AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 23 Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Section 96(3) of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt)
  • Section 96(3) of the Code, Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code, Act 104 of 1976, Section 104, Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Order 23 Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Section 96(3) of the Code, Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act (not mentioned in the excerpt)
  • Section 96(3) of the Code, Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code, Act 104 of 1976, Section 104, Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code
  • Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The first respondent filed OS No. 2261 of 1988 before the IV Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad seeking a declaration that the agreements between the parties were in the nature of an “industrial licence” and not a “leave and licence”, together with a permanent injunction over industrial premises in Sanathnagar, Hyderabad. During the suit, the parties purportedly entered into a compromise recorded in documents marked Exts. A-8, A-9 and A-14. Because the defendants disputed the compromise, the plaintiff filed IA No. 490 of 2002 requesting an enquiry under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The trial court conducted the enquiry, evaluated extensive oral and documentary evidence—including correspondence (Exts. A-15, A-16, A-25) and sale deeds (Exts. B-3, B-12, B-22)—and decreed the suit on the footing that a lawful compromise had been entered and acted upon.

The first appellate court affirmed the decree but treated it as a consent decree, holding that Section 96(3) CPC barred any appeal. The High Court, in second appeal, relied on Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566 to uphold that view and dismissed the appeal. The present appeal to the Supreme Court arose from that decision.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, in circumstances where the validity of a compromise is disputed and the trial court has held an enquiry under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC, the resulting decree is immune from appeal under Section 96(3) CPC.
  2. How Section 96(3), Order 23 Rules 3 and 3-A, and Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC interrelate, and whether the precedent in Pushpa Devi Bhagat conflicts with Order 43 Rule 1-A.
  3. Whether the findings of the trial court and first appellate court on the existence and validity of the compromise were perverse or otherwise unsustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments

  • The courts below erred in treating the decree as a consent decree; once the compromise was disputed and an enquiry held, Section 96(3) should not bar an appeal.
  • Pushpa Devi Bhagat did not examine Order 43 Rule 1-A; relying on it without harmonising Section 96(3) with Order 43 Rule 1-A was erroneous.
  • The High Court failed to examine alleged perversities in the factual findings of the lower courts, thus causing miscarriage of justice.

Respondents’ Arguments

  • The parties knowingly executed a lawful compromise which has been substantially acted upon (e.g., transfer of machinery and sale of land portions), validating the decree.
  • Because the compromise was valid, the decree is effectively a consent decree, attracting the statutory bar on appeal in Section 96(3) CPC.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, (2006) 5 SCC 566 A consent decree is non-appealable under Section 96(3); challenge must be before the court that recorded the compromise. Considered but distinguished: held applicable only where no dispute about the compromise was raised or pursued in the trial court.
Kishun v. Behari, (2005) 6 SCC 300 When the compromise itself is in dispute and an enquiry is held, the resultant decree is not a decree “passed with consent”, hence appealable. Applied as controlling authority; Supreme Court held that the present decree, preceded by an enquiry, could not be barred by Section 96(3).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court examined the distinction between (a) a decree passed purely on consent and (b) a decree following an enquiry into a disputed compromise under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 CPC. Referring to Kishun v. Behari, the Court held that once a compromise is contested and the trial court decides its validity after evidence, the decree cannot be categorised as a “consent decree” for the purpose of Section 96(3).

The Court then evaluated the factual determinations of the trial court—particularly the reliance on letters (Exts. A-15, A-16, A-25), sale deeds (Exts. B-3, B-12, B-22) and witness testimony (including PW 3, the defendants’ former counsel)—and found them well-reasoned. It noted that both the appellate court and the High Court had revisited these materials and accepted the trial court’s conclusion that the compromise had been executed and acted upon. Consequently, even though the High Court erroneously treated the decree as non-appealable, its ultimate affirmation of the decree was not vitiated because the findings on the merits were sound.

Holding and Implications

APPEAL DISMISSED.

The Supreme Court upheld the decree in favour of the respondents and left the parties to bear their own costs. The judgment clarifies that a decree following an enquiry into a disputed compromise is appealable despite Section 96(3) CPC, but affirms that where the compromise is proved valid on evidence, the decree will stand. No new precedent is established beyond reaffirming the principle in Kishun v. Behari.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Daljit Kaur And Another v. Muktar Steels Private Limited And Others

    Dipak Misra, J.— Delay condoned. Leave granted. This appeal, by special leave, is directed against the judgment and decree dated 7-3-2013 passed in Hind Re-Rolling Industries v. Muktar Steels (P) Ltd. (2013) 4 ALD 500, 2013 AIR CC 2577 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh whereby the learned Single Judge has affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court concurring with the view that the decree being a consent decree was not assailable in appeal, and further giving the stamp of approval to the conclusion that the learned trial Judge, after conducting due enquiry as envisaged under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), had passed a consent decree.

