Ramachandra Raju, J.:— This batch of Civil Revision Petitions has arisen under the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reform (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). The common question of law involved in the Civil revision petitions is what is the ‘holding’ of a “family unit”. The contention of the petitioners is that there is no provision made in the Act as to what is the holding of a Family Unit and in the absence of such a provision the other provisions in the Act relating to limitation of holdings of agricultural land cannot have any application to a family unit. What is a family unit is defined under Section 3(f) of the Act. By means of a fiction, the family unit is constituted as a person as per the definition given to the term “person” under Section 3(o) of the Act. The term “holding” is defined under Section 3(i) of the Act.

2. It is convenient to extract here the definitions:

“Section 3(f) “family unit” means—

(i) in the case of an individual who has a spouse or spouses such individual, the spouse or spouses, and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters, if any:

(ii) in the case of an individual who has no spouse, such individual and his or her minor sons and unmarried minor daughters;

(iii) in the case of an individual who is a divorced husband and who has not re-married, such individual and his minor sons and unmarried minor daughters, whether in his custody or not: and

(iv) where an individual and his or her spouse are both dead, their minor sons and unmarried minor daughters.

Explanation: Where a minor son is married, his wife and their offspring, if any, shall also be deemed to be members of the family unit of which the minor son is a member.”

Section 3(i): “holding” means the entire land held by a person—

(i) as an owner;

(ii) as a limited owner;

(iii) as an usufructuary mortgagee,

(iv) as a tenant;

(v) who is in possession by virtue of a mortgage by conditional sale or through part performance of a contract for the sale of land or otherwise; or in one or more of such capacities;

and the expression “to hold land” shall be construed accordingly”.

“Section 3(o): “person” includes an individual, a family unit, trustee, a company, a firm, a society or an association of individuals, whether incorporated or not”.

3. Under the scheme of the Act every entity which constitutes, a person as per its definition, which was extracted above, is entitled to hold land equivalent to a “ceiling area” as specified in Sec. 4 or 4-A of the Act and the excess, if any, has to be surrendered to the Government, which on surrender would vest in the Government. As provided under Section 8 of the Act every person whose holding on the specified date exceeds the specified limit shall file a declaration before the Tribunal in respect of such holding. As provided under Section 9 the Tribunal determines whether the person holds any extent of land in excess of the ceiling area and if so, the extent of land so, held in excess on the notified date. As provided under Section 10 if the extent of the holding of a person is in excess of the ceiling area, the person shall be liable to surrender the land, held in excess. As provided under Section II when the excess land is so surrendered it would vest in the Government. The “family unit” is an artificial person created under the Act. Therefore under ordinary law a family unit does not hold any property. As per the definition, for instance, in the case of an individual who has a spouse or such individual, the spouses or spouse and their minor sons and their unmarried minor daughters if any would constitute a family unit. It has nothing to do, for instance, with a Hindu undivided family. For the purpose of the Act, those individuals were constituted as a legal entity called “family unit”. For the purpose of the Act, the question for consideration is, what is the land which constitutes the holding of such a family unit, to determine whether there is any excess land for surrender to the Government.

4. According to the Government, the holding of such a family unit is the sum total of the land held by all the members of such a family unit is the sum total of the land held by all the members of such a family unit. This contention of the Government is based upon the explanation to Section 4 of the Act wherein it is provided that

“In the case of a family unit, the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit”.

