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citation codes
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  • S. 3 of the Hyderabad Record of Right in Land Act (No. 1 of 1345 Fasli),
  • Sec. 59 of the Land Revenue Act. But S. 59
  • S. 2(12) or S. 67 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Land Act (Act No. 1 of 1346 Fasli)
  • 12 of S. 2 of Land Revenue Act
  • Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of S. 11
  • S. 57 of the Land Revenue Act
  • S. 59 of the Land Revenue Act.
  • Section 4 or Section 6
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citation codes
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  • S. 3 of the Hyderabad Record of Right in Land Act (No. 1 of 1345 Fasli),
  • Sec. 59 of the Land Revenue Act. But S. 59
  • S. 2(12) or S. 67 of the Land Revenue Act
  • Land Act (Act No. 1 of 1346 Fasli)
  • 12 of S. 2 of Land Revenue Act
  • Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of S. 11
  • S. 57 of the Land Revenue Act
  • S. 59 of the Land Revenue Act.
  • Section 4 or Section 6
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This writ petition challenges an order of the Additional Collector, Medak dated 17-4-1965, made under Section 15(2) of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation (VIII of 1358 Fasli), directing that the name of the 1st respondent, Momin Begum, be entered as Shikmidara in the Record of Rights in respect of certain disputed lands to the extent of her share as an heir of the late pattadar Mir Mohammed Hussain Ali Khan.

The petitioner, Mir Ahmed Ali Khan, is recorded in the Khasra Pahani of 1954-1955 as the holder and possessor of the disputed lands (a list of survey numbers and total area is given in the opinion). The 1st respondent is a widow of the deceased pattadar. After the death of the pattadar, the patta was entered in the name of the petitioner's father, Liakat Ali Khan. Momin Begum alleged earlier joint possession until dispossession in 1345 Fasli and brought a civil suit in Farwadi 1355 Fasli (corresponding to February 1945) claiming a 1/8th share and possession; that suit was dismissed on 30-6-1951 and the dismissal became final (no appeal was preferred).

After an extended period of silence following the dismissal of her suit, Momin Begum applied under Section 15(2) for rectification of the Record of Rights to have her name entered as Shikmidara. The Additional Collector allowed her application and ordered the entry, relying in part upon Section 59 of the Land Revenue Act. The petitioner challenged that order by filing this writ petition for certiorari (or other appropriate writ), seeking quashing of the Additional Collector's order. The matter was heard by a Bench and this opinion disposes of the petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation (No. LXIII of 1358 Fasli) permit the Talukdar/Collector to rectify an entry in the Record of Rights in a manner inconsistent with a prior, final decision of a competent civil court.
  2. Whether the doctrine of limitation (including adverse possession/ouster) and the prior dismissal of a civil suit (on the ground of limitation) preclude rectification under Section 15(2) in favour of a claimant who remained silent for a long period after the civil decree.
  3. Whether a widow/heir (claiming as Shikmidara) can be entered in the Record of Rights merely by virtue of relationship to the deceased pattadar notwithstanding loss of possession or perfection of adverse possession by a co-sharer — particularly in light of Section 59 of the Land Revenue Act and the statutory definitions (e.g., definition of "shikmidar").

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments (represented by Mr. Jaleel Ahmed Advocate)

  • Once a competent civil court adjudicated that Momin Begum was never in possession and dismissed her suit as barred by limitation, the Collector cannot make an entry in the Record of Rights inconsistent with that civil court decision.
  • Even apart from the decree, the petitioner had in the civil suit specifically denied Momin Begum's right, title and interest; therefore any right was extinguished by the efflux of time (ouster/adverse possession) and cannot be recognised after a long lapse (12 years).
  • The long silence of the 1st respondent after preparation of the record of rights is fatal to any rectification application; rectification should have been sought within the statutory periods provided by the Regulation.

