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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: N. Krishnaswami Iyengar
Judges
  • Joseph Vithayathil
  • T.K Joseph, JJ.
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Attorney(S)
  • For the Appellant: N. Krishnaswami Iyengar
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  • Joseph Vithayathil
  • T.K Joseph, JJ.
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Smart Summary

Summary of Judgment — Vithayathil, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

This set of seven original petitions challenges suspensions imposed by the Road Traffic Board, Quilon, and (in appeals) by the Central Road Traffic Board. The petitions arise from multiple overloading reports made by police officers on three different buses and involve both owners and drivers:

  • O.P. No. 3 (owner of bus T.C.Q. 1119) and O.P. No. 7 (driver of that bus): On 26-5-1955 the Circle Inspector of Police, Pathanamthitta, checked the bus at Nanukkadu and reported overloading. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit of the bus for six months and suspended the driver's competency certificate for six months; the Central Road Traffic Board reduced the bus suspension to one week and the driver's suspension to one month.
  • O.P. No. 8 (driver of T.C.Q. 997) and O.P. No. 10 (owner of that bus): On 15-5-1955 the District Superintendent of Police, Quilon, reported overloading at Kollakadavu. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit and the driver's competency certificate for six months; on appeal the Central Board reduced the driver's suspension to three months and the permit suspension to two weeks.
  • O.P. No. 9 (owner of T.C.Q. 1758) and O.P. No. 11 (driver of that bus): On 15-5-1955 the District Superintendent of Police, Quilon, reported overloading near Kollakadavu. The Road Traffic Board suspended both permit and competency certificate for six months; the Central Board reduced the permit suspension to two weeks and the competency certificate suspension to three months.
  • O.P. No. 61 (owner of T.C.T. 1793): On 22-2-1956 the Inspector-General of Police checked the bus at Adichanallor and reported overloading. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit for three months; an appeal to the Central Board was refused for a stay, and the owner brought the writ petition (O.P. 61).

The petitions seek writs of certiorari quashing the orders of the Road Traffic Board and the Central Road Traffic Board in the respective cases.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Road Traffic Board has power to suspend a bus permit on the ground of overloading.
  2. Whether the Road Traffic Board has power to suspend the competency certificate of a driver for overloading in the bus.
  3. Whether the Road Traffic Board acted illegally and in breach of the rules of natural justice by suspending permits and competency certificates without giving a fair opportunity to substantiate explanations (including whether written opportunity sufficed or an oral hearing/evidence was required).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (Owners and Drivers)

  • The Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend a vehicle permit for overloading because "not to overload" is not one of the conditions listed in section 59(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act (ground No. 1).
  • The Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend a driver's competency certificate for overloading in the bus (ground No. 2).
  • The Road Traffic Board acted illegally and against the rules of natural justice by suspending permits and competency certificates without giving the petitioners an opportunity to substantiate their explanations—specifically, the petitioners contend they were not afforded an opportunity to produce evidence or have an oral hearing (ground No. 3).
  • Factual explanations supplied to the Board included denials of overloading and denials of responsibility; in some cases owners said passengers forcibly boarded and refused to alight, and one owner stated he had suspended the driver and conductor.

Respondent / Board Position (as reflected in the record)

