AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1451
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section not specified, Subsection I of Explanation appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
008 INSC 1451
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section not specified, Subsection I of Explanation appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code
  • Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Article 142 of the Constitution of India
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Secretary of Magadh Raj Jarsandh Akhara, Rajgir, filed a suit (O.S. No. 67 of 1990) for declaration of title and recovery of possession over 9 decimals of Plot No. 5180. Six defendants filed a joint written statement. During trial, Defendants 2 and 5 formally compromised with the plaintiff; compromise discussions with Defendants 1 and 6 did not culminate in a written petition. The plaintiff’s witnesses were cross-examined by Defendants 1 and 6, who adduced no evidence of their own. The Munsif, Biharsharif, decreed the suit partly on compromise and partly after contest.

After learning of the decree, Defendants 1 and 6 filed Misc. Case No. 19 of 1998 under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside the ex parte decree. They examined four witnesses; the plaintiff examined one witness in opposition. By order dated 20-2-2003, the Munsif allowed the application, rescinded the decree and imposed costs of ₹200.

The plaintiff filed Civil Revision No. 497 of 2003 before the Patna High Court. On 4-3-2004 the High Court set aside the Munsif’s order, reasoning that all defendants had filed a common written statement and that allegations of fraud should have been pursued under Section 44 of the Evidence Act. The plaintiff (appellant in the present proceedings) challenges that High Court decision before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC is maintainable by some defendants when a joint written statement had been filed by all defendants in the suit.
  2. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the Munsif’s order that had set aside the ex parte decree without analysing the evidence and reasons required under Order 9 Rule 13.
  3. What is the correct procedural course when allegations of fraud and collusion are raised against an ex parte decree—recourse under Order 9 Rule 13, a separate suit, or other remedies?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The High Court wrongly assumed that a joint written statement barred individual defendants from pursuing relief under Order 9 Rule 13.
  • Some defendants were “won over” by the plaintiff; therefore, the written statement could not bind the appellants (Defendants 1 and 6) after compromise talks collapsed.
  • The High Court ignored the appellants’ evidence showing they lacked notice of case developments after transfer of the Presiding Officer.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The High Court correctly found that allegations of fraud should be pursued through proceedings envisaged under Section 44 of the Evidence Act rather than via Order 9 Rule 13.
  • The appellants were aware of the proceedings and filed the miscellaneous case only to delay execution of the decree.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787 A defendant against whom an ex parte decree is passed may simultaneously pursue an appeal and an application under Order 9 Rule 13; dismissal of the appeal bars a later O-9-R-13 application, but the converse is not true. Used to illustrate the range of remedies available against an ex parte decree and to emphasise that filing an Order 9 Rule 13 application is a permissible course.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court noted that two defendants had already compromised, but the High Court failed to examine whether Defendants 1 and 6 were properly represented or notified after the case’s transfer in 1997. The High Court also overlooked the appellants’ specific pleadings and evidence alleging ignorance of subsequent proceedings.

Order 9 Rule 13 expressly empowers a court to set aside an ex parte decree against some defendants and, if necessary, against all defendants. Consequently, the mere fact of a joint written statement cannot bar relief under that provision. The Court clarified that multiple remedies (appeal, Order 9 Rule 13 application, suit alleging fraud, review) are available, and a litigant is entitled to choose the appropriate route.

However, the Supreme Court criticised the Munsif’s 20-2-2003 order for being “unreasoned”; the evidence adduced by the parties was not analysed and the statutory test under Order 9 Rule 13 (whether summons was not duly served or sufficient cause existed) was not expressly addressed.

Finding both the High Court’s summary rejection and the Munsif’s unreasoned acceptance unsustainable, the Supreme Court exercised its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to set aside both orders and remit the matter for fresh consideration.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed. The Supreme Court:

  • Set aside the Patna High Court judgment dated 4-3-2004.
  • Set aside the Munsif’s order dated 20-2-2003 that had rescinded the decree.
  • Remanded Misc. Case No. 19 of 1998 to the Civil Judge for a fresh, reasoned determination on merits under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC.
  • Directed the parties to bear their own costs.

Implications: The decision underscores that (i) defendants who file a joint written statement may still seek relief under Order 9 Rule 13, (ii) trial courts must provide reasoned orders on such applications, and (iii) higher courts should not summarily dismiss or allow such applications without analysing statutory prerequisites. No new legal principle is created, but the judgment reinforces procedural rigor and clarifies the availability of multiple remedies against an ex parte decree.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    Mahesh Yadav And Another v. Rajeshwar Singh And Others

    S.B Sinha, J.— Leave granted.