1st Respondent's Allegations and Contentions (as set out in the record)

  • She claimed to be a Shikmidara (one of the heirs) and asserted that the Tahsildar in 1341 Fasli had directed the Patwari to enter her name and that of her senior co‑widow as shikmidaras (relying on exhibits P.1 and P.2).
  • She averred she believed her name had been entered as Shikmidara pursuant to that Tahsildar direction but later discovered it had not been entered.
  • In seeking rectification under Section 15(2), she relied on her status as widow/heir and on statutory provisions (the Additional Collector relied explicitly on Section 59 of the Land Revenue Act when granting rectification).

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analysed the matter by first examining the scheme and relevant provisions of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation and related provisions of the earlier Act and the Land Revenue Act. The opinion sets out the statutory framework governing preparation, notification and rectification of the Record of Rights and the register of mutations (notably Sections 1, 4, 5, 6, 11, 13 and 15 of the Regulation, and the consequences of Section 11(2) and (3)).

Key statutory features and principles emphasised by the court:

  • The Regulation establishes a statutory procedure for preparation and notification of the Record of Rights and provides a two-year period for persons aggrieved by entries to apply for rectification after completion of the record (S.4).
  • Section 11(2) requires parties in suits or applications relating to land to annex certified copies of relevant record entries; Section 11(3) requires courts to communicate to the Talukdar any corrections required by reason of their decrees or orders and for the Talukdar to cause corresponding corrections in the record.
  • Section 13 creates a presumption of correctness for entries in the Record of Rights and Register of Mutations until the contrary is proved.
  • Section 15(2) vests the Talukdar (Collector) with power to call for and examine records made under Sections 4 or 6 and to pass such orders as he deems fit, subject to the proviso that no order adversely affecting any person shall be passed without hearing that person.

Application of these principles to the facts:

  • The civil suit by Momin Begum for possession was filed in 1355 Fasli and was dismissed on 30-6-1951; that dismissal became final because no appeal was preferred. The civil court's decision thus negatived the respondent's claim to possession and was competent to determine the rights of the parties.
  • The Khasra Pahani of 1954-1955 already recorded the petitioner as holder and possessor. The respondent made no steps within the statutory period for rectification and remained silent for a long period after the civil decree.
  • Although Section 15(2) does not specify a limitation period, the court held that the Talukdar's powers under S.15(2) should not be exercised in a manner that undoes the effect of S.4(3) or S.11 and renders them meaningless. In particular, the Talukdar should not correct an entry in a way that is inconsistent with a decree or decision of a competent civil court which adjudicates rights that must be reflected in the Record of Rights under S.11(3).
  • The Additional Collector failed to give due effect to the civil court's final decision. He treated the civil dismissal as being solely on limitation and therefore considered other issues unnecessary; on that basis he concluded the finding of the civil court need not be given effect to when exercising S.15(2) powers. He also accepted the respondent's status as a widow and relied on Section 59 of the Land Revenue Act to justify entry as Shikmidara irrespective of possession.
  • The court examined the legal nature of shikmidari and pattadari rights (citing the statutory definitions). It emphasised that shikmidari rights require an existing subsisting right and entail an element of possession or enjoyment; such rights may be lost or extinguished where a co-sharer denies rights and perfects adverse possession (after the requisite statutory period), or where the remedy for enforcing the right is lost by lapse of time.
  • On the facts, the petitioner's denial of the respondent's rights in the civil suit gave a fresh cause of action and established open hostile possession from that time; the respondent did not take effective steps to vindicate her rights within twelve years. Thus, the petitioner perfected his right by adverse possession and the respondent's remedy to enforce any right was lost by lapse of time.
  • Given these findings, the court concluded that the Additional Collector was in error in believing that shikmidari rights could subsist independently of possession or notwithstanding ouster/adverse possession, and was further in error in failing to apply the provisions of Section 11. The order contained an error apparent on the face of the record and was therefore liable to be quashed.

