A.D.V Reddy, J.:— This appeal is by the plaintiffs in O.S No. 6 of 1960 on the file of Subordinate Judge, Rajahmundry against the Judgment and decree in the said suit.

2. The plaintiffs are the deities viz., Sri Someswaraswamivaru and Sri Venugopala Swamivaru installed in the temples at Vella village, respresented by the hereditary trustees. The case put forward on behalf of the deities is that the B Schedule lands, ten items of an extent of acres 10.08 cents in Vella village in East Godavari District are devadayam inams granted to the deities in the year 1738 by the then Nizam of Hyderabad, that till the year 1900 they were in the possession and enjoyment of the deities, that thereafter they were delivered to Setti Lakshmikantham, mother of defendants 1 to 3, of Kalavanthula caste under a registered contract, dated 15th june, 1900 to secure her services in the plaintiff temples, that under the said agreement she had to give dance recitals in the temples on stated occasions and enjoy the lands in lieu of her services, that she during her lifetime put her sister Chinakantham in possession of acre 2.20 cents in item 9 and 4th defendant Manikyam another sister in possession of item 8 and acre 0.49 cents in item 9, that on the passing of Act XXXI of 1947 (Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Devadasis (Prevention of Dedication) Act, 1947) the contract became void as there was a statutory prohibition against rendering these services and the plaintiffs became entitled to take possession of the lands, but as Lakshmikantham refused to give possession they had to file a petition under section 78 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1926, for the issue of a certificate and after obtaining the certificate they filed M.C No. 49 of 1954, before the 1st Class Magistrate, Kakinada, but on technical grounds the petition was dismissed and the C.R.P No. 616 of 1558, filed in the High. Court was also not successful that as Lakshmikantham and her sister Chinakantham had died, their legal representatives and Manikyam the 4th defendant another sister of Lakshmikantham, who have been in enjoyment of the land, had leased them out to defendants 7 to 10 and that they are liable to surrender possession. and hence this suit for possession and mesne profits. The defendants in their written statement contended that the lands were not granted to the plaintiff deities by the Nizam, that the plaintiffs have no title to the suit lands, that from time immemorial, the lands have been in the possession of defendants 1 to 4 and their predecessors-in-title, that the lands have been granted to the ancestors of these defendants burdened with service, that their original rights have not been lost by agreement, dated 15th June, 1900, that they are not Devadasis and the contract had not become void and unenforceable by reason of Act (XXXI of 1947), that the suit lands are a part Of the erstwhile zamindari village of Vella and that they have acquired occupancy rights in these lands and they are entitled to pattas as they constitute Darimila inam, that therefore, the jurisdiction of the Court is also barred by section 56 of Act (XXVI of 1948) and that the suit is also barred by time.

3. The 10th defendant contended that he had obtained a lease in his favour from defendants 5 and 6 and he had also made some improvements on the land.

4. On appropriate issues being framed, the Subordinate Judge held that the ten items of land detailed in B Schedule have not been proved to be lands granted to the deities by the Nizam under the Parmana Exhibit A-l in Hizri 1155 corresponding to the year 1738, that it is not also established that they are lands granted to Setti Lakshmikantham or her predecessors as personal inam for services to be rendered by them, that the lands however, belong to the deities and were given to Lakshmikantham for services of dancing to be rendered at the temple and at the festivals, but on the passing of Act (XXXI of 1947) putting an end to those services, the plaintiff is entitled to recover possession of these lands. He however found that these lands are situated in Vella, a Zamindari village which has been taken over under Act (XXVI of 1948), and as such the title to these lands vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. with regard to items 1 and 2 he held that they are comprised in a zirayati patta and title prima facie vests with the plaintiff under section 11 of Act (XXVI of 1948), the plaintiff has a right for the issue of a ryotwari patta and gave the plaintiffs a decree for possession with regard to these lands. No appeal has been filed by the defendants in possesion against that part of the decree. Therefore, we do not propose to consider in this appeal the rights of parties thereto.

5. With regard to items 3 to 10, the Subordinate Judge found that they are Darimila inams i.e, post-settlement inams that the question whether the defendants have a right to ask for a patta or whether the plaintiffs are entitled to recover possession thereof cannot he gone into by the civil Court, as a civil Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit in that regard under section 56 of Act (XXVI of 1956), and dismissed the suit. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs with regard to their claim for possession of item 3 to 10.

