Jeevan Reddy, J.:— This writ appeal is directed against the judgment of our learned brother, Muktadar, J., allowing with costs the writ petition filed by the management of ‘Assam Tea Depot’ against the order of the Labour Court, Hyderabad which, in turn, had allowed a petition filed by a worker under section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.

2. It would be necessary to state a few facts, for appreciating the contentions arising herein. The appellant was an employee with the 1st respondent Assam Tea Depot, His services were terminated on account of certain charges made against him. It would be sufficient for our purposes to state that he filed a petition, M.P No. 82/1970, under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, before the Labour Court, claiming that he is entitled to a sum of Rs. 4,860/- under five counts. They are:

(i) Salary for November 1969 to january 1970 at Rs. 270/- p.m Rs. 810-00 (ii) one month's pay in lieu of notice …270-00 (iii) Salary for unavalled leave: …270-00 (iv) Gratuity for 12 years service at is days pay per year of service ….1600-00 (v) Bonus for the period from 1963 to 1969 at Rs. 270/- per year ….1890-00

3. The petitioner contended that him, according to law. The management his services were terminated illegally besides denying the right of the work and that, the above amounts are due to man to the said amount or any part thereof, also disputed the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the said petition, but which objections were oyer-ruled and the workman was awarded an amount of Rs. 2,700/- under the order impugned in the writ petition. Thereupon the management filed the writ petition, W.P No, 4853/1972, and the only question raised before the learned single judge was that the labour court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition u/s. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, In respect of the petitioner-workman who is governed by the provisions of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act and the rules made thereunder. The said contention was accepted by the learned single Judge, following the decision of a Division Bench of this court in writ Petition Nos, 5494/71 and 3390/73 dated 26-7-1973. It was held by the learned single Judge that the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishment Act is a self-contained enactment providing its own procedure for raising the disputes between the employer and employees and also providing an appeal and a second appeal and that, In such a case a workman cannot have recourse to the said summary remedy provided by the Industrial Disputes Act Hence this wrlt Appeal by the workman.

4. Mr. E.D Nathan the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, contended that there is no provision in the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, depriving an employee governed by It, of his right to have recourse under Sec, 33C (2) of the fndustrial Disputes Act, He relied upon Sec. 63 of the said State Act, In particular, to contend that the provisions of the said Act shall not affect any rights or privileges which an employee Is entitled to under any other law contract custom or usage, applicable to such establishment, If such rights or privileges are more favourable to him than those conferred by the said Act, He submitted that the Bench decision of this court in writ petition Nos 5494/71 and 3390/73 date 26 7-1973 is erroneous since Sec. 6) of the Shops and Establishments Act was not brought to be notice of the learned judges and that the said decision proceeded on a concession which is not warranted in law. Further he relied upon a judgment of another learned single Judge Madhava Reddy, In Writ Petition No, 1825/1971, dated 20-9-1974 which clearly supports his contention, while distinguishing the aforesaid Bench decision. The teamed counsel also relied upon several decisions of other High Courts in India which according to the counsel take a view contrary to the one taken by the aforesaid Division Bench We shall refer to those decisions at the appropriate stage.

5. The learned Government Pleader however contended that the decision of Madhava Reddy J. in Writ petition No 1875/1971 dated 20-9-1974, has been over-ruled by a Bench of this court in writ appeal No. 899/1974, dated 16-7-1975 following the earlier Bench decision dated 26-7-73 referred to above and that the Bench decision of this court took a correct view of the law.

6. At this stage it would be appropriate to set out the relevant provisions of bcth the Acts, It is however not deputed in this case that the dispute between the parties is one falling within the purview of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act (hereinafter referred to as the State Act’ (The said Act contains provisions with respect to leave and holidays with wages, and wages for over-time and other conditions of service. Sec. 41 creates an authority to hear and decide appeals arisng out of the termination of services of employees under Section 40 and also provides for a second appeal to Labour Court. Section 43 of the Act provides for appointment of judicial authority to hear and dcclde within any specified area all claims arising out of the deductions from wages or delay in payment of wages or gratuity payable under this Act to employees in any establishment in that ares. There are further provllons in chapter IX of the said Act providing for decision on any dispute between an employer and employee and the procedure in that behalf. Sec. 63. which is very much relevant for our purposes, reads as follows:

“9.63:— Nothing in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges which any employee in any establishments is entitled to, on the date on which this Act comes into operation in respect of such establishment, under any other law contract, custom or usage applicable to such establishment if such rights or privileges are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act,”