Holding and Implications

HOLDING: The order of the Additional Collector dated 17-4-1965 directing entry of the 1st respondent's name as Shikmidara in the Record of Rights is quashed. The writ petition is allowed with costs; advocate's fee Rs. 100/- was awarded.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The rectification ordered by the Additional Collector is set aside; the petitioner's entries in the Record/Register as reflected in the earlier Khasra Pahani remain supported by the civil court's decree and the material facts as found by the court.
  • The court emphasised that the Collector/Talukdar must exercise powers under Section 15(2) consistently with the statutory scheme (including S.11) and should not make entries in the Record of Rights that are inconsistent with final decisions of competent civil courts; the decision reinforces that administrative rectification cannot override final judicial adjudication of rights that are required to be recorded.
  • The opinion does not purport to create a novel principle beyond applying the Regulation and existing statutory provisions to the facts; it addresses the interplay between rectification powers under the Regulation and final civil decrees, and limits the Talukdar's corrective powers in respect of entries inconsistent with a final court decision.

    Meer Ahmed Ali Khan v. Momen Begum And Another

    1. This writ petition raises some important questions under the: Hyderabad Record, of Rights in Land Regulations, 1358 Fasli and the applicability of the doctrine of resjudicata to proceedings under Section 15(2) of the Regulations. I think it desirable that the matter may be decided authoritatively, by a Bench. I, therefore direct that the writ petition may be posted before a Bench.

    2. In pursuance of the above order this Case came on for final hearing before the Bench consisting of the Hon'ble Mr. N. Kumarayya, acting Chief Justice and the Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kondaiah. Mr. Jaleel Ahmed Advocate for the petitioner.

    3. Mr. N. Narasimha Iyengar Advocate for the 1st respondent, 3rd Government Pleader on behalf of the 2nd respondent.

    4. The Court made the following:—

    (The following order of the court was made by the Hon'ble the Acting Chief Justice)

    5. This is a petition for issue of a Writ of Certiorari or, any other appropriate writ, order or direction, quashing the order of the Additional Collector, Medak, dated 17-4-1965, whereby he, in exercise of his powers under S. 15(2) of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation (VIII of 1358) Fasli), directed that the name of the 1st respondent, Momin Begum, be entered as Shikmidara in the Record of Rights in respect of the disputed lands to the extent of her share as one of the heirs of the late pattadar Mir Mohammed Hussain Ali Khan.

    6. The petitioner Mir Ahmed Ali Khan is the present Pattadar of lands in question bearing survey Nos. 48, 85, 243, 251, to 266, 286, 292, 298 to 317, 319, 320, 322 to 332, 342, 352 and 360, measuring 356 acres 3 guntas, situated at Pattanpally village Taluka Shomali District Medak, and his name was entered in the Khasra pahani of 1954-1955 as holder and possessor of the above survey Numbers. The 1st respondent is one of the two widows of the late Mir Hussain Ali Khan, who was the pattadar of the above mentioned survey numbers. He died issueless, leaving surviving him his senior wife Turabunisa Begum, his junior wife Momin Begum (1st respondent) his brothers Mir Mohd. Liakat Ali Khan and Mir Hasham Ali Khan and three sisters Sharfunnisa Begum, Qaderunnisa Begum and Zebunnisa Begum. After his death in 1340 Fasli, the patta was entered in the name of his brother Liakat Ali Khan the father of the petitioner herein. According to the 1st respondent, after the death of Mir Hussain Ali Khan, his two widows were in joint possession of the disputed lands till 1345 Fasli, when Liakat Ali Khan dispossessed them. Later, on the death of Liakat Ali Khan on 22-1-1346 Fasli the heirs of Liakat Ali Khan came into possession of the suit lands. With these allegations, she brought a suit before the Subordinate Judge, Hyderabad District, in Farwadi 1355 Fasli, corresponding to February, 1945, claiming a 1/8th share under Mohammedan Law in the said lands and for possession of the lands falling to her share.

    7. The suit was resisted by the defendents to that suit, including Mir Ahmed Ali Khan, son of Liakat Ali Khan, who categorically denied the fight of the plaintiff to the suit lands and also her possession. He further raised the statute of limitation as a bar to the maintainability of the suit. Some of the defendants set up the plea that the lands belonged to Khuram Ali Khan, father of Husain Ali Khan Liakat Ali Khan and Hasham Ali Khan. These pleas found favour with the learned Subordinate Judge. As the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence with regard to her possession of the suit lands at any time till 1345 fasli, or latter, the petitioner was admittedly in possession of the lands in question, it was held that the suit was out of time. The suit was accordingly dismissed. This judgment was rendered on 30-6-1951. It became final as no appeal was preferred against the same.