The opinion records the administrative actions: the Road Traffic Board called for explanations, treated the incident reports as grounds to suspend permits and competency certificates, and the Central Road Traffic Board partly modified the suspensions on appeal. The opinion does not set out a detailed, separate statement of the Board's legal arguments beyond relying on the presence of conditions in the permits and the disciplinary power exercised under the Motor Vehicles Act and subordinate rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Re Nagulatiah, 1943-1 Mad LJ 130 (AIR 1943 Mad 283) Observation that mention of passenger seats and maximum laden weight in a permit does not necessarily amount to a condition against overloading. Distinguished: in that case the permit did not contain an explicit anti-overloading condition, whereas the permits in the present cases stated maximum passengers and expressly prohibited overloading.
In Re. Duraisami Raju, 1939-1 Mad. L.J 518 (AIR 1939 Mad 491) Principle that a driver cannot be held liable for non-observance of a rule or condition from which he has been exempted by statutory rule. Relied upon to support the conclusion that drivers could not have their competency certificates suspended for overloading where the statutory rules made the conductor responsible and a conductor was present.
In Re. Srinivasa Iyengar, AIR 1943 Mad 347 Similar principle that statutory exemption of responsibility prevents holding the driver liable for the relevant breach. Applied together with other Madras decisions to hold the Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend drivers' competency certificates in these facts.
Local Government Board v. Aldrige, 1915 A.C. 120 Quasi-judicial tribunal not bound to give an oral hearing; written opportunity to state a case may suffice. Applied (via later domestic authority) to hold that the Board need not give oral hearing where parties had opportunity to explain in writing.
Krishnankutty v. State of Travancore-Cochin, 1951 Ker. L.T 329 : AIR 1952 Trav.-Co. 287 In the case of a quasi-judicial tribunal, an oral hearing is not mandatory; written submissions can be sufficient. Relied upon to support that the Road Traffic Board was not necessarily required to hold an oral hearing if parties had opportunity to present their case in writing.
State of Travancore-Cochin v. Joseph Chacko, 1951 Ker. L.T 268 : AIR 1951 Trav.-Co. 241 Similar authority on requirements of natural justice for quasi-judicial bodies. Used as supporting precedent that written opportunity may satisfy rules of natural justice for tribunals of this kind.
In Re. Shanmuga Mudaliar, 1950-2 Mad LJ 399 : AIR 1951 Mad 276 Authority on procedural fairness in administrative/quasi-judicial proceedings (written opportunity may be adequate). Relied upon to support the conclusion that a written opportunity to explain can be sufficient absent a request for oral hearing or evidence.
Ramnath v. Collector of Dharbhanga, AIR 1955 Pat 345 Observation that tribunals need not follow all procedural requirements of formal trials; what constitutes a fair opportunity depends on facts. Quoted to illustrate the flexible, fact-specific nature of natural justice obligations applicable to tribunals.
Sheopujan v. State of Bihar, AIR 1956 Pat 212 Authority cited for flexible natural justice standards depending on circumstances. Used to support the view that whether a fair opportunity has been given depends on case-specific facts.
Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All E.R. 109 Tucker, L.J.'s observation that natural justice requirements depend on circumstances; essential is a reasonable opportunity to present a case. Quoted to emphasize that the standard of natural justice is variable and fact-sensitive; supported the court's analysis of whether a fair opportunity had been given.
General Medical Council v. Spacman, (1943) 2 All E.R. 337 Where a party requests that evidence be heard, the tribunal is bound to hear the evidence. Applied to the facts: because petitioners did not request an opportunity to examine witnesses or an oral hearing, the Board was not obliged to hear oral evidence.
Y. Thiruppathi v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andhra WR 192 Case where owner produced witnesses and the Regional Transport Authority did not record their statements; High Court quashed the order. Distinguished: in the present matters petitioners did not offer evidence or ask for oral hearing, so the Andhra decision did not apply.
Kandinella Ramayya v. Madras State, AIR 1951 Mad 1003 Observation that an opportunity which is a sham or make-belief is insufficient to satisfy statutory procedural requirements. Distinguished: the court found no evidence here that the opportunities given were sham; thus the observation did not apply to the present facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in a series of focused legal steps, applying statutory provisions, subordinate rules and relevant authorities to the facts:

