AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Attorney(S)
Judges
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff applied (application dated 25-7-1950) for an order compelling the defendant to produce certain documents listed under headings "A" and "B". Heading "A" concerns construction of Kothars in Handwara Tehsil (nine documents requested) and Heading "B" concerns Kanyan Sharif Road (seventeen documents requested). The defendant produced some documents (A: Nos. 1, 2, 3; B: Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12–17) but claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act for several other documents (A: documents 4–9 except two; B: documents 5, 7, 8, 10, 11). The defendant's objection was that the documents were communications addressed to public officers in official confidence and that disclosure would harm public interests. The Court inspected the documents in camera (without disclosing contents to the plaintiff) and adjudicated the question whether the communications were made in official confidence and therefore protected by Section 124.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the communications and documents sought to be produced are protected by privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act as "communications in official confidence".
  2. Whether communications that arise out of a contract between the State (His Highness' Government) and a private citizen (commercial/contractual matters) can be treated as communications made in official confidence and thereby protected from production.
  3. Whether opinions of the Law Secretary (Legal Remembrancer) fall within legal-advice privilege and are therefore privileged from production.
  4. What standard and scope should be applied when the State is a party in litigation and claims privilege over documents related to commercial/contractual activities.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Position

  • The plaintiff sought production and discovery of the listed documents on the basis that they relate to the case in issue (a contract between plaintiff and the His Highness' Government) and may shed light on the facts.
  • Implicit in the application is the claim that Government should produce documents in their possession relevant to the dispute, particularly where the State has entered into commercial relations with the plaintiff.

Defendant's Position (His Highness' Government)

  • The defendant claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act for a number of documents, arguing they were communications to public officers in official confidence and that disclosure would injure public interests.
  • The Assistant Advocate General produced authorities to support the broad proposition that communications made in official confidence are protected and that where communications are officially confidential, the public officer is the proper judge and the Court cannot compel production.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Mantubhai Mehta, AIR 1945 Bom 122 Supports the proposition that the question whether a communication was made in official confidence is a judicial question; if Court finds it was not in official confidence the public officer must produce; if Court finds it was, the officer may refuse. Cited as part of "ample authority" for the general proposition about judicial determination of official confidence; court relied on this principle in framing its approach to inspection and decision-making.
In re Makky Moithu, AIR 1943 Mad 278 Same line of authority as above—used to support the rule on court's role in deciding official confidence and the consequences of that decision. Included among authorities establishing that the court must decide whether communications were in official confidence; influenced the court's procedure of inspecting documents and deciding privilege.
Ijjatali Talukdar v. Emperor, AIR 1943 Cal 539 Another authority in the series supporting the judicial role in determining whether a communication is in official confidence. Relied upon as corroborative authority for the proposition that the court determines official confidence and the consequences flowing from that determination.
Nagaraja Pillai v. Secretary of State, AIR 1915 Mad 1113 Defines "communication in official confidence" as importing no special degree of secrecy; equates it in meaning to "professional confidence" (Section 126). Also indicated that production of certain official reports might be refused if public interest would be harmed and that the public officer was sole judge of detrimental character. Cited by the defendant; the court considered this definition but ultimately read it in context with other authorities that restrict the breadth of privilege, especially in commercial/contractual cases involving the State.
Vythilinga Pandarasannidhi v. Secretary of State, AIR 1935 Mad 342 Holds that if a court determines the communication is in public confidence, the officer alone can claim privilege and the court cannot interfere. Cited for the proposition that officer's claim of privilege is final once the court accepts official confidence; the court engaged with this authority but distinguished it for cases where the State is a party to commercial transactions.
Jehangir M. Cursetji v. Secretary of State, 27 Bom 189 Authority where a Government resolution was held to be privileged. Referred to by defendant's counsel as supporting limits on production; court acknowledged the authority but relied on other authorities to delimit privilege in commercial matters.
Governor General v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux, AIR 1950 EP 228 (Full Bench) Explores when privilege may be claimed: ordinarily political/administrative papers but privilege for trade/commercial/contractual documents is narrow and to be sparingly exercised; privilege must be necessary to protect State security, defence, diplomacy or proper functioning of public service. The court drew largely upon this Full Bench judgment to support its conclusion that privilege should be narrowly construed where documents arise out of the State's commercial activities, and that the present documents did not meet the threshold to be withheld.
Bhaiya Saheb Dajibabhau v. Pandit Ramnath Rampratap, AIR 1038 Nag 358 Draws a distinction between cases where the State itself is a party and those where it is not; holds the State when engaged in commercial activities is bound by ordinary rules of procedure and cannot evade discovery except as explained by Privy Council in Robinson. Adopted by the court to emphasize that when the State enters commercial transactions it largely gives up privileged position; used to support the order for production of documents related to the contract.
Robinson v. State of South Australia, A.I.R. 1931 P.C. 254 (Privy Council) Privy Council held privilege regarding State papers is narrow and to be applied only to protect public interest; production should not be refused merely because documents might prejudice the Crown in litigation; documents related to State commercial activities attract less scope for privilege; inspection by judge appropriate, especially where departments disbanded. Formed a central foundation for the court's approach: the court applied the Robinson principle to conclude that documents arising from commercial/contractual relations with the State should generally be produced unless disclosure would injure national defence, diplomacy, or proper functioning of public service. This led to ordering production of most documents in the present case.
Rigby, L.J. (dictum referenced) Dictum urging utmost care to give a defendant the discovery that Crown would have been compelled to give when in the position of a subject, absent a plain overriding principle of public interest. Quoted and treated as instructive; the court used the dictum to reinforce the limited scope of privilege and the need to safeguard genuine public interests while ensuring production in commercial disputes involving the State.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted an in camera inspection of the disputed documents and proceeded in a structured manner:

  1. Basis of claim: The defendant claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act, asserting the documents were communications made to public officers in official confidence and that disclosure would harm public interests.
  2. Judicial determination: The Court recognized the established principle (citing authorities) that whether a communication was made in official confidence is a judicial question. The Court therefore inspected the documents and evaluated whether the "official confidence" protection applied.
  3. Nature of documents: On inspection the Court found that most communications related to matters arising out of a contract between the plaintiff and the His Highness' Government—i.e., commercial/contractual relations. Some were letters between the Director General Rural Department and the Revenue Secretary; two specific documents (No. 8 under heading A and No. 10 under heading B) contained opinions of the Law Secretary (Legal Remembrancer).
  4. Legal-advice privilege: The Court held that the Law Secretary's opinions were of the nature of legal advice given by a legal adviser to his client, and therefore those opinions were privileged (i.e., not to be produced).
  5. Distinction between types of State involvement: The Court engaged with authorities that restrict or permit State privilege. It emphasized the important distinction between (a) litigation in which the State is not a party and a party seeks official communications, and (b) litigation where the State itself is a party in a commercial transaction with a private citizen. The Court accepted authorities (including the Privy Council in Robinson and the Full Bench decision cited) that privilege is narrow and to be sparingly exercised, especially for documents relating to commercial activities of the State.
  6. Application to facts: Applying the narrow approach, the Court concluded that the bulk of the communications were not made in official confidence of the kind that would injure the State's public interests (such as national defence, diplomatic relations, or proper functioning of public services). The mere fact that production might affect the fortunes of litigation was not a sufficient ground for withholding.
  7. Resulting order and reservations: The Court ordered discovery and production of the communications it found not to be in official confidence. It expressly limited its decision to the question of official confidence and clarified that the Government remained free to object later to admissibility, relevancy, or other objections under the Evidence Act at trial.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court ordered that the communications contained in the inspected documents (those it found not to be in official confidence) be discovered and produced. It also held that the Law Secretary's opinions (Document No. 8 under heading A and Document No. 10 under heading B) are privileged and not to be produced.