5. The argument of Sri P. Babul Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioners in some of the civil revision petitions, which argument was followed by the counsel for the petitioners in the other civil revision petitions, is that there is nothing in the explanation to show that the land held by all the members of the family unit would constitute the holding of the family unit; the provision in the explanation is made by making any provision as such in the Act that the aggregate of the land held by all the members of the family unit constitutes its holding and the Act being an exproprietory Act what is not clearly provided in the Act cannot be supplied by Court and the provisions of the Act have to be construed strictly according to their plain meaning and if an omission is made in the Act as to what land constitutes the holding of a family unit, it is a lacuna which cannot be supplied and therefore though family unit is a person as per the definition of that term which is liable to file a declaration as provided under Section 8 of the Act it would be a person without any holding and the question of filing a declaration of its holding as provided under Section 8 of the Act therefore would not arise and consequently the questions of determination of the ceiling area as specified in section 4 or section 4-A by the Tribunal and the surrender of any excess land and vesting of the same in the Government also would not arise. Thus, the argument of the learned counsel is that since no provision is made in the Act as to what land would constitute the holding of a family unit, it would be a person without a holding and therefore the other provisions of the Act cannot have any application with regard to a family unit. In this connection, the learned counsel brought to our notice section 5(2) of the Madras Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling on Land) Act, 1961 wherein provision is made that all the lands held individually by the members of a family or jointly by some or all of the members of such family shall be deemed to be held by the family. Under section 5(1) of that Act the ceiling area in the case of a person is specified. There also, the term ‘person’ is defined as including a family. The term ‘family’ in that Act also is defined as husband and wife, their minor sons and unmarried daughters etc.

6. Therefore, Sri Babul Reddy has argued that when no such specific provision is made in the present Act as in section 5(2) of the Madras Act as to what land would constitute the holding of a family unit, so far as the Act stand to-day it must be taken that the family unit is a person without any holding.

7. It is provided under section 4(1) of the Act that the ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of not more than five members shall be an extent of land equivalent to one standard holding and the ceiling area in the case of a family unit consisting of more than five members shall be an extent of land equivalent to one standard holding plus one fifth of one standard holding for every such member in excess of five, so, however, that the ceiling area shall not exceed two standard holdings. According to the explanation, in the case of a family unit the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of family unit. When it is said that the ceiling area shall be applied to the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit, by necessary implication, it follows that the aggregate of lands held by all the members of the family unit would be the ‘holding’ of the family unit. The explanation could have been more happily worded by merely saying that in the case of a family unit, the land held by all the members of the family unit would be deemed to be its holding. In enacting the explanation the intention of the Legislature is quite clear, namely, that it meant to mean that the lands held by all the members of the family unit shall be the holding of the family unit and the ceiling area and the excess are to be determined accordingly.

8. Sri Babul Reddy has argued that so construing the explanation, would amount to introduction of a fiction of far-reaching consequences and in law it cannot be permitted. We do not think so. The interpretation so put on the explanation as mentioned above is in accordance with the objects of the Act and the intention of the Legislature, namely, to put a ceiling on agricultural holdings in accordance with the definitions of the terms ‘family unit’ and ‘person’ and the other provisions of the Act. According to the definition of the term ‘person’ a family unit is also a person. All the provisions of the Act are intended, by the Legislature to apply to the family unit like the other categories of the term ‘person’ as per its definition. Therefore, the Legislature intended the family unit also to have a holding for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Act relating to the determination of the ceiling limit and excess land, if any, over it. It is true that the provision is not specific that such and such land constitutes the holding of a family unit. But from what was said in the explanation to section 4, it is clear what is meant by the Legislature to be the holding of a family unit. The implication is very clear that the holding of a family unit is the aggregate of all the lands held by all the members of the family unit.

9. Sri Babul Reddy by placing reliance on some decided cases of the Supreme Court and this Court has argued that if two constructions are possible upon the language of a statue the one which is favourable to the citizen should be accepted by the Court and the statutes which encroach on the rights of the subjects should be interpreted, if possible, so as to respect such rights by subjecting them to a strict construction. In Dilip Kumar v. State of Madhy Pradesh (I) (1976) 1 SCC 560 : AIR 1976 S.C 133 the Supreme Court said that if two constructions are possible upon the language of the statute, the Court must choose the one which is consistent with good sense and fairness and eschew the other which makes its operation unduly oppressive, unjust or unreasonable, or which would lead to strange, inconsistent results or otherwise introduce an element of bewildering uncertainity and practical inconvenience in the working of the statute.

