(1) In this writ petition a question of public importance i. E. , whether the existence of an alternative remedy by way of execution proceedings deter this court in directing the government to pay the enhanced compensation forthe compulsory acquisition of the lands belonging to the petitioners in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under article 226 of the constitution of india arises for consideration.

(2) Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners as well as the learned government pleader for land acquisition.

(3) Admittedly, the lands belonging to the petitioners along with others were acquired for construction of singo or project in the year 1982 by issuance of a draft notification under section 4 (1) of the land acquisition act (herein after referred as 'the act') published in the a. P. Gazette on 13 - 07 - 1982. By invoking the urgency clause, the respondents have taken possession of the lands dispensing with 5 (a) inquiry under the act. The respondents passed award on 19 - 12 - 1985 and on an application filed by the petitioners a reference was made to civil court under section 18 of the act for enhanced compensation. The district judge, medak in o. P. No. 191/87 and batch dated 31 - 07 - 1989 enhanced the compensation to a tune of rs. 12,000 per acre for dry lands. The respondents carried the matter in appeal by filing a. S. No. 73/92, which was ultimately dismissed on21 - 01 - 1994. But the respondents did not chose to pay the enhanced compensation for a long time. The execution proceedings initiated by the petitioners did not yield any fruitful results. In those circumstances, the present writ petition was filed by the petitioners seeking a direction to the respondents to deposit the entire enhanced compensation amount as per the orders of the civil court, in the district court, medak at sangareddy.

(4) The government pleader for the land acquisition strenuously contended that this court cannot give such a direction by giving a go - bye to the general law governing the relationship between the parties. In other words the government pleader contends that if the government fails to pay the enhanced compensation the petitioners are at liberty to initiate proceedings for execution of the decree under the provisions of c. P. C. Where under the rights of the petitioners are fully protected, but the petitioners cannot approach this court directlysurcumventing the ordinary law of the land.

(5) It is now well settled principle that mere existence of an alternative remedy does not deter this court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction to extend its protective umbrella to a citizen and see that his just claims are not defeated by technicalities. Keeping this principle in mind i would like to examine the facts of this case.

