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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 691
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
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Acts
  • Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions 'the Code' which is likely referring to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 313 of the Code
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 691
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) and Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act is not mentioned but it mentions 'the Code' which is likely referring to the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
  • Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872
  • Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860
  • Section 313 of the Code
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of 8 June 1988, Thanu (“the deceased”) and three accused, including the present respondent Wakteng, went to the respondent’s well to apprehend tribals allegedly stealing forest wood. After consuming “mahudi,” a local alcoholic beverage, the respondent allegedly produced a concealed sword and struck the deceased on the neck. Co-accused Dhuliya then took the sword and delivered another blow, causing the deceased to collapse.

The first information report (Ext. P-11) was lodged by Naveneet Lal (PW 4) when the deceased was unconscious and unable to identify his assailants. Two days later, on 10 June 1988, Sub-Inspector Abhey Singh Bhati (PW 7) recorded Ext. P-10 in the surgical ward of Government Hospital, Banswara, describing it as a dying declaration. Thanu succumbed to his injuries on 25 June 1988, converting the investigation from an offence under Section 307 IPC to one under Section 302 IPC.

A charge-sheet followed and, after trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Banswara convicted all three accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and awarded additional convictions to the respondent under Sections 326/34 and 324/34 IPC. While the two co-accused did not appeal, the respondent challenged his conviction before the Rajasthan High Court, which set aside all findings and ordered his acquittal. The present appeal—filed against that acquittal—came before the Supreme Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Ext. P-10 qualifies as a legally admissible and reliable dying declaration capable of sustaining a conviction.
  2. Whether the alleged recovery of the sword under Section 27 of the Evidence Act was proved and could corroborate the prosecution case.
  3. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the trial court’s conviction and directing the respondent’s acquittal.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant’s Arguments

  • The dying declaration (Ext. P-10) is a crucial piece of evidence and should not have been discarded merely because no medical endorsement of the deceased’s fitness was recorded.
  • Absence of question-and-answer format or a magistrate’s certification does not automatically invalidate a dying declaration.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • Ext. P-10 is unreliable: it is not in question-and-answer form, bears no certification of the deceased’s mental fitness, and was recorded by a police officer two days after the incident.
  • The alleged recovery of the sword is doubtful: the weapon was neither sent for forensic examination nor put to the accused during his Section 313 CrPC statement.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507 A statement recorded by police is not automatically inadmissible solely because it bears the thumb impression of the maker. Cited to illustrate that police-recorded statements may be admissible; however, the Court found Ext. P-10 deficient on other grounds.
Razik Ram v. Jaswant Singh Chouhan (1975) 4 SCC 769; AIR 1975 SC 667 Similar principle regarding admissibility of signed or thumb-marked statements before police. Used in conjunction with Teja Ram to demonstrate that thumb impression alone is not fatal.
Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P. AIR 1959 SC 1012 General guidance on evidentiary value of statements recorded by investigating officers. Reinforced the above proposition regarding admissibility.
Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126 A police-recorded complaint can operate as a dying declaration if the maker was in a fit state of health. Distinguished: unlike in Paras Yadav, there was no evidence here of the deceased’s fitness when Ext. P-10 was recorded.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s scepticism about Ext. P-10. It observed that:

  • The document was not recorded in question-and-answer form and lacked any medical or magisterial certification of the deceased’s mental and physical fitness.
  • Dr Bajrang Singh (PW 3) could not state whether the deceased was fit to make a statement or even recall the language used, undermining the reliability of Ext. P-10.
  • Although jurisprudence allows a conviction to rest solely on a dying declaration, such a statement must be free from infirmities, voluntary, and recorded with requisite safeguards—conditions absent here.
  • The prosecution offered no explanation for the failure to secure a magistrate to record the statement despite the deceased surviving from 8 June to 25 June 1988.
  • Regarding the recovered sword, no forensic examination was conducted, no report was exhibited, and the accused was not questioned about the weapon under Section 313 CrPC, further eroding evidentiary value.