10. In the decision State of Bombay v. United Motors Ltd., (2) A.I.R 1953 S.C 232 this is what the Supreme Court has said:

“It may be that the description of a provision cannot be decisive of its true meaning or interpretation which must depend upon the words used therein, but when two interpretations are sought to be put upon a provision, that which fits the description which the legislature has chosen to apply to it is, according to sound cannons of construction, to be adopted provided, of course, it is consistent with the language employed, in preference to the one which attributes to the provision a different effect from what it should have according to its description by the legislature.”

11. In Taj Mahal Hotel v. I.T Commissioner (3) AIR 1969 A.P 84 a Division Bench decision of this Court, what was held is that the dominant purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain the intention of the Legislature as expressed by the language used and the meaning of the statute is primarily to be sought in the words used in the statute itself: if they are plain and unambiguous be applied as they stand, however, strongly it may be suspected that the result does not represent, the intention of the Parliament.

12. In the decision Chandra Bai v. Government of Andhra Pradesh (4) 1968 (I) An. W.R 364, rendered by our learned brother, Justice Sambasiva Rao, the learned Judge was considering the classification of lands as provided under the Andhra Pradesh (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings Act), (Act 10 of 1961). The lands which were the subject-matter of that case are assured wet and classified as annawari of less than 8 annas. The Authorities under that Act classified them as lands coming under Class-D of 1st Schedule of the Act. In that Act wet lands bearing annawari settlement classification of 12 annas and above were classified in Classes A to C. Under Class-D, wet lands bearing annawari of 8 annas and above but below 12 annas were classified. There is no provision made in the Act for classification of lands with annawari classification of less than 8 annas. But the Additional Collector in his order classified them under Class-D on the ground that there is no corresponding classification for such lands. It is under those circumstances the learned Judge said that simply because there is no corresponding classification for such land in the Act, by including the same in Class-D, the land cannot be expropriated.

13. The present case is not a case where two constructions or two meanings are possible on the language used in the Explanation to section 4 of the Act. The question is what was meant by the Legislature by what was said by it in the Explanation. As already discussed above, by means of the Explanation the Legislature intends to say that the holding of a family unit is the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit. There can be no other meaning which can be given to the explanation as without there being no holding for a family unit, there cannot be any question of determining the ceiling area applicable for a family unit. In enacting the Explanation, as argued by Sri Babul Reddi, it is not a question of any assumption made by the Legislature that holding exists for a family unit without there being any provision made for it in the Act. By means of the Explanation itself the Legislature intended to make that provision. This meaning given to the Explanation is more consistent with what the Supreme Court has said id the decisions referred to above. If the Explanation is not interpreted in that manner, it would lead to absurdity and go against the clear intention of the Legislature which is manifest and would render the Explanation purposeless. As per the provisions and the scheme of the Act as already discussed above, the intention of the Legislature was to provide one ceiling limit with regard to land for all the members of a family unit put together.

14. When the intention of the Legislature is clear and for giving effect to the intention of the Legislature only one meaning is possible and without giving that meaning the other provisions of the enactment cannot be given effect to and by not giving that meaning no other purpose of the Act would be served and it becomes useless, that meaning alone has to be given. In the case of the family unit, to give effect to the other provisions of the Act the Explanation is possible of only one meaning, namely, the aggregate of the lands held by all the members of the family unit is to be treated as its holding.

15. In this connection, it is apposite to mention what the Supreme Court has said in M. Pentaiah v. Veeramallappa (5) A.I.R 1961 Supreme Court, P. 1107.

“It is, however, well established that

“Where the language of a statute, in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction, leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment, or to some in-convenience or absurdity, hardship or injustice, presumably not intended, a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence…………… Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear, it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftman's unskilfulness or ignorance of the law, except in a case of necessity, or the absolute intractability of the language used. Nevertheless, the courts are very reluctant to substitute words in a statute, or to add words to it, and it has been said that they will only do so where there is a repugnancy to good sense See Maxwell on Statutes (10th Ed) p. 229.

