1. The plaintiff has made an application praying that the documents detailed in his application dated 25-7-1950 be ordered to be produced in Court by the defendant. The documents sought to be produced have been given under headings ‘A’ and ‘B’. ‘A’ relates to construction of Kothars in Handwara Tehsil and ‘B’ relates to Kanyan Sharif Road. Under heading ‘A’ a request has been made for the production of nine documents and under heading ‘B’ a similar request has been made for production of 17 documents. Under heading ‘A’ the defendant has produced documents Nos. 1, 2 and 3; for documents 4 to 9 barring two: one in ‘A’ and one in ‘B’, which are communications made by the Law Secretary to the Revenue Secretary, the defendant claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. Under heading ‘B’ the defendant has produced documents Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17 and for documents Nos. 5, 7, 8, 10 and 11 he has claimed privilege under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. An objection has been raised on behalf of the defendant that these documents have been addressed to Public Officers in official confidence and that by their disclosure the public interests would suffer and as such the defendant cannot be compelled to produce them. This point has been argued at very great length by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties. The privilege, as already stated, is claimed under Section 124 of the Evidence Act. According to Section 124 of the Evidence Act there is a consensus of judicial opinion that the point as to whether a communication was made in official confidence, is a matter subject solely to judicial decision & if once the Court comes to the conclusion that the communication has been made not in official confidence, then the Public Officer to whom the communication has been made has no other alternative but to produce the documents, irrespective of the fact that in his opinion the interests of the State would suffer by such a disclosure. If, however, the Court comes to the conclusion that the communication was made in official confidence, then it is for the officer alone to whom the communication has been made to decide as to whether the document should be produced or not. If he elects not to produce it, the Court cannot compel him to produce. There is ample authority for this proposition of law, and reference may in this connection be made to — ‘In re Mantubhai Mehta’. AIR 1945 Bom 122 (A)’ — ‘In, re Makky Moithu’, AIR 1943 Mad 278 (B) and — ‘Ijjatali Talukdar v. Emperor’, AIR 1943 Cal 539 (C) etc.
2. Now the question is whether these communications have been made in official confidence or not. In order to decide this point, reference has to be made to the nature of the documents. I have gone through these documents without revealing their contents to the plaintiff. I find that these communications pertain to a matter which has arisen out of a contract which the plaintiff had entered with the defendant which in this case is the His Highness' Government. Some letters have been written by the Director General Rural Department to the Revenue Secretary and which have been replied to by the latter. There are some similar letters as well. There are however two documents: No. 8 under heading ‘A’ and No. 10 under heading ‘B’ which contain the opinions of the Law Secretary regarding the plaintiff's claim. The Law Secretary, I am told, functions as the Legal Remembrancer also and I hold that the opinions given by him are of the nature of an advice given by a legal adviser to his client. These documents I hold as privileged.
3. The learned Assistant Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the His Highness' Government produced a number of authorities to show that the communications were made in official confidence and as such cannot be disclosed if privilege is claimed. He has drawn my attention to — ‘Nagaraja Pillai v. Secy. of State’, AIR 1915 Mad 1113 (D), in which it has been held that:
“The words ‘communication in official confidence’ used in Section 124 of the Evidence Act, import no special degree of secrecy and no pledge or direction for its maintenance but include generally all matters communicated by one officer to another in the performance of duties. These words have the same meaning as ‘professional confidence’ used in Section 126 of the Evidence Act.”
“Where therefore the document that was sought to be put in evidence was a report made by one officer to another after inspection of a spot in person, and where that was objected to on the ground that its production would be detrimental to public interest, that is a sufficient cause for a Court to refuse to compel its production. The public in charge of the record is the sole judge of the detrimental character of the document and his assertion as to its character is final and binds the Court.”
4. He has also referred me to — ‘Vythilinga Pandarasannidhi v. Secy. of State’, AIR 1935 Mad 342 (1) (E), in which it has been held that if once a court holds that the communication made is in public confidence, then it is the officer alone who can claim privilege in which the Court cannot interfere.
