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  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 142 of the Limitation Act
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Citation Codes
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citation codes
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Attorney(S)
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  • Art. 144 of the Limitation Act
  • Art. 142 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

This second appeal arises from a suit for possession based on title and an alleged oral entrustment by the plaintiff to the first defendant. The material facts as stated in the opinion are:

  • On 19th Bhadon 2002 Jana Bibi sold a building to the plaintiff by sale deed which alleged that actual possession was delivered by the vendor to the vendee. Jana Bibi was the plaintiff's mother-in-law.
  • The plaint alleged that in Katik 2003 the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to occupy a portion of the building on the express undertaking that the defendant would restore possession to the plaintiff when asked.
  • The first defendant, despite repeated demands, did not vacate the premises. The plaintiff sought ejectment and delivery of actual possession.
  • The first defendant denied that the plaintiff ever put him in possession and also denied the title of Jana Bibi (the vendor). Other pleas in his written statement are not detailed in the opinion.

Procedural history:

  • The court of first instance found that the plaintiff had put the first defendant in possession as alleged and decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff.
  • On appeal, the learned Additional District Judge at Srinagar reviewed the evidence, found the alleged oral entrustment to be false, held that the first defendant's possession was not permissive, concluded the plaintiff had failed to establish possession within twelve years before the suit, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.
  • The plaintiff appealed to this Court in a second appeal challenging the appellate court's factual conclusion and its legal consequences.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the view taken by the lower appellate court (that the oral entrustment alleged in the plaint was false and that the plaintiff failed to establish possession within twelve years before the suit) is correct.
  2. In an action for ejectment where the defendant is in possession, whether the plaintiff must prove that he (or his predecessor-in-title) was in possession within twelve years next prior to the institution of the suit (i.e., applicability of Art. 142 of the Limitation Act).
  3. Whether Article 144 of the Limitation Act (a residuary article) can be invoked by the plaintiff to shift the burden entirely to the defendant in circumstances such as the present.
  4. Whether an allegation of an oral entrustment or oral lease/licence (permissive possession) in the plaint, when found to be false, should be treated as a discontinuance of the plaintiff's possession attracting the provisions of Art. 142.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff relied on title obtained from Jana Bibi (sale deed dated 19th Bhadon 2002) and alleged that he had put the defendant in permissive possession by an oral entrustment in Katik 2003.
  • The plaintiff's counsel contended that it was for the first defendant to establish his title to continue in possession and not for the plaintiff to prove possession within twelve years before the suit; the counsel relied upon Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao (ILR 39 Mad 617 : AIR 1916 PC 21) for the proposition that the onus of establishing title by reason of possession lies on the person asserting such possession.
  • It was also urged (by implication) that where a defendant holds under a leave and licence or lease (permissive possession), the plaintiff may be constructively in possession through the defendant and thus meet the requirement of possession within twelve years.

