Parthasarathi, J.:— This is an appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent from a decision of Ekbote, J., The facts lie in a narrow compass and are indisputable.

2. Etikopoaka village in the Viskhapatnam District was an estate within the meaning of the Madras Estates Land Act, as amended in 1936. It was held by several persons jointly, two of whom Bangariah and Appallaraju, suffered decrees for the recovery of money obtained against them by one Thirupathayya. In execution of the money decree, the one-fifth share of the judgment-debtors in the village was sold to one Mullayya who obtained symbolical delivery on 22nd December, 1956. The auction purchaser brought a suit for partition O.S No. 160 of 1958, to which the co-owners and tenants in possession of the inam lands are parties. In another decree suffered by the above mentioned persons, I/10th share of the inam village was sold in execution and the decree holder was the purchaser. He brought a suit seeking partition of the 1/10th share. The suit was registered as O.S No. 159 of 1958. In both the suits preliminary decrees were passed and I.A Nos. 263 and 264 of 1960 were presented to the Court for a final decree. The tenants were parties to the petitions and they ressisted the claim of the plaintiffs for a final decree on the ground that the Inams Abolition Act conferred on them the right to two-thirds share. The District Munsiff directed the appointment of a Commissioner with a view to pass the final decree of partition. The tenants questioned the correctness of the order in Revision Petitions Nos. 1148 and 1149 of 1961. They were allowed by Ekbote, J., and the order of the learned Judge has become final.

3. The two revision petitions mentioned above were heard by the learned Judge with some other revision petitions and an appeal. The revision petitions arose out of small cause suits filed by the auction-purchasers for recovery of rent. The suits were decreed and the tenants challenged the validity of the rent decrees contending, inter alia, that to the extent of two-thizds share of the lands, the title became vested in them by virtue of the Inams Abolition Act. They did not apply for the grant of ryotwari pattas. Nor were there any proceedings before the appropriate tribunal, recognising their right to any specific portions of the demised property. The learned Judge allowed the civil revision petitions and modified the decrees of the District Munsiff upholding the decrees only to the extent of one-third of the amount in each of the several suts. The decision of the learned Judge has become final.

4. The appeal with which we are concerned, was from the decree of the District Munsif in O.S No. 165 of 1960 which was the companion suit decided along with the small cause suits. In the original suit, the auction purchaser's claim for rent was decreed. An appeal was preferred to the District Judge but it was transferred to this Court to be decided with the revision petition, which also was between the same parties and raised identical questions; Ekbote, J., allowed the appeal in part and limited the decree to a third share of the claim. The landlord (Inamdar) preferred this appeal. The only question in this appeal is whether the tenants could resist the claim for recovery of rent on the ground that the lessor's interest in the demised property had become extinguished in part by the operation of the Andhra Pradesh Act XXXVII of 1956, commonly known as the Inams Abolition Act. This plea is advanced by the tenants although they had not been granted a ryotwari patta. In actual fact, they had not even applied for the grant of a ryotwari patta and had not taken any steps in furtherance of that objective.

5. It is contended by Sri Kodandaramaiah that the Act XXXVII of 1956 by its own force, does not bring about extinction of the title of the Inamdar, and that it enables the tenants in certain circumstances, to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of two-thirds share of the inam land and that the deprivation of a part of the inamdars property is effected only when the ryotwari patta is granted to the tenant. His contention is that till the ryotwari patta is issued to the tenant (which can occur only on the termination of the preliminary proceedings) the inamdar continues to hold the ownership of the entire inam land. The right of the Inamdar to the recovery of the rent pending the grant of ryotwari patta to a tenant, is unabated and does not suffer any diminution or injury as a direct consequence of the passing of the statute. This position is countered by the learned Counsel for respondents who has adopted as his argument the reasoning of our learned brother in his judgment.

6. The main conclusions of the learned Judge may be set out briefly. Firstly, he was of opinion that the abolition of the inams takes effect concurrently with the commencement of the Act. To quote the words of the learned Judge;

“The inam lands are converted into ryotwari lands immediately on the date when the Act commenced, on the abolition of the inams and the two thirds and one third shares get vested in the tenants and the landlord respectively.”

7. Secondly in the view of the learned Judge, the vesting of the shares in the tenants does not depend upon the enquiry under section 3 or separation of shares under section 6 or grant of ryotwari patta under section 7. He also expressed his opinion to the effect that:

“the law entitles them to the property on the day when the Act confers title and in pursuance of this right they have been given the right to approach the authorities concerned to get their shares separated or get pattas in their names as evidence of their title”.

8. Thirdly, he said that section 3 does not come in the way of vesting of title in the inamdars and the tenant as per section 4 of the Act. Section 3 is, therefore not a condition precedent to the conferment of title under section 4

9. The validity of these conclusions is keenly debated before us by the learned Counsel opposing each other. The appellant submits that the legislative intendment as well as the provisions of the enactment were misunderstood and that in any case the learned judge was in error in being influenced by his concept of the scheme of the Act, which can never supplant the plain meaning of the various provisions of the Act. Learned Counsel for the appellant lays stress on the contrast between the loams Abolition Act and other enactments of a like nature.