  1. Statutory power to suspend permits: The court examined Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act (power of Transport Authority to cancel or suspend a permit for breach of a condition specified in the permit) together with Section 59(3) (list of conditions that must be included in a permit). Although "not to overload" is not expressly listed in s.59(3), the court noted Section 60(1)(a) permits suspension for breach of any condition contained in the permit. Section 48(d)(iv) (a provision empowering Regional Transport Authorities) permits attaching a condition specifying a maximum number of passengers.
  2. Fact on the permits: The court inspected the permits and found each permit expressly stated the maximum number of passengers and included a condition that there should be no overloading. Consequently, carrying more persons than the permitted maximum amounted to a breach of a condition in the permit and fell within the power under Section 60 to suspend the permit.
  3. Distinguishing authorities: The petitioners relied on Byers, J.'s observation in Re Nagulatiah that mentioning seating numbers does not necessarily amount to an anti-overloading condition. The court distinguished that case because, unlike Nagulatiah, the permits before the court expressly prohibited overloading.
  4. Competency certificates of drivers: The court examined the statutory rules (Rules 230–234) that prescribe duties of drivers and conductors. Rule 231(1) makes the driver generally responsible "as far as may be reasonably possible" for observance of the Act and rules, but Rule 233 specifically makes it the conductor's duty not to allow persons in excess of the seating capacity. Rule 234 makes the driver responsible for such matters only when there is no conductor. It was undisputed that conductors were present on the buses in question.
  5. Precedential support on driver liability: The court relied on Madras High Court decisions (In Re Duraisami Raju, In Re Srinivasa Iyengar, and related authorities) that held a driver could not be held liable for non-observance of a rule from which he was exempted by statute. Applying this principle and the rules' allocation of responsibility to conductors where present, the court concluded that the Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend the competency certificates of the drivers in these cases.
  6. Natural justice and opportunity to be heard: The court considered the petitioners' complaint that they were denied a fair opportunity to substantiate their explanations. It observed the proviso to Section 60(1) (which requires an opportunity to explain before cancellation) does not literally apply to suspensions, but the requirements of natural justice still call for a fair opportunity to state one's case.
  7. Form of the opportunity required: Drawing on decisions (Local Government Board v. Aldrige; Krishnankutty; State of Travancore-Cochin v. Joseph Chacko; In Re Shanmuga Mudaliar; and others), the court reiterated that a quasi-judicial tribunal is not always bound to give an oral hearing and that a written opportunity may suffice. The court emphasized the fact-specific nature of what constitutes a fair opportunity.
  8. Whether petitioners asked for oral hearing or to adduce evidence: The court observed that, except in O.P. No. 3, owners in O.Ps. 9, 10 and 61 had in effect admitted overloading in their written explanations (stating passengers forcibly boarded or that overloading occurred and that they had suspended driver/conductor). Petitioners did not claim they had sought to give oral evidence or to call witnesses and that the Board refused such requests. The court also invoked General Medical Council v. Spacman to hold that if a party requests an opportunity to have evidence heard the tribunal must do so — but here no such request was made.
  9. Distinguishing adverse authorities: The court considered Y. Thiruppathi (where witnesses were tendered and their statements were not recorded) and Kandinella Ramayya (where an opportunity was found to be a sham) but explained these were distinguishable because in the present cases petitioners did not offer to give evidence or request an oral hearing, and there was no suggestion the opportunity was a sham.
  10. Conclusion of analysis: Applying these points, the court separated the issues: the Board validly suspended the permits (because a breach of a condition contained in the permit was established), but it lacked power to suspend the drivers' competency certificates where responsibility was statutorily placed on conductors and conductors were present.

Holding and Implications

Final Disposition:

The Court allowed O.Ps. Nos. 7, 8 and 11 and quashed the orders of the Road Traffic Board and the Central Road Traffic Board suspending the competency certificates of the respective petitioners in those cases. O.Ps. Nos. 3, 9, 10 and 61 were dismissed.

Immediate Consequences for the Parties

  • Permits: The suspensions of the vehicle permits imposed by the Road Traffic Board (as modified in some cases by the Central Board) were upheld by the court where the permits themselves contained an express no-overloading condition and the buses were found to be overloaded.
  • Drivers' competency certificates: Suspensions of the competency certificates of drivers (O.Ps. 7, 8 and 11) were quashed because the statutory rules made conductors responsible for preventing overloading when conductors were present; therefore the Board lacked power to suspend drivers' certificates on the facts of these cases.
  • Natural justice: The court held that the Road Traffic Board did not deny a fair opportunity to the petitioners to state their case, given that the petitioners had the chance to explain in writing and did not request oral hearings or to adduce evidence (with the factual admissions in several explanations making oral evidence unnecessary).