6. The plaintiff-deities claimed items 3 to 10 also as the lands granted to the deities by the Nizam of Hyderabad under a Pharmana, dated 17 Muwar 1155 Hizri i.e, 1738 A.D Exhibit A-l itself does not show the identity of the lands granted under the Pharmana. Therefore there is nothing to correlate the lands shown in the B Schedule items 3 to 10 as to those granted by Nizam. On the other hand there is evidence to show that the inam lands were granted subsequent to the settlement in 1832 A.D Exhibit B-2 is a certified copy of lease account of Vella village of 1344 Fasli. This shows the relevant S. No. as Darimila inam land of the plaintiff-deities. Exhibit B-l is the certified copy of the Inam Register extract of Vella village for Fasli 1350 which also shows these lands as Darimila inam lands belonging to the deities. In Exhibit A-2 agreement, which is not denied, dated 15th June, 1900 they are shown as lands belonging to deities given to Lakshmikantham towards the dancing services to be performed. It is therefore, clear that these are Darimila inam lands (post-settlement lands) granted to the temple given to Lakshmikantham for services to be performed by her. Though these services have come to an end by reason of Act (XXXI of 1947), through Lakshmikantham her sons and her two sisters who had come into possession appear to have continued in enjoyment of these lands leasing them in their turn to other cultivating tenants. Defendants 7 to 12 are said to be tenants now in possession.

7. Admittedly Vella village in which these lands are situate, was in an estate and the estate had been notified and had been taken over under the provisions of the Madras Estates Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari Act (XXVI of 1948). The object of the Act as stated in the preamble is to provide for the repeal of the Permanent Settlement, the acquisition of the rights of landholders in permanently settled and certain other estates in the Province of Madras and the introduction of the ryotwari settlement in such estates. In order to carry out this object, section 3 of the Act says, that, with effect on and from the notified date, the Madras Permanent Settlement Regulation, 1802, Estates Land Act and all other enactments applicable to the estate as such except the Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Act, 1947, shall be deemed to have been repealed in their application to the estate. Under clause (b) the entire estate shall stand transferred to the Government and vest in them free of all encumbrances. Under clause (c) all rights and interests created in or over an estate before the notified date by the principal or any other landholder shall as against the Government cease and determine. Under clause (f), the relationship of landholder and ryot shall as between them be extinguished. Under clause (g), ryots in the estate and persons holding under them shall as against the Government be entitled only to such rights and privileges as are recognised or conferred on them under this Act any other rights and privileges, which may have accrued to them in the estate before the notified date against the principal or any other landholder thereof, shall cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the Government or such landholders. Section 11 enables the issue of a ryotwari patta to every ryot in an estate subject to the conditions mentioned therein. Section 12 provides for the issue of ryotwari patta to a landholder under such circumstances and pending final decision by the settlement officer, section 3 enjoins on the Government not to disturb the possession of the landholder or ryot if he is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. This shows that on and after the notffied date, the plaintiff-deities ceased to have any title in these lands. Admittedly possession on that date was with defendants 1 to 6 who are related to Lakshmikantham and through them with defendants 7 to 12 the cultivating tenants. As per section 3, the tenants have a right to continue in possession undisturbed until any of their claims is adjudicated upon by the settlement officer. The claims of either the tenants or the landholder for the issue of a patta either under section 10, section 11 or section 12 has to be adjudicated and settled by the settlement officer and an appeal lay to the Tribunal as constituted under the Act. Therefore the defendants cannot be disturbed from their possession until: the patta enquiries by the settlement officer are over. Section 56 of the Act reads as follows:—

“56 (1) Where after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any holding is, the dispute shall be decided by the settlement officer.

(2) Any person deeming himself aggrieved by any decision of the settlement officer under sub-section (1) may, within two months from the date of the decision or such further time as the Tribunal may in its discretion allow, appeal to the Tribunal; and its decision shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law.”

8. The above provision has taken out the jurisdiction of the civil Court with regard to the disputes mentioned therein. The suit in the present case is for possession of items 3 to 10 of the plaint B schedule lands also along with mesne profits. But as stated already, the defendant's possession cannot be disturbed until their right to a patta is adjudicated on by the settlement officer, a Tribunal contemplated under the Act. This dispute is not a question relating to who has the lawful title to the land as title vested only in the Government but as to who is lawfully entitled to a patta, the question relating to the granting of patta as between the landlord and the tenant, also is a question to be decided by the settlement officer, under sections 11 and 12 of the Act. It is not open to the plaintiff to circumvent the Act and go to a civil Court and ask for possession when the civil Court cannot grant possession unless it goes into the question as to who is entitled to a patta and this is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the settlement officer under the Act.