10. The Inams Abolition Act unlike its counterpart in the Telangana Area and also the Madras Estates Abolition Act, does not expressly state that the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases to exist from the date of the commencement of the Act. This, Counsel submits, is the keynote of the Inams Abolition Act. Counsel also emphasises on the absence of any provision in the ???nams Abolition Act mentioning in specific terms the point of time when the ???onversion of tenure takes effect.

11. The preamble of the Inams Abolition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act or enactment’) declares that it is intended to abolish and convert certain inam lands into ryotwari lands. The Act does not profess to be all comprehensive but indicates that certain inam lands alone are to be within its operation. We shall examine later, whether this professed objective is really in accord with the actual provisions of the Act. It was necessary for the achievement of the obectives set out in the Act, to provide the machinery for the determination of the respective class or category of inams that are governed by its provisions So that the provisions of the Act appropriate to that particular category may be applied to it. Section 3 of the Act (marginally described as determination of inam lands) provides, inter alia, for enquiry by the Tahsildar in order to determine whether a particular land is an inam land, whether such inam is part of or is comprehended in a ryotwari, zamindari or inam village and thirdly wether the inam land is held by an institution. This determination or categorisation is the basic step necessary for the application of the provisions of the Act to any specific category of land. The materiality of this process of determination can easily be appreciated if one remembers that no further question of the application of any of the other provisions of the Act arises in regard to inams in a zamindari or ryotwari village except the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of such land. The point that emerges is that as in the case of inam lands, in an inam village, the change over of inams to ryotwari tenure in zamindari and ryotwari villages too, is effected by virtue of the very same enactment. However, in respect of the former categories of inams, the Act does not confer any right on the tenant to a share of the land itself. The Act is a comprehensive measure which brings about a change in (he tenure of all categories of inams. An analysis of its provisions will bear out that the several categories of inams contemplted by the Act are:

(a) Inams in ryotwari and zamindari villages.

(b) Inams in inam villages.

12. There is a further classification in respect of category (b) into the divisions, viz. Inams held by an institution and inams held by others. The result, therefore is that all inams that still retain such tenure are within the purview of the Act and are converted into ryotwari tenure.

13. The Act beyond doubt, provides for the changeover to ryotwari tenure of all the categories mentioned above. But as per the preamble, the objective of the Act is only to bring about the change in ‘certain inams’. We think that the language of the preamble which professes to make the Act applicable to ‘certain inams’ does not appear to be apt or accurate. Nor is it in consonance with what is ptated in the objects and reasons of the bill.

14. Another aspect relating to the preamble may now be considered it is apparent that it indicates as the scope of the enactment only the process of the abolition of inams and conversion into ryotwari tenure. But the Act in fact goes far beyond that objective. The preamble is at best a recital of the facts operative on the mind of the law giver but its effect is not conclusive and the words of the enactment are clearly separable from the motives or beliefs which led to the legislation.

15. As observed by Lord Campbell in Labrador v. R. . L.R 1893 A.C 104.

“A mere recital in an Act of Parliament either of fact or law is not conclusive, and we are at liberty to consider the fact or the law to be different from the recital.”

16. There can be no doubt that the recital that the Act intended to effect conversion to ryotwari tenure of ‘certain inams’ is not accurate. Collins, M.R observed in Headland v. Coster . L.R 1905 1 K.B 219 at 231., that;

“such misrecitals are not absolutely unknown even in Act which have been framed by skilled and careful draftsman”.

17. The preamble clearly suggests that the statute is intended to achieve only the limited objective of conversion of tenure where as its provisions in respect of inam lands in inam villages are very far reaching in character and partially extingusih the rights of inamdar and confer coeval rights on the tenants. In this respect also the preamble in question is inappropriately worded, if not misleading. The Act professes to have a circumscribed and narrow orbit whereas it is in reality a measure designed to extinguish in part the ownership of one lection of inamdars. The statute constitutes the tenants the beneficiaries of the interest in respect of which the deprivation of an interest is inflicted on the inamdars.

