1. The petitioner questions the constitutional validity of Act No. 27 of 1990 amending the provisions of the A.P (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli. The petitioner, in the alternative, prays for an appropriate writ declaring that Act No. 27 of 1990 has no application whatsoever to the case of the petitioner and issue a consequential direction directing the District Collector, Hyderabad to implement the orders of the State Government contained in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989.

2. Factual Matrix:—The petitioner claims to be the owner of the land admeasuring Ac. 2-38 Gts. in Plot No. 21 covered by Sy. No. 129 (New Sy. No. 403) situated at Shaikpet village Golkonda Mandal, Hyderabad District having purchased the same from one Smt Burhanunnisa Begum through a registered sale deed No. 3102/67 dated 26-9-1967. The petitioner also asserts that he is in possession of the said land eversince from the date of purchase and his predecessor in title before his purchasing the same. The petitioner is stated to have filed a declaration before the Special Officer and the Competent Authority under Section 8(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. He is also stated to have filed an application under Section 20(1) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976. The land is stated to have been sold to the employees of Nava Bharat Enterprises under an agreement of sale dated 22-3-1974.

3. The petitioner, however, filed an application on 15-10-1981 requesting for mutation of his name in the revenue records in respect of the said land which was rejected by the Collector. The said order was questioned in W.P No. 5231/1983 which was disposed of by this Court on 6-10-1987 directing the petitioner to file a revision before the Commissioner of Land Revenue and accordingly a revision was filed on 4-11-1987 and the same was rejected by the Commissioner. The petitioner preferred further revision before the Government under Section 166-B of the A.P (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli, for short ‘the Act’. The revision petition thus preferred by the petitioner was allowed by the Government in G.O.Rt No. 1721, Revenue (Assignment HI) Department, dated 1-12-1989 directing the District Collector to effect mutation and incorporate the name of the petitioner in revenue records in respect of the said land. However, the said order was implemented by the District Collector and the petitioner filed W.P No. 11656/90 seeking direction to the District Collector and Mandal Revenue Officer, Golkonda to implement the order passed by the Government in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 and the said writ petition was disposed of by this Court directing the Collector to implement the order of the Government in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989. However, on a letter filed by the learned Govt. Pleader for Revenue for modifiction of the order in W.P No. 11656/90 on the ground that the Government in Memo No. 119467, dated 14-2-1990 has decided to keep its earlier order in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 in abeyance until further orders the matter came up before the Court and the Court had passed the following order:

“The matter has come up for being mentioned. It is brought to my notice by the learned Government Pleader that the Government deferred the implementation of G.O.Rt No. 1721, Revenue, dated 1-12-1989”.

4. However, the fact remains that the order of the Government in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 directing the mutation of petitioner's name in the revenue records remained un-implemented.

5. In the meanwhile the Government issued notice dated 28-10-1993 informing the petitioner that “the case on the above subject is posted for hearing on 4-12-1993 in the Chambers of Minister for Revenue”. The said notice refers to a petition filed by the petitioner on 6-2-1991 which is stated to have been addressed to the then Chief Minister requesting him to recall the Memo No. 119467 issued by the Government keeping its earlier order in G.O Rt. No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 in abeyance. It is the petitioner's case that through the impugned Memo dated 28-10-1993 the Government proposes to review its earlier order in G.O Rt. No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 and there is no such power of review vested in the Government to review its own order passed in exercise of revisional power under Section 166-B of the Act.

6. It is however, required to notice that A.P (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317 Fash was amended by introducing new Section 166-C which reads as follows:

“(1) The Govt. may, at anytime, either suo moto, or on application from any person interested, made within ninety days of the passing of an order under Section 158 or Section 166-B review any such order (if it was passed by them under any mistake, whether of fact or of law, or in ignorance of any material fact:

Provided that the Government shall not pass any order adversely affecting the interests of any person unless such person has been given an opportunity of making his representation.

(2) The Govt. may stay the execution of any such decision or order, pending the exercise of their powers under sub-section (1) in respect thereof.

(3) The provisions of this section shall apply to any order passed under Section 158 or Section 166-B whether before or after the commencement of the Andhra Pradesh (Telangana area) Land Revenue (Amendment) Act, 1990 and in the case of an application for review from any person interested in respect of such an order passed prior to such commencement, the period of ninety days specified in sub-section (1) shall be computed from the date of such commencement.”