9. In Uligappa v. Mohan Rao . C.R.P No. 1026 of 1965 and a batch of appeals., a Bench of this Court considering the applicability of the provisions of Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, relating to leases, vis-a-vis, the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction Control) Act (XV of 1960), held that the State Rent Act is a complete Code intended by the Legislature to wholly occupy the three subjects mentioned in the preamble of the Act concerning the relationship of landlord and tenant in regard to houses and buildings and it should necessarily prevail over Chapter V of the Transfer of Property Act, although it may not in some respects be in direct conflict with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, and that therefore, no notice either under section 111 (g) or (h) read with section 106 of the Transfer or Property Act is necessary to determine the tenancy, before an application for eviction on any of the grounds mentioned in section 10 of the Act is filed before the Rent Controller. The Rent Control Act, referred to above, had also provided that all petitions for eviction should go to the Court of the Controller and other reliefs under the Act should be adjudicated on by a Controller appointed under the provisions of the Act. This would mean that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petitions for evictions filed under the Rent Control Act.

10. In Iswarananda Bharathi Swami v. Board of Commissioners, H.R.E2, the question whether the civil Court had lost the jurisdiction over certain disputes under the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable Endowments Act (II of 1927) came to be considered. Under section 84 of the said Act if any dispute arises as to whether a math is one to which this Act applies, the dispute should be decided by the Board and on the question whether the civil Court had lost jurisdiction to entertain a suit in that regard, it was held that as the powers are conferred on a statutory body for a public purpose, the injury caused to an individual in exercise of that power could be redressed only in the mannner provided by the Act. This view was later confirmed in Kaimal v. Board of Commissioners for H.R.E. In Bhaishankar v. The Municipal Corporation of Bombay, the provision, i.e, section 33 of the City of Bombay Municipal Act conferring the jurisdiction on the Chief Judge of the Small Causes Court in respect of disputes arising out of an election, was considered to oust the jurisdiction of the civil Court in that regard. It was pointed out that:

“But where a special Tribunal, out of the ordinary course, is appointed by an Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of that Act, then except so far as otherwise expressly provided or necessarily implied, that Tribunal's jurisdiction to determine those questions is exclusive. It is an essential condition of those rights that they should be determined in the manner prescribed by the Act to which they owe their existence. In such a case there is no ouster of the jurisdiction of the ordinary Courts, for they never had any, there is no change of the old order of things; a new order is brought into being.”

11. It follows therefore, that for the grant of a patta by which alone they can claim a right to possession, the plaintiff should go before a settlement officer. In this case, though the disputes had arisen between the parties on the passing of Act XXXI of 1947, as that enactment had put an end to the dancing services rendered by Lakshmikantham and her two sisters and the trustees of the plain- tiff-deities wanted to take over possesion, Lakshmikantham refused to give possession and this led to the filing of a petition under section 78 of the Religious Endowments Act, 1926, for the issue of a certificate and after obtaining the certificate they had filed M.C 48 of 1954 before the 1st class Magistrate, Kakinada and on the dismissal of the petition they had filed C.R.P No. 616 of 1958 in the High Court and in this also as they are not successful, they had filed this suit. In between, the estate had been notified and was taken over.