Broader Implications

The opinion applies existing statutory interpretation and administrative law principles to the facts: it affirms that (a) a Transport Authority may suspend a permit for breach of any condition contained in the permit (including an express anti-overloading condition), and (b) where subordinate rules allocate a duty to a conductor, a driver with a conductor present cannot be disciplined for overloading on that basis. The judgment does not purport to create a new legal principle beyond these applications and is anchored in earlier authorities; no broader new precedent is asserted by the court beyond its application to the facts before it.

Order: The court allowed the petitions specified above as to drivers' competency certificates, dismissed the remaining petitions attacking permit suspensions, and made no order as to costs.

Show full summary ...

    K. Balagangadharan And Others v. Central Road Traffic Board And Others

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Vithayathil, J.:— O.P No. 3 of 1956 is by the owner of bus T.C.Q 1119. He has a permit to run the bus on the Haripad — Kozhencherri route. O.P No. 7 of 1956 is by the driver of that bus. On 26-5-1955, the Circle Inspector of Police, Pathanamthitta, checked the bus at Nanukkadu. He reported to the Secretary, Road Traffic Board, Quilon, that the bus was found overloaded. The Board called for the explanations of the owner and the driver. The owner gave an explanation to the effect that there was no overloading and that he was not responsible for the overloading if any. The driver also denied the charge of overloading and also stated that even if there was overloading he was not responsible for the same. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit of the bus for 6 months and also suspended the competency certificate of the driver for 6-months. Both the owner and the driver appealed to the Central Road Traffic Board. The Central Road Traffic Board reduced the period of suspension of the bus to one week and the period of suspension of the competency certificate of the driver to one month. In other respects the order of the Road Traffic Board was confirmed.

    2. O.P No. 8 of 1956 is by the driver of bus. T.C.Q 997 running along the Haripad — Chenganror route & O.P No. 10 of 1956 is by the owner of that bus. On 15-5-1955, the District Superintendent of Police, Quilon, checked the bus at Kollakadavu and reported to the Road Traffic Board, Quilon that there was overloading in the bus. The Road Traffic Board asked for explanations of the owner and the driver. The driver denied the charge of overloading and also denied his responsibility even if there was overloading. The owner also denied responsibility for overloading in the bus. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit of the bus for 6 months and the competency certificate of the driver for 6 months. In appeals filed by the owner and by the driver, the Central Road Traffic Board reduced the period of suspension of the competency certificate of the driver to 3 months and the period of suspension of the permit to 2 weeks. O.P No. 9 of 1956 is by the owner of bus T.C.Q 1758 running along the Haripad — Pathanamthitta route and O.P No. 11 of 1956 is by the driver of that bus. On 15-5-1955, the District Superintendent of Police, Quilon, checked the bus near Kollakadavu and reported to the Road Traffic Board, Quilon, that there was overloading in the bus. The Road Traffic Board called for the explanations of the owner and the driver. The owner gave an explanation to the effect that he was not responsible for the overloading. The driver denied the charge of overloading. He also denied his responsibility in the matter. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit of the bus for a period of 6 months and the competency certificate of the driver for 6 months. In appeals filed before the Central Road Traffic Board, the suspension of the permit was reduced to 2 weeks and the suspension of the competency certificate of the driver was reduced to 3 months.