    2. The plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession is before us aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and order dated 4-3-2004 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Patna in Civil Revision No. 497 of 2003 whereby and whereunder an order dated 20-2-2003 passed by the Munsif, Biharsharif, Nalanda in Miscellaneous Case No. 19 of 1998 setting aside an ex parte decree, was reversed.

    3. The plaintiff filed the aforementioned suit as Secretary of Magadh Raj Jarsandh Akhara, Rajgir. In the said suit, six defendants were impleaded as parties. It was, inter alia, contended that although the plaintiff had been in uninterrupted possession of Plot No. 5180, the defendants attempted to take forcible possession of land measuring 9 decimals.

    4. In the said suit, the defendants filed a joint written statement. During the pendency of the said suit, however, Defendants 2 and 5 entered into compromise with the plaintiff. A compromise petition filed by the parties thereto was accepted. Indisputably, talks for compromise were going on by and between the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 6; however, no compromise petition was filed in that behalf. Although witnesses examined on behalf of the plaintiff were cross-examined on behalf of Defendants 1 and 6, they did not adduce any evidence.

    5. The learned Munsif, Biharsharif decreed the suit, stating:

    “After contest, this suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff partly on the basis of the compromise petition and partly after contest. If the defendants have effected any possession over the disputed land during pendency of the present suit, the plaintiff will have full right to effect eviction of the defendants with the assistance of the court on payment of proper costs. No order regarding any cost is being given in the suit.”

    6. The appellants herein, having come to know of the said ex parte decree passed against them, filed an application in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They examined a large number of witnesses in support of their case.

    7. We may notice that the plaintiff's evidence was closed on 18-5-1995. The learned Judge thereafter was transferred. The learned District Judge transferred the said case by an administrative order dated 20-2-1997. There is nothing on record to show that the counsel appearing on behalf of the other defendants was the advocate of the appellants herein also. By reason of an order dated 20-2-2003, the learned Judge while considering the case of the appellants that they were kept in the dark about the development of the case due to connivance of the respondents herein as they had been informed that the compromise had been entered into by some of the parties and the Presiding Officer had been transferred, noticed:

    “Four witnesses have been examined on behalf of the applicant and all of them supported the facts mentioned in the miscellaneous application. Witness 2 Chinta Devi is herself Opposite Party 2 and has clearly stated in the examination-in-chief that she is prepared to contest the suit and, therefore, the suit should be revived. On behalf of the opposite party one witness was examined in support of the rejoinder. Witness 1 is himself Opposite Party 1. In the examination-in-chief he has stated that the applicant has filed the miscellaneous application with the intention of causing harassment to him because the applicant had information about the suit. Therefore, the application should be dismissed.”

    It was directed:

    “After hearing both parties and after perusal of records, I find that the applicant has furnished satisfactory reasons to show that he had no information about developments in Suit No. 67 of 1990 and his application for revival is fit to be accepted but with costs.
    Therefore, the miscellaneous application is accepted subject to costs of Rs 200 under Order 9 Rule 13 and the ex parte decree in Original Suit No. 67 of 1990 is rescinded.”

    A revision application was filed thereagainst.

    8. The High Court passed the impugned judgment only on the premise that as all the defendants had filed a joint written statement, there was no occasion for the court to set aside the ex parte decree stating that if a fraud had been practised upon the court, an appropriate proceeding should have been initiated therefor. It was held:

    “If the contention of Defendants 1 and 6 is to the effect that the decree was obtained by fraud and collusion, then this matter need be pleaded by facts and circumstances so as to take a declaration under Section 44 of the Evidence Act, 1872. This step was not taken. Suffice it to say that if there be a fraud it is a criminal act and there is no limitation if such action is to be taken by a party to the suit.
    Thus, at present the order dated 20-2-2003 in Miscellaneous Case No. 19 of 1998: Mahesh Yadav v. Rajeshwar Singh, permitting setting aside an ex parte decree under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure is set aside.”

    9. Mr Goutam Prasad, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, would submit that the High Court failed to take into consideration that only because a joint written statement was filed, the same was binding upon the appellants although some of them had been won over by the plaintiff.