16. In Seaford Court Estates Ltd. v. Asher, 1949 2 All. E.R 155 at p. 164 Denning, L.J said.

“When a defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame the draftsman. He must set to work on the constructive task of finding the intention of Parliament…and then he must supplement the written word so as to give “force and life” to the intention of the legislature………….A Judge should ask himself the question how if the makers of the Act had themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, they would have straightened it out? He must then do as they would have done. A judge must not alter the material of which the Act is woven, but he can should iron out the creases”.

17. Therefore we think that there is absolute justification in reading the Explanation to S. 4 of the Act as providing by xx xx necessary implication as meaning only that the holding of a family unit is the aggregate of the lands held by all its members.

18. Another ground raised in C.R.P No. 2391/1977 is that a divided coparcenes minor son of a joint Hindu Family cannot become a member of a family unit as per its definition. Sri Chavall Krishna Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, has argued by contending that the judgment of our learned brother Justice Ramachandra Rao in B. Krishnamurthy v. Land Reforms Tribunal (6) (1977 (1) An. W.R p. 210) in which it was held to the contrary is not good law. We are unable to agree. As rightly pointed out in that judgment by Ramachandra Rao Justice, there is no ambiguity in the definition of ‘family unit’. The definition does not qualify the expression ‘Minor sons’, whether divided or undivided, and therefore the said expression takes in all minor sons, either divided or undivided. To contend that the intention of the Legislature would not have been to include divided minor sons also in the definition of ‘family unit’, the learned counsel has place reliance mainly on Explanation I to S. 8 of the Act, which to the extent it is relevant, is as follows:—

“Explanation I: Where the land is held or is deemed to be held by a minor, lunatic, an idiot or other person subject to like disability, not being a member of the family unit (the stress is ours), the declaration shall be furnished by the guardian, manager or other person in charge of the property of such person……..”

19. Under S. 8 provision is made for filing declarations of holding. As provided under Explanation II to Sec. 8 with regard to the land held by a family unit, the declaration shall be furnished by a person in management of the property of such family unit and the declaration so furnished shall be binding on all the members of the family unit. There can be minors, lunatics, idiots or other persons subject to like disability not being members of any family unit. For instance, in the case of orphans. Since persons near those disabilities cannot manage their own affairs, they cannot themselves be expected to file the declarations. That is why provision is made in Exn. I to S. 8 for filing declarations on behalf of such persons by the guardian or other person in charge of the property of such persons. If those persons subject to the disabilities mentioned are members of a family unit, there is no difficulty. Provision is made in Exn. II as mentioned above as to who should furnish the declaration on behalf of the family unit. The learned counsel by laying stress on the language used in Exn. I namely, the expression ‘the family unit’ instead of the expression ‘a family unit’ has argued that since the Legislature used the expression ‘the family unit’ it means apart from the divided minor there is another family unit consisting of his parents and other members of the family if any and therefore the Legislature contemplated filing of a separate declaration by a divided minor. We are unable to understand this argument of the learned counsel. There is absolutely no force or merit in that argument. In the Explanation it is dearly mentioned that provision is made as regards filling of declarations by a minor, lunatic or other persons subject to like disability, when they are not members of any family unit. Therefore the provision is intended for the persons who are subject to the disability mentioned, when they are not members of any family unit. We are in entire agreement with the view expressed by our learned brother Justice Ramachandra Rao in B. Krishnamurthy v. Land Reforms Tribunal (6) (1977) I An. W.R (210) that no distinction is made in the definition of ‘family unit’ between divided minor sons and undivided minor sons. There is no ambiguity at all in the language used in the definition to think that only undivided minor sons are intended to be members of a family unit.

20. After deciding the points in question as above, we direct the civil revision petitions to be posted before a single judge for disposing the cases after deciding the other points involved in the civil revision petitions.