Implications:

  • The immediate effect is that the defendant must produce the communications which the Court found were not made in official confidence, thereby allowing the plaintiff access to those documents for use in the litigation.
  • The two documents containing the Law Secretary's legal opinions are protected by legal-advice privilege and need not be produced.
  • The Court emphasized that its determination was confined to the question of official confidence; the defendant retains the ability to raise later objections as to admissibility or relevancy under other provisions of the Evidence Act.
  • The Court applied and relied upon existing authorities to draw a distinction between State documents of political/administrative character (more likely to attract privilege) and documents arising out of commercial/contractual activities of the State (where privilege is narrow and sparingly exercised). The opinion does not purport to lay down a new precedent beyond applying and reconciling existing decisions to the facts at hand.

Order: Accordingly.

    L. Tirath Ram v. His Highness' Govt., Jammu And Kashmir

    1. The plaintiff has made an application praying that the documents detailed in his application dated 25-7-1950 be ordered to be produced in Court by the defendant. The documents sought to be produced have been given under headings ‘A’ and ‘B’. ‘A’ relates to construction of Kothars in Handwara Tehsil and ‘B’ relates to Kanyan Sharif Road. Under heading ‘A’ a request has been made for the production of nine documents and under heading ‘B’ a similar request has been made for production of 17 documents. Under heading ‘A’ the defendant has produced documents Nos. 1, 2 and 3; for documents 4 to 9 barring two: one in ‘A’ and one in ‘B’, which are communications made by the Law Secretary to the Revenue Secretary, the defendant claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. Under heading ‘B’ the defendant has produced documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and for documents Nos. 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 he has claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. An objection has been raised on behalf of the defendant that these documents have been addressed to Public Officers in official confidence and that by their disclosure the public interests would suffer and as such the defendant cannot be compelled to produce them. This point has been argued at very great length by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The privilege, as already stated, is claimed under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. According to Section 124 of the Evidence Act there is a consensus of judicial opinion that the point as to whether a communication was made in official confidence, is a matter subject solely to judicial decision & if once the Court comes to the conclusion that the communication has been made not in official confidence, then the Public Officer to whom the communication has been made has no other alternative but to produce the documents, irrespective of the fact that in his opinion the interests of the State would suffer by such a disclosure. If, however, the Court comes to the conclusion that the communication was made in official confidence, then it is for the officer alone to whom the communication has been made to decide as to whether the document should be produced or not. If he elects not to produce it, the Court cannot compel him to produce. There is ample authority for this proposition of law, and reference may in this connection be made to — ‘In re Mantubhai Mehta’. AIR 1945 Bom 122 (A)’ — ‘In, re Makky Moithu’, AIR 1943 Mad 278 (B) and — ‘Ijjatali Talukdar v. Emperor’, AIR 1943 Cal 539 (C) etc.

    2. Now the question is whether these communications have been made in official confidence or not. In order to decide this point, reference has to be made to the nature of the documents. I have gone through these documents without revealing their contents to the plaintiff. I find that these communications pertain to a matter which has arisen out of a contract which the plaintiff had entered with the defendant which in this case is the His Highness' Government. Some letters have been written by the Director General Rural Department to the Revenue Secretary and which have been replied to by the latter. There are some similar letters as well. There are however two documents: No. 8 under heading ‘A’ and No. 10 under heading ‘B’ which contain the opinions of the Law Secretary regarding the plaintiff's claim. The Law Secretary, I am told, functions as the Legal Remembrancer also and I hold that the opinions given by him are of the nature of an advice given by a legal adviser to his client. These documents I hold as privileged.

    3. The learned Assistant Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the His Highness' Government produced a number of authorities to show that the communications were made in official confidence and as such cannot be disclosed if privilege is claimed. He has drawn my attention to — ‘Nagaraja Pillai v. Secy. of State’, AIR 1915 Mad 1113 (D), in which it has been held that:

    “The words ‘communication in official confidence’ used in Section 124 of the Evidence Act, import no special degree of secrecy and no pledge or direction for its maintenance but include generally all matters communicated by one officer to another in the performance of duties. These words have the same meaning as ‘professional confidence’ used in Section 126 of the Evidence Act.”

    “Where therefore the document that was sought to be put in evidence was a report made by one officer to another after inspection of a spot in person, and where that was objected to on the ground that its production would be detrimental to public interest, that is a sufficient cause for a Court to refuse to compel its production. The public in charge of the record is the sole judge of the detrimental character of the document and his assertion as to its character is final and binds the Court.”