18. As stated above, the Act achieves the conversion of the tenure of all categories of inams. This fact must be borne in mind in dealing with the rival contentions that were urged before us. The inams situate in Zamindari and ryotwari villages are also included in its purview for effecting the changeover in tenure. But, the further measures the Act has adopted are designed only in regard to inams in inam villages. In regard to these inams again, there was no uniformity in the approach of the Legislature, and, in the provisions designed by it, a differential treatment was accorded to inams held by institutions. The institutions are granted ryotwari tenure for all lands held by them but the tenants get rights of occupancy. In the solitary instance i.e, in respect of inams in inam villages not held by institutions, the Legislature has thought fit to apportion the entire proprietary interest or ownership between the inamdar and the tenant. In this process of distribution, they do not share alike the tenant gets twice as much as the inamdar. Two thirds of what the inamdar owns ii taken away from him in order to transmit it to the tenant. It is not an unreasonable guess to make, if one were to hold that the preamble perhaps advisedly concealed the real legislative intentions as to inam lands in inam villages. Apparently, it was considered discreet to do so. The Legislature indicated in the preamble the common result of conversion of tenure, achieved in regard to all types of inams, and advisedly omitted all reference to the special provisions made about a single category of inams. The omission to make the preamble comprehensive and explicit enough so as to reflect the entire legislative intentions appears to be deliberate rather than inadvertant, No indication was given in the preamble perhaps because it was considered unwise to pin point the discriminatory portion of the legislation.

19. The logical thing would have been to have two distinct enactments, one limited to the conversion of inam tenure to ryotwari pattern, and made comprehensive in its sweep so as to apply to all inams, and another piece of legislation to bring about the partial extinguishment of the right of inamdar and the bestowal of the benefit accruing from the expropriation, on the tenant. In any case, it could have been in the form of a distinct chapter of the same Act. As the Legislature has not adopted either of the courses mentioned above and has in one piece of legislation included both the measures, it has resulted in some inadequacies or lacunae, some of which have given rise to the questions now before us. It is in this background that we must evaluate the effect of the specific provisions adverted to by Counsel on the opposite sides.

20. At this stage, it is necessary to point out that all the material conclusions of our learned brother summarised above by us are based on what he considered to be the necessary implications of the scheme of the Act and some of its provisions. We have endeavoured to show that the scheme of the Act as expressed in the preamble, was to effect only a conversion of the tenure and nothing more. The main argument before us, therefore, turned on the question whether the provisions of the Act and its scheme necessarily imply that the conversion into ryotwari tenure is concurrently accomplished with the commencement of the Act and whether the extinguishment of the interest of the inamdar is also brought about simultaneously with the commencement of the Act.

21. Before we examine the relevant statutory provisions, it is as well that we address ourselves to some cannons of constrution that are relevant. The learned Judge in his judgment, and both the Counsel appearing in this case, proceeded on the basis that there is no specific provision in the Act, making provision for the abolition of the inam at a point of time defined by it. It is also common ground that there is no provision in the Act, which fixes precisely the point of time when the extinguishment of the interest of the inamdar takes place and the vesting of the split ownership is brought about, so as to give two-thirds share of the inam land to the tenant. In the absence of specific provisions, whas are the criteria by which the questions should be judged?

22. If the matter is altogether omitted from a statute, it is clearly not permissible to insert it by implication, for to do so would not be to construe the Act but to alter it. Such an attempt may improve the enactment but it is unquestionably an alteration of the enactment and enlargement of the provisions which the Legislature thought fit to make. This rule is of considerable antiquity and longstanding and is found expressed in clear terms in In re, Sneezum What we Sad in the Inams Abolition Act is that there is no declaration of the precise time when the conversion of the tenure takes place. If was open to the Legislature to have declared that the new tenure is operative from the commencement of the Act. Such an explicit provision was within the competence of the law making body, and the Legislature could not have been unaware of it. It has, however, chosen not to declare or define the relevant point to time when the change becomes effectual. What then is the the effect of the studied omission of the Legislature? Does it not stand to reason that, when it was open to the Legislature to make the change of tenure effective concurrently with the commencement of the Act, but it has failed to make it so, the legislative intendment was clearly against the instantaneous change over of the tenure? When the Legislature did not make such a provision, it is not the duty or function of the Court to ignore its obvious effect and to find out what the unexpressed intention of the Legislature might be said to be. To hold that it was the intention of the Legislature to bring about a concomitant change in inam tenure with the commencement of the Act, is to resort to judicial legislation. We shall presently examine some provisions of the Act which, as a matter of fact, manifest a contrary intention of the Legislature.

23. The decisions on the subject contain many a warning against the general proposition that the circumstances as are present in the instant case, it is for the Court to find out the intention of the Legislature. It has been said in Solomon v. Solomon & Co..

“Intention of the Legislature is a common but very slippery phrase, which properly understood, may signify anything from intention embodied in positive enactment to speculative opinion as to what the Legislature probably would have meant, although there has been an omission to enact it.”

24. The principle has been expressed in the form of an injunction in the judgment of the Privy Council in Craford v. Spooner . 6 M.O.O.P C.C 8 1846-1851.

“We cannot aid the Legislature's defective phrasing of the Act, we cannot add, and mend, by construction, make up the deficiencies which are left there.”