    8. After a long silence thereafter, the 1st respondent Momin, Begum applied under S. 15(2) of the Record of Rights in Land Regulation for entering her name in the Record of Rights claiming that she was, at any rate, a Shikmidara being one of the heirs to the deceased pattadar. She claimed that as far back as in 1341 Fasli, the Tahsildar had given a direction to the Patwari to enter heir name and also the name of her senior co-widow Turabunnisa Begum as shikmidaras in the Record of Rights. In support of this contention she relied on Exs. P. 1 and P. 2. She averred that she was under the impression that her name had been entered as Shikmidara in the Record of Rights as per the order of the Tahsildar in 1341 Fasli. But she came to know recently that her name was not entered either as Shikmidara or joint pattadars.

    9. There seems to be some misapprehension as to the proceeding before the Tahsildir being one for entering the name in the Record of Rights for no such Regulation was in existence in the year 1341 fasli. It was probably succession proceedings, and therein, a direction seems to have been given by the Tahsildar, which was finally taken up in revision before the Government, and an order in Ex. P. 2 was passed. Be that what it may the fact remains that there was a civil suit filed later by Momin Begum which was finally, dismissed. The name of the petitioner was entered in the Khasra Pahani of 1954-1955 in relation to the disputed, lands and his father was admittedly the pattadar after the death of the husband of Momin Begum. She filed her application before the Collector for rectification of this entry in the Record of Rights long after her suit was dismissed.:—

    10. The petitioner herein resisted the petition relying on the judgment of the Subordinate Judge, Hyderabad District. His contention was that the 1st respondent had no manner of right or, at any rate, no subsisting right in the lands in question to be entitled to get her name entered in the Record of Rights. He also relied on the succession statement drawn up by the Tahsildar and approved of by the Deputy Collector, Sarfe-Khan (Distrct Atraf Balda) in mutation proceedings as to Watan, Mali and Police Patelgi of Pothanpalli in favour of the petitioner herein.

    11. The Additional Collector in his final order in the petition under S. 15(2) observed that since the widow was not setting up her possession or claiming right on that basis, the question of possession was not material for the purpose. He held that inasmuch as she claimed as the widow or heir of the pattadar, she was entitled to get her name entered as Shikmidara (or as joint pattadar) along with the other heirs by reason of her relationship to the deceased pattadar to the extent of 1/8th share in his property under S. 59 of the Land Revenue Act. He directed that her name be entered in the register accordingly. He further held that the Judgment of the Sub-Court Hyderabad, was not relevant to the case before him nor did the decision with regard to Watandari rights stand in the way of the 1st respondent in getting the relief prayed for. It is this, order that is called in question in this writ petition.

    12. The argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner by Mr. Jaleel Ahmed is two-fold. Firstly, once a competent civil court has decided that Momin Begum was never in possession ever since the death of her husband that her suit for possession is out of time and that her right is extinguished by efflux of time, it is not competent for the Collector to make any entry in the Record of Rights inconsistent with the civil court's decision. Secondly, it is urged that even in the suit filed, the petitioner had denied her right, title and interest in the property. Therefore even apart from the decree in the suit her right cannot possibly be recognised after a lapse of 12 years from the date of such specific denial. That right stands extinguished by reason of ouster and, at any rate, is incapable of enforcement after the lapse of statutory period. It is further urged that the long silence on the part of the 1st respondent after due preparation of the record of rights is fatal to any step for rectification in that behalf.

    13. The main question for consideration is whether the Additional Collector, purporting to act under S. 15(2) of the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Regulation (No. LXIII of 1358 Fasli) could rectify the record of rights in a manner quite inconsistent with the decision of the Civil Court.

