This second appeal arises out of a suit for possession based on title as well as an oral entrustment by the plaintiff to the first defendant. The court of the first instance decreed the suit. On appeal the learned Addl. District Judge at Srinagar found the oral entrustment alleged in the plaint to be false and dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish possession of the property within twelve years before the date of the suit. The plaintiff has now come up in second appeal to this court.
2. The relevant facts of the Case lie within a brief compass. One Jana Bibi sold a building to the plaintiff on 19th Bhadon 2002. The sale deed alleged that actual possession of the building was delivered by the vendor to the vendee. The vendor Jana Bibi was the mother-in-law of the vendee plaintiff. The plaint alleged that in Katik 2003 the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to occupy a portion of the building on the express undertaking that he would restore possession to the plaintiff as and when he asked for it.
The first defendant, in spite of repeated demands, did not vacate the premises in his occupation. The plaintiff therefore, asked for ejectment of the first defendant and delivery of actual possession to him. The first defendant denied that the plaintiff ever put him in possession of the premises; he also denied the right and title of Jana Bibi from whom the plaintiff purchased the property. It is unnecessary to set out the other pleas taken by him in the written statement.
The court of first instance found that the plaintiff put the first defendant in possession of the property as alleged in the plaint and on the strength of that finding decreed the suit. The Addl. District Judge on appeal elaborately went into the evidence adduced in the case and came to the conclusion that the oral entrustment set up in the plaint was false, that the first defendant was not in permissive possession of the property, and that the plaintiff had not been able to establish his possession within 12 years before the suit. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
3. The question in this second appeal is whether the view taken by the lower appellate court is correct. I shall first deal with the finding of fact, because under S. 100(1)(d) C.P.C. as it obtains in this State, where the decision of the first court in a suit in which the value of the subject. matter exceeds Rs. 100 has been varied or reversed by the lower appellate court, the correctness of the finding of fact can be canvassed in second appeal on the ground that the decision of the lower appellate court is against the weight of the evidence in the case.
I have been taken through the evidence in the case by the learned counsel on both sides. The onus of proving the oral entrustment set up in the plaint and thereby making out that the possession of the first defendant was only permissive in character has keen rightly cast on the plaintiff. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff is however grossly inadequate to discharge this onus. The witnesses called by the plaintiff have far from supporting his case thoroughly undermined it.
Their evidence shows that the first defendant was in possession of the property not only at the time of the sale in favour of the plaintiff by Jana Bibi but long prior to it. Thus, the story of the alleged oral entrustment and the permissive possession of the first defendant set up in the plaint stands discredited on the evidence in the case.
The finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court has therefore to be upheld. We have then to proceed on the basis that the alleged handing over of possession of the property by the plaintiff to the defendant in Katik 2003 is false. No other case has been put forward or circumstance alleged by the plaintiff to show that the first defendant was in Permissive possession of the property in question within 12 years before suit.
4. Yet, the learned counsel for the plaintiff strenuously urged that it was for the first defendant to establish his title to continue to be in possession of the property and not for the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession of it within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiffs learned counsel relied upon Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, ILR 39 Mad 617 : (AIR 1916 PC 21) where in the course of their judgment their Lordships of the Privy Council said at p. 631 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 26 of AIR) :
"Nothing is better settled than that the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period lies upon the person asserting such possession. It is too late in the day to suggest the contrary of this proposition. If it were not connect it would be open to the possessor for a year or a day to say : 'I am here; be your title to the property ever so good, you cannot turn me out until you have demonstrated that the possession of myself and my predecessors was not long enough to fulfil all the legal conditions.' Such a singular doctrine can well be illustrated by the case of India, in which the right of the Crown to vast tracts of territory, including not only islands arising from the sea. but great space of jungle lands, necessarily not under the close supervision of Government officers, would disappear because there would be no evidence available to establish the state of possession for 60 years past. It would be contrary to all legal principles thus to permit the squatter to put the owner of the fundamental right to a negative proof upon the point of possession."