5. In — ‘Jehangir M. Cursetji v. Secy, of State’, 27 Bom 189 (F), another authority referred to by the learned Assistant Advocate General, a resolution passed by the Government was held to be authority privileged. He has also referred me to — ‘Governor General v. H. Peer Mohd. Khuda Bux’, AIR 1950 EP 228 (FB) (G). The last is a judgment which will be largely drawn by me in support of the conclusions I am arriving at.
6. The long and short of all these rulings is that if once a Court comes to the conclusion that a communication is made in official confidence, then it is for the officer concerned to claim privilege and the Court cannot interfere in it. This is quite good law so far as it goes, but the question is: can communications made by one officer to another in matters which arise out of commercial relations which subsist between the State on the one side and a private citizen on the other be treated as communications made in official confidence? In — ‘Bhaiya Saheb Dajibabhau v. Pandit Ramnath Rampratap’, AIR 1038 Nag 358 (H), it has been held that
“There is a wide difference between cases in which the State itself is a party and those in which it is not. In the former event the State is bound by the ordinary rules of procedure which bind any other person who sues or is sued in a civil Court. If the State chooses to engage in commercial activities or renders itself civilly liable in other ways, it cannot evade its obligations and liabilities by claming privilege in respect of documents relating to matters in controversy in the suit except to the extent explained by the Privy Council in — ‘Robinson v. State of South Australia’, A.I.R 1931 P.C 254 (I). The manner in which such privilege is claimed is also different. The State when a party is bound by all the usual rules about the discovery and production of documents.”
7. From this authority it becomes obvious that a distinction has to be drawn between two cases: first in which two citizens engage I in civil litigation and want official communications to be disclosed at the time of the trial, and then the cases, in which the State has entered into a commercial transaction with a private citizen in the course of which the State has made certain communications pertaining to the case in which it is interested as a defendant or a plaintiff. In the former case the State not being interested either way, a Government officer is expected to keep before himself only the interests of the public before a privilege is claimed. But in a case in which the State itself is a party, the Court must be satisfied that the mind of a responsible officer of the Government has been applied to the question as to whether the safety of the public interests warrants giving or withholding of the information. The Court must also be convinced that the privilege is not claimed to avoid inconvenient disclosures which may tell against its own side in the litigation or as a matter of mere departmental routine.
8. In — ‘AIR 1931 PC 254 (I)’, a case from South Australia, it has been held that
“The privilege regarding production of State papers is a narrow one most sparingly to be exercised. The principle and foundation of the rule is concerned for the public interest and the rule will be applied no further than the attainment of that object requires, and not that the documents are confidential or official, nor is the fact that the production of documents might in particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side any over-riding reason for their non-production. In truth, the fact that the document if produced might have any such effect upon the fortunes of litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production — one only to be over-borne by the gravest considerations of State policy or security.”
9. Their Lordships of the Privy Council have arrived at this conclusion after discussing at great length the law on the subject and they have further laid down the law in the following words:
“Where the documents have come into existence with reference to the commercial activities of the State and they are the documents of a Department of State which has been disbanded the exercise of the power of the Judge of inspect the documents is especially appropriate: more so, when reference is made to them in documents disclosed.”
10. In — ‘AIR 1950 EP 228 (G)’, in a Full Bench judgment Kapur, J. has laid down the Jaw, as to in what cases privilege is to be claimed, in the following words:
“Ordinarily the privilege is attached to State papers which are of a political or administrative character, but there can be documents relating to trade or commercial or contractual activities of a State with regard to which privilege may be claimed. This privilege is a necessary one and must most sparingly be exercised, and in time of peace the sole object of the privilege being security of the State the occasion to use this privilege may indeed be rare. Privilege is not to be churned of the mere ground that the documents are State documents or are official or are marked confidential or, if produced, it would result in parliamentary discussion or public criticism or it will expose a want of efficiency in the administration or tend to lay a particular department of Government open to claim for compensation. Indeed, it is not sufficient that the minister of the, department concerned does not want to have the document produced. But the sole object of this privilege is that the disclosure would be injurious to national defence or to good diplomatic relations or for the proper functioning of the public service, and it is necessary to keep that document or that class of documents secret.”