    14. It is but appropriate at this stage to consider the scheme and provisions of the Regulation, to the extent relevant for our purpose. Before the advent of this Regulation, there was in force the Hyderabad Record of Rights in Land Act (Act No. 1 of 1346 Fasli) enacted by the Hyderabad State Legislature. The regulation as distinct from the said Act was enacted in 1358 Fasli and not all its provisions came into force immediately. S. 1 and S. 19 had to take effect forthwith on the publication of the Regulation in the Jarida. So also under the express provision contained in S. 1 the, other provisions came into operation Subject to the provision of s. 19 from the date of publication in the Jarida in the villages in which record of rights were being prepared under S. 3 of the Hyderabad Record of Right in Land Act (No. 1 of 1345 Fasli), or where such record of rights had been completed in pursuance there of before the said dated Sections 11 and 12, however under the clear provision of S. 1(4), could not come into force until a period of two years had elapsed from the date of the issue of a notification directing the provisions to be applied to a village or local area, S. 4 provided that the record of rights in all its, details enjoined in that section shall be prepared, and after its completion, it shall be notified in the Jarida or published in any other manner as the Government may direct. It further directed that persons aggrieved by any entry may within a period of two years apply for rectification of such entry to the officer concerned. S. 5 refers, to intimation of acquistion of rights after the expiry of a period of six months from the date of the notification and casts a duty on the Patwari to give a written acknowledgement on receiving such report. Under S. 6 the village patwari is bound to enter in a register of mutations every report made to him under S. 5. He has to enter unreported acquisitions also provided he has reason to believe that they have taken place. A copy of the entries of the Register of Mutations has to be posted in a conspicuous place at the Chavdi and due intimation is to be given to the persons interested. In case objections are raised he has to enter the same in the Register. Entries in the Mutation Register after due checking and corrections by a competent revenue officer, have to be transferred to the. Record, of Rights, S. 11, which is made applicable only on the expiry of two years from the date of the issue of notification referred, to in sub-s. (2) of S. 4, makes it incumbent on the plaintiff in a suit or an applicant in an application in relation to a land to annex to the plaint or application, a certified copy of any entry in the record of rights, register of mutations or register of tenancies relevant to such land, Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of S. 11 read thus:

    “(2) If the plaintiff or applicant fails to comply with sub-section (1) for any cause which the Court deems sufficient, he shall produce such certified copy within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court and if such certified copy is not so annexed or produced, the plaint or application shall be rejected, but the rejection thereof shall not of its own force preclude the presentation of a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action or of a fresh application in respect of the same subject-matter, with a certified copy annexed.

    (3) After the disposal of any case in which a certified copy of any such entry has been recorded, the court shall communicate to the Talukdar any error appearing in such entry and any alteration therein that may be required by reason of the decree or order, and a copy of such communication shall be kept with the record. The Talukdar shall in such case cause the entry to be corrected in accordance with the decree or decision of the Court, so far as it adjudicates upon any right required to be entered in the record of rights, register of mutations or register of tenancies. The provisions of this sub-section shall apply also to an appellate or revisional Court, provided that, in the case of an appellate or revisional decree or order passed by the High Court, the communication shall be made by the Court from which the appeal lay or the record was called for”.

    15. Section 13 raises the presumption of correctness of entries in the Record of Rights and Register of Mutations until the contrary is proved. S. 15 refers to appeals against orders pissed with regard to rectification under Sub-S. (3) of S. 4 or Sub-S. (6) of S. 6 etc. Sub. S. (2) of S. 15 reads thus:—

    16. The Talukdar may of, his own motion or on the application of a party call for and examine any records made under Section 4 or Section 6 and pass such orders as he may think fit;

    17. Provided that no order which would adversely affect any person shall be passed except after hearing that person”.

    18. The other provisions are not of much relevance to our purpose.

    19. It would appear from the scheme of the Regulation that a Record of rights in all lands containing various details bearing on the nature, extent of right and also the subject-matter in which the right exists together with other details, has to be necessarily maintained in all villages or areas to which this Regulation is applicable. If the record of rights has, not been prepared in any village before the advent of the Regulation, it has to be prepared and completed in accordance with the provisions of this Regulation in the village or areas to which this Regulation is made applicable under due notification. The mode of preparation and completion of the record is set out in the relevant provisions. Due care is taken to ensure that, the entries are correctly made in the Register. After the entries in the completed record of rights are notified, the persons interested in taking objections have to apply for rectification within a period of two years. The Regulation provides for an appeal against any orders passed in such application and the Talukdar is also given power suo motu or on application to call for and examine records and pass such orders as he may think fit. Records thus finalised, are liable to be revised or amended by reason of any decree or order of the court as provided in S. 11. There is a statutory presumption of correctness of the entries in the record of rights and register of mutations.