This pronouncement cannot, however, be regarded as deciding the Correct article of the limitation act applicable to a case like the present. The facts of the case before the Privy Council were far removed from the facts of the instant case. There the plaintiff who was in possession of certain lands alleged that he had acquired title to them by prescription and asked for a declaration of title on that ground. The actual title was originally vested in the Crown. The Privy Council therefore pointed out that it was for the plaintiff to prove. that he had acquired a title by adverse possession, and this position was forcefully propounded by Lord Shaw in the passage extracted above.
5. But in the present case it is the plaintiff who seeks to eject the defendant and recover actual possession of the property. Could he in such an action refrain from showing that he was in possession within 12 years before the suit and call upon the, defendant to show that he has perfected his title to the property by adverse possession over tile statutory period of 12 years ? In other words, can the plaintiff legitimately cast the entire burden on the contesting defendant by invoking Art. 144 of the Limitation Act which is a residuary Article available only when no other Article is applicable to the case.
I think the answer has to be emphatically in the negative. To a case like the present Art. 142 is clearly applicable and the Plaintiff cannot succeed unless he makes out not only that he has title over the property but also that he was in possession of it within 12 years next prior to the institution of the suit. This position is well settled on the authorities of the Privy Council itself. As early as 1859 the Privy Council in Maharajah Koonwur Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh, 8 Moo Ind App 199 at P. 220 observed :
"The Appellant is seeking to disturb the possession, admitted to have existed for about eleven years of Defendants, who insist on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. It clearly lies on him to remove that bar by satisfactory proof that the Cause of action accrued to him (for that is the way in which the Regulation puts it) on a dispossession within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit, and, therefore, that he, or some person through whom ho claims, was in possession during that period. No proof of anterior title, such as would be involved in the decision of the boundary question in his favour, can relieve him from his burden, or shift it upon his adversaries by compelling them to prove the time and manner of dispossession. The lands in question may have been part of Mouza Gopalpore, and as such may have been enjoyed by his ancestors and yet ho may have lost, by lapse or time, his right to recover them. Their Lordships therefore propose to consider in the first place, what evidence there is that the Appellant, or any person through whom he claims, was in possession of lands in question at any time within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit."
6. Again in Mohima Chunder Mazoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi, ILR 16 Cal 473 (PC) it was pointed out :
"The learned Judge then says : 'When I showed above that the plaintiffs are the rightful owners of the disputed land, it is for the ryot defendants to show that they are entitled to retain possession of these lands. That as a proposition of law, is one which hardly meets with the approval of their Lordships. This is in reality what in England would be called an action for ejectment, and in all actions for ejectment where the Defendants are admittedly in possession, and a fortiori where, as in this particular case, they had been in possession for a great number of years, and under a claim of title it lies upon the Plaintiff to prove his own title. The plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, and it is the opinion of their Lordships, that in this case the onus is thrown upon the plaintiffs to prove their possession prior to the time when they were admittedly dispossessed, and at some time within twelve years before the commencement of the suit, namely for the two or three years prior to the year 1875, or 1874, and that ii floes not lie upon the Defendants to show that in fact the Plaintiffs were so dispossessed."
7. In Mahammad Amanulla Khan v. Badan Singh, ILR 17 Cal 137 the Privy Council held that Art. 144 is only a residuary Article which can be invoked when no other Article has specially provided for the case and that, therefore, when a claim comes within the terms of Art. 142 adverse possession is not required to be proved in order to maintain a defence. To the same effect is the decision in Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gabar Ali Khan, 25 Mad LJ 95 (PC). The suit there was one for ejectment of persons who were in possession of the land at the date of the suit. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee made the following weighty observations regarding the burden of proof which lies on the plaintiff in such suits :
''It lay upon the plaintiffs to prove not only a title as against the defendants to the possession; but to prove that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed or 'had discontinued to be in possession of the lands within 12 years immediately preceding the commencement of the suit. Their Lordships find that the plaintiffs failed to prove a title against the defendants to the possession of the lands in dispute or any part of them; they failed to prove that the lands, the possession of which they claimed were not the lands covered by the sanad; and they failed to prove that they had been dispossessed or that their possession had been discontinued within 12 years before suit."
