1. The plaintiff appeals from the judgment of the District Judge. Nalgonda, given on 7th February, 1963 whereby the learned Judge allowed the appeal and dismissed the plaintiff's suit.

2. The necessary facts are that the plaintiff instituted a suit for possession of 1 acre and 31 guntas of wet land and 15 acres of dry land and for mesne profits. It was alleged inter alia that there was a compact area of 180 acres of dry land arid 20 acres of wet land. This compact area has not been divided by metes and bounds between three different families which own this compaot area. Padmati dandam and Pati families cultivate these lands jointly with 12 ploughs. Padmati family has got 8 ploughs while the remaining two families have got two ploughs each. The plaintiff belongs to Padmati family. Originally the share of the plaintiff was one plough, that is o-1-4 share. Mallayya, husband of the 52nd defendant Rajamma. was having 0-1-4 share and his brother Rajayya was also having 0-1-4 share. Mallayya was the pattedar after whose death his 0-1-4 share devolved on his widow, Rajamma, the and defendant. 11 was alleged that when Rajayya was alive Rajayya, and Rajamma (2nd defendant), wife of Mallayya, executed a registered gift deed, for 0-1-4 share of land (that is one plough) in plaintiff's favour on 28th April. 1943 in view of the services rendered by the plaintiff to Rajayya and Rajamma. The plaintiff was put in possession in pursuance of the gift deed. The plaintiff was thus in possession of his own 0-1-4 share and the said gifted share of 0-1-4 and was cultivating 0-2-8 share. While so, in May, 1949, the 1st defendant, who is a nephew of Rajayya, dispossessed the plaintiff with the help of some communists and in. collusion with Rajayya and Rajamma of his 0-1-4 share. He therefore claimed that he should be put in possession of his 0-1-4 share and also claimed mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 100 per year. Defendants 1 to 4 and 6 in their joint written statement denied the execution of the gift deed by Rajayya and Rajamma in favour of the plaintiff. Their allegation was that the plaintiff asked Rajayya and Rajamma to give him 0-1-4 share of land on lease at the rate of Rs. 30 per year and took them to Tehsil office and got a deed registered representing that it was only a lease deed. The plaintiff paid the lease amount to Rajayya and Rajamma for 1353 Fasli year. When they demanded for the next year the lease amount, the plaintiff turned round and stated, that he was the owner and that he was not liable to pay the lease amount. It is only on this fact that Rajayya and Rajamma filed a civil suit in 1354 Fasli for the cancellation of the gift deed. The suit however was dismissed for default. It was contended that during the pendency of that suit, the plaintiff, Rajayya and Rajamma compromised under which the plaintiff relinquished his cla m to 0-1-4 share. It is then in 1357-F. that the said Rajayya and Rajamma sold the suit land for a sum of Rs. 1,000 to the 1st defendant. It is in pursuance of this sale deed that the 1st defendant is in possession. They raised the plea of limitation. They further raised a contention that since no permission was obtained from the Taluqdar under the Prevention of Alienation of Agricultural Lands Act of 1349-F. hereinafter referred to as “The Act,” the said gift deed is void and cannot be enforced in a. Court of law.

3. The 5th defendant adopted the written statement of the other defendants.

4. Upon these pleadings, the trial Court framed several issues and after recording the evidence adduced by the parties decreed the plaintiff's suit.

5. On appeal by the defendants, the learned District Judge reversed the judgment of the trial Court and held that the gift deed is hit by section 4 of the Act. The learned District Judge further found that although the gift deed was not vitiated on account of fraud or misrepresentation as urged by the defendants. Rajayya and Rajamma were subordinated to the undue influence of the plaintiff and the deed therefore was Voidable. It is from this judgment of the District Judge that the present second appeal has been filed.

6. Three contentions have been raised by Mr. V. Madhava Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant. It was firstly contended that the District Judge has: erred in making out a new case for the defendants regarding undue in fluence which was not pleaded at all by the defendants. Secondly, the gift deed, since it is in favour of the plaintiff, who is the member of the family of Rajayya and Rajamma, it is not hit by section 4 of the Act. In any case, he argued finally that assuming that the plaintiff did not get title because of some defect in the gift deed, he was in possession and has been dispossessed by the 1st defendant. Consequently, a decree on his possessory title could have been passed against the 1st defendant as was claimed by him in the plaint.