7. The respondents in their counter-affidavit seriously dispute the petitioner's title in respect of the land in question. There is no need, in detail, to record the objections raised by the respondents in the counter-affidavit with regard to the questions of title, as the Court proposes not to express any opinion with regard to the question of title in respect of the land in question. It is however, stated that the Government was acquainted with the true and correct fact after the disposal of the revision petition filed by the petitioner in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989 directing the mutation of the petitioner's name in the revenue records. It is stated that all the necessary and relevant facts were not available to the Government when the revision petition of the petitioner was disposed of on 1-12-1989. It was specifically brought to the notice of the Government that due to non-payment of Rs. 1,925/- towards the cost of plot by the predecessor in interest of the petitioner, the deposited amount of Rs. 100/- was forfeited some time during in the year 1957 itself. But suppressing the fact, the land was sold to the immediate predecessor in title of the petitioner, namely Burhannissa Begum from whom the petitioner purchased the land in question. It is brought to the notice of the Government that the land was always and at all points of time was treated as the Government land. The Government immediately issued orders in Memo No. 1 19467, dated 14-2-1990 deferring its own earlier order in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989.

8. It is also stated that the writ petition is premature, as nothing prevents the petitioner to approach the Government and submit his explanation in the matter which shall be considered by the Government.

9. Sri Nooty Ram Mohan Rao, learned Counsel for the petitioner submits that the Government has no power whatsoever to review its own earlier order dated 1-12-1989 passed in G.O Rt. No. 1721 in which a specific direction was issued to the District Collector concerned to effect mutation and record the name of the petitioner in the revenue records. The argument runs thus:

10. The Government's decision to review or reopen the matter after a period of more than three and half years suffers from arbitrariness, as the Government cannot be allowed to reopen the matter at its will and pleasure after a long lapse of time and in a manner disturbing the vested rights. The order passed by the Government on 1-12-1989 in G.O.Rt No. 1721, has merged into the orders passed by this Cort on 14-8-1990 in W.P No. 11656/90, whereunder a positive direction was given to the District Collector, Hyderabad to implement the Government Order dated 1-12-1989. Any review of the Governmental order would amount to reviewing the order passed by this Court on 14-8-1990 in W.P No. 11656/90.

11. It is further urged that the State Government has no jurisdiction whatsoever to review its own order passed in exercise of its revisional power under Section 166-B of the Act but for Act 27 of 1990, incorporating a new provision Section 166-C into the Act. The Act has come into force with effect from 27th December, 1990. It is submitted that even newly inserted Section 166-C does not give power to the State Government to review the orders which are already passed as such the order would amount to reviewing the order with retrospective effect. The newly inserted provision 166-C is prospective in nature. The provision has to be read as such. The Constitutional validity of Section 166-C itself is assailed on the ground that the provision itself is arbitrary, and cofers unguided, power upon the Govt. to review its own order at any point of time. There is no justification whatsoever for enacting the impugned Act as there is no rationale behind it. It is also urged that the amended Act clearly recognises two classes of persons and for one class of persons, a period of limitation prescribed for securing the review while the State Government is conferred the power to review its order without any restriction as to the period of limitation. The classification in favour of the State Government is wholly unjust and improper. In nutshell, 166-C, according to the learned Counsel for the petitioner offends Art. 14 of the Constitution of India.

12. Constitutional validity of the amended Act. It is settled position in Constitutional law that a statute enacted by the Legislature can be struck down by the Constitutional Courts on two grounds viz; (a) lack of legislative competence and (b) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution or any other Constitutional provision. It is the second ground that is pressed into service in the instant writ petition. The amended Act, according to the petitioner, is violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India. I express my inability to accept the submission. The Legislature in its wisdom thought it fit to confer the power of review upon the State Government to review its own order passed either under Section 158 of under Section 166-B of the Act, provided, the order under such section was passed under any mistake of fact or law, or in ignorance of any material facts. Enactment of a particular statute may be due to variety of factors and circumstances and the experience of the State. No Court can go into the question as to whether there was any necessity for making such a law. An Act cannot be struck down on the ground that there is no necessity for such a law. Neither the Executive nor the Legislature can be compelled to disclose the reason for enactment of any particular law. The Court while exercising the power of judicial review does not sit in appeal and question the wisdom of Legislature in enacting a particular piece of legislation.

13. In my considered opinion Section 166-C of the Act cannot be struck down by describing it as arbitrary and unreasonable or irrational. The expression ‘arbitrary’ is normally used to characterise a decision or action taken by an administrative authority, not according to reason or judgment and in disregard of facts. A decision taken, not according to reason and in a tyrannical manner is an arbirary one. The Doctrine of arbitrariness, is more familiar in the field of Administrative Law and is invoked to test the validity of administrative action. The administrative action taken at pleasure or will in a capricious manner without any reason would be an arbitrary decision. “The meaning and true import of arbitrariness is more easily visualized than precisely stated or defined. The question, whether an impugned Act is arbitrary or not, it ultimately to be answered on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case. An obvious test to apply is to see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned Act and if so, does it satisfy the test of resonableness. (See K. M. Nanavati v. State Of Maharashtra , 1962 AIR (SC) 605. In State of A.P v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709, the Supreme Court held:

