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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 277
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Constitution of India, Article 311
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Neutral Citations
2007 INSC 277
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Attorney(S)
Judges
Acts
  • Constitution of India, Article 311
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

Respondent 1 joined the appellant-organisation on 14 May 1971 as a Statistical Officer and completed probation. His services were terminated on 10 April 1974, prompting him to file CWP No. 545 of 1974 before the Delhi High Court. While the writ petition was pending, he secured alternative employment with the Bombay Cancer Registry on 25 January 1975.

In April 1983, the appellant offered to reinstate Respondent 1 as a Senior Research Officer without back wages but with restoration of his original seniority and pay fixation. The respondent accepted this offer, and by order dated 27 April 1983 the High Court disposed of the writ petition in those terms, adding that he should be considered for promotion or confirmation when eligible. Pursuant to this, he re-joined the appellant’s service on 11 May 1983 under the specified conditions.

Although a no-objection certificate later described him as a permanent employee effective 23 January 1978, the appellant excluded the period 10 April 1974 to 11 May 1983 when calculating his pension and other retiral benefits. The Delhi High Court, in a subsequent writ petition, held that the respondent would be deemed in continuous service for that entire period. The present appeal challenges that finding.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Respondent 1 is entitled to have the period from 10 April 1974 to 11 May 1983 counted as qualifying service for pensionary and other retiral benefits despite not drawing wages from the appellant during that interval.
  2. Whether the reinstatement offered and accepted in April 1983 created continuity of service sufficient to attract pension rights.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Pension is an earned right, not a bounty; it accrues only for periods during which the employee actually serves and draws wages.
  • Because Respondent 1 did not work for or receive wages from the appellant between 1974 and 1983, that period cannot be included for pension or retiral benefit computation.

Respondent's Arguments

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the respondent’s legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Union of India, AIR 1958 Cal 239 Definition and implications of “reinstatement.” Used to affirm that reinstatement restores the employee to his original position, supporting the finding of continuity of service.
Chamba Singh v. State of Punjab, (1997) 11 SCC 452; AIR 1997 SC 2455 Scope of “reinstatement” in service rules and its effect on service benefits. Cited to clarify that reinstatement concerns resumption of service and can affect grant of increments and qualifying service.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court focused on whether the respondent’s service should be viewed as continuous despite the break from 1974 to 1983. Key steps in its analysis were:

  • The appellant itself offered “reinstatement,” a term the Court interpreted—using authoritative definitions and prior case-law—to mean restoration to the original post with continuity of service.
  • The respondent was accorded his original seniority, confirming the appellant’s intention to treat his service as uninterrupted; such seniority would be illogical had the appointment been considered fresh.
  • The appellant’s 1983 letter contemplated possible consideration of back wages, signalling acknowledgment that the employment relationship had persisted.
  • The subsequent description of the respondent as a permanent employee from 1978 further evidenced the parties’ understanding of continuity.
  • Denial of back wages was viewed as a distinct issue that could not, by itself, negate pensionary entitlement flowing from continuous service.

On these grounds, the Court held that the respondent must be deemed in service throughout the disputed period for pension and retiral purposes.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Dismissed. The respondent is entitled to have the period 10 April 1974 to 11 May 1983 counted towards his pension and other retiral benefits. The appellant is also ordered to pay counsel’s fee assessed at ₹5,000.

The ruling directly affects only the parties by ensuring full pensionary calculation for the respondent; it does not announce a new legal doctrine but reinforces the principle that reinstatement ordinarily carries continuity of service.

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    Director General, Icmr v. Dr. D.K Jain And Another

    S.B Sinha, J.— Learned counsel for both the parties accept that the Union of India is not a necessary party in this case. It is hence directed to be expunged accordingly.

    2. Leave granted.

    3. Respondent 1 herein joined the services of the appellant as a Statistical Officer on 14-5-1971. He completed his period of probation. However, on or about 10-4-1974 his services were terminated. He questioned the order of his termination by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Delhi which was marked as CWP No. 545 of 1974. Indisputably, he joined Bombay Cancer Registry on or about 25-1-1975.

    4. The writ petition filed by the respondent herein came up for consideration before the High Court sometime in 1983. During pendency of the said writ petition, the appellant herein placed before the said Court an offer so that Respondent 1 may be reinstated in service on the following terms:

    “Having regard to the facts summed up in Para 1 above and the issues discussed in Para 2, the Director General of ICMR is of the considered view that Shri Jain can at best be offered a regular post of Senior Research Officer, which he had been holding before his services were terminated. He may be given his seniority in the grade of Senior Research Officer, as had been originally assigned to him, and his pay may be fixed as per rules. He cannot be given any back wages for the reasons that he had not worked in the post since April 1974, that his services were terminated in terms of the conditions specifically included in the offer of appointment issued to him and that, for some time he was actually employed (no employee can draw pay from two sources). As already explained, there is no question of offering him any appointment for the post higher than Senior Research Officer because such an appointment can be made only by direct recruitment through open advertisement as per the procedure of the Council. Shri Jain is, however, free to take his chance along with other candidates for the post of Assistant Director under the Council, as and when such a post is created and advertised.”