12. In Neelakanteswararaju v. Mangamma, a Full Bench of this Court held that the provisions of section 56 (1) of Act XXVI of 1948 are not retrospective in operation in divesting the jurisdiction of the civil Court, but if during the pendency of a dispute in a civil Court an estate is notified, the civil Court will continue to have jurisdiction, but if no case had been filed and is pending in the civil Court, it will be the settlement officer in whom the jurisdiction will lie. In this case, the suit came to be filed in 1961, after the estate had been notified and taken over. Admittedly, it is not the plaintiffs who are in possession, hut defendants 1 to 6 and their cultivating tenants defendants 7 to 12. Therefore, they will have a right to continue in possession and until the issue of a patta, it cannot be disturbed. It has been pointed out is Siva Kutumba Rao v. Sarvalakshmamma, that either the landlord or the tenant in possession can file a suit in a civil Court for the ejectment of the trespasser, because the trespasser is not a person who comes tinder the Abolition Act and when the rights are not contemplated or governed by the Abolition Act, suits can he entertained by the Civil Court. But, as pointed out in Appanna v. Sriramamurthy . 1958 1 An. W.R 420., the jurisdiction of the Tribunals contemplated under the Abolition Act to determine questions as to rights which are the creation of the Acts is exclusive and the suits with regard to those facts cannot he filed in Civil Courts. The appellant relies on the decision of Chandra Reddi, J. (as he then was) in Chirugupati Venkatasubbaiah v. Ravi Punnayya . 1957 2 An. W.R 204., where it was held that the Civil Courts can certainly take cognisance of suits in which the title to the holding forming part of an estate is put in issue, especially where the relief of possession and mesne profits cannot be granted by the settlement officer, they being beyond his competence, and within the purview of the civil Courts. While noticing the above case, a Bench of this Court in Appanna v. Sriramamurthy, dissented from it by saying that they cannot agree with the view that the civil Court is barred even in respect of disputes between two persons claiming to be lawful ryots. In the present case, the reliefs asked are for possession and mesne profits. Though these reliefs cannot be granted by the settlement officer which is the Tribunal contemplated under the Act, they are intimately connected with the question as to who is entitled to the issue of patta, as per the rights created under the Act. Admittedly the plaintiff's had leased out the lands and the lands have been in possession of Lakshmikantham, her successors-in-interest and their cultivating tenants ever since the year 1900. It is also admitted that the estate has been notified and has been taken over and that the plaintiffs have lost their title thereto by reason of section 3 of the Act. Under section 3, the person in possession has a right to continue in possession until his rights are determined and terminated either under section 11 or section 12 of the Act by the non-issue of patta in his favour. Both the plaintiff's and the defendants could go before the settlement officer for the adjudication of their claims with regard to the issue of a patta. Until that is determined and the plaintiffs succeed in getting a patta in their favour, they have no right to recover possession from the defendants, who are now in possession. Only when their right is so declared and possession is denied to them, they can resort to a civil Court. Until then their right for possession does not ripen. It is premature for them to file a suit for recovery of possession now. Therefore it is not proper for the plaintiffs by a trick of pleading or by a camouflage of the reliefs asked for to make the Court enquire into the questions which are exclusively in the jurisdiction of the Tribunal created by the special Act i.e, the settlement officer, under the Estates Abolition Act. That enquiry with regard to the grant of patta to the ryot in possession are not ancilliary or incidental to the relief of possession in the civil Court. Their main relief for possession depends entirely on their right to the issue of a patta. Therefore they must first approach the settlement officer for a patta and having obtained it, then sue for possession in a civil Court. Their present suit cannot be now entertained with regard to items 3 to 10 of the B schedule and that claim has rightly been dismissed. This appeal therefore, fails. It is now contended that the Subordinate Judge having found that the civil Court had no jurisdiction with regard 10 items 3 to 10 of the B schedule, he should have returned the plaint in so far as those items are concerned, for presentation to the proper Court and should not have dismissed it. In Gulabchand v. M.V.T.C.A Society, V.B Raju, J. (as he then was) held that in a case Where only part of the plaint is triable by a civil Court, the plaintiff should be asked to amend the plaint so as to make it wholly triable by the civil Court by deleting the portion of the plaint which is triable by another Court, and if the plaintiff does not do so the whole plaint will have to be returned. We do not think it proper to go to that extent. There is no reason why the civil Court which has jurisdiction with regard to a part of a claim should refuse to adjudicate with regard to that part. In Mathara Das v. Hakim Singh where a similar question arose, it was held that there is no reason why the civil Court should not take cognizance of such part of the claim as is triable by it that it should adjudicate on so much of the claim as is cognisable by itself treating the rest of the claim as surpluage and leaving it to the plaintiff, if so advised, to bring a fresh suit in the Revenue Court as regards the claim cognizable by that Court is concerned. In Govindarao v. Bhagwan following the rulings in Secretary of State v. Natabar Mangraj, and Kishori Lal v. Ram Sunder . A.I.R 1921 All. 193., it was held that the proper course to adopt in such a case is to dismiss the portion falling outside the jurisdiction. In this case we do not think it proper to return the entire plaint for presentation to any other Court, as with regard to items 1 and 2, the Court has pass ed a decree while it dismissed the rest of the claim with regard to items 3 to 10, on the ground that the, civil Court had no jurisdiction. We think in the circumstances of the case, that is the proper order, be passed and we accordingly dismiss the suit regarding item 3 to 10 of the plaint B schedule.

13. This appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.

14. Appeal dismissed.