    20. This being the purport and scheme of the Act, the question is whether the Talukdar (Collector) could go behind the decree or order of a Civil court and revise any entry in the record of rights as against the decision of the court.

    21. It is common ground that a civil suit was brought by Momin Begum for possession of the very lands claiming right, title and interest therein and, alleging, that she was dispossessed-unlawfully. That suit was filed on 25th Farwardi 1355 Fasli long before the advent of the Regulation. It was disposed of on 30-6-1951. Evidently there was no occasion for the application of S. 11 of the Regulation. According to the material available in the Khasra Pani of 1954-1955, the name of the petitioner was found entered as the holder and possessor of the lands in dispute. Admittedly, till 1964, no objections were raised and no steps were taken by the petitioner for getting her name entered by way of rectification even though according to the clear provisions of the Regulation, steps for rectification ought to be taken within two years from the completion of the record of rights. The decree of the Civil Court, which established the right of the petitioner by reason of the dismissal of the suit of the respondent, evidently stood in her way. Nevertheless at long last in 1964, she, the respondent, made her application for rectification, S. 15(2) nodoubt, does not fix the period of limitation; but the powers under S. 15(2) should not as far as possible be exercised in a way as to undo the effects of Sub. S. (3) of S. 4 or Sub-S. (1) of S. 15 and render them otiose. Further, in exercise of the powers under S. 15(1), the taluqdar or collector could not cause an entry to be corrected as against the decree or decision of court so far as that decree or decision has bearing upon the right sought to be entered in the record of rights. He has certainly to bear in mind the provisions of S. 11(3) and give effect to the letter and spirit thereof. Indeed, the powers of the Taluklar under S. 15(2) are not arbitrary. They have to be exercised cautiously and consistent with the provisions of the statute. Evidently the Additional Collector, failed to bear in mind the scheme of the Act. Also he failed to take into account that the right of Momin Begum to the possession and enjoyment of the property was negatived by the civil Court, which was competent to validly determine the rights of the parties. The decision of the Civil Court as against the respondent had become final and the entry, as found in the Register, was quite in accordance with that decree. It is not the case of the party that fresh title had accrued to her meanwhile. There was, therefore, no valid reason for rectification of the entry. The Additional Collector did not attach significance to the decision of the civil court on the question of right on the ground that the suit was dismissed on the ground of limitation, and consequently the decision of the civil court on other issues was unnecessary for the purpose of the suit. He felt in these circumstances that the finding given by the civil court need not be looked into nor should he be influenced thereby while exercising his powers under S. 15(2) of the Regulation. He was of the view that Momin Begum being the widow of the original pattadar, her name could be, entered as Shikmidara or joint pattadar along with the petitioner herein by reason of her relationship irrespective of her possession or ouster. For this he relied upon Sec. 59 of the Land Revenue Act. But S. 59 itself, while providing that the name of the nearest heir, in the absence of any will made by the pattadar, shall be entered in the register and the names of the remaining heirs shall be entered as Shikmidar, states at the same time that if the decree of a competent Court entitling any of the claimants to preference over the others is produced, the records shall be amended or rectified accordingly. It is not in dispute that Momin Begum is one of the widows of Hussain Ali Khan and that Hussain Ali Khan was the pattadar. According to the Muslim law, on the death of Hussain Ali Khan, his property devolved on his heirs in defined share. But the rights so accrued could as will subsequently by operation of law be lost and defeated under certain circumstances. Of course, she was a cosharer and as such the property in the hands of the other co-sharer will be deemed to be in her possession as well. But this position in law becomes altered as soon as the said co-sharer continues in possession denying the right of or claiming adverse right against her viz. one of the other co-sharers. If the petitioner as co-sharer had denied the right, title and interest of the respondent or dispossessed her and she took no steps to vindicate her right within a period of twelve years, his adverse possession would be fatal to her right. It would appear that her husband died in 1340 Fasli. She claimed