8. These decisions of the Privy Council have been strongly relied upon by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) where it is held :
"It is wrong to say that a person who proves title in a suit for ejectment has the right to the decree sought unless the defendant proves adverse possession for 12 years. The plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he shows in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that fie was in Possession within 12 years of suit; the onus is not upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years."
9. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the position becomes different when the contesting defendant is in permissive possession under a leave and license or holds under a lease. As a proposition of law. I do not think exception can be taken to it. In such cases the Plaintiff who seeks possession will be in constructive possession of the property holding it through the defendant. And such constructive possession within 12 years before the suit would entitle the plaintiff to a decree.
But the next step in the argument is difficult to accept. It is urged that the position cannot be different when the plaint has set up an oral entrustment and consequently permissive possession of the defendant within 12 years before the suit. If this argument is acceded to, all that a plaintiff need do to discharge his onus under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act will be just to allege a fictitious lease or license in favour of the defendant in actual possession.
In more than one case which eventually went up to the High Courts in this country such disingenuous attempts had been made by the plaintiffs, but they have been uniformly worsted in those attempts. In AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) (Supra) an oral entrustment was set up in the plaint and was found against by the courts. In dealing with that aspect of the matter, Leach, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed as follows at page 801 :-
"And drafting his plaint in a manner which disguises the real nature of the suit will not help a plaintiff."
10. In Gopaul Chander v. Nilmoney Mitter : ILR 10 Cal 374 Garth, C.J. at p. 378 stated :
"Mr. Philips contends, that this is not so, because the plaintiff has alleged in his plaint, that the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were the tenants of Mittunjoy. But if a mere allegation of that kind could relieve a. plaintiff from the burthen of proving that he or those under whom he claims had been in possession within twelve years, that device might always be resorted to for the purpose of evading the law of limitation."
11. In Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB) the plaintiff had set up a tenancy in favour of the defendant in possession; that tenancy was found to be fictitious. In those circumstances the Full Bench regarded the case as one where the plaintiff had set up possession and subsequent dispossession, and applied Art. 142 of the Limitation Act to it.
12. Another case in point is Krishna Pillai v. Kumara Pillai, AIR 1954 Trav-Co. 449. There the plaintiff set up an oral lease in favour of the defendant and it was found to be false. A Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court held that it was tantamount to discontinuance of possession of the plaintiff who was previously in possession, and dismissed the suit on applying Art. 142.
13. The principles of these decisions undoubtedly apply to the instant case. Here, the plaintiff hay set up an oral entrustment of the property to the defendant which the defendant has denied. The oral entrustment has been found to be false tin the evidence in the case. The position, therefore, is that the contesting defendant who was admittedly in possession of the property at the time of the suit held the property independently of any transaction between him and the plaintiff which rendered his possession permissive in character.
This surely is not a case therefore of the defendant holding derivatively or permissively from the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title. The definite case of the plaintiff is that he and his predecessor-in-title were previously in actual possession of the property; but we fine the defendant to have been in actual possession of it at the date of the suit and also prior to it. As the attempt of the plaintiff to cloak the independent character of defendant's possession by setting up an entrustment of the Property to him has failed, the case clearly becomes one of dispossession of the plaintiff or discontinuance of possession by him, thus attracting the application of Art. 142.
In order to succeed in such a case, the plaintiff is bound to show that he or his predecessor-in-title was in possession within 12 years next prior to the commencement of the suit. This the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving. The result is that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed in this action. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.
Appeal dismissed.