First Defendant's Arguments

  • The first defendant denied that the plaintiff ever put him in possession of the premises (i.e., denied the oral entrustment).
  • The first defendant denied the right and title of Jana Bibi (the vendor) from whom the plaintiff purchased the property.
  • The opinion states other pleas were taken in the written statement but describes them as unnecessary to set out; therefore this summary does not elaborate beyond the denials recorded in the text.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, ILR 39 Mad 617 : AIR 1916 PC 21 The onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for the requisite period lies upon the person asserting such possession. The court observed this pronouncement but held it did not decide which Article of the Limitation Act applied to the present case because the facts in that Privy Council case differed materially (there the plaintiff sought declaration of title by prescription against the Crown).
Maharajah Koonwur Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh, 8 Moo Ind App 199 When a plaintiff seeks to disturb defendants' possession, it lies on the plaintiff to prove that cause of action accrued within 12 years before suit and that he or those through whom he claims were in possession during that period. Cited to support the proposition that the plaintiff must remove the statutory bar by satisfactory proof of dispossession within twelve years; used to show the burden lies on plaintiff in ejectment suits where defendants are in possession.
Mohima Chunder Mazoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi, ILR 16 Cal 473 (PC) In actions for ejectment where defendants are in possession, the plaintiff must prove his own title and that he or predecessors were in possession within twelve years before suit. Relied upon to reinforce that the burden is on the plaintiff to prove possession prior to dispossession; cited as a Privy Council authority to the same effect.
Mahammad Amanulla Khan v. Badan Singh, ILR 17 Cal 137 Article 144 of the Limitation Act is residuary; when a claim comes within Art. 142, Art. 144 is not the applicable provision. Cited to support the conclusion that Art. 144 cannot be invoked where Art. 142 applies; used to show that adverse possession is not required as a defence where Art. 142 governs the claim’s limitation consequences.
Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gabar Ali Khan, 25 Mad LJ 95 (PC) Where a suit is for ejectment of persons in possession at the date of the suit, plaintiffs must prove title and dispossession within twelve years preceding the suit. Cited as an additional Privy Council authority for the principle that the burden of proving possession within twelve years lies on plaintiffs seeking to recover possession.
Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (Full Bench) The plaintiff is not entitled to a decree in ejectment unless he shows, in addition to title, that he had been in possession within twelve years of the suit; the burden lies upon the plaintiff. Relied upon strongly; the Full Bench's declaration that drafting a plaint to disguise the real nature of the suit (e.g., by alleging an oral entrustment) will not relieve the plaintiff from his burden was quoted and applied.
Gopaul Chander v. Nilmoney Mitter, ILR 10 Cal 374 A mere allegation of tenancy (or similar allegation) cannot relieve a plaintiff from the burden of proving possession within twelve years; such devices could be used to evade the law of limitation. Cited to support the rejection of a plaintiff's attempt to evade limitation by pleading permissive possession without proof; applied as persuasive authority against accepting a mere allegation as sufficient.
Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (Full Bench) Where tenancy alleged in favour of a defendant is found to be fictitious, the case is treated as one of dispossession and Art. 142 applies. Referred to as an example where a fictitious tenancy led to application of Art. 142; used to show consistent treatment of such pleadings as discontinuance of plaintiff's possession.
Krishna Pillai v. Kumara Pillai, AIR 1954 Trav-Co. 449 An oral lease found to be false is tantamount to discontinuance of the plaintiff's previous possession and Art. 142 should be applied. Cited as a case in point where oral lease allegations, when disbelieved, resulted in dismissal under Art. 142; applied analogously to the facts before the Court.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in a structured manner. The key analytical steps recorded in the opinion are:

  1. Scope of second appeal: The Court noted that under Section 100(1)(d) of the Code of Civil Procedure (as applicable in the State), where the decision of the first court (trial court) in a suit exceeding Rs. 100 in value has been varied or reversed by the lower appellate court, the correctness of the appellate court's finding of fact can be canvassed in second appeal on the ground that the appellate decision is against the weight of evidence. Thus the Court first considered the factual conclusion of the lower appellate court.
  2. Burden of proof on oral entrustment: The Court observed that the onus of proving the alleged oral entrustment (and thereby that the defendant's possession was permissive) was properly cast on the plaintiff.
  3. Evaluation of evidence: After being taken through the evidence by learned counsel for both sides, the Court concluded that the plaintiff's evidence was "grossly inadequate" to discharge that onus. The witnesses called by the plaintiff did not support his case and in significant respects undermined it.
  4. Findings on timing of possession: The evidence indicated that the first defendant was in possession not only at the time of the sale to the plaintiff but long prior to it. Consequently, the alleged story of oral entrustment and permissive possession was discredited by the evidence.
  5. Consequent factual stance: The Court upheld the lower appellate court's finding of fact that the oral entrustment was false and proceeded on the basis that the alleged handing over of possession in Katik 2003 did not occur. No other circumstances or case were shown by the plaintiff to establish that the first defendant was in permissive possession within twelve years before the suit.
  6. Legal consequence under the Limitation Act: The Court considered the plaintiff's legal argument (relying on Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao) that the onus was on the defendant to establish his title by adverse possession. The Court distinguished that authority on its facts (where the plaintiff sought title by prescription against the Crown) and held it did not determine which Article of the Limitation Act applied in the present factual matrix.
  7. Application of Articles 142 and 144: The Court held Article 144 to be a residuary article and rejected the plaintiff's attempt to invoke it to place the entire burden on the defendant. Instead, the Court found Article 142 clearly applicable: when a plaintiff seeks ejectment against a defendant in possession (and the defendant's possession is independent and not permissive), the plaintiff must show that he or his predecessors were in possession within twelve years next before the suit.
  8. On permissive possession and constructive possession: The Court acknowledged that where a defendant truly holds under a licence or lease or as a permissive occupant, the plaintiff may be treated as in constructive possession (through the defendant), which would satisfy the twelve-year requirement. However, the Court rejected any rule that a mere allegation of an oral entrustment in the plaint — if false — would relieve the plaintiff of his onus; allowing that would permit plaintiffs to fabricate fictitious licences or entrustments to evade limitation requirements.
  9. Reliance on authorities: The Court relied on multiple Privy Council and High Court decisions (summarised above) which uniformly support the rule that in ejectment suits plaintiffs must prove possession within twelve years when defendants are in possession, and that fictitious allegations of permissive possession cannot shift the burden.
  10. Conclusion on proof: Because the plaintiff failed to prove that he or his predecessor-in-title had been in possession within twelve years prior to the suit, the plaintiff did not discharge the burden imposed by Article 142 and therefore was not entitled to succeed in the action.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The second appeal is dismissed and the appeal fails. The Court upheld the lower appellate court's finding that the alleged oral entrustment was false, applied Article 142 of the Limitation Act, and concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove possession within twelve years prior to the suit.

Implications and direct consequences:

  • The plaintiff is not entitled to recover possession; the decree of the trial court in favour of the plaintiff was set aside by the lower appellate court and that decision has been affirmed by this Court.
  • The appeal was dismissed with costs.
  • The opinion applies established principles from Privy Council and High Court authorities regarding the burden of proof in ejectment suits and the limited, residuary role of Article 144. The opinion does not state that it establishes a new legal precedent beyond applying these principles to the facts of the case.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Appeal dismissed."

    Taja Bibi v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat And Others

    This second appeal arises out of a suit for possession based on title as well as an oral entrustment by the plaintiff to the first defendant. The court of the first instance decreed the suit. On appeal the learned Addl. District Judge at Srinagar found the oral entrustment alleged in the plaint to be false and dismissed the suit on the ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish possession of the property within twelve years before the date of the suit. The plaintiff has now come up in second appeal to this court.

    2. The relevant facts of the Case lie within a brief compass. One Jana Bibi sold a building to the plaintiff on 19th Bhadon 2002. The sale deed alleged that actual possession of the building was delivered by the vendor to the vendee. The vendor Jana Bibi was the mother-in-law of the vendee plaintiff. The plaint alleged that in Katik 2003 the plaintiff permitted the first defendant to occupy a portion of the building on the express undertaking that he would restore possession to the plaintiff as and when he asked for it.

    The first defendant, in spite of repeated demands, did not vacate the premises in his occupation. The plaintiff therefore, asked for ejectment of the first defendant and delivery of actual possession to him. The first defendant denied that the plaintiff ever put him in possession of the premises; he also denied the right and title of Jana Bibi from whom the plaintiff purchased the property. It is unnecessary to set out the other pleas taken by him in the written statement.