    3. O.P No. 61 of 1956 is by the owner of bus T.C.T 1793 running along the Quilon — Kulathupuzha route. On 22-2-1956, the Inspector-General of Police checked the bus at Adichanallor and made a report to the Road Traffic Board. Quilon, that there was overloading in the bus. The Road Traffic Board called for the explanation of the owner. The owner stated that he was not responsible for the overloading. The Road Traffic Board suspended the permit of the bus for a period of 3 months. The owner filed an appeal before the Central Road Traffic Board and applied for stay of the order of the Road Traffic Board. The Central Road Traffic Board refused to grant the stay. The owner then filed the original petition for a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the Road Traffic Board, Quilon. O.Ps Nos. 3, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 are for the issue of writs of certiorari quashing the orders of the Road Traffic Board and the Central Road Traffic Board in the respective cases.

    4. The grounds urged in the petitions are: (1) the Road Traffic Board has no power to suspend the permit of the bus for overloading. (2) The Road Traffic Board has no power to suspend the competency certificate of the driver of a bus for overloading in the bus. (3) The Road Traffic Board acted illegally and against rules of natural justice in suspending the permits of the buses and the competency certificate of the drivers in the respective cases without giving them an opportunity to substantiate their explanations.

    5. Ground No. 1. Section 60 of the Motor Vehicles Act empowers the Transport Authority which granted the permit for a motor vehicle to cancel or suspend the same in certain cases. The section reads:

    “60. Cancellation and suspension of permits—

    (1) The Transport Authority which granted a permit may cancel the permit or may suspend it for such period as it thinks fit—

    (a) on the breach of any condition specified in sub-section (3) of S. 59, or of any condition contained in the permit, or

    (b) if the holder of the permit uses or causes or allows a vehicle to be used in any manner not authorised by the permit, or

    (c) if the holder of the permit ceases to possess the vehicle or vehicles covered by the permit, or

    (d) if the holder of the permit has obtained the permit by fraud or misrepresentation:

    Provided that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation.

    (2) Where a Transport Authority cancels or suspends a permit, it shall give to the holder in writing its reasons for the revocation or suspension.”

    6. It is argued for the petitioners that not to overload the bus is not one of the conditions of the permit specified in S. 59(3). Section 59(3) provides:

    “59(3). The following shall be conditions of every permit:—

    (a) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are at all times so maintained as to comply with the requirements of Chapter V and the rules made thereunder;

    (b) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven at a speed exceeding the speed lawful under this Act;

    (c) that any prohibition or restriction imposed and any minimum fares or freights fixed by notification made under S. 43 are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates;

    (d) that the vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates are not driven in contravention of the provisions of S. 72;

    (e) that the provisions of this Act limiting the hours of work of drivers are observed in connection with any vehicle or vehicles to which the permit relates; and

    (f) that the provisions of Chapter VIII so far as they apply to the holder of the permit are observed.”

    7. It is true that prohibition relating to overloading is not one of the conditions specified in the sub-section. But S. 60 sub-s. 1(a) empowers the Transport Authority to cancel or suspend a permit or the breach of any condition contained in the permit. Section 48(d)(iv) empowers the Regional Transport Authority to attach to a stage carriage permit a condition to the effect—

    “That not more than a specified number of passengers and not more than a specified amount of luggage shall be carried on any specified vehicle at any one time.”

    8. The question is whether such a condition is attached to the permits issued in these cases. The permits of the buses in question were placed before us. In each permit the maximum number of passengers that can be carried in the bus is mentioned. It is also stated as one of the conditions of the permit that there should be no overloading of the vehicle at any time. According to learned counsel for the petitioners the entry in the permit relating to the maximum number of passengers is only a description of the vehicle and that carrying mere persons than those specified in the entry does not amount to overloading. We are unable to accept this argument.

    9. When the maximum number of passengers that can be carried in the vehicle is mentioned in the permit and it is also stated that there should be no overloading of the vehicle, it is clear that carrying more persons than the maximum number specified in the permit amounts to overloading. If there has been such overloading it clearly amounts to breach of a condition contained in the permit. Learned counsel for the petitioner relied on the observation of Byers, J., in Re, Nagulatiah, 1943-1 Mad LJ 130 : (AIR 1943 Mad 283 (A)) that the mention of the number of passengers' seats as well as the maximum laden weight in the permit does not amount to a condition relating to overloading. But in that case it was not one of the conditions of the permit that there should not be overloading. It is not so in the present cases. There is thus no substance in the first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners.