7. In the view which I am taking it is not necessary to consider the first contention raised before me. I will therefore confine my consideration to the second and third contentions.

8. The Act is in Urdu. The correct translation of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4 of the Act, which is relevant for our purposes, is as follows:

“Where the alienor and the alienee belong to the same agricultural group or to such agricultural groups which have been included by Government in the same class under section 3, and after such alienation, land with an annual assessment of Rs. 50 at least is left in proprietory possession of the alienor. But the condition of Rs. 50 assessment shall not apply where a person has alienated land by will or gift in favour of members of his own family.”

9. A careful reading of the section, particularly clause (b) of sub-section (2), would reveal that section 4 is the heart of the Act. It mentions the permanent transfers which would be invalid if they are effected without the permission of the Collector. Irrespective of the fact as to what the other law, in section 4 enjoins that no permanent transfer of an agricultural land would be given effect to until and unless permission to effectuate such transfer is obtained from’ the Taluqdar, sub-section (2) however makes certain exceptions to this embargo put upon the transfers of agricultural land. The first exception relates to the persons who do not belong to agricultural class. Under clause (b) of sub-section (2), it is not necessary to obtain permission of the Collector in a case where the transferor and the transferee belong to the same agricultural group or to such another agricultural groups who have been included by the Government in the same class under section 3 of the Act. The then Government issued a notification under section 3; The Notification enumerates five classes, the second being that of Hindus etc. In that class, several agricultural groups are mentioned which include Reddis to which agricultural group admittedly the parties belong. It is not therefore in dispute that by Virtue of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4, Rajayya and Rajamma who belong to Reddi agricultural group could have permanently transferred the agricultural land either in favour of Reddis or in favour of any agricultural group which has been included by the Government in the class of Hindus etc. under section 3. It must however be noted that clause (b) provides a rider to the general permission granted to agricultural groups to transfer the land in favour of the same, agricultural group or others included in the same class without obtaining the necessary permission of the Collector. In cases where if any such permanent transfer is effected, the transferor is left with a land whose land revenue is below Rs. 50, he has to obtain the permission of the Taluqdar for any such permanent transfer. In other words, if in spite of the transfer the transferor is left with an agricultural land, the land revenue of which exceeds Rs. 56 annually, no permission of the Taluqdar becomes necessary. It is common case that in this case after the gift by Rajayya and Rajamma was made, these Vendors were left with agricultural land, the land revenue of which was only Rs. 34, that is to say, they owned agricultural land, the land revenue of which was less than Rs. 50. It is conceded that the gift deed therefore was inconsistent with section 4 since no permission was obtained from the Collector to effectuate such a permanent transfer in favour of the plaintiff by the two vendors.

10. What was however argued by Mr. V. Madhava Rao was that because the gift was in favour of the member of the same family under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4 it was not necessary to obtain the permission. The short but important question which falls for my consideration is whether the plaintiff in whose favour the gift deed was executed is a member of Rajayya and Rajamma's own family. As stated above that clause uses the expression “members of his own family.”

11. In order to appreciate this contention, the relationship between Rajayya and Rajamma on the one hand and the plaintiff on the other has to be clearly borne in mind. From the genealogical tree given in the judgment of the appellate Court, it is well established that the plaintiff is the great grandson of. the common ancestor, whereas Rajayya was the great grandson, of Z the common ancestor and Rajamma was the wife of Mallayya, who was another great grandson of the common ancestor. It is not in dispute that the two branches which emerged from the common ancestor were divided and lived separately since a considerable long time. In these circumstances, it has to be seen whether it can be validly found that the plaintiff is the member of Rajayya and Rajamma's own family.

12. It was contended by Sri V. Madhava Rao, the learned Counsel for the appellant, that the said expression should be given a liberal and wide meaning whereas the contention of Mr. C. Poomiah and Mr. B.V Subbarayudu, appearing for the respondents, was that the said expression in that context of the Act has necessarily to be given a narrow meaning.