    2. The broad essential facts giving rise to the appeal are that the first respondent instituted OS No. 2261 of 1988 in the Court of the IVth Additional Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad for declaration to the effect that the agreements and arrangements between the parties are in the nature of “industrial licence” and not “leave and licence” in respect of the suit premises situate in private industrial estate Sanathnagar, Hyderabad and also for permanent injunction. The suit was originally filed against Defendant 1, the managing partner of the firm but after his death Defendants 2 to 6 were brought on record.

    3. The firm filed its written statement contending, inter alia, that the terms and conditions of the agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the defendant clearly indicate that the parties had entered into a “leave and licence” agreement and the licensor is the absolute owner. It is worthy to mention here that the facts with regard to the stand put forth in the plaint and the stance taken in the written statement may not be stated in detail, because the real fulcrum of the lis is whether the parties had entered into a lawful compromise and whether the learned trial Judge had followed the mandate as postulated under Order 23 Rule 3 CPC.

    4. Suffice it to state that during the pendency of the suit at the intervention of the elders both the parties, as alleged, entered into a compromise. As noted by the trial court as well as by the appellate court, the parties entered into a settlement which was reflectible from Exts. A-8, A-9 and A-14. IA No. 966 of 2001 was filed before the learned trial Judge for recording the compromise and passing a decree in terms of the settlement. It was urged before the trial court that as the defendant had disputed the compromise, it was imperative to conduct an enquiry. For the said purpose IA No. 490 of 2002 was filed by the plaintiff. The said application was resisted by the defendant on many a ground. The learned trial Judge rejected the said application solely on the base that the plaintiff had not carried out the amendments in the plaint by complying with the order passed in IA No. 1015 of 1998 for amendment and hence, his claim for getting an enquiry done was not maintainable.

    5. After completion of due formalities the suit was taken up and evidence was adduced. The learned trial Judge, at that juncture, adverted to the oral and documentary evidence brought on record, including Exts. A-8 and A- 9. The learned trial Judge, relying on the letters exchanged between the parties, namely, Exts. A-15, A-16 and A-25 and discussing the contents of the letters in extenso, came to hold that the compromise deeds, Exts. A-8, A-9 and A-14 had been acted upon with the understanding between the plaintiff and Defendant 4 because Defendant 4 had sold away the portions of the land to different persons under sale deeds, Exts. B-3, B-12 and B-22, which apparently took place subsequent to Exts. A-8, A-9 and A-14. The trial court further held that had there been no compromise between the plaintiff and Defendant 4, there could have been any scope entitling Defendant 4 to sell portions of the land to the third parties under Exts. B-3, B-8, B-12 and B-22 during the pendency of the suit. The court also took note of the fact that possession had been handed over to the third parties.

    6. The learned trial Judge analysing the oral and documentary evidence recorded a finding to the effect that in the compromise deed the terms and conditions contained about the sharing of the amount, taking possession of the machinery by Defendant 4 through gate passes and Exts. A-18 to A-23 clearly showed that the machinery was in the shed of the plaintiff who was put in possession of the schedule property in the year 1980. The learned trial Judge further opined that the defendants had no access or possibility to enter into the plaintiff's premises as there was an injunction operating, but because of the compromise deed between the parties it could materialise without any obstruction. For arriving at the said conclusion the learned trial Judge took support from Exts. A-15, A-16 and A-25 written by the counsel for DW 1 to the plaintiff and his counsel. This position was admitted by PW 3, the counsel then defending the defendants.

    7. It also weighed with the trial court that the defendants had continued PW 3 as their advocate for about 2 years after the compromise without making any allegations against him. That apart, it observed that it was evident from Exts. A-18 to A-22 that Defendant 4 took away the machinery and the plaintiff installed new furnace after taking over the suit schedule premises and selling the old furnace under Ext. A-27 after effecting the compromise in the presence of Defendant 4 who was a witness to the sale document, Ext. A-27. On the basis of aforesaid reasoning the learned trial Judge opined that the compromise had been legally entered into between the parties and the same had been acted upon by both the parties to a major extent. Being of this view, he accepted the deed of compromise and decreed the suit accordingly.