Given these deficiencies, the Court held that the prosecution had not established guilt beyond reasonable doubt and that the High Court’s acquittal was justified.

Holding and Implications

Appeal dismissed; acquittal of the respondent affirmed.

The decision leaves the respondent finally acquitted. The Court reiterated that dying declarations must be recorded with adequate safeguards—especially evidence of the declarant’s fitness—and that corroborative evidence such as weapon recovery must be properly proved. No new legal precedent was established beyond reaffirming settled principles on the evidentiary standards for dying declarations and recoveries.

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    State Of Rajasthan v. Wakteng .

    Dr. Arijit Pasayat, J.— Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Rajasthan High Court directing acquittal of the respondent. The respondent along with two others faced trial for alleged commission of offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860 (in short “IPC”). The respondent in addition was also convicted for offence punishable under Section 326 read with Section 34 IPC and Section 324 read with Section 34 IPC. Life sentence of two years' rigorous imprisonment and six months' rigorous imprisonment were respectively imposed along with fine with default stipulation.

    2. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Banswara convicted all the three accused persons but two other accused did not prefer any appeal while the respondent preferred an appeal against his conviction and sentence imposed. In appeal, the High Court set aside conviction and directed acquittal.

    3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:

    On 8-6-1988 Thanu (hereinafter referred to as “the deceased”) along with three accused persons in the night, went to well of the respondent-accused Wakteng in order to capture tribals stealing away forest wood. They also drank “mahudi”, a local wine, and thereafter, accused Wakteng stated to the deceased that he used to frighten village people, and therefore, he shall be taught a lesson today and brought a sword concealed in the well and inflicted a blow on his neck. When deceased Thanu started running, he was chased by Dhuliya and Lalu and thereafter, Dhuliya took sword from Wakteng and inflicted second blow on neck of the deceased, upon which he fell down unconscious.

    4. This factual narration is found in Ext. P-10, alleged dying declaration, recorded by Abhey Singh Bhati, SHO (PW 7) in surgical ward of Government Hospital, Banswara on 10-6-1988 two days after the occurrence.

    5. The FIR, Ext. P-11 was lodged by Naveneet Lal (PW 4) on the basis of injuries seen on the person of Thanu, who was unconscious till then and was not able to speak and therefore, neither any narration of the crime is mentioned in it nor name of assailants. An offence under Section 307 IPC was registered on the basis of Ext. P-11 and the deceased was admitted in the hospital where his injuries were examined and he was given treatment and his dying declaration (Ext. P-10) was recorded, as stated above.

    6. Subsequently, Thanu died on 25-6-1988 and, therefore, offence was converted to one under Section 302 IPC. On the basis of Ext. P-10, all the accused persons were put under arrest on 11-6-1988 vide memos Exts. P-12 to P-14. A disclosure statement Ext. P-15 under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 (in short “the Evidence Act”) as given by Dhuliya at 8.00 a.m on 2-6-1988 by which he wanted to recover “myan” and “sword” used in the crime and on the same day, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Bhika (PW 5) and Chamna, vide Ext. P-7 Dhuliya made “sword” along with “myan” recovered from his residential house, which was seized and sealed then and there. A site plan, Ext. P-8 was also prepared of the place of recovery. On completion of investigation charge-sheet was filed and charges were framed.

    7. The accused persons denied accusations and claimed trial. Seven witnesses were examined to further the prosecution version. The trial court relied on two circumstances to convict the accused persons: (i) the dying declaration purported to have been made; and (ii) the recovery of the sword. Because of the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial court, an appeal had been filed as noted above.