13. Now, strict and liberal construction are relative terms and will vary in degree according to the nature of the statute and the rights and persons affected thereby. A strict or liberal interpretation will depend upon a combination of several factors. One of the important factors, however, is with reference to the purposes and object of the statute. Whether it is strict or liberal I would prefer that construction which would help in actually realising the purpose of the Act.

14. While the intention of the Legislature must be gathered from the words used to express it, the manifest reason and obvious purpose of the law should in no case be sacrificed to a liberal interpretation of such words. The purpose of the inquiry is not to ascertain what is the abstract meaning or force of a particular word or what the expression may comprehend, but the inquiry must be directed to find out as to in what sense the phrase must have been used by the Legislature.

15. It is well in this connection to remember that the presumption is that the legislature has a definite purpose in every enactment and it has adopted and formulated the subsidiary provisions in harmony with that purpose, and these expressions are needful to accomplish it and that if that is the intended effect, they will, at least conduce to effectuate it.

16. Thus the practical inquiry in litigation is usually to determine what a particular provision or word means. To answer it one must proceed, as he would with any other composition—construe it with reference to the dominant idea or purpose of the whole enactment. In order to do that the enactment has to be read as a whole and the particular meaning to be attributed to any word or phrase is to be then ascribed from the context, the nature of the subject-matter treated of and the purpose or intention of the Legislature which enacted the law.

17. Bearing these broad guidelines in mind, let me examine the real purpose of the Act. The preamble of the Act says that the law has been enacted with a view to protect the agricultural classes from the undesirable results of transfers of agricultural lands. It is to arrest the tendency of agricultural land passing out of the hands of the agricultural communities, whether because of transfers from lower castes in favour of the higher castes or from the economically harassed agricultural community to the money-lenders that the Act was brought into force. A reading of the various provisions of the Act would disclose that it has three main objectives: (i) to prevent transfers from agricultural classes to non agricultural classes; (2) to prevent transfers from cultivators to money-lenders; and (3) to prevent transfers from scheduled castes and scheduled tribes to members of the higher classes. The Act, therefore divides itself into two broad parts, the first relating to permanent alienations and the second relating to temporary alienations such as mortgages etc.

18. Land alienation has been a problem in different forms at the Various stages| of the Indian agricultural economy. In the early days, the problem was one of land passing, from members of agricultural tribes and lower classes to the members of the higher castes in the community and to persons who were themselves not cultivators. Thereafter the land began to pass hands from cultivators to the money lenders on account of indebtedness of the agriculturists resulting from various reasons. At the present stage, an added factor in land alienation is the land reforms, particularly the ceiling legislation.

19. It was correctly submitted in my view that the process of land alienation was identical in different parts of the country. It started with the actual owner of the land raising loan mostly for unproductive purposes mortgaging his land to the village money-lender. The interest charges being unconscionably high the agriculturist could hardly repay the loan with the consequence that the land used to pass to the money-lender. Indebtedness was thus the most important cause for mortgage or sale of agricultural lands. It is to arrest this multiple trends of passing of agricultural land from the hands of the agriculturists that series of enactments were brought into force. The Prevention of Alienation of the Agricultural Lands Act was one such step taken in the former State of Hyderabad. It is this Act which gave birth to the present Act, the Hyderabad Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1950, which has new and broader objectives with which I am not at the moment concerned.

20. It will thus be seen that the dominant purpose of the Act was to prevent the agricultural lands from passing into the hands of non-agriculturists, moneylenders and members of the higher castes. It is fro in that point of view that one has to construe the provisions of the Act.