    10. Mr H.L Agarwal, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents, however, supported the judgment.

    11. Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as under:

    “13. Setting aside decree ex parte against defendant.—In any case in which a decree is passed ex parte against a defendant, he may apply to the court by which the decree was passed for an order to set it aside; and if he satisfies the court that the summons was not duly served, or that he was prevented by any sufficient cause from appearing when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the decree as against him upon such terms as to costs, payment into court or otherwise as it thinks fit, and shall appoint a day for proceeding with the suit:
    Provided that where the decree is of such a nature that it cannot be set aside as against such defendant only it may be set aside as against all or any of the other defendants also:
    Provided further that no court shall set aside a decree passed ex parte merely on the ground that there has been an irregularity in the service of summons, if it is satisfied that the defendant had notice of the date of hearing and had sufficient time to appear and answer the plaintiff's claim.
    Explanation.—Where there has been an appeal against a decree passed ex parte under this rule, and the appeal has been disposed of on any ground other than the ground that the appellant has withdrawn the appeal, no application shall lie under this rule for setting aside the ex parte decree.”

    12. Indisputably, two of the defendants had entered into a compromise with the plaintiff. They have accepted the title of the plaintiff.

    13. The contents of the written statement filed by the appellants had not been noticed by the High Court. The High Court furthermore failed to consider that according to the appellants herein, talks of compromise started by and between Defendants 1 and 6 and the plaintiff. They cross-examined the witnesses of the plaintiff but did not adduce any evidence. It was on the aforementioned premise alone, the plaintiff was found to be in possession of the suit land and a decree was passed.

    14. There is nothing on record to show that the appellants herein were being represented by the same learned advocate. If they were represented by different advocates, it is not known as to whether the order of transfer of the case was brought to the notice of the learned advocate for the appellants. The High Court, in our opinion, therefore, may not be correct in holding that only because a joint written statement was filed, an application for (sic setting aside the) ex parte decree was not maintainable. In fact, the same was held to be maintainable by the learned Civil Judge by an order dated 26-7-2000.

    15. The proviso appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure postulates that when an ex parte decree has been passed against some of the defendants and it is necessary to set aside the entire decree, the court is not powerless to do so. If an application for setting aside the ex parte decree was maintainable at the instance of the appellants, we fail to understand as to why a separate suit was required to be filed. When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant may have more than one remedy. He may file a suit contending that the decree was obtained fraudulently. He may file an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex parte decree. He may prefer an appeal from the ex parte judgment and decree. In a given case, he may also file a review application.

    16. In Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787 this Court held:

    “26. When an ex parte decree is passed, the defendant (apart from filing a review petition and a suit for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground of fraud) has two clear options, one, to file an appeal and another to file an application for setting aside the order in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code. He can take recourse to both the proceedings simultaneously but in the event the appeal is dismissed as a result whereof the ex parte decree passed by the trial court merges with the order passed by the appellate court, having regard to Explanation appended to Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code a petition under Order 9 Rule 13 would not be maintainable. However, Explanation I appended to the said provision does not suggest that the converse is also true.”

    It was, however, observed:

    “28. It is true that although there may not be a statutory bar to avail two remedies simultaneously and an appeal as also an application for setting aside the ex parte decree can be filed; one after the other; on the ground of public policy the right of appeal conferred upon a suitor under a provision of statute cannot be taken away if the same is not in derogation or contrary to any other statutory provisions.”

    17. The judgment of the High Court, therefore, in our opinion is not sustainable. While, however, saying so, we must express our dissatisfaction for the manner in which the learned Civil Judge has passed the order impugned before the High Court. The said order is an unreasoned one. The evidence adduced on behalf of the appellants was not analysed for arriving at a finding as to whether a case for setting aside an ex parte decree has been made out by the appellants or not. The matter had not been considered as is required in terms of Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order setting aside the ex parte decree being a judicial order should have been supported by reasons. The learned Judge could not have allowed the said application without following the legal principles on the basis whereof such an order could be passed.

    18. We, therefore, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, while setting aside the order passed by the High Court also set aside the order passed by the learned Civil Judge. The Civil Judge should consider the matter afresh on merit and pass a reasoned order.

    19. The appeal is allowed with the aforementioned directions. However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, the parties shall bear their own costs.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Mahesh Yadav And Another v. Rajeshwar Singh And Others
    (Dec 16, 2008)