    10. Ground No. 2. The second contention is that the Road Traffic Board has no power to suspend the competency certificate of the driver for overloading in the bus. Rules 230 and 231 of the Rules passed under the Motor Vehicles Act prescribe the duties of the driver of a public service vehicle. It is not stated in those rules that it is one of the duties of the driver to see that the vehicle is not overloaded. It is true that it is stated in R. 231 Cl) that the driver and the conductor of a public service vehicle while on duty

    “shall, as far as may be reasonably possible, having regard to his duties, be responsible for the due observance of the provisions of the Act and of the rules.”

    11. But we do not think that this provision makes the driver responsible for the overloading of the bus so long as it is not one of his duties to see that the bus is not overloaded. Rule 233 which prescribes the duties of the conductor of a public service vehicle provides that the conductor shall not allow any person to be carried in any public service vehicle in excess of the seating capacity specified in the permit of the vehicle. It is thus the duty of the conductor to see that the bus is not overloaded. It is only when there is no conductor for a public service vehicle that the driver is made responsible for the observance of the rule relating to overloading. (vide rule 234).

    12. It is not disputed that there were conductors for the buses in question. This question came up for consideration before the Madras High Court in 1943-1 Mad. L.J 130 : (AIR 1943 Mad 283 (A)). It was held in that case that under the rules then in force corresponding to rules 230, 231, 233 and 234 of the present rules the driver could not be made liable for overloading in a bus which had a conductor. To the same effect are the decisions in In Re. Duraisami Raju, 1939-1 Mad. L.J 518 : (AIR 1939 Mad 491 (B)) and In Re, Srinivasa Iyengar, AIR 1943 Mad 347 (C). It was held in those cases that the driver could not be held liable for the non-observance of a rule or condition in respect of which he has been exempted from responsibility by a statutory rule. We therefore accept the contention that the Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend the competency certificate of the drivers in these cases.

    13. Ground No. 3. The third ground raised is that the Road Traffic Board acted against the rules of natural justice in that it did not give the petitioners an opportunity to substantiate the explanations given by them. The proviso to S. 60(1) says that no permit shall be cancelled unless an opportunity has been given to the holder of the permit to submit his explanation. The proviso cannot apply to the present cases since the permits have not been cancelled but only suspended in these cases. Yet rules of natural justice require that a person should be given a fair opportunity to state his case before he is punished.

    14. In these cases the owners of the buses were asked to show cause why the permits should not be suspended and the drivers were asked to show cause why their competency certificates should not be suspended for overloading the respective vehicles. In view of our finding that the Road Traffic Board had no power to suspend the competency certificates of the drivers, it is not necessary to consider the question whether they were given a fair opportunity to state their case. We are concerned only with the question whether the owner of the buses in O.P Nos. 3, 9 and 10 and the owner of the bus in O.P 61 were given a fair opportunity to state their case before the permits were suspended.

    15. In O.P Nos. 9 and 10 the owner of the buses practically admitted in the explanations given by them that there was overloading in the buses. What was stated in the explanations was that some people forcibly got into the buses and refused to get down in spite of repeated requests. It was also suggested that it must have been at the instance of somebody that those people forcibly got into the buses. In O.P No. 61 also the owner admitted in his explanation that there was overloading in the bus and that he suspended the driver and the conductor. It was only in O.P No. 3 that the owner denied the fact that there was overloading. The petitioners in O.Ps Nos. 3, 9, 10 and 61 have no case that they wanted to give evidence or to have an oral hearing and that the Road Traffic Board refused to take evidence or to give an oral heaving. The question is whether under the circumstances it can be said that the petitioners were not given a fair opportunity to state their case.