21. Looked at from this point of view, it cannot be in doubt that any interpretation given to the expression “members of his own family”, if it restilts in allowing the transfers of land, the land revenue of which is below Rs. 50 beyond the limit set it will defeat the purpose of the Act. As stated supra, the intention of section 4 is not to permit transfers broadly speaking. It is to this broad general rule that some exceptions are provided. One such exception is that one agricultural group can transfer certain lands leaving certain minimum in favour of the same agricultural group or the groups which are included by the Government under section 3 in the same class. It is to this broad exception that another exception is grafted, that is to say, that no permission would be necessary for the permanent transfer of agricultural land in favour of the members of his own family even if the land which he owns, the land revenue of which is less than Rs. 50. What must necessarily follow from the dominant purpose of the Act is that permanent transfers of agricultural lands are not broadly speaking looked with favour unless the transfers are brought into the exceptions. Such permanent transfers cannot be held valid if they are effected without the permission of the Collector. The expression “members of his own family” therefore will have to be given a restricted meaning in order to achieve the abovesaid intention of the Legislature.

22. The said expression is not an expression of art. It has not been defined in this or any other analogous Act. The word “family” has been construed in some cases as one of great flexibility and capable of different meanings according to the connection in which it is used. In its ordinary sense, however, the term signifies the collective body of persons living in one house or under one head or manager or one domestic government. It may include all members of the household living under the authority of the head thereof as also the servants employed in the house. The term is often used to include descendants of persons claiming descent from a common ancestor. This can therefore be taken to be a liberal meaning which can be put on the Word ‘family’. The test applied as will be noticed is whether the person is living in the same house or is under one head or manager or under the control of one domestic government and in that expression even the servants employed in the house are some times brought in. The other test applied whether the person claims descent from a common ancestor. As stated above, however, the word ‘family’ is qualified with the words “his own family” in section 4 of the Act. In the context of the Act, I am clear in my view that this phrase cannot be applied in all cases, to all those persons living in one house including the servants. That would be defeating the Very purpose of section 4. It cannot obviously be applied in all cases to even persons who claim common descent from a common ancestor. That would amount to widening the scope of the exception to section 4. I am therefore satisfied that the only meaning which can be attributed to the expression “members of his own family” is that of members of the household who are under the control of one manager or head of the family such as father and sons including grandsons or members of joint family. If the remote relations are to be brought in the definition of “members of his own family”, the words “his own family” will have no meaning. If the two branches are separated by three or four generations and quite remotely descended from a common ancestor, it cannot be said that they are members of their own family. In this view, the members of the family of Rajayya and Rajamma can only be said to be defendants 3. to 6 because they are either the sons or daughters of Rajayya. Any member belonging to a divided family removed from this family by three or four generations merely because they have a common ancetstor at a distant stage cannot be said to be a member of his own family. I do not therefore think that the plaintiff can be said to be a member of Rajayya or Rajamma's own family within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4. The learned District Judge, in my view, correctly held that since the plaintiff Was not a member of Rajayya and Rajamma's own family he ought to have obtained necessary permission of the Collector before he took the permanent transfer in his favour. Since admittedly no valid permission exists, the gift deed is hit by section 4. It is void as it is inconsistent with section 4 and it cannot.be given effect to. The only other contention which I have therefore to deal with is about the possessory title of the plaintiff. It was contended by the learned Counsel for the appellant that in pursuance of this void gift deed the plaintiff was put in possession and since the 1st defendant alone has dispossessed him, a decree for possession in plaintiff's favour against the 1st defendant can be passed. I do not think I can give effect to this argument. A plain reading of the plaint as a whole do not leave me in doubt that the plaintiff's suit for possession is not directed only against the 1st defendant although in the relief portion of the plaint it is mentioned so, It is categorically stated in the plaint that the 1st defendant with the active assistance of Communist party as well as in collusion with the either defendants dispossessed the plaintiff.” The necessary result of my finding that the gift deed is void is that the plaintiff will have no title and consequently Rajamma and Rajayya continued to be the oweners of the suit land. They have therefore superior title to the plaintiff. The plaintiff could have succeeded on the allegation of possession and dispossession if his suit had been filed only against the 1st defendant who perhaps was a trespasser. But since the suit is against the 2nd defendant also, who is the real owner of. the property, the plaintiff cannot get a decree for possession against a person who has superior title.

23. For the aforesaid reasons, the second appeal fails and is dismissed. No order as to costs. No leave.

24. Appeal dismissed.