(6) Admittedly, the lands belonging to the petitioners were taken over in the year 1982, i. E. , about 14 years back, and the land acquisition officer has taken nearly 3 1/2 years to pass an award under the act. From the record now it is seen that the compensation awarded by the respondent was very meagre and on a reference made to the civil court the compensation payable to the petitioners was enhanced in a substantial measure. The civil court has taken 4 years to pass the award i. E. , on 31 - 07 - 1989, but the respondents without paying the enhanced compensation carried the matter in appeal and the appeal was dismissed on 21 - 01 - 1994. In other words, the respondents gained breathing time of over five years in resisting the just claim of the petitioners to receive adequate compensation in lieu of the compulsory acquisition of their lands. Though the award proceedings became final on 21 - 01 - 1994 i. E. , about 2112 years back the respondents did not chose to pay the enhanced compensation and went on postponing the execution proceeding swith out any justifiable cause. If i may say so, this is not a solitary incident and it is not the first case where this court came across of such a situation. This unhealthy practice is being followed by the state administration through out the length and breadth of the state. It is rather an unfortunate situation in which a citizen is placed. The government having acquired the lands belonging to the petitioners for ceably by using state force and having deprived them of their liveli hood is not prepared to pay the just and adequate compensation even after decades of their dispossession. Even if the citizen files an execution petition, at best he can get an order from the court attaching a few chairs or ajeep of a land acquisition officer, which might have been the subject matter of several attachments by that time. Even if the decree holder brings these articles for sale by overcoming the procedural hurdles he will not be in a position to realise even a fraction of the decretal amounts. From this it is evident that the ordinary law of the land in case where the government is a party - respondent and if i may say so, which is the biggest litigant in the country today has miserably failed and gave raise to a very extraordinary situation calling for an extraordinary solution than the one contemplated under the ordinary law of the land. Hence, i am of the firm opinion that the citizens can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under article 226 of the constitution of lndia compelling the state authorities to act according to the law and the provisions of the land acquisition act. Now it is useful to have a look at the provisions of the act. As per section 31 of the act on making an award under section 11 of the act, the collector shall tender payment of the compensation awarded by him to the persons interested, entitled thereto according to the award and shall pay it to them unless prevented by some one or more of the contingencies mentioned in the sub - section. As per the award of the civil court if the compensation payable to the displaced person is more than the sum awarded by the collector under section 28 of the act the court shall direct him to pay interest at a rate of 9% per annum for the excess amount payable from the date on which he took possession of the land to the date of payment of the excess amount into the court. If the excess compensation is not paid within one year under proviso to section 28 of the act the land acquisition officer has to pay interest at the rate of 15% per annum from the date of expiry of the period of one year till the same is paid into the court. From section 31 of the act, it is seen that the moment award proceedings came to an end the collector is bound to tender the sum awarded as compensation to the persons eligible to receive the compensation. The same provision applies to the decree of a court with equal force when the court comes to conclusion that the compensation awarded by the collector is grossly inadequate and passes an award increasing the compensation payable as the order passed by the civil court on a reference under section 18 of the act is also termed as "award" under section 26 of the act. It is only under section 26 (2) of the act the award is deemed to be treated as a judgment under section 2 (2) and a decree under section 2 (9) of the c. P. C. A deeper look at the act makes it abundantly clear that all the provisions of c. P. C. Are not made applicable automatically. But by virtue of section 53 of the act those provisions of the c. P. C. Which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the act were made applicable to the proceedings before the court under the act. But, nowhere in the act it was mentioned that the provisions of the c. P. C. Relatingto the execution shall apply to the proceedings under the act. In fact the state of karnataka by a state amendment act xvii of 1961 extended the provisions of the c. P. C. Relating to the execution of an award. This fact, fortifies my view that none of the provisions of the act extended the provisions of the c. P. C. Relating to execution for execution of an award. Even assuming without admitting that the provisions of c. P. C. For execution of the award can be invoked by the citizens, i am of the opinion that he need not be subjected to time consuming process for realisation of the compensation which is legally and legitimately due to him. Having lost his valuable property and as he is entitled to receive the compensation under the provisions of the act itself and if the authorities refuse to comply with the provisions of the act he can invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this court in compelling the authorities to obey the command of the law and pay the compensation due to him without subjecting him to a time consuming process and without any assurance about the payment of the compensation by the government in the near future.

(7) In a recent pronouncement in " union of india and another, appellants v. Kirloskar pneumatic company ltd. , respondent" (1) 1996 (5) supreme 1 the supreme court explained the ambit and purpose of articles 226 and 227 of the constitution of india in the following terms:

"the power conferred by article 226/ 227 is designed to effectuate the law, to enforce the rule of law and to ensure that the several authorities and organs of the state act in accordance with law. It cannot be invoked for directing the authorities to act contrary to law."

(8) In the instant case also as the petitioners are seeking a direction to the authorities concerned to act in accordance with law, the petitioners are perfectly justified in approaching this court and even if the execution proceedings are available to them the same cannot be termed as an effective remedy and the same may not come in their way in approaching this court under article 226 of the constitution of lndia which is an effective and speedy remedy. Being a welfare state where rule of law is paramount, it is unfortunate that the state authorities instead of comply ing with the orders passed by the competent civil court are thriving on technicalities in defeating the just claims of the citizens to receive the compensation in lieu of compulsory acquisition of their lands.