    The court of first instance found that the plaintiff put the first defendant in possession of the property as alleged in the plaint and on the strength of that finding decreed the suit. The Addl. District Judge on appeal elaborately went into the evidence adduced in the case and came to the conclusion that the oral entrustment set up in the plaint was false, that the first defendant was not in permissive possession of the property, and that the plaintiff had not been able to establish his possession within 12 years before the suit. He, therefore, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit.

    3. The question in this second appeal is whether the view taken by the lower appellate court is correct. I shall first deal with the finding of fact, because under S. 100(1)(d) C.P.C. as it obtains in this State, where the decision of the first court in a suit in which the value of the subject. matter exceeds Rs. 100 has been varied or reversed by the lower appellate court, the correctness of the finding of fact can be canvassed in second appeal on the ground that the decision of the lower appellate court is against the weight of the evidence in the case.

    I have been taken through the evidence in the case by the learned counsel on both sides. The onus of proving the oral entrustment set up in the plaint and thereby making out that the possession of the first defendant was only permissive in character has keen rightly cast on the plaintiff. The evidence on the side of the plaintiff is however grossly inadequate to discharge this onus. The witnesses called by the plaintiff have far from supporting his case thoroughly undermined it.

    Their evidence shows that the first defendant was in possession of the property not only at the time of the sale in favour of the plaintiff by Jana Bibi but long prior to it. Thus, the story of the alleged oral entrustment and the permissive possession of the first defendant set up in the plaint stands discredited on the evidence in the case.

    The finding of fact arrived at by the lower appellate court has therefore to be upheld. We have then to proceed on the basis that the alleged handing over of possession of the property by the plaintiff to the defendant in Katik 2003 is false. No other case has been put forward or circumstance alleged by the plaintiff to show that the first defendant was in Permissive possession of the property in question within 12 years before suit.

    4. Yet, the learned counsel for the plaintiff strenuously urged that it was for the first defendant to establish his title to continue to be in possession of the property and not for the plaintiff to prove that he was in possession of it within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit. The plaintiffs learned counsel relied upon Secretary of State v. Chellikani Rama Rao, ILR 39 Mad 617 : (AIR 1916 PC 21) where in the course of their judgment their Lordships of the Privy Council said at p. 631 (of ILR Mad) : (at p. 26 of AIR) :

    "Nothing is better settled than that the onus of establishing title to property by reason of possession for a certain requisite period lies upon the person asserting such possession. It is too late in the day to suggest the contrary of this proposition. If it were not connect it would be open to the possessor for a year or a day to say : 'I am here; be your title to the property ever so good, you cannot turn me out until you have demonstrated that the possession of myself and my predecessors was not long enough to fulfil all the legal conditions.' Such a singular doctrine can well be illustrated by the case of India, in which the right of the Crown to vast tracts of territory, including not only islands arising from the sea. but great space of jungle lands, necessarily not under the close supervision of Government officers, would disappear because there would be no evidence available to establish the state of possession for 60 years past. It would be contrary to all legal principles thus to permit the squatter to put the owner of the fundamental right to a negative proof upon the point of possession."

    This pronouncement cannot, however, be regarded as deciding the Correct article of the limitation act applicable to a case like the present. The facts of the case before the Privy Council were far removed from the facts of the instant case. There the plaintiff who was in possession of certain lands alleged that he had acquired title to them by prescription and asked for a declaration of title on that ground. The actual title was originally vested in the Crown. The Privy Council therefore pointed out that it was for the plaintiff to prove. that he had acquired a title by adverse possession, and this position was forcefully propounded by Lord Shaw in the passage extracted above.

    5. But in the present case it is the plaintiff who seeks to eject the defendant and recover actual possession of the property. Could he in such an action refrain from showing that he was in possession within 12 years before the suit and call upon the, defendant to show that he has perfected his title to the property by adverse possession over tile statutory period of 12 years ? In other words, can the plaintiff legitimately cast the entire burden on the contesting defendant by invoking Art. 144 of the Limitation Act which is a residuary Article available only when no other Article is applicable to the case.

