Only the incumbent can put in his resignation. Nobody can do that act. In particular, there cannot be a vacancy under this clause by the action of any superior authorities referred to above by themselves independent of the incumbent. Nobody can prevent a village officer of class (4) from resigning his post in the sense of giving up his post or relinquishing it and putting an end to his incumbency so far as action on his part is concerned. If it is a post of class (i), there is an authority empowered in law to accept such resignation and the resignation would become effective and final on the acceptance of such authority. But in the case of class (4), there is no authority which has been created or empowered in law to accept such resignation and to take action on it. The fact that there is no one to take action on such resignation does not affect the question whether the resignation can be effective. Just as there is no authority in law who can accept the resignation, there is also no authority provided by law and rules who can reject his resignation or whose acceptance is necessary for the resignation to come into effect. The resignation under such circumstances, in effect, would be a relinquishment or surrender of the office by the artisan wherein only his free will and action of his own violation can come into operation to make him cease to be an incumbent of the office. It stands to reason to hold that village office under Class (4) is a hereditary privilege to which a man is entitled to by birth and by virtue of which he can hold office and enjoy the emoluments. It cannot be treated as onerous duty which attaches to a man by birth and a burden from which he cannot free himself even if he wanted to at any time up to his death. The nature of work of a village artisan is not of the nature of a soldier under conscription or of an officer working in an office which is perpetually an essential service for which there is special provision in law forbidding resignation or relinquishment. It is not akin to slavery or bondage for life. If the incumbent of an office, for any reason to his own subjective satisfaction, is willing to relinquish the post along with the right to emoluments or lands attached to it, there should be nothing in this free country to stand in the way of his doing so. He must have a right to do so.

31. There is scope for some difficulty in certain circumstances. It the resignation can come into effect without being accepted by some authority (provided by statute or lawful rules) there may by difficulty in;knowing when exactly the vacancy arises by resignation. Further, as a person can put in his resignation without the need of any one accepting it to become effective, it would be open for him to withdraw that resignation without the need for any one allowing him to withdraw. In such a case, there would be difficulty in making sure that a vacancy has arisen, that the resignation has become irrevocable and that a succession has taken place. But it is not impossible for circumstances to exist wherein a resigation takes effect and becomes irrevocable and results in automatic succession under section 12 of the Act. For example, if the incumbent in office makes it clear when resigning that his resignation is irrevocable and gives effect to the succession to himself and openly recognises it thereby creating estoppel in himself. Consequently, if any one makes a claim in suit for succession on the basis of resignation, he cannot be allowed to succeed unless he proves to the entire satisfaction of the Court that the resignation did take place, became effective and irrevocable and resulted in succession coming into effect under Section 12. That a fact is difficult to prove does not mean that such fact does not exist or can never come into existence. B.S O. 157 runs as follows:—

“When a person on whom a village artisan's office has devolved by legal or customary right, makes default in respect of service, the revenue officer cannot ordinarily interfere in order to appoint a successor, nor are revenue officers in general empowered to punish village artisans.”

32. The fact that there is no one to receive information and record the resignation of village officers under Class (4) does not mean that no resignation can take place any more than it can be said that no death can take place be cause there is no provision for registration of births and deaths.

33. So, it appears to be reasonable to hold on Point No. 2 that a village artisan of Class (4) can resign his post effectively, that on such resignation, a vacancy would arise in that village office concerned and that on such vacancy arising, succession to such office can automatically take place under Section 12.

34. In view of the above finding, the view of the Learned District Collector that there can be no cause of action for the plaintiff to file a suit for the office so long as his father Veerabhadrudu is alive is not correct or tenable. I, therefore, set aside the decision of the Learned District Collector in S.A No. 3 of 1956, allow Civil Revision Petition No. 1942 of 1957 and remand the appeal to the District Collector, East Godavari, who is directed to dispose of the appeal in the light of the observations made above in this judgment.

35. I also set aside the judgment in S.A No. 4 of 1956, allow C.R.P No. 1943 of 1957 and remand the appeal to the Learned District Collector, East Godavari who is directed to dispose of the appeal S.A No. 4 of 1956) also on merits afresh in the light of the observations made above in this judgment.

36. The Learned District Collector will be free for coming to his own findings on the questions of fact, including the question as to whether there was a resignation, whether the resignation had become effective and caused a vacancy and resulted in succession taking effect under the provisions of law.

37. I award costs to the petitioner. Advocate's fee Rs. 50/- one set.

Ch. R.

Appeal allowed.