We may now refer to the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act hereinafter referred to as the ‘I.D Act’ In the I.D Act as originally enacred there was no provision entitling an individual worker to seek his remedies in any special forum, apart from the collective right of workmen to raise an industrial dispute. When the need for such a remedy in favour of an individual workman, to enforce his individual rights, was recognised, the Parliament enacted Sec. 20 In the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950, which provided for recovery of money due to the workman from the employer, under an award or decision in 1953 the Legislature amended the I.D Act by inserting Chapter-V Acontaining sections 25-A to 25-1, dealing with lay off and retrenchment of workers, their rights, and the procedure in that behalf. Section 25-1 in the said Chapter provided that any money due from an employer under the provisions of the said Chapter, whether by way of compensation or by way of wages may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery be recovered in the same manner as arrears of land-revenue, or as a public demand, by the appropriate government, on an application being made to it by the person entitled to the money. Even this provision was found to be insufficient to meet the several situations arising in that behalf, and hence in 1956, Sec, 33C was put in. The said provision has been, recast and substituted by another Amendment Act in 1964, and it reads now as follows:—

“S. 33C(1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter V-A, the workman himself or any other person authorised by him in writing in this behalf or in the case of the death of the workman, his assignee or heirs may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that, any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Coliector who shall proceed to recover the same in the manner as an arrear of land revenue:

Provided that every such application shall be made within one year from the date on which the money became due to the workman from the employer:

Provided further that any such application may be entertained after the expiry of the said period of one year, If the appropriate Government is satisfied that the applicant had sufficient cause for not making the application within the said period.

(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the question may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government”.

(3) For the purposes of computing the money value of a benefit, the Labour Court may, if it so thinks fit, appoint a Commissioner who shall, aftertaking such evidence as may be necessary, submit a report to the Labour Court and the Labour Court shall determine the amount after considering the Report of the Commissioner and other circumstances of the case.

(4) The decision of the Labour Court shall be forwarded by it to the appropriate Government and any amount found due by the Labour Court may be recovered in the manner provided for in sub-section (1).

(5) Where workmen employed under the same employer are entitled to receive from him any money or any benefit capable of being computed in terms of money, then, subject to such rules as may be made in this behalf, a single application for the recovery of the amount due maybe made on behalf of or in respect of any number of such workman.

Explanation: In this Section Labour Court includes any court constituted under, any law relating to investigation and settlement of industrial disputes in force in any State”.

8. After its introduction, the said provision, has been the subject-matter of consideration by the various High Courts in India as well as the Supreme Court, which decisions clearly define the object and scope of the said provision and the fields occupied by sub-sections (1) and (2) thereof respectively, it may be noted that, while sub-sec. (1) is confined to recovery of money only due to a workman from an employer, under a settlement or an award, or under the provisions of Chapter V-A of the Act, there is no such limitation in sub-section (2). A workman can apply under subsection (2) not only for recovery of money due, but also for any other benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money. The word ‘entitled occurring in sub-section (2) had given rise to frequent arguments on behalf of the managements that there must first be lather a settlement or an award, or any other adjudication of any competent Tribunal, before a workman is entitled to apply under sub-section (2) and that, the Labour Court cannot entertain petitions where the very right to receive the money or benefit claimed by a work— man is disputed by the management. However, it has now been well settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court, including the one in Central Bank of India Ltd v. P.S Rajagopalan (1) (1964) 3 S.C.R (40) that…… the claim under Sec. 33C (2) clearly postulates that the ‘determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, In some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must belheld to be Incidental to the main determination which has been assigned to the Labour Court by sub-section (2). As Maxwell as observed, “Where an Act confers a jurisdiction, it impliedly also grant the power of doing all such acts, or employing such means, as are essentially necessary to Its execution” (Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p 350), must accordingly hold that Section 33C (2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claimed that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money, even though the right to the benefit on which their claim is based, is disputed by their employers……. It was further held in the said decision that the scope of sub-section (2) is wider than sub-section (1), and that:

“………There is no doubt that the three categories of claims mentioned in Sec. 33C (2) fall under Sec. 33C (2) and in that sense Section 33C (2) can itself be deemed to be a kind of execution proceedings; but It is possible that claims not based on settlements or awards or made under the provisons of Chapter V-A, may also be competent under Sec. 33C (2) and that may Illustrate its wider scope …Thus, our conclusion is that the scope of Sec. 33C (2) is wider than Sec. 33C(1) and cannot be wholly assimilated with it, though for obvious reasons, we do not propose to decide or indicate what additional cases could fall under Sec. 33C (2) which may not fail under Sec. 33C (1)…”