    I think the answer has to be emphatically in the negative. To a case like the present Art. 142 is clearly applicable and the Plaintiff cannot succeed unless he makes out not only that he has title over the property but also that he was in possession of it within 12 years next prior to the institution of the suit. This position is well settled on the authorities of the Privy Council itself. As early as 1859 the Privy Council in Maharajah Koonwur Nitrasur Singh v. Baboo Nund Loll Singh, 8 Moo Ind App 199 at P. 220 observed :

    "The Appellant is seeking to disturb the possession, admitted to have existed for about eleven years of Defendants, who insist on a possession of much longer duration as a statutory bar to the suit. It clearly lies on him to remove that bar by satisfactory proof that the Cause of action accrued to him (for that is the way in which the Regulation puts it) on a dispossession within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit, and, therefore, that he, or some person through whom ho claims, was in possession during that period. No proof of anterior title, such as would be involved in the decision of the boundary question in his favour, can relieve him from his burden, or shift it upon his adversaries by compelling them to prove the time and manner of dispossession. The lands in question may have been part of Mouza Gopalpore, and as such may have been enjoyed by his ancestors and yet ho may have lost, by lapse or time, his right to recover them. Their Lordships therefore propose to consider in the first place, what evidence there is that the Appellant, or any person through whom he claims, was in possession of lands in question at any time within 12 years next before the commencement of the suit."

    6. Again in Mohima Chunder Mazoomdar v. Mohesh Chunder Neogi, ILR 16 Cal 473 (PC) it was pointed out :

    "The learned Judge then says : 'When I showed above that the plaintiffs are the rightful owners of the disputed land, it is for the ryot defendants to show that they are entitled to retain possession of these lands. That as a proposition of law, is one which hardly meets with the approval of their Lordships. This is in reality what in England would be called an action for ejectment, and in all actions for ejectment where the Defendants are admittedly in possession, and a fortiori where, as in this particular case, they had been in possession for a great number of years, and under a claim of title it lies upon the Plaintiff to prove his own title. The plaintiff must recover by the strength of his own title, and it is the opinion of their Lordships, that in this case the onus is thrown upon the plaintiffs to prove their possession prior to the time when they were admittedly dispossessed, and at some time within twelve years before the commencement of the suit, namely for the two or three years prior to the year 1875, or 1874, and that ii floes not lie upon the Defendants to show that in fact the Plaintiffs were so dispossessed."

    7. In Mahammad Amanulla Khan v. Badan Singh, ILR 17 Cal 137 the Privy Council held that Art. 144 is only a residuary Article which can be invoked when no other Article has specially provided for the case and that, therefore, when a claim comes within the terms of Art. 142 adverse possession is not required to be proved in order to maintain a defence. To the same effect is the decision in Dharani Kanta Lahiri v. Gabar Ali Khan, 25 Mad LJ 95 (PC). The suit there was one for ejectment of persons who were in possession of the land at the date of the suit. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee made the following weighty observations regarding the burden of proof which lies on the plaintiff in such suits :

    ''It lay upon the plaintiffs to prove not only a title as against the defendants to the possession; but to prove that the plaintiffs had been dispossessed or 'had discontinued to be in possession of the lands within 12 years immediately preceding the commencement of the suit. Their Lordships find that the plaintiffs failed to prove a title against the defendants to the possession of the lands in dispute or any part of them; they failed to prove that the lands, the possession of which they claimed were not the lands covered by the sanad; and they failed to prove that they had been dispossessed or that their possession had been discontinued within 12 years before suit."

    8. These decisions of the Privy Council have been strongly relied upon by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Official Receiver, East Godavari v. Govindaraju, AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) where it is held :

    "It is wrong to say that a person who proves title in a suit for ejectment has the right to the decree sought unless the defendant proves adverse possession for 12 years. The plaintiff is not entitled to succeed unless he shows in addition to title, that he has been in possession of the property within 12 years of the suit. The burden lies upon the plaintiff to prove that fie was in Possession within 12 years of suit; the onus is not upon the defendant to prove adverse possession for a period of 12 years."