    5. The said offer of the appellant having been accepted by Respondent 1, the High Court disposed of the writ petition directing:

    “The respondent Council has addressed a letter to this Court dated 22-4-1983. Let this letter be placed on record.
    The petitioner has been offered a post on the terms and conditions given in the aforesaid letter; the petitioner has conveyed his acceptance to the Council of the offer made to him. This disposes of the writ petition.
    Mr Gupta on behalf of the petitioner further submits the following two points:
    1. That the petitioner should be considered for appointment to the post of Assistant Director. I have no doubt that if the post is available the petitioner will be considered for the same and if found eligible, he will be given his due promotion.
    2. The petitioner has been appointed against a regular post. He should be considered for confirmation. This request also seems to me to be reasonable since the petitioner has been reinstated in service.
    The petition is disposed of in terms of the above order. No costs.”

    Pursuant to and in furtherance of the said order passed by the High Court, Respondent 1 was reinstated in service on the following terms:

    “1. The pay of Shri Jain will be fixed as admissible under the ICMR Rules.
    2. He will be given seniority in the grade of Senior Research Officer (Rs 1100-50-1600) as was originally assigned to him.
    3. He will not be given any back wages.
    4. Notwithstanding his seniority in the grade of SRO he will not have any claim for automatic promotion to the post of Assistant Director. He can, however, take his chance along with other candidates for the post of Assistant Director as and when such a post is created and advertised. As regards his posting, I am to state that with his experience in work at Bombay Cancer Registry, Shri Jain is considered suited to work as Senior Research Officer at the technical unit of the National Cancer Registry Project under Dr. L.D Sanghvi at Tata Memorial Research Centre, Bombay. He is, therefore, required to report to Dr. Sanghvi as early as possible.
    I am to add that only after Shri Jain has joined the post of Senior Research Officer (Rs 1100-50-1600) on the above terms and conditions and without any further preconditions on his part, if he makes any specific request for giving him back wages, the matter may be considered in due course on merits by the competent authority. However, the Council cannot make any commitment in this regard at this stage.”

    6. It is not in dispute that even a no-objection certificate was issued on his application for acquiring an Indian passport wherein Respondent 1 was described as a permanent employee of the appellant organisation with effect from 23-1-1978. The period from 10-4-1974 to 11-5-1983, however, was kept out of consideration for the purpose of computing pensionary and retiral benefits of Respondent 1 inter alia on the premise that he had not been in service of the appellant during the said period.

    7. The High Court by reason of the impugned judgment has allowed the writ petition filed by Respondent 1 herein opining that he would be deemed to be in the service of the appellant even during the aforesaid period i.e 10-4-1974 to 11-5-1983.

    8. Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, in support of the appeal, would submit that despite the settled legal position that “pension” is not a bounty but the same must be earned wherefor the employee must remain in the employment of his employer during the entire period, in view of the fact that Respondent 1 did not earn any wages during the period in question, the same cannot be considered for the purpose of computing pensionary and retiral benefits.

    9. In a case of this nature, in our opinion, the question as to whether Respondent 1 continued to be in service despite temporary break during the said period, will have to be determined having regard to the fact situation involved herein. The services of Respondent 1 although were terminated on 10-4-1974, he immediately questioned the legality and validity thereof by filing a writ petition. The Director of the appellant organisation himself made an offer that Respondent 1 would be reinstated in service subject to the terms and conditions mentioned in his letter dated 29-4-1983, as noticed hereinbefore. It was that offer of the appellant which was unconditionally accepted by the respondent. Not only this, certain other observations had also been made by the High Court while passing the order dated 27-4-1983. The High Court directed that he be reinstated in service.

    10. The expression “reinstatement” has been defined in Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanatha Aiyar (at p. 4030) to mean:

    “Reinstatement means that a man is put back in his job. Reinstatement can only arise if a man is dismissed or removed from service or if otherwise his service has terminated and he is brought back to service. Hemanta Kumar Bhattacharjee v. Union of India AIR 1958 Cal 239, AIR at p. 241. (Constitution of India, Article 311.)”

    Therein it is further stated:

    “The word ‘reinstatement’ in the context of Rule 16.5 of the Punjab Police Rules can refer only to the resumption of service for the purpose of grant of increments. The said rule has no bearing on qualifying service for compulsory, premature retirement. Chamba Singh v. State of Punjab (1997) 11 SCC 452, AIR 1997 SC 2455.”

    11. It is also significant to note that the appellant in terms of its letter dated 21-4-1983, also assured Respondent 1 to consider his request, if any, for payment of back wages. As indicated hereinbefore, he had even been considered to be a permanent employee of the appellant with effect from 21-3-1978.

    12. Having regard to the conduct of the parties which, in our opinion, is significant, for the purpose of determining the issue involved, we have no doubt in our mind that for all intent and purport, Respondent 1 has to be treated to be continuing in service despite small disruption during the aforementioned period. The very fact that the offer made in favour of the respondent by the appellant was for reinstatement in service, it is beyond any cavil of doubt that the same would amount to continuity of his service. Moreover, the respondent has been given his due seniority from the date of his initial appointment. Had it been a case of fresh appointment, as sought to be argued by Mr Raju Ramachandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, the question of Respondent 1's getting his seniority from the date of his original appointment would not have arisen. What was, therefore, denied to him was only the back wages for the period he was in service in some other organisation, which in our opinion cannot be construed to mean that an employee although being validly appointed and continued in service shall be deprived of the pensionary benefits during the period in question thereby.

    13. For the reasons aforementioned, there is no merit in this appeal which is dismissed. Counsel's fee is assessed at Rs 5000.

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    Director General, Icmr v. Dr. D.K Jain And Another
    (Mar 9, 2007)