25. It is unnecessary to cite further authorities on this aspect. We only wish to add that the legitimate and permissible method of ascertaining the intention of the Legislature is to deduce it from what it has chosen to enact either in ex press words or by reasonable and necessary implication. If we are to speculate on what the Legislature had intended, it would not be interpretation of the enactment as we find it but would be tantamount to the filling in of blanks, perhaps advisedly left by the Legislature, and we might be imputing imarginary intentions to the Legislature.

26. In his judgment, our learned brother said (referring to the Act):

“It does not also expressly state that the relationship of landlord and tenant would cease to exist from the date of the commencement of the Act or from any date subsequent thereto. No provison of the Act mentions as to when an inam land shall be deemed to have been converted into a ryotwari land.”

27. He then added:

“Nevertheless, in view of the scheme of the Act, in my view, the inams are abolished with immediate effect from the date when the Act came into force.”

28. He thought that the intention of the Legislature is plain from the language of section 4.

29. When the provisions of section 4 of the Act are analysed, we notice in the first instance that sub-section (1) provides for the issue of ryotwari patta to the person or institution holding an inam land in a ryotwari or zamindari village, on the date of the commencement of the Act. That date is enacted to be the crucial date for the determination of the right. It is noteworthy that the Legislature does not make the ryotwari patta effective from the date of the commencement of the Act. We cannot lose sight of the very material circumstance that the time of the commencement of the Act is made the determining factor only for the selection of the recipient of the patta and not to make the change over of the tenure simultaneously operative with the commencement of the Act.

30. Clause (a) of sub-section (2) likewise provides that the institutions holding an inam land in an inam village, on the date of the commencement of the Act, shall be entitled to the issuance of a ryotwari patta. Here again the commencement of the Act is designated as relevant only for determination as to who should obtain the patta under the changed tenure.

31. Classe (b) of sub-section (2) envisages the case of an inam land in an inam Village being held by a person and not an institution on the date of the commencement of the Act. Though the holder of the inam is in possession at the relevant point of time, the Legislature provided for the benefit of the enactment being conferred on the tenant in possession on 7th January, 1948. An inquiry to determine that fact is contemplated and if a tenant is declared to have been in possession on the 7th day of January, 1948, he will be entitled to the isssue of a patta in respect of the two thirds share of the land. The patta for the residue in case a tenant files an application for a patta for his share and in default of such an application, a patta for the entire extent, is to be granted to the person holding the inam. The material feaure is that there is no nothing to indicate that simultaneously with the commencement of he Act, the changeover of the tenure becomes automatically effective. Cause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 4 provides for inams in the possession of tenants on the date of the commencement of the Act and for the grant of ryotwari Pattas to the tenants and the holder of the inam for their specific shares. If no tenant applies for the grant of ryotwari patta, on the strength of his possession as on January, 1948, the tenant actually in possession at the commencement of the Act gets the benefit of the tenant's share. It will be noticed that the two clauses (b) and (c) contemplate cases of default on the part of the tenants who were in possession in January, 1948, and the consequence of such default is that in the one case the inamdar gets the advantage and in the other case the tenant subsequently inducted into possession becomes entitled to the benefit. If the title to the two thirds share has vested in the tenant who held the inam land in that capacity in January, 1948, by what process does the divesting take place so as to enable others to get a ryotwari patta in respect of the two thirds share which is supposed to have become his property by virtue of the implications of the Act? This aspect will be dealt with more fully hereafter.

32. We wish to add, though it is by way of parenthesis that clauses (b) and (c) seem to contemplate that only the very person who was the tenant who held the land in January, 1948, as the one entitled to the two thirds share. Is it a personal right that accures to him or did the Legislature intend that the representatives of the tenant should also be the beneficiaries under this scheme of retrospective conferment of windfalls? If a tenant dies or becomes bankrupt, are the representatives to have the benefit of the conferred right? The statute does not define ‘tenant’ to mean his legal representatives or assigns. Prima facie, ‘tenant’ contemplated by clauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (2), must be understood to mean only the very person who held as tenant on the pre scribed date. Does the expression ‘tenant’ in that context mean a tenant holding over, a tenant who had been in arrears and who was liable to be evicted? Again can it take in a tenant against whom an action for eviction was then pen ding and who was subsequently dispossessed, or one who voluntarily relinquished or surrendered his interest after 7th January, 1948? The application of the provisions of clauses (b) and (c) would give rise to many complications in particular, if legal representatives or assigns also are deemed to be tenants under the said clauses. Sub-section (3) of section 4 enacts that the retention of one third share of his own property by the inamdar is to be deemed the compensation for the extinguishment of two thirds share in the property.