    9. But it is urged on behalf of the plaintiff that the position becomes different when the contesting defendant is in permissive possession under a leave and license or holds under a lease. As a proposition of law. I do not think exception can be taken to it. In such cases the Plaintiff who seeks possession will be in constructive possession of the property holding it through the defendant. And such constructive possession within 12 years before the suit would entitle the plaintiff to a decree.

    But the next step in the argument is difficult to accept. It is urged that the position cannot be different when the plaint has set up an oral entrustment and consequently permissive possession of the defendant within 12 years before the suit. If this argument is acceded to, all that a plaintiff need do to discharge his onus under Art. 142 of the Limitation Act will be just to allege a fictitious lease or license in favour of the defendant in actual possession.

    In more than one case which eventually went up to the High Courts in this country such disingenuous attempts had been made by the plaintiffs, but they have been uniformly worsted in those attempts. In AIR 1940 Mad 798 (FB) (Supra) an oral entrustment was set up in the plaint and was found against by the courts. In dealing with that aspect of the matter, Leach, C.J. who delivered the judgment of the Full Bench observed as follows at page 801 :-

    "And drafting his plaint in a manner which disguises the real nature of the suit will not help a plaintiff."

    10. In Gopaul Chander v. Nilmoney Mitter : ILR 10 Cal 374 Garth, C.J. at p. 378 stated :

    "Mr. Philips contends, that this is not so, because the plaintiff has alleged in his plaint, that the defendants Nos. 1 to 7 were the tenants of Mittunjoy. But if a mere allegation of that kind could relieve a. plaintiff from the burthen of proving that he or those under whom he claims had been in possession within twelve years, that device might always be resorted to for the purpose of evading the law of limitation."

    11. In Behari Lal v. Narain Das, AIR 1935 Lah 475 (FB) the plaintiff had set up a tenancy in favour of the defendant in possession; that tenancy was found to be fictitious. In those circumstances the Full Bench regarded the case as one where the plaintiff had set up possession and subsequent dispossession, and applied Art. 142 of the Limitation Act to it.

    12. Another case in point is Krishna Pillai v. Kumara Pillai, AIR 1954 Trav-Co. 449. There the plaintiff set up an oral lease in favour of the defendant and it was found to be false. A Division Bench of the Travancore-Cochin High Court held that it was tantamount to discontinuance of possession of the plaintiff who was previously in possession, and dismissed the suit on applying Art. 142.

    13. The principles of these decisions undoubtedly apply to the instant case. Here, the plaintiff hay set up an oral entrustment of the property to the defendant which the defendant has denied. The oral entrustment has been found to be false tin the evidence in the case. The position, therefore, is that the contesting defendant who was admittedly in possession of the property at the time of the suit held the property independently of any transaction between him and the plaintiff which rendered his possession permissive in character.

    This surely is not a case therefore of the defendant holding derivatively or permissively from the plaintiff or his predecessor-in-title. The definite case of the plaintiff is that he and his predecessor-in-title were previously in actual possession of the property; but we fine the defendant to have been in actual possession of it at the date of the suit and also prior to it. As the attempt of the plaintiff to cloak the independent character of defendant's possession by setting up an entrustment of the Property to him has failed, the case clearly becomes one of dispossession of the plaintiff or discontinuance of possession by him, thus attracting the application of Art. 142.

    In order to succeed in such a case, the plaintiff is bound to show that he or his predecessor-in-title was in possession within 12 years next prior to the commencement of the suit. This the plaintiff has not succeeded in proving. The result is that the plaintiff is not entitled to succeed in this action. The appeal, therefore, fails and is dismissed with costs.

    Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Taja Bibi v. Ghulam Mohd. Bhat And Others
    (Jul 12, 1961)