    8. Before the High Court it was submitted that the dying declaration Ext. P-10 was open to grave doubt. It cannot be treated as a dying declaration as the same was neither in question answer form nor was there any endorsement of fitness of the deceased given. On the other hand, the State supported the order of conviction. The High Court noticed that the dying declaration was not recorded in question answer form and it was not written as a dying declaration. Further, the trial court held that Ext. P-10 was neither a dying declaration nor a statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”) because the thumb impression of the deceased was affixed on it. The trial court held that it has been recorded in course of investigation and therefore it was admissible in evidence. The High Court found that Ext. P-10 cannot be called to be a dying declaration and cannot be made the basis of conviction. It also doubted the recovery of the sword as claimed. Accordingly, evidence of the prosecution witnesses was held to be unworthy of credence and therefore acquittal was directed.

    9. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the dying declaration is a vital piece of evidence and the High Court should not have lightly brushed it aside. It was stated that merely because condition of the deceased to make a statement was not noted in the dying declaration that cannot be a ground to outright reject the same.

    10. If Ext. P-10 does not come in the category of dying declaration it cannot be made the basis of conviction. There is no other provision under which a signed statement before the police can be admissible into evidence even if it discloses in detail the prosecution story.

    11. Merely because a statement is recorded by a police personnel and the thumb impression of the deceased was affixed it cannot straightaway be rejected. (See State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram (1999) 3 SCC 507, Razik Ram v. Jaswant Singh Chouhan (1975) 4 SCC 769, AIR 1975 SC 667 and the famous case of Tahsildar Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1959 SC 1012)

    12. In Paras Yadav v. State of Bihar (1999) 2 SCC 126 it was held that the statement of a deceased recorded by a police officer in a routine manner as a complaint and not as a dying declaration can be taken as a dying declaration after the death of the injured if he was found to be in a fit state of health to make a statement. If the dying declaration is recorded by an investigating officer the same can be relied upon if the evidence of the prosecution witness is clearly established beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased was conscious and he was removed to the hospital and he was in a fit state of health to make the statement. In the instant case, the position appears to be different.

    13. Naveneet Lal (PW 4) claimed to have gone to the site where the deceased was lying injured and unable to speak. He was sent to the hospital for treatment at Banswara and simultaneously Ext. P-11 was lodged. Two days thereafter in the surgical ward of Government Hospital, Banswara Ext. P-10 was purportedly recorded by Abhey Singh Bhati (PW 7) without finding out whether the deceased was in a fit state of mind and health to give dying declaration. Significantly, the doctor Bajrang Singh (PW 3) stated that he does not remember at what time Ext. P-10 was recorded and he does not know whether the deceased was in a fit condition to give a statement and he also did not know in which language the deceased replied to the questions put to him.

    14. Though conviction can be based solely on the dying declaration, without any corroboration the same should not be suffering from any infirmity.

    15. While great solemnity and sanctity is attached to the words of a dying man because a person on the verge of death is not likely to tell lie or to concoct a case so as to implicate an innocent person but the court has to be careful to ensure that the statement was not the result of either tutoring, prompting or a product of the imagination. It is, therefore, essential that the court must be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement, had clear capacity to observe and identify the assailant and that he was making the statement without any influence or rancour. Once the court is satisfied that the dying declaration is true and voluntary it is sufficient for the purpose of conviction.

    16. One other factor is of great importance. The occurrence took place on 8-6-1988 and the deceased breathed his last on 25-6-1988. Ext. P-10 was recorded on 10-6-1988. No evidence was forthcoming as to why the Magistrate could not be called to state why certificate of his fitness and state of health and condition of the deceased could not be procured at the time of recording Ext. P-10.

    17. So far as recovery of the sword is concerned, the same was not sent for any examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory and the report if any was not exhibited and even no question in that regard was put to the accused while he was examined under Section 313 of the Code.

    18. Above being the position, the High Court has rightly held that the prosecution has failed to establish the accusations against the respondent. The appeal is sans merit and is dismissed.

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    Comments

    State Of Rajasthan v. Wakteng .
    (Jun 7, 2007)