9. It is thus clear that Section 33C (2) is beneficial provision providing for a prompt and cheap remedy to a workman to receive and realist the money or other benefits due to him, either under a settlement or award or any ether provision of law, and without being affected by the provisions of the limited in Act. It Is not necessary that the money or the benefit should be due to the workman only under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act; the money or benefit due to a workman under any other law can also be worked out and recovered under the said provision. This is made clear by the aforesaid decision of he Supreme Court, and it has been so held by a learned single Judge of this court, Chinnappa Reddy J. in Writ Petition No: 4752/1968. dated 31-3-1969, In our opinion, rightly. It has also been held by the Gujarat High Court in East India Coal Company Limited v. Rameswar (2) (1968) (1) LLJ 6 that a benefit provided in the bonus scheme made under the. Coal Mines Provident Fund and Bonus Act 1948 can be entertained and ordered under Sec. 33C (2). It has also been held by the Madras High Court in Danlet Doralraj v. Buckingham & Carnatic Company Limited (3) (1964) I LLJ 207) chat the existence of an independent procedure is no bar for proceeding under Sec. 33C (2) of the Act. The remedy provided by the said Act has been held to be in the alternative and Independent of the other remedies provided by other enactments. Vide Amblca Mills Ltd. v. Second Labour Court. (4) 1967 II L.LJ 800), In this behalf, we may also note the words without prejudice to any other mode of recovery occurring in Subjection (1) of Sec. 33C, and the provision contained in sub-section (4) that the decision of a Labour Court under Sub-section (2) shill be executed in the manner provided for by sub-section (1).

11. Now, it is not disputed before us that appellant is a ‘workman’ as defined by the I.D Act. The only contention is that inasmuch as the State Act Itself provides a special procedure for decision of all disputes arising between an employer and an employee, that procedure alone is applicable to the exclusion of any other remedy or procedure contained in any other enactment. Including the I.D Act,

12. We may now refer to the decision of a Bench of this Court, in W.P Nos. 5494/71 and 3390/73 dated 26-7-1973, which forms the sheet-anchor of the managements case. The learned judges noted the provisions of Sections 41 and 43 of the Act and then observed:—

“…What is thus plain is that claims in regard to wages or gratuity arising under the Act can begot decided only before the judicial authority constituted by the Government under Sec. 43 of the Act. It could not be doubted before us that the judicial authority so constituted has exclusive jurisdiction to Jecide the claims arising under the Act and since the Act is a self-contained Act and provides its own machinery for disposal of the claims. It must follow that the judicial authority is an exclusive authority and all claims arising under the Act must have to be filed only before the said authority and no other. By necessary implication it excludes the jurisdiction of a labour Court to hear an application under Sec. 33C (2) arising under the provisions of the Shops and Establishments Act. No decision contrary to the view which we are taking could be brought to our notice. Decisions arising under Sec, 33C (2) unrelated to the provisions of the Shops and Establishments Act do not help us in solving the question with which we are concerned in this case……………

(emphasis is ours)

13. The above extract constituted the ratio of said decision, and It would be seen atonce that it is based upon a concession before the Bench that the judicial authority under the Act has got the exclusive jurisdiction to decide the claims arising under the Act, while that was the only issue put in controversy. The said concession constitutes the basis of the said decision, which concession, in our opinion, is not warranted inlaw. It is unfortunate that section 63 of the State Act was not brought to the notice of the learned judges, nor some of the decisions under the Shops & Establishments Acts of other States, which we shall consider hereinafter.

14. We think It appropriate to note in this behalf that the procedure provided by the State Act is as much a special procedure prescribed by a special Act, as the one provided by the I.Df Act. Ordinarily, these remedies will have to be worked out in a Civil Court; but having regard to the circumstances in which the workmen are placed, and their difficulties and helplessness the Legislature thought It fit to create special forums like the one under section 33C(2) of the I.D Act. as well as those under section 43 and section 41 of the State Act,

