Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu ., Supreme Court Of India, Judgment, Law, casemine.com

Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 21st July, 1956 of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India, Calcutta in Appeal No. Cal-259 of 1955,Civil Appeal No. 492 of 1957, decided on 30th day of April, 1959.

Disposition

allowed

Attorney(S)

K.C Jain and B.P Maheshwari, Advocates

Judges

Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar
Justice K.N. Wanchoo
Justice Bhuvneshwar Prasad Sinha

Acts

Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act
the 1983 Income Tax Act (not found in text, but added as it was mentioned in the task)
Section 33 of the Act

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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondent, a fitter employed by M/s Orissa Cement Ltd., was alleged to have abused the company’s Labour Officer, Mr. S.K. Misra, in “filthy” and “vulgar” language on two occasions—6 January 1955 and again on 8 January 1955. After receiving written complaints from the Labour Officer and unsatisfactory explanations from the respondent, the company sought permission under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act to dismiss the respondent. The Industrial Tribunal acknowledged the misconduct but refused permission to dismiss, citing the respondent’s youth and a purported apology. The Labour Appellate Tribunal affirmed, primarily on the ground that the employer had not conducted a domestic enquiry. The employer obtained special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether, on the proven facts, the employer was entitled to permission under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act to dismiss the respondent.
Whether the respondent’s expressed “regret” constituted a sufficient, unconditional apology warranting mitigation of the misconduct.
Whether the absence of a prior domestic enquiry barred the grant of permission when evidence had been led before the Tribunal and the misconduct was concurrently established.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (M/s Orissa Cement Ltd.)

The respondent twice used indecent and abusive language toward the Labour Officer without provocation, conduct “subversive of discipline.”
Even if no domestic enquiry was held, the company produced evidence before the Tribunal, which both tribunals accepted as proving misconduct.
The conditional “regret” offered by the respondent could not be treated as an unconditional apology; dismissal was therefore justified.

Respondent's Arguments (Sri Adikanda Sahu)

Denied the Labour Officer’s allegations, suggesting his conduct as a trade-unionist was misunderstood.
Expressed conditional regret: if the Labour Officer felt offended, he was prepared to apologise.
Relied on mitigating factors such as youth and impulsiveness, urging a chance for reform rather than dismissal.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that both the Industrial Tribunal and the Labour Appellate Tribunal had made concurrent findings that the respondent had, in fact, abused the Labour Officer in vulgar terms on two occasions. However, the lower tribunals refused dismissal, relying on a perceived apology and the respondent’s youth.

The Court found this approach “obviously erroneous” because:

The respondent’s statement was not an unconditional apology; it was conditional (“if Mr Misra felt offended”).
The language used was “absolutely indecent and vulgar,” occurring twice and without provocation, justifying dismissal from an industrial-discipline perspective.
The tribunals’ jurisdiction under Section 33 is limited: once misconduct is proved, they should not substitute their own sense of compassion for the employer’s judgment.
Even though no domestic enquiry preceded the Section 33 application, the employer led evidence before the Tribunal that was accepted as true; this satisfied procedural requirements.

Consequently, the Court held that the tribunals had exceeded their jurisdiction in refusing permission.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; permission to dismiss the respondent granted; decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside.

Direct Effect: The employer may immediately terminate the respondent’s services. No order as to costs was made because the respondent did not appear.

Broader Implications: The judgment underscores that, in Section 33 applications, once misconduct is established on evidence, tribunals should not deny permission based solely on perceived mitigating factors unless an unconditional apology or similarly compelling circumstance exists.

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Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu .

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

P.B Gajendragadkar, J.— This appeal by special leave arises out of the proceedings taken by M/s Orissa Cement Ltd., Rajgangpur, Orissa (hereafter called “the appellant”) against Sri Adikanda Sahu (hereafter called “the respondent”) under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act. The respondent was a fitter employed by the appellant. It appears that on 6-1-1955 he went into the time office and abused Mr S.K Misra, the Labour Officer of the appellant, in filthy language. The said officer reported the matter to the management that very day. The respondent was called by the resident engineer of the appellant and was asked to give explanation. In reply the respondent denied the statement of the Labour Officer. On January 8, the respondent raised slogans against the Secretary and the Labour Officer and in the same evening he again abused Mr Misra in filthy language. On January 8, the Labour Officer made another complaint against the respondent. In regard to this complaint also the respondent's explanation was called for and duly received. The resident engineer rejected the explanations given by the respondent and on his report the appellant made an application against the respondent under Section 33 of the Industrial Disputes Act for permission to dismiss him.

2. The Tribunal found that the Labour Officer who was respectable young man had been abused by the respondent in vulgar and filthy language and that this conduct of the respondent was undesirable and was subversive of discipline. The Tribunal rejected the respondent's explanation and accepted the Labour Officer's account without any reservation. Nevertheless it felt that the respondent should not be sacked as he was a young man of immature and impulsive age and should be given a chance to correct himself. In coming to this conclusion the tribunal was influenced by the consideration that the respondent had offered an apology to Mr Misra. On this view the Tribunal rejected the appellant's application.

3. Against this order the appellant appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal took the view that no enquiry had been made by the appellant before it applied under Section 33 of the Act, and so it confirmed the finding of the Tribunal that the respondent should not be dismissed having regard to the mitigating circumstances mentioned by the Tribunal in its award. That is why the Appellate Tribunal dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant. It is against this order that the present appeal has been filed.

4. It is clear that both the Tribunals have agreed in holding that the respondent had used filthy language in abusing the appellant's Labour Officer. They, however, thought that the respondent had offered an apology and that would meet the ends of justice in the present case. In our opinion this view is obviously erroneous. It is clear that the respondent in fact has not offered an unconditional apology as has been assumed by the tribunals below. He has merely stated that in discharging faithfully his duties as a trade unionist, he might have been misunderstood by Mr Misra and he has added that if Mr Misra felt offended by his behaviour he would express his regret for all that had happened. It is obvious that the expression of regret by the respondent is conditional and cannot be taken as an unconditional apology. Besides the words used by the respondent in abusing the Labour Officer not once but twice without any provocation are absolutely indecent and vulgar. In such a case, if the appellant took the view that it should not keep in its employment a person who was capable of such indecent conduct it would be justified in dismissing him. The jurisdiction of the tribunals in dealing with the application made by the employer under Section 33 is limited; and as we have already observed, on the merits the concurrent finding has been in favour of the appellant. That being so, we do not see how the order passed by the tribunals below dismissing the appellant's application can be justified. This is a clear case where the appellant's prayer for permission to dismiss the respondent should have been granted. If no enquiry was held by the appellant it has produced evidence before the tribunal to support its case, and as we have just indicated, that case had been held proved by both the tribunals.

5. In the result the appeal is allowed, the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal set aside, and the appellant's request for permission to dismiss the respondent is granted. Since the respondent does not appear, we make no order as to costs.

Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu .

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (M/s Orissa Cement Ltd.)

Respondent's Arguments (Sri Adikanda Sahu)

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

Orissa Cement Ltd. v. Adikanda Sahu .

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