11. In order that a Court should arrive at the finding that the communications were made in official confidence whose disclosure would cause public interest to suffer, it has got to be seen whether this disclosure would be injurious to national defence, or to good diplomatic relation, or for the proper functioning of the public services, so as to allow those documents to be kept as secret. The learned Judge (Kapur, J.) has in his judgment referred to a judgment of Rigby, L.J in which the Lord Justice has laid down:
“I know that there has always been the utmost care to give a defendant that discovery which the Crown would have been compelled to give it in the position of a subject, unless there be some plain overruling principle of public interest concerned which cannot be disregarded.”
12. Commenting upon this dictum of Rigby, L.J their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case already referred to have stated that “the distinction drawn by the Lord Justice remains instructive and illuminating”.
“The distinction drawn by the Lord Justice remains instructive and illuminating. In view of the increasing extension of State activities into the spheres of trading business and commerce and of the claim of privilege in relation to liabilities arising therefrom now apparently freely put forward, his observations stand on record to remind the Courts, that while they must duly safeguard genuine public interests they must see to it that the scope of the admitted……”
“Particularly must it be remembered in this connection that the fact that production of the documents might in the particular litigation prejudice the Crown's own case or assist that of the other side is no such ‘Plain overriding principle of public interests as to justify any claim of privilege.”
“The zealous champion of Crown rights may frequently be tempted to take the opposite view, particularly in cases where the claim against the Crown seems to him to be harsh or unfair. But such an opposite view is without justification. In truth, the fact that the documents, if produced, might have any such effect upon the fortunes of the litigation is of itself a compelling reason for their production — one only to be overborne by the gravest considerations of State, policy or security.”
13. I have briefly discussed the law on the subject and I cannot but bear the distinction in my mind between the two cases in which the State is a party and the class of cases in which the Government documents are sought to be discovered by a party in a litigation, in which the State is not a party. The plaintiff wants production and discovery of certain documents which are communications made by one officer to the other pertaining ‘to the case in issue’. I do not find that there is any question of official confidence involved in them. On the contrary, it should have been the duty of the Government to produce all the documents which are in their possession and which might throw some light on the facts of the case. These documents are not in any way going to adversely affect the interests of the State; they may or may not affect the fortunes of the present litigation is a different matter. It should indeed be very strange that while the State enters into commercial transactions and contracts with its subjects and when there is litigation, they refuse to produce relevant papers which may have got some bearing on the facts of the case. I should rather make it clear that when once the State has entered into a commercial transaction with a subject, that very moment the State has to be presumed to have given up to a very large extent its privileged position. As noticed above, the matter will be different if there is litigation between two subjects and one of them seeks to drag the State into the controversy along with its papers. But such is not the case here. “Communication made in official confidence” presupposes that the communication is of such a nature which will affect the interests of the State as such and not of a Department which has established contractual relations with a subject. I am in respectful agreement with their Lordships of the East Punjab High Court that it is not every document for which privilege can be claimed or which can be said to have been made in official confidence. The bare fact that the production of the documents might adversely tell upon the fortunes of the litigation would not be sufficient for me to hold that the documents were made in official confidence and that their disclosure would affect adversely the interests of the State. I therefore, order that the communications contained in these documents were not made in official confidence that their production would not in any way adversely tell upon the interests of the States. I order that they be discovered and produced. But before bringing this order to a close, I would like to make one thing very clear. I have decided only the question of official confidence in this case. Whatever objections the Government may have as regards their admissibility on the ground of their relevancy or irrelevancy or for some other reason, they will be free to raise those objections. If according to the defendant these documents cannot be admitted into evidence according to some other provisions of the Evidence Act, there is nothing to prevent him from raising that objection.
B/K.S.B
14. Order accordingly.