1. The short but important question which has necessarily to be answered in this enquiry is whether market charges can be imposed by the market Committee.
2. The essential facts are that the petitioners are merchants carrying on trade in foodgrains seeds and other agricultural products. They do this business on commission basis. Apart from charging commission on their transactions, the petitioners charge also godown charges as well as insurance charges actually incurred. Bye-law 12 of 1954 Bye-laws permit commission to be charged at the rate of Rs. 2-25 paise per 100. In view of the various changes occurring in the economic conditions, the petitioners and other merchants requested the Market committee to increase the rate of commission. The market Committee met at a meeting on 28-11-1969. They resolved to increase the rate of commission from 2¼% to 3%. They also approved the amendment to Bye-law 12(3).
3. The resolution together with the proposed amendment to the Bye-law was then sent to the Director of Marketing for approval. He approved the same on 15-1-70.
4. The Government in exercise of its powers under section 27 of the Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966 (Act 16 of 1966), herein after called the Act, set aside the order of the Director of Marketing approving the Resolution of the Market Committee and amendment of the Bye-law. The Government held that it is within the exclusive competence of the Government to impose market charges and that neither the Market Committee nor the Director is the Authority to impose such charges. This order was passed on 16-2-70. It is to question the validity of this order that the present writ petition is filed. The petitioners have asked for the issue of a writ of mandamus restraining respondents 1 and 2 from interfering with the right of petitioners to carry on their business in accordance with the amended bye-laws 12(3).
5. The principal contention of Sri P. Babulu Reddy, the learned counsel for the petitioners was that under Rule 45 the Market committee is empowered to levy market charges which includes the authority to impose the commission charges. The Resolution of the Market committee therefore was well within its power and the Government could not have set it aside on the ground that Market committee has no such power.
6. In order to appreciate the implications of this contention it is necessary to mention that under section 33(2)(XXV) of the Act, the Government is empowered to make rules and provide for the regulation of ‘market charges’ such as commission, weighment charges godown charges and other incidental charges.
7. Section 34 then says that subject to any rules made by the Government under section 33 and with the previous sanction of the Director of Marketing, a market committee may make byelaws for the regulation of the business and the conditions of trading therein.
8. In exercise of the powers conferred on the Government under section 33(2)(XXV) the Government made certain rules. Rule 45 on which reliance is placed by the petitioners in so far as it is relevant reads:
“Rule 45: The market committee shall make bye-laws under Section 34 consistent with these rules and model bye-laws framed by the Director to regulate its own procedure and to specify the conditions of trading in the notified area. The bye-laws shall, inter alia provide for—
(1) ……….…………
(2) …………..……
(3) …………………
(4) the levy of market charges …… …
9. Rule 64 then goes on to say that when the agricultural produce is sold through a commission agent he shall pay the sale proceeds of the agricultural produce from his own account to the seller on the same day of its sale after deducting the charge payable by the latter as permissible under the bye-laws of the market committee and recover the same from the buyer.
10. Rule 73 which relates to market charges, enjoins that ‘no charges other than those specified by the Government either by a general or special order shall be payable by the seller or the buyer in market’.
11. The word ‘Government’ appearing in the said rule is substituted by the words ‘Director of Marketing’ by a G.O dated 7th June, 1971.
12. At first flush, a reading of these provisions may indicate some kind of conflict between rules 45 and 73.
13. On a closer examination however, it would be clear that there is no such conflict between the two rules. They operate in two different fields and relate to different legislative problems. While Rule 73 enacts that no charts other than those specified by the Director of Marketing shall be payable, rule 45 empowers the Market committee to make a Bye-law providing for levy of market charges.
14. Now it is true that the word ‘levy’ is frequently used in more than one sense. Its meaning however, in a particular instance, has to be determined by resort to the context and bearing different significations according to its object. Thus, the term ‘levy’ in certain instances may mean all the three stages of a tax or charge, that is to say, imposition assessment and collection. It may also confine its meaning to any one or more of the three things stated above. It is in the context in which it is used that one has to determine its scope and actual meaning.