33. A scrutiny of the provisions of section 4, in our judgment, leads necessarily to the conclusion that whenever the section referred to the “commencement of the Act” as a relevant point of time under the scheme of the Act, it is expressly for the purposes of determining the person who is to be recipient of the benefit. Under clause (c) it may be the tenant in possession of the land on the date of the commencement of the statute that is to be the beneficiary under the grant of two thirds share of the inam land Under clause (b) the time of he commencement of the Act is material for determining whether the Inamdar was in possession of the land on that date. Likiwise, under clause (a), it is the institution holding the inam land on the date of the Act that gets ryotwari patta. We have, therefore, no hesitation in holding that in none of the alternatives contemplated by section 4, the time of the commencement of the Act is intended by the Legislature to be the starting point for the conversion of tenure. We are unable to share the view of our learned brother that the scheme of the Act, by its necessary implication, brings about the abolition of the Inams as a concomitant of the commencement of the Act. Not only is there no such implication, the express provisions of the enactment, on other hand, unmistakably indicate the contrary result. In this context, the most material provision that throws light on the question in issue, is section 12. It is intended to fix the liability of the persons or institutions receiving the ryotwari patta in respect of the ryotwari assessment payable by them. It enacts inter alia. that ‘from the date of the grant of the ryotwari patta’ the person receiving the patta shall be liable to pay the ryotwari assessment.

34. The essence of the mam tenure is the concession the tenure implies in the shape of the partial or complete immunity from the payment of land revenue. The confirmation of an inam by the British Government and the grant of the inam title deed secured for the holder of the inam the assessment—free tenure, income cases where the Government relinquished their reversionary interest as a quid pro quo a quit rent was imposed. Similarly, in some cases where the original grant itself did not completely exempt the grantee from assessment, the confirmatory title deed of the inam by the Government, may have embodied only the partial exemption. It is the exemption in part or in full from this liability that is abrogated by the Inams Abolition Act. The Inam land which was free from assessment is subjected to all the incidents of ordinary ryotwari tenure and the enactment achieves this result by the process of the levy of assessment which brings about conversion of tenure. The change over is signified by the imposition of the full assessment under the ryotwari system. This is effected as from the date of the grant of ryotwari patta and not from the date of the commencement of the Act. There can be no clearer indication than the provisions of section 12 that the changed tenure becomes operative only with effect from the date of the grant of ryotwari patta.

35. We have adverted to the words of the preamble which recite that the purpose of the enactment is to convert the inam into ryotwari tenure. What does the coversion bring about or achieve? What is the crux of the matter? Can it be doubted that the pith and substance of the abolition of the one and the introduction of the changed tenure is the withdrawal of the concession as to payment of assessment and the imposition of the assessment? The outstanding feature of the Inam tenure vis-a-vis the State is the right to hold the land without the payment of the customary share of the State. The Inam grants in some cases may have comprised the land too but the hall-mark of the Inam tenure is the complete or partial immunity from revenue assessment. It is the abrogation of this privilege that is tantamount to the abolition of Inam; and by the same token abolition can be effective, only from the date of the issue of ryotwari patta which fixes the liability for the payment of revenue. Section 12 can, in our opinion, permit of no other interpretation than that the charge over of the tenure is operative concurrently with the issue of ryotwari patta.

36. While dealing with the provisions of section 12, Ekbote, j., observed.

“The Government cannot obviously recover the land revenue unless pattas are granted and direct relationship established. As the grant of patta is the culmination of all the proceedings under the Act, the Legislature naturally thought that the direct relationship could be established only after the patta is granted.”

37. These observations, no doubt, occur in the context of the discussion of the question as to the point of time when the right is vested in the tenant. But the point that emerges is that the learned Judge himself conceded in effect that the liability to pay land revenue, and ‘the direct relationship’ between the pattadar and Government, constitute the essence of ryotwari tenure. In other words, the observations of the learned Judge can be understood only to mean that the crucial point of time for the conversion is the grant of patta and the imposition of the assessment. It appears to us that the necessary consequence of the legal position recognsied by the learned Judge himself, can and should be the conclusion that, the change in tenure is not accomplished before the grant of ryotwari patta. It follows that the conversion of the tenure cannot be held to have occurred at the time of the commencement of the Act. The decision of the learned Judge runs counter to the legal position which he himself elucidated in the observations cited by us. There is no warrant for the view that the necessary implication of the scheme of the enactment is that the change of tenure is contemporaneous with the commencement of the Act. With respect to the learned Judge, we have to say that he missed the effect of the indubitable legal position that the direct relationship between the grantee of ryotwari patta and the State is the essence of the ryotwari tenure. This situation, be conceded, arises only as the culmination of the proceedings under the Act. Such proceedings are an indispensable pre-requisite for the settlement of the terms and conditions of the patta. viz., the extent and quality of the land, and the precise assessment to which it should be subjected as also the point of time when the liability is to commence. We are of opinion that section 12 brings about the conversion of tenure only from the date of the grant of ryotwari patta. There can be no resort to the method of construction by implications of the enactment when the provisions of section 12 unequivocally fix the point of time at which the liability to pay ryotwari assessment arises.

38. The next question arising for determination is, whether the vesting of the split ownership of the inam land is brought about at the commencement of the Act. On this aspect also, we are unable to uphold the learned Judge's view.