“No enactment can be struck down by just saying that it is arbitrary or unreasonable. Some or other constitutional infirmity has to be found before invalidating an Act. An enactment cannot be struck down on the ground that Court thinks it unjustified. Parliament and the Legislatures, composed as they are of the representatives of the people, are supposed to know and be aware of the needs of the people and what is good and bad for them. The Court cannot sit in judgment over their wisdom. In this connection, it should be remembered that even in the case of administrative action, the scope of judiciail review is limited to three grounds, viz., (i) unreasonableness, which can more appropriately be called irrationality, (ii) illegality, and (iii) procedural impropriety (see Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374) which decision has been accepted by this Court as well). The applicability of doctrine of proportionality even in administrative law sphere is yet a debatable issue. (Seethe opinions of Lords Lowry and Ackner in R. v. Secy. of State for Home Deptt. ex p. Brind, (1991 AC 696 AC at 766-67 and 762) It would be rather odd if an enactment were to be struck down by applying the said principle when its applicability even in administrative law sphere is not fully and finally settled. It is one thing to say that a restriction imposed upon a fundamental right can be struck down if it is disproportionate, excessive or unreasonable and quite another thing to say that the Court can strike down enactment if it thinks it unreasonable, unnecessary or unwarranted.”

14. By no stretch of imagination, it can be said that newly inserted Section 166-C is violative of equality clause. It does not in any manner discriminate and give different treatment to the similarly situated persons. Every interested person has to file an application for the review of an order passed under Section 158 or Section 166-B, as the case may be within ninety days. Only one period of limitation is provided. No specific period of limitation as such is provided only in case where the Government propose to exercise its suo motu power. Thus the provision does not prescribe two different periods of limitation enabling the Government to exercise suo motu power of review. For the aforesaid reasons, I hold that the newly inserted Section 166(c) does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity and is a valid piece of legislation. It is true that the power to review or reopen any matter already decided by the Government has to be exercised within a reasonable time and only for good reasons to be recorded in writing and strictly in accordance with the provisions conferring the power of such review.

15. Therefore, the question would be as to whether the Government has exercised the power in the instant case within a reasonable time. The records disclose that the matter was being processed at various levels after the disposal of the revision petition by the Government and the issues involved in the matter were being critically examined. It was felt that the Government while passing the revisional order had not discussed the various relevant factors and had the Government taken those factors into consideration, the result would have been different. The record would disclose that the Government itself felt that the implementation of the revisional order in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-10-1989 should be kept pending until further orders of the Government. Ultimately, it was so decided that the matter could not be reviewed until an amendment is made to the provisions of A.P (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-Fasli and accordingly it appears a decision was taken proposing to introduce suitable amendment to the provisions of the said Act. It has ultimately resulted in incorporating Section 166(c) in the said Act. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the delay in proposing to review the order earlier passed by the Government is so unreasonable warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The time taken by the Government for reviewing its own order in exercise of the suo motu power conferred upon it would depend upon variety of factors and the same has to be judged with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. It cannot be indicated by the Court as to what would be the reasonable period for exercise of such suo motu power of review, as it would depend upon the facts of each case. The Court can, however, interfere, if the Government exercised the suo motu power of review after very long lapse of time disturbing the vested rights. The Court may also interfere if there was no justification whatsoever for exercising that power after unreasonable delay. It is not as if, the Government was sleeping over in this matter and one fine morning has decided to reopen the matter.

16. The Memo No. 119467.Assn. III(2)/89-14 dated 26-4-1994 itself refers to the grounds on which the Government proposes for reviewing its earlier order. The very memo provides an opportunity to the petitioner to appear in person or through an Advocate. It would be perfectly open to the petitioner to raise his objection as to the maintainability of the proposal to review the revisional order passed by the Government in G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989, the petitioner can always show that there was no mistake of fact or law whatsoever when the Government disposed off the revision vide G.O.Rt No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989. It is not as if the Memo suffers from any inherent lack of jurisdiction so as to be set aside by this Court at this stage. The record would disclose that the Memo was served on the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioner can certainly raise his objection to the contents/grounds of the said Memorandum whereunder, the Government proposes to review its earlier order. The respondent-Government is bound to consider such objection. It is needless to clarify that the order can be reviewed only on the ground stated in Section 166(c) of the Act and on no other grounds. The petitioner shall be given reasonable opportunity including the opportunity to peruse the relevant record. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered opinion that it is not desirable to interdict the proceedings at the threshold. The respondent-Government need not be restrained at this stage, not to proceed further in the matter. However, it is required to clarify that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the questions relating to the title and possession of the property involved. The Court also has not expressed any opinion about the earlier revisional order passed by the Government vide G.O Rt. No. 1721, dated 1-12-1989. The entire matter is left open so as to be decided in the proposed review proceedings by the 1st Respondent-Government in accordance with law. In view of the long pendency of the proceedings, it would be appropriate for the Government to dispose of the matter as expeditiously as possible, preferably within four months from the date of receipt of copy of this order and there shall be a direction accordingly.

17. The writ petition is accordingly disposed of.

18. No costs.