(9) In this context, i feel it worth mentioning the observations of justice krishna iyer as he then was in "p. P. Abubacker v. Union of lndia" (2) air 1972 kerala 103 which were extracted by the learned judge himself in "d. R. Jerry, appellant v. Union of india and others, respondents" (3) air 1974 sc 130 as here under while commenting on the unreasonable contention of the state with regard to limitation to deny the backwages to the respondent:

"the state, under our constitution, undertakes economic activities in a vast and widening public sector and inevitably gets involved in disputes with private individuals. But is must be remembered that the state is no ordinary party trying to win a case against one of its own citizens by hook or by crook; for, the state's interest is to meet honest claims, vindicate a substantial defence and never to score a technical point or overreach a weaker party to avoid a just liability or secure an unfair advantage, simply because legal devices provide such an opportunity. The state is a virtuous litigant and looks with unconcern on immoral forensic successes so that if on the merits the case is weak, government shows a willingness to settle the dispute regardless of prestige and other lesser motivations which move private parties to fight in court. The lay - out on litigation costs and executive time by the state and its agencies is so staggering these days because of the large amount of litigation in which it is involved that a positive and wholesome policy of cutting back on the volume of law suits by the twin methods of not being tempted into forensic show downs where a reasonable adjustment is feasible and ever offering to extinguish a pending proceeding on just terms, giving the legal mentors of government some initiative and authority in this behalf. I am not indulging in any judicial homily but only echoing the dynamic national policy on state litigation evolved at a conference of law ministers of india way back in 1957. This second appeal strikes me as an instance of disregard of that policy."

(10) At in another decision in

"the madras port trust, appellant v. Hymanshu international by its proprietor (died) by l. Rs. , respondents"

(4) air 1979 sc 1144 justice bhagawati as he then was speaking for the bench while rejecting the contention of the appellant that the claim of the respondent for refund of the amount of warfage, demurrage and transit charges paid to the appellant was barred by section 110 of the madras port trust act observed as under:

"we do not think that this is a fit case where we should proceed to determine whether the claim of the respondent was barred by section 110 of the madras port trust act (ii of 1905). The plea of limitation based on this section is one which the court always looks upon with disfavour and it is unfortunate that a public authority like the port trust should, in all morality and justice, take up such a plea to defeat a just claim of the citizen. It is high time that governments and public authorities adopt the practice of not relying upon technical pleas for the purpose of defeating legitimate claims of citizens and do what is fair and just to the citizens. Of course, if a government or a public authority takes up a technical plea, the court has to decide it and if the plea is well - founded, it has to be upheld by the court, but what we feel is that such a plea should not ordinarily be taken up by a government or a public authority, unless of course the claim is not well - founded and by reason of delay in filing it, the evidence for the purpose of resisting such a claim has become unavailable. Here, it is obvious that the claim of the respondent was a just claim supported as it was by the recommendation of the assistant collector of customs and hence in the exercise of our discretion under article 136 of the constitution, we do not see any reason why we should proceed to hear this appeal and adjudicate upon the plea of the appellant based on section 110 of the madras port trust act (ii of 1905)."

(11) In the light of foregoing discussion, i hold that the execution proceedings contemplated for execution of the decree of a civil court under c. P. C. Is not a remedy provided in the land acquisition act 1894. Even, if it is considered to be available for the proceedings under the act by virtue of the deeming provision in section 53 of the act it is not an effective and efficacious remedy and the same is a time consuming process. It is doubtful whether it can serve as a remedy in furtherance of ajust cause. Hence, i hold that this court is having ample power in exercise of its plenary jurisdiction to compel the state authorities to act in accordance with law and obey the command of law as laid down in the provisions of the land acquisition act without subjecting the citizen to an endless litigation for receiving compensation for the land lost by him under compulsory acquisition.

(12) In the circumstances stated above, rule nisi issued is made absolute and a direction is given to the respondent to pay the decretal amount with all other statutory benefits within 8 weeks from the date of receipt of the order, failing which a serious view will be taken in the matter. The writ petition is accordingly allowed with costs. Advocates fee rs. 2,000 - 00.