1. This is a revision petition directed against an order of the First Addl. Munsiff Srinagar dated 12-9-63 whereby he has stayed the present suit pending in his court under Section 10 of the CPC. The facts that have given rise to the present revision petition are that an application for partition was presented in the office of the Asstt. Commissioner Srinagar on 21st January, 1959 by Om Prakash respondent against Sham Singn and Deedar Singh for partition of land under Survey No. 1060K Khewat No. 189, village Nawhatta. The land of which partition was sought measures 2 kanals and 2 marlas. After the appearance of the non-applicants in that application, they put in a written statement. Issues were framed which are on page 24 of the file, but are undated. These issues can be called anything but issues. Anyhow, we are not concerned with that aspect of the case. Later on amended issues were framed which are on page 41 of the revenue file. These issues also do not bear any date. These issues were (1) Whether the applicant in that case had possession over the suit land; (2) Whether the applicant had any right to institute the suit and what sort of title he had over the property in suit; (3) Whether the possession of the defendant had become adverse over the suit property and on what grounds. The fourth issue pertained to the improvements and the fifth was to the effect whether there was a civil suit between the parties with respect to the title of the property and whether the partition proceedings should be stayed.
2. It is stated that in spite of the request of the non-applicants in this case the proceedings in that application were not stayed. Later on a civil suit was filed by S. Nirmal Singh Deedar Singh and: Sham Singh against Om Prakasn for declaration and injunction that the plaintiffs were the owners of the suit property which consisted of the entire land under Khasra No. 1060 khewat No. 1180 in village Nowhatta. The relief claimed was that they should be declared to be the owners of this property on account of adverse possession and the defendant should be restrained from interfering with their possession. In para 2 of the plaint the plaintiffs stated that plaintiff No. 1 was adopted by one Om Prakash (not the defendant Om Prakash) and continued to be in possession of the property with the other plaintiff. On 13-6-60 nine issues were framed in this case out of which issue No. 4 was with respect to the stay of the proceeding under Section 10 of the CPC. It appears that after some time after recording the evidence of the parties, the trial Court passed the order under revision staying the suit, on the ground that there was a previously instituted suit between the parties with respect to the very land which was pending before the Asstt. Collector first class Srinagar.
3. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Mr. Satyapal learned counsel for the non applicants Om Prakash and others has argued that when a petition for partition under Section 105 of the Land Revenue Act is presented to a revenue officer, under Section 111-A of the Act the revenue officer has three courses open to him:
(1) He may decline to grant the application until the question in dispute is determined by a competent Court.
(2) He may require any party to the case to institute within three months a suit in a civil Court for determination of such question, or
(3) may proceed to inquire into the merits of the objections.
4. In case he adopts the third course, the revenue officer shall follow the procedure laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure for the trial of original suits and all decrees passed under this class of cases shall be held to be decrees of a civil Court of original jurisdiction and shall be appealable as decrees of ordinary civil Courts. Mr. Satya Pal has therefore argued that when the Assistant Collector framed issues in this case, he acted under the third alternative given under Section 111-A of the Land Revenue Act. Therefore the Assistant Collector now trying the application for partition was to be a civil Court, and as the matter in that partition proceeding and the present civil suit is the same and the parties are substantially the same, the trial Court has rightly stayed the proceedings in the civil suit from which this revision arises.
5. I am afraid this argument of Mr. Satyapal is on the face of it fallacious and the provisions of Section 10 of the CPC are not at all applicable to the facts of the present case. Nor can the civil suit pending in the Court be stayed under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151 of the CPC. A cursory perusal of Section 10 of the CPC would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before this section can be applied:—
(1) The matter in issue in both the suits must be substantially the same.
(2) The previously instituted suit must be pending in the same Court in which the subsequent suit is brought or in a different Court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed.
(3) Both the suits must be between the same parties or their representatives.
(4) Such parties must be litigating in both the suits under the same title.
6. I am afraid none of these conditions is fulfilled in the present case. There are authorities that in order that S. 10 applies there must not only be identity of certain issues but the entire matter must be the same in both the suits. For this view the following authorities may be cited.