    8. On appeal being preferred, the learned Additional Chief Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, reappreciated the evidence and came to hold that both the parties had entered into a compromise vide agreements, namely, Exts. A-8 and A-9 and the learned trial Judge had correctly placed reliance on the same. The learned appellate Judge opined that as it was a consent decree, no appeal would lie under Section 96(3) CPC.

    9. Being grieved by the dismissal of the appeal the appellant preferred a second appeal. The learned Single Judge addressed the following two substantial questions of law:

    “1. Whether the appellate court was justified in holding that the appeal against a consent/compromise decree is not maintainable in view of bar created under Section 96(3) CPC, Order 23 Rule 3-A while ignoring Order 43 Rule 1-A which is inserted simultaneously while deleting Order 43 Rule 1(m).
    2. Whether the law laid down by this Honourable Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566 is contrary to Order 43 Rule 1-A? If so, what is the effect of the law laid down by the Supreme Court?”

    Analysing Section 96(3) and Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC and placing reliance on Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh (2006) 5 SCC 566, the learned Single Judge came to hold that the decree in question was a consent decree and hence, the appeal was not maintainable. However, it adverted to the facts and eventually dismissed the appeal.

    10. We have heard Mr P. Vishwanath Shetty, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants and Mr D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the respondents.

    11. Assailing the defensibility of the judgment (2013) 4 ALD 500, 2013 AIR CC 2577 passed by the High Court affirming the view expressed by the courts below, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants has contended that an erroneous conclusion has been arrived at that the appeal was not maintainable on the assumption that it was a consent decree. It is urged that the decision rendered in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (2006) 5 SCC 566 had not considered Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC and hence, the said decision could not have been placed reliance upon. It is contended that Section 96(3) and Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC should have been harmoniously construed by the High Court as it is open to the appellant to take a stand that the compromise should not have been recorded. It is his further submission that the High Court has failed to appreciate the perversity of approach by the courts below and concurred with the findings recorded by them baldly stating that it is a question of fact and such an approach has resulted in miscarriage of justice, and, more so, when the learned Single Judge had already opined that the appeal was not maintainable.

    12. Mr D. Rama Krishna Reddy, learned counsel for the respondents, resisting the aforesaid submissions, urged that the appellants had entered into a lawful compromise with the respondents and the same had been duly acted upon to a great extent and hence, the acceptance of the same by the learned trial Judge on the basis of material brought on record cannot be found fault with. It is further submitted that because of the said conclusion, the decree had earned the status of a consent decree and hence, the conclusion arrived at by the High Court is absolutely impeccable.

    13. The pivotal issue that arises for consideration is whether in the present case the appeal could have been preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge. As is evincible, the lower appellate court as well as the High Court have placed reliance on Pushpa Devi Bhagat (2006) 5 SCC 566 to come to hold that the appeal was not maintainable. In Pushpa Devi Bhagat (2006) 5 SCC 566 a two-Judge Bench, dealing with a contention canvassed for the first time before this Court that the appeal before the first appellate court or before the High Court was not maintainable as there was a consent decree, permitted the contention to be raised and heard both the parties on that score. In this context, it referred to Rules 3 and 3-A of Order 23 and analysing the said provisions summed up the statement of law emerging from Order 23 that:

    13.1 no appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC;

    13.2 no appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1, Order 43;

    13.3 no independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A; and

    13.4 a consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 of Order 23.

    14. Thereafter the learned Judges proceeded to state thus: (Pushpa Devi Bhagat (2006) 5 SCC 566)

    “17. … the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made. The second defendant, who challenged the consent compromise decree was fully aware of this position as she filed an application for setting aside the consent decree on 21-8-2001 by alleging that there was no valid compromise in accordance with law. … For reasons best known to herself, the second defendant within a few days thereafter (that is on 27-8-2001) filed an appeal and chose not to pursue the application filed before the court which passed the consent decree. Such an appeal by the second defendant was not maintainable, having regard to the express bar contained in Section 96(3) of the Code.”