39. The conclusions reached by him on both the questions are based on the tame or identical approach as to the legislative intendments and what he considered to be the necessary inferences from the scheme of the Act. He observed:

“When once the object of the Act is kept in view, it leaves no one in doubt that the Act abolishes the inams and converts them into ryotwari tenure on the commencement of the Act. It simultaneously vests two-thirds and one third shares on the tenants and the inamdras respectively. When once this title is given by the Act, it naturally provides for the machinery and the proceduee in order to separate the property and grant pattas.”

40. What we stated earlier as to the method of statutory interpretation in regard to the first question holds good in regard to the second question also. There is no express provision in the Act vesting in the tenants of inam lands of inam ages a right to two-thirds share of the land, with reference to any prescribed or, fixed point of time. The Act, effects the partial extinguishment of the interest of the inamdars and enables the tenants to obtaina patta in respect of the portion of land of which the inamdar is deprived. But the controversy is, when does the right get vested in the tenant?

41. It cannot be gainsaid that immediately before the commencement of the Act, the entire interest in respect of an inam land in an inam village stood vested in the holder of the inam. It is a part of this property that is detached from his ownership and the portion of which he is thus deprived is transmitted to the tenant. It is apparent, therefore, that the vesting of the right in the tenant cannot take place at a point of time earlier than the extinguishment of the interest of the land-holder.

42. The position may be described thus. An inam holding comprising of a particular extent is held by A. The statute deprives A of two-thirds share in that holding and provides the machinery for the separation of the interest of which he is to be deprived. The two-thirds share of which he is deprived, has to be assessed and separated with reference to the extent, quality of land, and the advantages and disadvantages of the situation of the land etc. It is only after the separated two-thirds share is ascertained that the statute provides for the grant of a patta to a tenant in respect of the separated portion. It must also be remembered that a determination of the question as to who the recepient of the two-thirds share is to be, is also a condition precedent for the grant of the patta.

43. The point is when, during this process, does the extinguishment of the interest of the two thirds share occur? The Act is silent about it. We may however observe that if the intention of the Legislature was that the vesting of the two thirds share in a tenant was to be accomplished by virtue of the passing of the Act itself there was no impediment to such a provision having been inserted. The Legislature did not make any such provision, but created the machinery for the separation of the two-thirds share and the ascertainment of the person who is to receive the benefit of that two thirds share. The conferment of the ownership in regard to the two thirds share is a formal act and it is to be evidenced by the grant of a ryotwari patta. It is hardly necessary to stress the position that apart from the grant of the ryotwari patta, no other means or vehicle of the transfer of title to the two thirds share is contemplated by the Act. In other words, though the scheme of the Act is to split up the ownership of the inam land into two fractions, a two thirds share and the residue, the transmission of title to the two thirds share is done only through the instrument ??? a patta. Title to property docs not become extingusihed by mere implication of an enactment. The Act conceives of only one method of extinction of title and the modus operandi adopted is to issue pattas separately to the tenant and inamdar.

44. When a statute is enacted for the expropriatory purpose of splitting the ownership in a property and passing the ownership of a fraction thereof to a third party, the transmission of the interest cannot become effective except by an unequivocal provision to that effect. Title to property cannot be extinguihed in the absence of a definite statutory provision bringing about the result. Judged in this light, what are the provisions in the Act which bring about a termination of the interest of the holder of the inam or the transfer thereof to the tenant? In our opinion, extinguishment of the interest of the holder of the inam and the transfer of the interest in the two-thirds share of the inam land to the tenant, are designed to be accomplished only by the grant of the respective pattas for the split fractions. There is nothing in the Act to indicate that extingueshment and the consequent ransmission of title to the tenant occur at a point of time earlier than the grant of the patttas.

45. Section 4(3) is to the effect that the inamdar is entitled to ryotwari patta in respect of a one-third share of the land, and that the grant of the ryotwari patta to him in respect of the one third share has to be deemed to be the compensation payable for the extingushment of his rights in the two-thirds share of the land. This section unmistakably points to the conclusion that the extinguishment of the two-third share of the land is a concomitant of the grant of the ryotwari patta in respect of the one-third share. Clauses (b) and (c) contemplate the grant of ryotwari pattas to the tenants in respect of two-thirds share of the inam lands. The release of the two thirds share from the ownership of the inamdar becomes operative when the patta in respect of the one-third share is issued to him. The provisions of sub-sections (2) and (3) of section 4 cannot be read in any other manner except as indicating the following: (a) The extinguishment of the inamdar's interest in a two-thirds share of the land is brought about when he is given as compensation therefor a patta in respect of the one thirds share. (b) The two-thirds share gets released from the ownership of the inamdar only by the, grant of the patta to him in respect of the one-third share. And (c) It is only on the extinguishment of the interest of the inamdar that the transmission of title to the two-thirds share by the grant of a ryotwari patta to the tenant is possible.