15. If we read rule 45 with rule 73, no one would be left in doubt that while rule 73 concerns itself with the imposition of the charges, called ‘market charges’ rule 45 concerns itself with the assessment and collection of market charges. If the word ‘levy’ appearing in rule 45 is given a compendious meaning so as to include all the three stages of the market charges, as was urged before us by the learned counsel for the petitioners, then no function will be left to rule 73; and it is the first cannon of construction of a rule, that no word in a rule or no rule should be made ineffective as far as it is possible. The only way in which these two rules can harmoniously be construed is to hold that rule 73 empowers the Government to specify, that is to say, to impose ‘market charges’ which term includes ‘commission’. The moment the Director of Marketing imposes the market charges, in other words prescribes the rate of commission, his function comes to an end under rule 73. He has thereafter nothing to do with the two other facets of the levy that is, quantification and collection. That function is specifically left to the Market committee. Once a market charges is imposed by the Government then according to that charge, the Market committee would assess the commission and collect it from the concerned person.
16. That this interpretation is more sensible can be seen from the object of the levy of market charges and its repercussions on the marchantile transactions. If the market committees are left to their own discretion to prescribe the market charges, the rates may vary from Market Committee to Market Committee, the result of which would be that the same agricultural produce would have varying prices within and without a Market committee, a thing which everyone would like to avoid if possible. In order to thus bring uniformity or near uniformity, a central authority to impose market charges becomes necessary. Whether it is the Government or the Director of Marketing they would have power to impose market charges for all the Committees keeping in view the trend of business in agricultural produce. Thus the prices of the agricultural produce would be kept under control by a unified central authority. It is with that purpose that rule 78 confers power to impose market charges upon the central authority that is to say, previously the Government and now, the Director of the Marketing.
17. The contention that rule 73 relates only to specification of heads which are to be included in the broad term of ‘market charges’ did not impress us. Rule 73 no where uses the word ‘head’ or ‘sub-bead’. Section 33(2)(XXV) which empowers the Government to make rules refers to regulations of the market charges such as commission, weighment charges, godown charges and other incidental charges. ‘Commission’ is specifically mentioned in that provision. There can therefore be little doubt that commission is a market charge. Therefore rule 73 has no relevance whatsoever with the determination of ‘heads’ which may be brought within the term ‘Market charges’, but it relates only to the imposition of market charges. It is not necessary in this case to consider and decide as to whether the Government or the Director of Marketing can add to or subtract from the categories of charges mentioned in section 33(2)(XXV). Since ‘Commission’ is specifically included, we need not go into the other question which does not arise in the instant case. It is however, beyond any doubt that rule 73 emphatically says that no charges other than those specified by the Government shall be payable. On what head or sub-head, it does not mention. Obviously, it means on all heads where the market charges can be imposed. The words ‘no charges other than those specified by the Government shall be payable’ negative the argument advanced before us. We are therefore satisfied that rule 73 empowers the Government to specify the market charges. When once the Government or the Director of Marketing specifies the market charges then the rule enjoins that no charges other than those specified shall be payable by the seller or buyer in a market. It is only by these means that we can reconcile rule 45 with rule 73.
18. What must necessarily follow is that since rule 45 does not authorise the Market committee to impose market charges as that function is specifically left by rule 73 now to the Director of Marketing the resolution passed by he Market committee is ultra vires of the rules and is made without having any jurisdiction or competence in that behalf.
19. The fact that the Director has approved the resolution of the Market committee does not alter the position. It does not make the resolution valid. It was not also in doubt that at the relevant time when the Director gave his approval to the resolution, that is to say on 15-1-’70 he was not authorised to impose the market charges. It was the Government then which was authorised to so fix the market charges. In any case, no rule was brought to our notice under which, the Director's approval was necessary. What is thus clear is that not only the resolution was passed by the Market committee which had no power whatsoever to pass such a resolution, but the Director also had on power under the rule then prevailing to give his approval to any such resolution. The resolution and the approval of the Director therefore must be taken to be bad in law. The Government therefore was right in putting an end to the resolution and the approval of the Director which had no legal basis whatsoever. The contention that no notice of cancellation of the resolution or of the approval of the Director was given to the petitioners is devoid of any substance obviously because the resolution was passed by the Market committee and the approval was accorded by the Director. It is not for us to enquire whether they had received the notice or not. They seem to be satisfied with the Governments stand and therefore the matter ends there. The petitioners were neither a party to the resolution nor to the accord of approval. They need not have therefore been given any notice. That apart when there was inherent lack of competence in the Market committee as well as the Director of Marketing no useful purpose could have been served, by giving notice to the petitioners who in our opinion, were not entitled to any such notice.
20. For the reasons stated above, the writ petition is dismissed with costs. Advocate's fee Rs. 100/-.