    15. The analysis made in the aforesaid decision in Pushpa Devi case (2006) 5 SCC 566 and the dictum laid down therein has to be appositely understood. In fact, the Court was adjudicating a controversy pertaining to assail of a consent decree where the parties concerned had filed an application before the Court that had passed the consent decree alleging that there was no valid compromise but chose not to pursue the same and filed an appeal. In that factual context the Court had ruled that in view of the express bar under Section 96(3) the appeal was not maintainable. Thus, we are inclined to think that the view expressed therein only conveys the principle that a consent decree is not appealable being barred under Section 96(3) CPC. Be it noted, what weighed with the court was that the application filed for setting aside the compromise was not pursued. Therefore, the said decision has to be confined to the facts exposited therein, for the fundamental factum was that the facet of consent was not contested.

    16. In Kishun v. Behari (2005) 6 SCC 300 a three-Judge Bench was dealing with the maintainability of appeal in the backdrop of Section 96(3) of the Code which provides that no appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of the parties. In that case, the High Court had allowed the second appeal holding that the first appellate court could not have entertained an appeal against a compromise decree. In the said case, one of the facets that arose for consideration was whether the High Court was justified in holding that the appeal preferred against the decree under Section 96(3) was maintainable.

    17. After discussing the factual matrix the Court opined thus: (Kishun case (2005) 6 SCC 300)

    “7. When on a dispute in that behalf being raised, an enquiry is made (now it has to be done in view of the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3 of the Code added by Act 104 of 1976) and the suit is decreed on the basis of a compromise based on that enquiry, it could not be held to be a decree passed on consent within the meaning of Section 96(3) of the Code. Section 96(3) contemplates non-appealability of a decree passed by the court with the consent of parties. Obviously, when one of the parties sets up a compromise and the other disputes it and the court is forced to adjudicate on whether there was a compromise or not and to pass a decree, it could not be understood as a decree passed by the court with the consent of the parties. As we have noticed earlier, no appeal is provided after 1-2-1977, against an order rejecting or accepting a compromise after an enquiry under the proviso to Order 23 Rule 3, either by Section 104 or by Order 43 Rule 1 of the Code. Only when the acceptance of the compromise receives the imprimatur of the court and it becomes a decree, or the court proceeds to pass a decree on merits rejecting the compromise set up, it becomes appealable, unless of course, the appeal is barred by Section 96(3) of the Code. We have already indicated that when there is a contest on the question whether there was a compromise or not, a decree accepting the compromise on resolution of that controversy, cannot be said to be a decree passed with the consent of the parties. Therefore, the bar under Section 96(3) of the Code could not have application.”
    (emphasis supplied)

    18. The ratio laid down in the aforesaid case applies on all fours to the case at hand. The respondent-defendants had raised a dispute with regard to the validity of the compromise and the court concerned had conducted an enquiry. Thus, a decree had been passed on the basis of the compromise based on that enquiry and, therefore, it cannot be said to be a consent decree. The decision in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (2006) 5 SCC 566 has to be understood that when a decree is passed without any dispute being raised or contested in the court of first instance, the decree being passed on consent cannot be appealed against. As the present controversy is covered by the decision rendered in Kishun (2005) 6 SCC 300, we are not required to dwell upon the applicability of Order 43 Rule 1-A CPC.

    19. The next aspect, that is highlighted by Mr Shetty, is that the High Court has really not dwelled upon the perversity of approach of the courts below and cryptically given the stamp of approval to the conclusion and it is manifest as the fundamental premise, that the Court was concerned with, pertained to the issue of maintainability of the appeal. We have discussed the analysis of the learned trial Judge who has discussed the evidence while dealing with the dispute raised by the defendants in the suit pertaining to the entering of a compromise. We have also noticed the analysis made by the first appellate court. On a careful perusal of the judgment of the High Court, it is noticeable that it has, at the commencement of the judgment, adverted to the facts relating to the manner in which the compromise decree had been passed and opined that the enquiry conducted by the learned trial Judge related to the evidence brought on record had been rested on proper application of oral and documentary evidence. On the aforesaid analysis, the High Court has concurred with the conclusion of the first appellate court that the decree in question was a consent decree. To satisfy ourselves, we have discussed the approach of the learned trial Judge and that of the first appellate court and we find that the High Court, after stating the facts and referring to the documents by which it has been recorded and further taking note of the fact how the settlement had been acted upon by both the parties, has expressed its opinion and hence, it cannot really be found fault with.

    20. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not find any merit in this appeal and, accordingly, the same stands dismissed without any order as to costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Daljit Kaur And Another v. Muktar Steels Private Limited And Others
    (Nov 19, 2013)