46. We are accordingly of opinion that the extinguishment of the title of the land-holder to share of the inam land and the transfer of that interest to the tenant are brought about simultaneously by the issue of the ryotwari pattas to them. The result is that the vesting of the title in the tenant is effected through the instrumentality of the patta, which is necessary for establishing direct relationship with the State under ryotwari tenure.

47. This conclusion is further strengthened by a reference to the provisions of section 11 of the Act. It states inter alia, that the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act, 1956 shall apply to the tenancies in respect of inam lands governed this Act. The learned Judges construed section 11(1) as applicable only to tenancies created under section 8 of the Act. According to him, the expression “governed by this Act” qualifies the word “tenancies” and he held that the only tenancies that are governed by the Act are those referred to in sections 8, 9 and 10. We do not think that it is permissible to read section 11(1) in the manner done by the learned judge. According to the rules of grammer and ordinary construction, the phrase “governed by this Act” qualifies the words “inam lands” and not the word “tenancies”. The permanent tenancies created under section 8 are not exhaustive of all categories of the tenancies in respect of inam lands governed by the Act. There is no warrant for placing the narrow construction on section 11(1) and to exclude from its operation the tenancies in respect of inam lands governed by the Act. It must be remembered that the Act is a comprehensive measure dealing with all inam lands including inam lands in ryotwari and zamindari villages. Section 4(1) entitles the person or institution holding inam lands in ryotwari and zamindari villages to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of such inam lands. The Andhra Tenancy Act is made applicable also to tenancies in respect of the inam lands within the purview of section 4(1) of the Act: The intention of the Legislature apparently is that notwithstanding the change in the tenure brought about by the Act under sections 4(1) and 4(2), the tenancies in respect of all inam lands should be groverned by the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act. There is no warrant to cut down the operation of sub section (1) of section 11 and to construe it in such a manner as to ignore the plain meaning of the words tenancies in respect of inam lands governed by the Act:” We are of opinion that section 11. (1) has been designed to make the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act applicable to all tenancies of all inam lands including the permanent tenancies under section 8. It is clear that among other things, the Legislature wanted to dispel any misapprehension that may arise by reason of the conversion of tenure under section 4(1). We think that the most reasonable construction that can be placed by the sub-section (1) is to hold that it was intended to make the Andhra Tenancy Act applicable to the tenancies of inam lands] situate in inam villages also, as long as the splitting up of the ownership does not take place and till separate ryotwari pattas are issued to the inamdar and tenant. The Legislature apparently had in mind the inevitable time lag between the commencement of the Act and the grant of separate ryotwari pattas to the inamdar and tenant and it intended to define the relationship as one of landlord and tenant, till the split ownership is given effect to. This is one of the many contingencies which section 11(1) contemplates. It appears to us that it is a comprehensive provision applicable to all tenancies of inam lands governed by the Act. If we accept the contention urged for the respondents, we have to hold that the words “in respect of inam lands” were used by the Legislature without giving them their plain or natural meaning. The words have to be regarded as superfluous. This if not a permissible method of construction.

48. If there was was any room for misunderstanding section 11(1), the misconception is certainly cleared by a reference to sub-section (2). It enacts, inter alia, that if it appears that a person in occupation of inam lands is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta, under section 4, no order for his eviction should be passed under the provisions of the Andhra Tenancy Act till a final decision is rendered in respect of the grant of the ryotwari patta. The wide provisions of sub-section (2) are applicable having regard to their plain meaning, to the tenancies of inam lands in inam villages, also. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the learned Judge of sub-sections (1) and (2), and in our opinion, the effect of both the sub-sections of section 11 it to make the provisons of the Andhra Tenancy Act applicable to tenancies of inam lands in inam villages.

49. The fact that the Legislature thought it necessary to make a provision for the continuance of the tenancies till the question as to the issue of ryotwari patta is finally decided, is proof of the legislative intention that the vesting of title as to the two-thirds share of the inam land in the tenants is to take place concurrently with the grant of the ryotwari patta. There can be no doubt that section 11 if rightly construed cannot exclude from its purview the tenancies in respect of inam lands in inam villages. To accept the construction placed by our learned brother on section 11 is to deny to the plain words, of section 31 their natural and ordinary meaning we accordingly hold that the Legislature clearly envisaged the position that the holder of inam lands in inam villages was to continue to be the landholder in respect of such land till the extinguishment of his interest takes place.