    4. He has also referred me to — ‘Vythilinga Pandarasannidhi v. Secy. of State’, AIR 1935 Mad 342 (1) (E), in which it has been held that if once a court holds that the communication made is in public confidence, then it is the officer alone who can claim privilege in which the Court cannot interfere.

    5. In — ‘Jehangir M. Cursetji v. Secy, of State’, 27 Bom 189 (F), another authority referred to by the learned Assistant Advocate General, a resolution passed by the Government was held to be authority privileged. He has also referred me to — ‘Governor General v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux’, AIR 1950 EP 228 (FB) (G). The last is a judgment which will be largely drawn by me in support of the conclusions I am arriving at.

    6. The long and short of all these rulings is that if once a Court comes to the conclusion that a communication is made in official confidence, then it is for the officer concerned to claim privilege and the Court cannot interfere in it. This is quite good law so far as it goes, but the question is: can communications made by one officer to another in matters which arise out of commercial relations which subsist between the State on the one side and a private citizen on the other be treated as communications made in official confidence? In — ‘Bhaiya Saheb Dajibabhau v. Pandit Ramnath Rampratap’, AIR 1038 Nag 358 (H), it has been held that

    “There is a wide difference between cases in which the State itself is a party and those in which it is not. In the former event the State is bound by the ordinary rules of procedure which bind any other person who sues or is sued in a civil Court. If the State chooses to engage in commercial activities or renders itself civilly liable in other ways, it cannot evade its obligations and liabilities by claming privilege in respect of documents relating to matters in controversy in the suit except to the extent explained by the Privy Council in — ‘Robinson v. State of South Australia’, A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (I). The manner in which such privilege is claimed is also different. The State when a party is bound by all the usual rules about the discovery and production of documents.”

    7. From this authority it becomes obvious that a distinction has to be drawn between two cases: first in which two citizens engage I in civil litigation and want official communications to be disclosed at the time of the trial, and then the cases, in which the State has entered into a commercial transaction with a private citizen in the course of which the State has made certain communications pertaining to the case in which it is interested as a defendant or a plaintiff. In the former case the State not being interested either way, a Government officer is expected to keep before himself only the interests of the public before a privilege is claimed. But in a case in which the State itself is a party, the Court must be satisfied that the mind of a responsible officer of the Government has been applied to the question as to whether the safety of the public interests warrants giving or withholding of the information. The Court must also be convinced that the privilege is not claimed to avoid inconvenient disclosures which may tell against its own side in the litigation or as a matter of mere departmental routine.

    8. In — ‘AIR 1931 PC 254 (I)’, a case from South Australia, it has been held that

    “The privilege regarding production of State papers is a narrow one most sparingly to be exercised. The principle and foundation of the rule is concerned for the public interest and the rule will be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires, and not that the documents are confidential or official, nor is the fact that the production of documents might in particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side any over-riding reason for their non-production. In truth, the fact that the document if produced might have any such effect upon the fortunes of litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production — one only to be over-borne by the gravest considerations of State policy or security.”

    9. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have arrived at this conclusion after discussing at great length the law on the subject and they have further laid down the law in the following words:

    “Where the documents have come into existence with reference to the commercial activities of the State and they are the documents of a Department of State which has been disbanded the exercise of the power of the Judge of inspect the documents is especially appropriate: more so, when reference is made to them in documents disclosed.”

    10. In — ‘AIR 1950 EP 228 (G)’, in a Full Bench judgment Kapur, J. has laid down the Jaw, as to in what cases privilege is to be claimed, in the following words:

    “Ordinarily the privilege is attached to State papers which are of a political or administrative character, but there can be documents relating to trade or commercial or contractual activities of a State with regard to which privilege may be claimed. This privilege is a necessary one and must most sparingly be exercised, and in time of peace the sole object of the privilege being security of the State the occasion to use this privilege may indeed be rare. Privilege is not to be churned of the mere ground that the documents are State documents or are official or are marked confidential or, if produced, it would result in parliamentary discussion or public criticism or it will expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay a particular department of Government open to claim for compensation. Indeed, it is not sufficient that the minister of the, department concerned does not want to have the document produced. But the sole object of this privilege is that the disclosure would be injurious to national defence or to good diplomatic relations or for the proper functioning of the public service, and it is necessary to keep that document or that class of documents secret.”