15. Hence, the theory of a special procedure or forum excluding the general procedure or forum is misplaced. In any event, in the face of the express saving provision contained in section 63 of the State Act there is no room for contending that the procedure and forum created by the State Act are of an exclusive nature barring the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain applications under section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The obvious intention of Legislature in enacting section 63 was to clearly save the remedies available to workmen under other enactments. The State was enacted in 1966, by which date section 33C(2) of the I.D Act was already on the statute-book. As noticed by us above, section 33C(2) provides a cheap, summary and prompt remedy. (It is sometimes loosely referred to as a petition in the nature of an execution petition, though such a description has very often led to a good amount of avoidsble controversy,) and there is no valid reason to close this avenue hitherto available to an employee workman. Whether the procedure prescribed by the State Act is more favourable, or whether the procedure prescribed by any other Act is more favourable to an employee, should be left for him to decide. In other words if he chooses to adopt the remedy under section 33C’2) of the I.D Act, an authority cannot say that the remedies provided by the State Act are more favourable to him, and thereby compel him to adopt the remedy under the State Act, As pointed out by the Gujarat High Court, the remedy provided by section 33C(2) is, in the alternative and independent of other remedies provided by other enactments. Nor did the Division Bench of this Court rest Its decision on the ground that the provisions of section 33C(2) are not more favourable than the remedies provided by the State Act. As we have stated above, the attention of the learned judges was, unfortunately, not Invited to the provisions of section 63 of the State Act, at all.

16. We may now refer to certain decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, the first of which is a decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Chalachitra Karamchari Sangh v. Regal Talkies (5) (1963) 7, F.LR 328) Section 58 of the Madhya Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1958 provides that no employer shall dispense with the services of an employee who has been in continuous employment tor not less than three months, without giving atleast thirty days' notice in writing, or wages in lieu of notice, to such employee in case of contravention of the said conditions, the workman has been given a right to apply to the Magistrate of First Class, or the authority appointed under the Payment of Wages Act, for such benefit. Section 61 of the Madhya Pradesh Act correspond to Sec. 63 of our State Act, and It reads as follows:—

“Nothing in this Act shall affect any rights or privileges which ait employee in any establishment is entitled to at the date this Act comes Into force in a local area, under any other law, contract, custom or usage applicable to such establishment or any award, settlement or agreement binding on the employer and the employee in such establishment, if such rights or privileges are more favourable to him than those to which he would be entitled under this Act.”

17. Construing the said provision, a Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court held that the rights and privileges of an employee under the Industrial Disputes Act, for which either there is no provision in the Madhya Pradesh Shops & Establishments Act, or which are more favourable than the provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Act, have been expressly preserved by the said Section 61.

18. In Lal & Company v. Kulkarnl (R.M) (6) (1968) 17 F.LR 438 a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the wages due under Section 18(3) of the Bombay Shops & Establishments Act can be recovered by a workman by filing a petition under Section 33C (2) It was held that, In the absence of any express language in the Bombay Act, barring the resort to Sec. 33C (2) of the I.D Act, the said remedy is still open. In that connection, it was clearly held that the principle that where a right is created by a stacute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it that remedy atone is available to the exclusion of a general remedy, is not applicable in the context. The court also negatived the contentions of the management that persons who fall within the definition of ‘employees’ under the Bombay Act, cannot fall within the definition of ‘workmen’ under Sec. 2(s) of the I.D Act.

19. The Madras High Court, In New Taj Mahal Cafe (Private) limited v. Its workmen (7) (1969) (I) MLJ 279 held that Sec. 41 of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act (the said provision imposes certain restrictions on the powers of the management to terminate the services of an employee) does not affect the jurisdiction of the Labour Court, where a dispute between the employer and the workmen ts referred to the Labour Court under the provisions of the I.D, Act and that, the Madras Act does not prevent the Govt from making a reference under the I.D Act with respect to a dispute between an employer and an employee.

20. Again in State Bank of India v. State Bank of India Staff (8) (1975) 30, F.I.R 53) the same court held that overtime wages due under the provisions of the Madras Shops and Establishments Act can be recovered by fifing a petition under Sec. 33C (2) of the I.D Act. While coming to that conclusion, the learned Judges also referred to the provisiont of Section 50 of the Madras Act (which corresponds to Section 63 of our State Act) and also to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S Rajagopalan (1) (1964) 3 S.C.R 140). This decision of the Madras High Court clearly supports the conclusion which we have arrived at in this case.

21. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33C (2) of the I.D Act is not barred, either expressly or by necessary implication, by any of the provisions contained in the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments Act, 1966 and that it is open to an employee governed by the provisions of the State Act, to recover the money or other benefit due to him under the provisions of the State Act by filing a petition under Sec. 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, so long, as he is a ‘workman, within the meaning of the Central Act. The decision of the Divlsfon Bench of this court in Writ Petition No. 5494/1971 and 3390/1973 dated 26-7-1973, being based on a concession, cannot be deemed to be a binding decision of this court:— In so far as the decision in Writ Appeal No 899/74 dated - 16-7-1975, is concerned, we notice that they merely followed the earlier Division Bench decision, and it is not the result of any independent reasoning.

22. Accordingly, this writ appeal is allowed, but, in the circumstances of the case, without costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.