7. In Bepin Behary v. Jogendra, AIR 1917 Cal 248, it has been laid down that the expression ‘matter in issue’ in S. 10 has reference to the entire subject-matter in controversy between the parties and is not equivalent to “any of the questions in issue”. In that case a suit for subsequent rent for the same property was not stayed although the same questions were raised in both the suits.
8. In Mahomed Afzal v. Mt. Sardar Begum, AIR 1949 Lah 69, it was held that the ‘matter in issue’ means “the entire matter in controversy and not merely one of several issues”. The first suit was for declaration that the properties were wakf and that therefore alienations were void. In the second suit there was a further plea that the plaintiff was a Mutwalli asking for possession of alienated property in the capacity or a Mutwalli. On these facts it was held that S. 10 did not apply, and that the second suit could also not be stayed under S. 151 which could be invoked only for ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of Court.
9. In Radhe Shyam Agarwal v. Kashinath Vaish, AIR 1960 Madh Pra 169, it was laid down that for the application of Section 10 of the CPC, there must be a complete identity of the parties and also an identity of the subject-matter.
10. In Channan Kuer v. Sahdeo Singh, AIR 1929 Oudh 341, it was laid down that in order to attract the provisions of S. 10 it is not enough that the same issue should be involved in the two suits but it is also necessary that the entire subject-matter of the two suits should be the same. In that case the former suit was a suit relating to the declaration of title in regard to certain properties and the latter was a suit for profits in regard to a portion of the properties, and on these facts it was held that S. 10 will ave no application.
11. Similarly in Hathi Ram…Applicant; v. Hazi Mohammad…Opposite Party., AIR 1954 All 141 it has been held that the words ‘matter in issue’ in S. 10 of the CPC mean the entire matter in controversy and not one of several issues in the case.
12. Though the view expressed in these authorities is extreme in so far as a complete identity of the parties and the identity of the subject-matter in controversy has been stressed in these authorities, yet the real test is that complete identity of the subject-matter or the identity of the parties may not be necessary to attract the application of S. 10, but the matter that is the subject-matter of dispute in the two suits between the parties must be the same.
13. In this case the matter in issue in both the suits is not substantially the same, nor are the parties the same. In the revenue proceedings Nirmal Singh plaintiff No. 1 was not a party. Nirmal Singh in the civil suit claimed a definite status for himself and that is he claimed to be the adopted son of one Om Prakash. There is no such contention in the partition proceedings nor is Nirmal Singh's adoption a point in issue at all. Therefore the first test laid down above is not at all fulfilled in the circumstances of the present case.
14. The second test is that the previously instituted suit must be in a Court having jurisdiction to grant the relief claimed in the subsequent suit. The revenge Court in the previous application is not at all competent to grant the relief of declaration with respect to this land, much less can it grant a decree for injunction. Although a revenue officer whether acting as a civil Court or not in the previous revenue proceedings can partition the land in dispute, no further relief can be granted by the revenue Court. In support of this view Somasundaram v. Venkata Subbayya, AIR 1938 Mad 602 may be cited. This authority lays down that Section 10 of the CPC applies when the Court in which the previous suit is pending is competent to grant relief claimed in the subsequent suit.
15. The third test is that the suits must be between the same parties. Here also, as already remarked, the parties are not the same. Nirmal Singhl does not at all figure in the partition proceedings, nor is his adoption a matter in issue in the partition proceedings.
16. The fourth test also is not satisfied in the instant case because in the revenue proceedings the parties are litigating under a different title whereas in the present civil suit the title of Nirmal Singh as the adopted son of Om Prakash is raised for the first time. Therefore the title of the parties, even though some of them are common to the two proceedings, is different. In these circumstances, in my view the order passed by the trial Court is erroneous and cannot be maintained. The order of the trial Court is set aside and this revision petition is accepted with costs. Counsel's fee Rs. 25/-.
I.H/M.V.J/D.V.C
17. Petition accepted.