at the time of the suit that she was in possession thereafter up till 1345 faslis but she could not establish the same. On the other hand, the petitioner herein categorically denied her right and title and said that she had been never in possession of the lands. That was in the year 1355 faslis. It follows therefore that the denial of the petitioner give a fresh cause of action. At any rate, possession of the petitioner as against Momin Begum was openly hostile from that time. That was in any event terminus aquo or starting point of limitation for establishing her possession. Notwithstanding the same no steps were taken to vindicate her rights within 12 years from the date of the denial of her rights. Even in her suit already filed, she did not try to establish her possession by adducing any evidence. That is sufficient at all events to enable the petitioner to perfect his right by adverse possession. If is manifest that the petitioner was in possession of both the rights of patta and shikmi for a period more than 12 years adversely to her knowledge. Her remedy to enforce her right became lost to her by lapse of time and with it her right if any, became extinct. It is wrong to believe whether under Revenue law or otherwise she can still remain to be shikmidara or be entitled to shikmidari rights. Shikmi does exist in the eye of law apart from possession and enjoyment of land. Sub-S. 12 of S. 2 of Land Revenue Act defines the term ‘shikmidar’. That term covers three categories of persons. In order to come within its, definition the person must possess a right to the land like a pattadar, or he must have been from the beginning jointly in possession with the pattadar or he must have before the advent of the land Revenue Act, by virtue of any rule in force, e.g Zabita shikmidars etc., acquired, the right of shikmidar. These rights once acquired must be subsisting at the time of disputes. The person concerned must be in possession or enjoyment of this right. True it is that as a widow of the deceased pattadar, Momin Begum could have set up her rights on the death of her husband. She could enforce that rights so long as it is subsisting and not extinguished in the eye of law or the remedy for enforcement was not lost to her. Pattadar, as defined, is the person who is directly responsible to the Government for payment of land revenue and whose name as such is entered in the Government record, whether he be personally in possession of the holding or through his shikmidar. It is clear that unless the name is found in the Government records as the person responsible for payment of revenue to the Government, one cannot be within the definition of pattadar. He can be said to be in possession of this right only if his name is in the Government records and not otherwise. His persona possession of the land is of little significance. Indeed it is well settled that right of patta is heritable and alienable independent of or without regard to actual possession of land. But in casa of a shikmidar possession of land physically or constructively is of vital importance. It is only then that a shikmidar can be said to be in possession of the right of shikimdari. If such possession is lost and no steps are taken effectively to recover the same, within the statutory period, her right would be barred by time Momin Begum claimed to have right like pattadar. Of course, she was one of the heirs of the deceased pattadar in possession of land but on that account she was not entitled to patta under S. 57 of the Land Revenue Act but only to be entered as Shikmidara to the extent of her share. Her shikmdari rights could not be attributed to any other grounds mentioned in S. 2(12) or S. 67 of the Land Revenue Act or to Zabita-sbikmidaram. She has not been in possession of the lands from a long time and her co-sharer who could ordinarily be deemed to be in possession on her behalf had denied her right long ago and perfected his right to her share by adverse possession or ouster. It is a mistake to believe that in spite of loss of her right in this manner in the eye of law, she is still a shikmidara merely because she happens to be the widow of a person who was once the pattadar. The Additional Collector fell into error in believing that rights of Shikmidar can subsist apart from possession, whether actual or constructive, or inspite of ouster. As the order of the Additional Collector suffers from this error apparent on the face of the record, it is liable to be quashed. As already observed, the order is bad also because it was not in due accord with the provisions of the Regulation contained in S. 11.

    22. The order of the Additional Collector is therefore quashed and this Writ petition is allowed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.

    23. K.R.S

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    Meer Ahmed Ali Khan v. Momen Begum And Another
    (Jun 27, 1969)