    16. Following the decision in Local Government Board v. Aldrige, 1915 A.C 120 (D), this court held in Krishnankutty v. State of Travancore-Cochin, 1951 Ker. L.T 329 : AIR 1952 Trav.-Co. 287 (E), that in the case of a quasi-judicial tribunal like the Board of Revenue the tribunal is not bound to give an oral hearing to the party and that it would be sufficient if the party is given an opportunity to state his case in writing. To the same effect are the decisions in State of Travancore-Cochin v. Joseph Chacko, 1951 Ker. L.T 268 : AIR 1951 Trav.-Co. 241 (F) and In Re, Shanmuga Mudaliar, 1950-2 Mad LJ 399 : (AIR 1951 Mad 276 (G)). As observed by Ramaswami, J. in Ramnath v. Collector of Dharbhanga, AIR 1955 Pat 345 (H), the “tribunal is not required to decide the question at issue as if he were sitting as a court of law. He is not bound to, fellow all the procedural requirements of a formal trial. It is sufficient if the tribunal gives a fair opportunity to the party to present his case. On the question whether a fair opportunity has been given or not no general test can be formulated. The question depends upon the particular facts of each case”.

    17. To the same effect is the decision in Sheopujan v. State of Bihar (S) AIR 1956 Pat 212 (I). Reference may also be made to the following observation of Tucker, L.J, in Russel v. Duke of Norfolk, (1949) 1 All E.R 109 (J). “The requirements of natural justice must depend upon the circumstances of the case, nature of enquiry, the rules under which the tribunal is acting, the subject-matter that is dealt with and so forth. Accordingly, I do not derive much assistance from the definitions of natural justice which have, been from time to time used, but, whatever standard is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned should have a reasonable opportunity of presenting his case”.

    18. In General Medical Council v. Spacman, (1943) 2 All E.R 337 (K) Lord Atkin observed that in a case in which a party requested the tribunal to hear his evidence, the tribunal was bound to hear the evidence. In the circumstances of these cases we think that so long as the petitioners in O.Ps Nos. 3, 9, 10 and 61 did not ask for an opportunity to examine witnesses or for an oral hearing the Road Traffic Board cannot be said to have denied them a fair opportunity to state their case.

    19. Learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the decision of the Andhra High Court in Y. Thiruppathi v. State of Andhra, 1956 Andhra WR 192 (L) (The Andhra Weekly Reporter Vol. II, page 192). That was a case in which the owner of the bus produced four respectable persons as witnesses before the Regional Transport Authority to show that there was no overloading. The Regional Transport Authority did not record their statements and did not refer to the same in their order. The High Court quashed the order suspending the permit. We do not think that this decision applies to the facts of the present cases. In the present cases the petitioners did not offer to give any evidence. Another case referred to by learned counsel for the petitioners is Kandinella Ramayya v. Madras State, AIR 1951 Mad 1003 (M). His Lordship Govinda Menon. J., observed as follows in that case:

    “If the Court is satisfied that the giving of opportunity was only a make belief and a sham affair, that as a matter of fact the opportunity given was such that it could not be legally considered an opportunity, then the provisions of Section 43 of the (Madras Co-operative Societies Act) have been violated.”

    20. We do not think that this observation will apply to the facts of the present cases. As stated already, except in the case of O.P No. 3, the overloading was practically admitted in the explanations given by the owners of the respective buses. In the circumstances we do not think that the petitioners in O.Ps Nos. 3, 9, 10 and 61 were not given a fair opportunity to state their case and that the orders of the Road Traffic Board and the Central Road Traffic Board are liable to be quashed on that ground. In the result we allow O.Ps Nos. 7, 8 and 11 and quash the orders of the Road Traffic Board and Central Road Traffic Board suspending the competency certificates of the respective petitioners in those cases. O.Ps Nos. 3, 9, 10 and 61 are dismissed. We make no order as to costs in the seven Original Petitions.

    21. Order accordingly.

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    K. Balagangadharan And Others v. Central Road Traffic Board And Others
    (Oct 5, 1956)