    11. In order that a Court should arrive at the finding that the communications were made in official confidence whose disclosure would cause public interest to suffer, it has got to be seen whether this disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relation, or for the proper functioning of the public services, so as to allow those documents to be kept as secret. The learned Judge (Kapur, J.) has in his judgment referred to a judgment of Rigby, L.J in which the Lord Justice has laid down:

    “I know that there has always been the utmost care to give a defendant that discovery which the Crown would have been compelled to give it in the position of a subject, unless there be some plain overruling principle of public interest concerned which cannot be disregarded.”

    12. Commenting upon this dictum of Rigby, L.J their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case already referred to have stated that “the distinction drawn by the Lord Justice remains instructive and illuminating”.

    “The distinction drawn by the Lord Justice remains instructive and illuminating. In view of the increasing extension of State activities into the spheres of trading business and commerce and of the claim of privilege in relation to liabilities arising therefrom now apparently freely put forward, his observations stand on record to remind the Courts, that while they must duly safeguard genuine public interests they must see to it that the scope of the admitted……”

    “Particularly must it be remembered in this connection that the fact that production of the documents might in the particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side is no such ‘Plain overriding principle of public interests as to justify any claim of privilege.”

    “The zealous champion of Crown rights may frequently be tempted to take the opposite view, particularly in cases where the claim against the Crown seems to him to be harsh or unfair. But such an opposite view is without justification. In truth, the fact that the documents, if produced, might have any such effect upon the fortunes of the litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production — one only to be overborne by the gravest considerations of State, policy or security.”

    13. I have briefly discussed the law on the subject and I cannot but bear the distinction in my mind between the two cases in which the State is a party and the class of cases in which the Government documents are sought to be discovered by a party in a litigation, in which the State is not a party. The plaintiff wants production and discovery of certain documents which are communications made by one officer to the other pertaining ‘to the case in issue’. I do not find that there is any question of official confidence involved in them. On the contrary, it should have been the duty of the Government to produce all the documents which are in their possession and which might throw some light on the facts of the case. These documents are not in any way going to adversely affect the interests of the State; they may or may not affect the fortunes of the present litigation is a different matter. It should indeed be very strange that while the State enters into commercial transactions and contracts with its subjects and when there is litigation, they refuse to produce relevant papers which may have got some bearing on the facts of the case. I should rather make it clear that when once the State has entered into a commercial transaction with a subject, that very moment the State has to be presumed to have given up to a very large extent its privileged position. As noticed above, the matter will be different if there is litigation between two subjects and one of them seeks to drag the State into the controversy along with its papers. But such is not the case here. “Communication made in official confidence” presupposes that the communication is of such a nature which will affect the interests of the State as such and not of a Department which has established contractual relations with a subject. I am in respectful agreement with their Lordships of the East Punjab High Court that it is not every document for which privilege can be claimed or which can be said to have been made in official confidence. The bare fact that the production of the documents might adversely tell upon the fortunes of the litigation would not be sufficient for me to hold that the documents were made in official confidence and that their disclosure would affect adversely the interests of the State. I therefore, order that the communications contained in these documents were not made in official confidence that their production would not in any way adversely tell upon the interests of the States. I order that they be discovered and produced. But before bringing this order to a close, I would like to make one thing very clear. I have decided only the question of official confidence in this case. Whatever objections the Government may have as regards their admissibility on the ground of their relevancy or irrelevancy or for some other reason, they will be free to raise those objections. If according to the defendant these documents cannot be admitted into evidence according to some other provisions of the Evidence Act, there is nothing to prevent him from raising that objection.

    B/K.S.B

    14. Order accordingly.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    L. Tirath Ram v. His Highness' Govt., Jammu And Kashmir
    (Sep 14, 1950)