50. We have already adverted to the provisions of section 12 while discussing the first question. What we have stated there, goes to reinforce our conclusion on the second aspect also. The liability of the inamdar to pay the assessment till the grant of the ryotwari patta in respect of some inam is clearly provided for, under section 12. What is the inference to be drawn from the fact that till the grant of the ryotwari patta the inamdar is made liable to the assessment in respect of the entire land? Let us assume for a moment that the Act brought about arresting of the ownership of the two-thirds share of the inam land in the tenant. The position is that She tenant would be free from the obligation to pay rent to the landholder in respect of the two-thirds share of the land while at the same time the inamdar would be saddled with the liability to pay the assessment down to the time of the granting of the ryotwari patta to the tenant. Could such an anamolous result be attributed to the Legislature? Can it be said that the Legislature intended to make the inamdar liable for the assessment in respect of the entire land though he ceased to be the owner in respect of a two-thirds share thereof? We do not think that such an anamolous situation arises on a correct reading of the provisions of the Act. In our opinion, the effect of sections 11 and 12 of the Act weighs against the argument that the vesting of the two thirds share of the inam land occurred by implication at the time of the commencement of the Act.

51. Yet another aspect that has a bearing on this question is this: Under clause (b) of sub-section (2) of section 4 the tenant in possession in January, 1948 is declared to be the person entitled to the two-thirds share but in default of an application by him, the inamdar is to get a ryotwari patta for the entire extent. If the hypothesis that the vesting of the two-thirds share took place on the passing of the Act is correct we will have to further imply that the vested right is forfeited by the tenant's default. Likewise under clause (c), we will have to proceed on the basis of a forfeiture of the interest vested in the tenant. We are of opinion, that clauses (b) and (c) negative the validity of the assumption that the scheme of the Act impliedly vests title to the two thirds share concurrently with the commencement of the Act. The learned Counsel for the respondent could not furnish any valid answer to the question whether his argument would not bring about the vesting of title in the tenant even before the inamdar suffers exinguishment of his right. His argument necessarily leads to the anomaly that though the inamdar's right is extinguished on the grant of a patta to him, the tenant nevertheless becomes the owner of the two-thirds share in anticipation of an eventuality.

52. In the statement of objects and reasons, it is stated, inter alia, that “the tenant, if any, in occupation of the land on the commencement of the Act, shall be entitled to ryotwari pata in respect of two-thirds of the land in his occupation, on his surrendering the remaining one-third in favour of the inamdar.”

53. Much has been said in this case about Legislative intendment as supporting the view taken by Ekbote J., but when we examine the objects and reasons of the enactment, we find that “the commencement of the Act” is considered relevant only to declare that the person then in possessionshall be entitled to the issue of patta. The selection of the beneficiary is made with reference to that date but he gets a patta if and when he surrenders the one-third share of the lands. This is condition precedent to the grant of patta. The Act does not enable the tenant to obtain a patta except on surrender of a third share of the leasehold property to the inamdar. If it were not so and if the contention of the respondents' Counsel is to be upheld the tenant can remain in possession of the entire extent of the property indefinitely and the inamdar will have to pay the assessment to the Government in respect of the entire land. We hold that till the condition is fulfilled the anterior relationship subsists and it is in this context that the provisions of the Act especially sections 4, 11 and 12 are to be understood.

54. Learned Counsel for the respondent relied on a decision in Commissioner of Income-tax, Madras v. Sivakasi Match Exporting Co. as a direct authority in support of his contention.

55. The facts of the case are that a minor inamdar obtained a decree for delivery of possession of property against the tenant and after the Act came into force, sought the aid of Court in execution of his decree. The Court held that delivery of possession could not be enforced to the extern of two-thirds share because of the provisions of the Act. It may be noted that the analogy of the principle of section 11(2) was applicable. The lower Courts apparently proceeded on the basis that prima facie the tenant was the beneficiary in respect of the two-thirds share and held that it was not just to allow the decree holder (inamdar) to recover in entirety the possesson, of the land. The decision rendered by Sharfuddin Ahmed J., affirmed the dismissal of the execution petiton by (he Courts below to the extent of two-thirds share of the land.

56. The learned Judge held on the evidence that the tenant was in possession in 1948 and at the commencement of the Act and therefore, the situation was one directly attracting the provisions of clause (c) of sub-section 2 of section 4. The provisions of section 15 of the Act were adverted to by Sharfuddin Ahmed J., and he held that the provisions of 15th section of the Act should be held to have overriding effect, notwithstanding any instrument to the contrary. A decree was held to be ‘an instrument’ within the meaning of section 15. It is unnecessary for the determination of the case on hand to canvass the validity of the decision of Sharfuddin Ahmed, J., We do not read it as a pronouncement on the effect of section 11, which in our view keeps intact the relationship of landlord and tenant, of the parties in the instant case. It is scarcely necessary to consider in the present context whether section 15 of the Act was rightly construed by the learned Judge. We are of opinion that another decision relied on for the respondents' Counsel in Vissam Raju v. Gopal Rao, is of no help to him, because the precise questions debated here were not dealt with in that case.

57. For all the reasons stated above, the appeal succeeds and the decree of the lower Court has to be affirmed with costs right through.

58. Appeal allowed.